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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an 
increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime 
security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, 
counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly 
disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater 
theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In 
particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a 
criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to 
theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this 
dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, 
terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand 
phenomena of political violence. 
 
To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the 
Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. 
Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and 
infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful 
influence of an individual or community’s environment on behavior. These two themes, 
as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the 
Broken Windows theory. 
 
Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by 
employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one 
primary and two illustrative)—the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken 
Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a 
consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides 
greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of 
maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature.  
 
Key words: Maritime Security, Broken Windows, Piracy, Terrorism, Trafficking, United 
States Navy, Coast Guard, Caribbean, Gulf of Guinea, West Africa, Southeast Asia, 
Malacca. 
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Introduction 
 
Corrugated tin roofs stretch for miles, dotted and crossed by makeshift markets 
and roads with no names. Under this urban canopy, countless people subsist on dollars or 
cents a day. The lucky find work in a sweatshop or factory in the city center, making 
shirts or toys or shoes for export at pennies an hour. The less fortunate are forced to find 
work in the teeming illicit black markets found throughout the city’s neglected slums. 
Drug running, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, money laundering, armed robbery, 
and the myriad petty crimes that accompany these industries become familiar to the 
world’s poorest urban dwellers. As the sea of fragile metal huts meets the coastline, 
swarms of creaking wooden and fiberglass dinghies with small outboard motors ferry 
people, food, and goods on and off shore in a thick stream. There is no discernable 
municipal presence here, no sign of law enforcement, social services, or sanitation. Life 
here is dirty and hard, and all too often short. And yet this is life for hundreds of millions 
of people across the world, from the shantytowns of Mumbai to the favelas of São Paulo. 
In 2012, thirty-three percent of the urban population of the developing world lived in 
slums like this, a number approaching nine hundred million souls.1 As these third world 
cities prepare to absorb hundreds of millions more in the coming decades, the world’s 
littorals are fast becoming some of the densest, most dangerous terrain on the planet. 
How navies meet the threats and crises indigenous to this expanding terrain will in many 
ways define their relationships with the third world. Yet, the littorals are a complicated 
place, a region large navies, like that of the U.S., have often preferred to eschew in favor 
of the familiar security of the open ocean. In the last decade, however, it has become 
obvious that ignoring the perils of the urban coastal poor can be dangerous in global 
proportions. 
Late on November 23, 2008, Pakistani terrorists hijacked the Indian fishing 
trawler Kuber while it was out to sea.2 The captain, Amar Narayan Solanki, had a history 
of smuggling and likely mistook the terrorists for the usual bands of illicit traffickers that 
frequent those waters.3 Solanki may not have resisted his assailants because of his 
familiarity with coastal smuggling, but his reluctant cooperation would go unrewarded 
this time. On the evening of November 26, Solanki was bound and killed as the terrorists 
disembarked to land near one of the many slums on the outskirts of Mumbai.4 Their 
presence did not go unnoticed; locals spotted both teams as soon as they grounded their 
inflatable boats near Badhwar Park and Machhimar Nagar.5 While one raiding party 
passed themselves off as students, the other was able to successfully intimidate the 
residents into remaining quiet, likely because the residents (as had Solanki) assumed 
them  to be part of the fabric of political violence, including organized crime and 
smuggling, which defined their lives.6 The terrorists that had slipped out of Pakistan amid 
the traffic of coastal slums had infiltrated India in much the same way, easily “inserting 
themselves into a coastal fishing fleet to cover their approach.”7 Yet, the havoc they 
caused was exponentially greater than that of Mumbai’s typical smuggler. One of the 
world’s largest cities was brought to a paralyzed halt, as over one hundred people were 
killed and hundreds more wounded in one of the most shocking and successful terrorist 
attacks in modern Asian history.8 The terrorists, all but one of whom died in the attack, 
were at home in the urban camouflage of Mumbai’s slums. And while the result was 
unmistakably an act of terrorism, the method of its execution “blurred the distinction 
Introduction 
	 2 
between crime and war: both the Indian ship captain and the local inhabitants initially 
mistook [the terrorists] for smugglers, and their opponents for much of the raid were 
police, not soldiers.”9 The landing sites these terrorists chose are illustrative of the littoral 
terrain that navies so frequently hope to avoid, littered with “dense, complex informal 
settlements–coastal slums made up of thousands of tiny shacks, fishing huts, and moored 
boats.”10 To Solanki and the residents of these slums, there was nothing out of the 
ordinary about those strange men landing on their shores; it was part of the “normal 
background environment” of life on the margins.11 Yet, the littorals are bringing the 
margins to the foreground, and understanding this terrain is central to understanding its 
impact on the broader global system. 
The famed British naval strategist Julian Corbett notes simply, “men live upon the 
land and not upon the sea,” and consequently a navy’s real task is to influence events 
ashore.12 Naval historian Captain Dudley Knox, a contemporary of Corbett, echoes the 
same principle: “the supreme test of the naval strategist is the depth of his comprehension 
of the intimate relationship between sea power and land power, and of the truth that 
basically all effort afloat should be directed at an effect ashore.”13 There is no easy 
definition for littoral, but the spirit of these quotes reveals the principle of the word, the 
region where sea power and land power overlap. Broadly speaking the littoral region is 
the “area of land susceptible to military influence from the sea, and the sea area 
susceptible to influence from the land.”14 In military terms, “a littoral zone is the portion 
of land space that can be engaged using sea-based weapon systems, plus the adjacent sea 
space (surface and subsurface) that can be engaged using land-based weapon systems, 
and the surrounding airspace and cyberspace.”15 The littoral is therefore defined by the 
technological capabilities of a military, and as a result the littoral is not like other 
geographic terms. A mountain remains a mountain no matter the century, a plateau and a 
river and a steppe do not require points of technological reference. Yet, time has changed 
what we mean by littoral.16 In an era of cannons, large shore-based batteries determined 
the distance of the littoral as far as a favorable wind could carry a projectile (about three 
miles, the original extent of the territorial sea).17 In the Afghan war, by contrast, the U.S. 
Navy demonstrated that it could contribute to operations hundreds of miles inland, 
radically changing what we mean by littoral.18 If we conservatively limit the littoral to 
just two hundred miles inland, that would encompass seventy-five percent of the world’s 
population, eighty percent of capital cities, and practically “all major centres of 
international trade and military power.”19 The littorals are a congested environment, 
crowded by freight in transshipment, oil and gas platforms, navigational markers, and 
geographic features like islands and reefs.20 The hive of human activity in the region only 
serves to constrict movement even further, with littoral zones cluttered by cargo ships, 
aircraft, and leisure and small commercial vessels.21 Furthermore, time has not only 
expanded the littorals horizontally. Today, navies must consider up to nine operational 
domains: 
 
The seabed, the submarine environment, the sea surface, and naval 
airspace (airspace over the sea), which together make up the maritime 
domain; the land surface, subterranean space, and supersurface space (to 
include tunnel systems, canals, sewers, basements, exterior street-level 
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surfaces, building interiors, high-rise structures, and rooftops), making up 
the land domain; the airspace domain; and the domain of cyberspace.22 
 
In other words, the littorals are where the threats are, where responses must be 
rapid, and where non-state and non-traditional actors can have an outsized impact on a 
global stage. How navies will recalibrate to meet the growing threats of the sprawling 
littorals will be central to defining their impact on the global system in the coming half-
century. In this dissertation, we use an equally flexible interpretation of littorals, using a 
state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (measured as 200 nautical miles perpendicular from the 
coast as set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the 
adjacent land as baselines. In so doing, we enable a holistic conversation on the distinct 
asymmetric actors and insecurities plaguing this ambiguous domain—the very actors and 
actions that straddle the lines of convention. And ultimately, discussing the littoral zone 
requires a comfort with ambiguity. Time and tide change the exact definition of the 
terrain from day to day, yet its fundamental role in human security and society remains 
constant. 
 Finally, before we continue, it is incumbent upon us to narrow our definition of 
the term maritime security. The emerging field of maritime security, even more so than 
similar disciplines like terrorism studies, has yet to settle on a universal definition of the 
term. This is so in large part because, as Christian Bueger of Cardiff University 
illustrates, maritime security in 
its modern usage can be 
portrayed at the nexus of a range 
of overlapping spheres of 
security.23 This approach to the 
definitional issue is semiotic, an 
attempt to understand a concept 
in relation to known others.24 
Yet, one of the greatest 
challenges with such an approach 
rests in achieving a narrow 
enough definition to ensure 
fruitful dialogue. Until we can 
accomplish this much, as both 
Bueger and Basil Germond (of 
Lancaster University) make reference to, the concept of maritime security will remain 
more of a “buzzword” than a useful tool.25 King’s College London’s Geoffrey Till is 
particularly concerned about the surging popularity of such an ambiguous phrase—one 
he regards as a complicating rebranding of the more conventional ‘good order at sea’26 
(itself not a particularly clear phrase). Indeed, as Till notes, and as seen in Figure 1, just 
the word maritime connotes a range of meanings, from entirely military, to purely 
commercial endeavors.27 However, though we cannot yet point to a consensus definition, 
Christian Bueger, “What is Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 53, 
(2015): 161. 
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we can at the least ensure that we employ a consistent and common usage within our own 
body of work.* 
 Here, maritime security is the state response to threats precipitated by non-state, 
frequently transnational actors who, while operating, break national and international law 
and maintain the capacity to use violence in the furtherance of such actions. (Climate 
change, while not a component 
of this definitional matrix, can 
aggravate remaining components 
and thus arises at points in our 
discussion as an indirect factor.) 
In other words, “maritime 
security has to do with (illegal 
and disruptive) human activities 
in the maritime” domain.28 This 
modifies Bueger’s original 
matrix by eliminating the marine 
safety quadrant as well as the 
inter-state component of the 
national security quadrant. We 
are still left with a term at the nexus of multiple conceptions of security, but one aimed at 
a single framing of security (asymmetric, illegitimate threats) in much the way traditional 
naval strategy is often conceived in terms of one major framework (symmetric, 
legitimate, inter-state threats). This is consistent with Germond’s definition of maritime 
security, which emphasizes the restoration or maintenance of the legitimate use of force 
by state actors.29 Consequently, the human security considerations of maritime security 
tie the field to liberal and critical interpretations, even as the overarching framework of 
the discipline incorporates realist conceptions of order. Both Germond’s and our 
definitions direct the application of maritime security studies towards the impact of non-
state and unconventional actors on the Westphalian conception of sovereignty, and 
consequently towards an application of maritime security in environments close to a 
state’s area of influence. This set of definitions thus has both geographic and political 
components. Reference to the maritime space, here, is used to evoke principally brown 
(riverine) and green (coastal) waters. Thus, if we deconstruct the term ‘maritime 
security,’ maritime speaks to the geography of the domain—the littorals, as defined 
above—while security speaks to the nature of the threat—illegitimate non-state actors, as 
per Germond. Our use of the phrase naval (or naval strategy), meanwhile, is used more 
broadly to signify the wider body of work on what navies do, which is historically (in the 
American context particularly) focused on inter-state conflict. 
 
 																																																								
* Maritime security has also been defined in the negative, as a lack of threats or insecurity. Freedom 
Onuoha, for example, of Nigeria’s National Defense College defines it as “the freedom from or absence of 
those acts that could negatively impact the natural integrity and resilience of any navigable waterway or 
undermine the safety of persons, infrastructure, cargo, vessels, and other conveyances…” See, Freedom 
Onuoha, “Piracy and Maritime Security off the Horn of Africa: Connections, Causes, and Concerns,” 
African Security 3, No. 4 (2010): 193. 
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The Research Question 
 
While maritime insecurity takes place on the water, the literature we will explore 
throughout this dissertation reflects threats that often seem to have more in common with 
crime than naval warfare. The exposition above reads nothing like the imaginings of 
Mahan or Corbett, the canonical fathers of naval strategy.30 And so the question arises, 
can theories derived from research on crime help us understand maritime issues in a new 
way? More specifically, can the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of 
social disorganization, provide a lens through which to theorize maritime security in the 
littorals? American interests in coastal zones worldwide face a diversity of threats, many 
of which arise from non-state and transnational actors. These regions are hotspots for the 
trafficking of people, narcotics, and arms, operations that destabilize friendly 
governments and support terrorist activities.31 It is these transnational and global 
organizations, over the coming decades, which will pose some of the most prolonged 
threats to American security and the global system. This does not preclude the rise of 
other, more traditional threats. Yet, the unconventional nature of maritime insecurity 
poses an unusually fundamental identity crisis for large navies. 
The Broken Windows approach provides guidance for developing a strategic 
framework for maritime security. This approach is informed by two components: Broken 
Windows in theory, and Broken Windows in practice. Theoretically, Broken Windows 
posits that people’s actions are influenced by the state of their environment, both physical 
and perceived. In other words, the rational actor model cannot fully explain deviant 
activities because individuals are constantly responding to subtle stimuli from their 
physical and behavioral context. Practically, when attempting to police the environmental 
signals that influence behavior, authorities found that low-level criminality is also 
multidimensional—policing small-scale disorder has an outsized impact on controlling 
more violent crimes. By evaluating maritime security threats through the lens of the 
Broken Windows approach (outlined in greater detail in Chapter Two), we can identify 
themes that aid in the construction of a truly littoral strategy of maritime security. As we 
will see in Chapter One, the need for such strategic development is paramount. 
It is in this strategic context that this dissertation attempts to make the greatest 
contribution. As we will explore further in the following chapter, maritime security is a 
relatively new subfield, one that lacks a rigorous theoretical framework for discussing 
littoral security cohesively. This is particularly true within the U.S. strategic literature, 
which will be a focus of the review to come. It was only in 2007, for example, that 
Maritime Security was included as a distinct component in a U.S. naval strategy capstone 
document. (More broadly, the major focus of this research is the United States maritime 
services. Consequently, unless otherwise specified, references to the Navy, Coast Guard, 
or maritime services refer specifically to those of the United States.) In the furtherance of 
this discussion, our dissertation is also situated at the intersection of a number of related 
research efforts and debates across security studies and international relations. While, 
given constraints on time, space, and cogency, we cannot address all in depth, three are 
worth highlighting at the outset to better help the reader track their emergence over the 
course of the dissertation. First, this research engages heavily with the literature on 
transnational threats, bringing them into greater contact with the maritime security 
sphere. Works by Naím, Thachuk, and Kilcullen contributed heavily in this regard. 
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Second, this research touches often on the changing conception of naval peacetime 
activities and what constitutes war, peace, and policing when interacting with non-state 
actors (see Chapter Two for more). Third, this research attempts to spark a greater debate 
over what good order at sea means, strategically, and how navies might think about order 
maintenance (again, see Chapter Two for more). Other important literatures (like those on 
critical studies of terrorism or maritime security) are relevant as well and can be found 
referenced particularly across the first two chapters for the interested reader. 
Looking forward, our research question is best examined by beginning with two 
sub-questions: Why might a new naval approach be instructive? And, what is the Broken 
Windows theory? Answering these sub-questions is critical to building a foundation for 
the theory testing and building to come in our case studies. As a consequence, we will 
address them in turn in the following two chapters, followed finally by a discussion of 
methods and evidence. By answering these sub-questions we will demonstrate not only 
the theoretical foundation of this thesis, but also its relevance amid a broader strategic 
context. 
Our first sub-question is answered in Chapter One, serving consequently as a 
literature review. Chapter One is divided into two sections—Shaping Strategy and 
Theorizing Sea Power—exploring the strategic relevance of the littorals and surveying 
the American strategic naval literature in the post-Cold War era. Our second sub-question 
is answered in Chapter Two and is likewise divided into two broad themes. The first 
offers a discussion of the development of Broken Windows in theory and practice within 
the discipline of criminology. The second theme explores how Broken Windows has been 
adopted and adapted outside of criminology, predominantly in the field of public health, 
and the lessons we can learn from those appropriations in our own cross-disciplinary 
application. Chapter Two concludes with an assessment of the best methodological 
framework for answering our larger research question, leading into three empirical case 
study chapters. First, however, we turn to Chapter One for an answer to the most 
important question of all: so what? 																																																									
1 United Nations, State of the World’s Cities 2012/2013: Prosperity of Cities (Nairobi, Kenya: United 
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Company, 2013), 54. 
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8 While Kilcullen’s telling is particularly insightful for its emphasis on the littoral component, the 2008 
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Chapter 1: Shifting Tides 
 
“Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.” – Attributed to Winston 
Churchill 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Why should we consider blending community policing and international relations 
in the first place? In Chapter Two we will establish a theoretical foundation upon which 
to build our case studies. Beforehand, however, there remains the most basic question for 
any researcher: why does it matter? This chapter, therefore, speaks to relevance. And the 
most effective way to address this question is to ask it in a slightly modified way—what 
has changed? What is different today that makes it worthwhile to approach strategy from 
a new angle instead of attempting to square the edges of older perspectives? “The United 
States faces a rapidly changing security environment,”1 answers the 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) in its opening lines. From “new centers of power” to “a world 
that is growing more volatile” to “unprecedented levels of global connectedness,” the 
nature of military strategy is being challenged at numerous points.2 The 2014 QDR’s 
predecessor (2010) “was fundamentally a wartime strategy.”3 Yet, the most recent 
strategic white papers out of the United States stress that as the U.S. and its allies attempt 
to move past these wars, what comes next will be no less ambiguous. Conflicts of the 
future may be characterized by hybrid threats emanating from non-state, asymmetric 
actors, to conventional, symmetrical adversaries armed with nuclear weapons.4 The 
dynamic nature of littorals and the increasing interconnectedness of global commerce and 
information flows suggest that theorists revisit what we mean by ‘Maritime Security.’ 
Maritime Security (in capital letters)5 is an increasingly common sub-heading in 
naval strategy documents, particularly in the United States. Yet, while the usage of the 
phrase has expanded, there remains some ambiguity about the prominence of littorals in 
the wider realm of operations conducted by the United States Navy (USN). Global 
demographic changes and historical patterns of conflict, however, suggest that maritime 
security—naval operations in brown waters, often directed against non-state or 
unconventional actors—will play an increasingly important role in American and global 
foreign policy over the coming years. In this chapter, we endeavor to outline the most 
pressing trends substantiating an increased theoretical investment in maritime security as 
a distinct subfield. These are addressed in two sections. The first, Shaping Strategy, 
investigates the evolving nature of threats in the littorals, providing an understanding of 
the threat forecast in which international actors will operate over the coming decades. In 
the second section, Theorizing Sea Power, we analyze the timeline and content of post-
Cold War, largely post-9/11 strategic naval literature to better place our research within a 
small but expanding narrative. We conclude that such trends, both real world and 
theoretical, will act to draw navies towards low intensity littoral operations in the decades 
to come. 
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2.0 Shaping Strategy 
 
The Asia-Pacific’s resurgence, which precipitated the Obama administration’s 
Pivot to Asia, is not the only noteworthy geostrategic phenomenon of the early twenty-
first century. There are a growing number of unconventional factors that are poised to 
demand greater consideration in the coming decades. In his book Out of the Mountains, 
David Kilcullen sets out a compelling argument for taking unconventional threats 
seriously, an argument primarily based upon the simple principle: conflict happens where 
people are.6 So, where are the people? 
Kilcullen identifies four “megatrends” of demography and economic geography 
that suggest where we can expect to find the majority of the world’s population in the 
coming decades.7 “Rapid population growth, accelerating urbanization, littoralization (the 
tendency for things to cluster on the coastlines), and increasing connectedness” all 
suggest that populations are concentrating in networked, urban, dense, littoral 
communities.8 The United Nations projects that the global population will reach around 
9.6 billion people by 2050, a number that has been revised upward to reflect sustained 
high fertility rates in the developing world, particularly across Africa.9 By 2050 as well, 
approximately three quarters of the global population will live in cities.10, 11 Some 
estimates suggest coastal cities (now home to about three billion people) may double by 
2025.12 By 2030 as many as forty percent of urban dwellers (two billion people) may live 
in slums.13 Already nearly one-and-a-half million people migrate to a city every week.14 
In less than thirty-five years, cities are expected to absorb almost all new population 
growth.15 Moreover, most of this urban coastal expansion will take place where 
governments are least prepared for it, clustered in some of the world’s poorest regions.16 
The Caribbean and Latin America, for example, will see its population grow by more 
than 200 million people, Africa could see its population expand by 800 million, and Asia 
will see a growth of 1.7 billion.17 In the 1990s the World Bank was already anticipating 
that slums would become the “most significant, and politically explosive, problem of the 
next century.”18 To give an indication of scale, consider the following. In one generation, 
the world’s poorest cities will absorb the majority of a population increase equal to all of 
the population growth ever recorded in human history through the year 1960.19 That is 
sure to produce astounding institutional strains, ones that will inevitably stress already 
fragile municipal governments to a breaking point. And yet, only since around 2006 and 
the “Trends and Shocks” project at DOD does it appear that demographic projections 
have played a substantive role in the strategic planning process.20 
And we need not wait for 2050 to see these statistics in action. Already half of the 
world’s population lives within about thirty miles of a coast, and three quarters of large 
cities are on the water.21 In the Mediterranean, for example, the urban littoral population 
grew by 40 million from 1970 to 2000, with seventy-five percent of that growth taking 
place in the poorer Middle Eastern and North African portion of the basin.22 Libya’s 
population is among the most densely coastal in the entire region, at eighty-five percent.23 
In fact, worldwide, of the twenty-five largest cities on the planet, only four lay inland.24 
But, how is demography dangerous? The answer comes from how communities respond 
to the pressures of these trends. (Libya, for example, is also a springboard in the ongoing 
European migrant crisis). When a city doubles in size it produces, on average, “fifteen 
percent higher wages, fifteen percent more fancy restaurants, but also fifteen percent 
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more [HIV/]AIDS cases, and fifteen percent more violent crime. Everything scales up by 
fifteen percent when you double the size.”25 In cities already bursting at the seams, cities 
like Lagos or Mumbai or San Pedro Sula, the consequences of a fifteen percent spike in 
crime or AIDS rates act on preexisting stressors like poverty, climate change, and 
political violence, which can precipitate or aggravate still more disorder.26 The impact of 
these magnified stressors can cause a metropolis to turn ‘feral.’ In the Naval War College 
Review, Richard Norton defines a feral city as “a metropolis with a population of more 
than a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to maintain 
the rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater 
international system.”27 John Sullivan and Adam Elkus describe the feral city as “an area 
in which state power is nonexistent, the architecture consists entirely of slums, and power 
is a complex process negotiated through violence by differing factions.”28 At the time, 
Richard Norton considered only Mogadishu to truly exemplify the criteria of a feral 
city.29 Yet, a number of cities then contained feral pockets characteristic of Norton’s 
theory. In such pockets, segments of an urban or peri-urban (a region at the intersection 
of urban and rural spaces) sprawl exist outside the reach or interest of the government. 
Matthew Frick, in Proceedings Magazine, as well as The New York Times, both cite São 
Paulo, Mexico City, and Johannesburg (the Times also adds Karachi) as examples of 
modern cities with feral components. Frick explicitly links these feral cities to maritime 
security by arguing that they are modern incarnations of the pirate havens of lore, 
inheritors of the piratical legacy of leveraging ungoverned spaces.30 In feral cities, the 
legitimate governing fabric of the urban area erodes as the stress of an oversized 
population pushes it past the ability to cope with the pressures of crime, poverty, and 
health. Such violence perpetuates the cycle of urban exclusion, precipitating yet more 
physical, political, social, economic, and infrastructure neglect.31 
The collapse or erosion of local governance therefore creates a power and services 
vacuum. That power vacuum creates disorder from which people crave a reprieve. In 
turn, the local actor that can produce a sense of order and stability is frequently adopted 
as a surrogate government. Yet, inevitably, these surrogates are not peaceful 
neighborhood watch groups. Kilcullen’s concept of “competitive control”32 posits that the 
surrogates most likely to survive in these environments are those that are capable of 
acting across a spectrum of power ranging from soft to coercive. Without soft power, the 
allure of an institutionalized set of normative community rules, the population is denied 
the sense of order it demands. Under such a rules-based system, a neighborhood is likely 
to tolerate a measure of violence because it can be predicted and avoided. Without 
violence, a competitor will find it easy to supplant the surrogate. What we are inevitably 
left with is a void filled by organized gangs, terrorists, militias, or criminal networks that 
manipulate a feral city’s disorder to establish fortifications within neighborhoods that 
often come to depend on them. Kilcullen illustrates this point with Kingston, Jamaica’s 
garrison neighborhoods, districts made loyal to gang leaders as a consequence of their 
dominant role in the local informal justice system and economy.33 When such groups 
offer locals enough of a sense of fair and predictable order, many are willing to tolerate 
their presence. Finally, one of the most sophisticated and successful examples of the rise 
of these surrogate groups comes from Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The group is capable of 
acting across the range of Kilcullen’s spectrum, from responsive normative governance 
structures to armed coercive capacity.34 Hezbollah has opened hospitals and schools, and 
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provided job training and security to Lebanon’s impoverished Shia community. Filling an 
expansive power vacuum, the organization’s ability to operate everything from daycares 
to militia units, its subsequent subnational hold on southern Lebanon, and the 2006 war it 
precipitated with Israel are all proof of how entrenched and dangerous non-state actors 
can be, even in a realist paradigm. At its root, we are talking about the essence of 
sovereignty and Max Weber’s conception of the monopoly over the legitimate use of 
physical force.35 
So far, however, surrogate groups and feral cities would appear a danger largely 
within their own neighborhoods. What brings these groups and populations into the 
international maritime orbit is Kilcullen’s final megatrend—connectedness. Crowded, 
poor coastal zones may turn feral, but feral regions do not implode. Instead they remain 
connected with the world around them through the Internet, ports, airports, and diaspora 
communities.36,37 As the U.S. Navy’s then-Chief of Information Rear Admiral John Kirby 
noted in 2013, “the littorals are where products come to market; it’s where seaborne trade 
originates.”38 Thus, with all the implications of such connectedness, even a feral region 
remains a dynamic, strategic, and significant actor in the international arena.39 This 
connectedness allows the feral elements of a community to interact with licit and illicit 
trade and information flows, offering local actors the capacity to directly impact events 
across the country and world.40 The same pathways that facilitate normal trade and 
migration likewise enable illicit transfers such as the smuggling of narcotics, people and 
weapons, human trafficking, terrorism, and piracy.41 This connectedness is what gives 
rise to the potential for actions a world away, events like protests or acts of political 
violence, to have a rapid and meaningful impact on domestic considerations elsewhere.42 
As a result of the indirect but consequential connection between local non-state groups 
and international security, “the distinction between war and crime, between domestic and 
international affairs” almost disappears.43 We are left facing an amorphous hybrid threat, 
what John Sullivan calls “criminal insurgents,”44 or the melding of criminal syndicates 
with the direct political control of territory. 
Strategists infrequently use the term hybrid threat because it reflects the “large 
gray space between our idealized bins” and reality.45 Military theorists have likewise 
proven resistant to dealing with something that a bureaucratized approach to security 
categorizes (perhaps even “curtly dismisses”) as an issue of law enforcement.46 
Nevertheless, the term is not without its proponents. Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman (Ret.) 
advances a definition similar to that which we use here. He describes a hybrid threat as 
“any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional 
weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain 
their political objectives.”47 And notwithstanding lagging terminology, the concept 
behind hybrid threats has gained prominence. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 
White House included a section on “Transnational Criminal Threats and Threats to 
Governance.”48 In it, the administration acknowledges that illicit trades and the 
transnational actors who facilitate them continue to “expand dramatically in size, scope, 
and influence,” and that such groups have “accumulated unprecedented wealth and 
power.”49 The relationship between transnational crime and terrorism is “well-
established” and building, and the deleterious impacts for governments is a matter of 
record.50 Thus, while the “local/transnational, criminal/military hybrid threat” concept 
has been slow in coming into its own phraseology, the growing influence of such threats 
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has already begun to command attention. Demographic trends portend that the hybridized 
threat may soon impact hundreds of millions more people in the coming decades.51 And 
the surrogate groups likely to produce these threats are diverse, including “urban street 
gangs, communitarian or sectarian militias, insurgents, bandits, pirates, armed smugglers 
or drug traffickers, violent organized criminal networks, vigilantes and armed public 
defender groups, terrorist organizations, warlord armies, and certain paramilitary 
forces.”52 All remain connected to the wider world through the littoral domain. 
When it comes to hybrid threats, there is a great deal of overlap between crime 
and war, “and thus a great deal of commonality between constabulary, policing, and 
military operations.”53 For this reason, Australia fields an internationally deployable 
federal police unit.54 The Italian Carabinieri host NATO’s Center of Excellence for 
Stability Policing Units, which trains students in community policing methods.55, 56 Israeli 
police form Joint Operations Forces with the military to help close the gap between 
operational requirements.57 Even the United States military studies policing methods and 
has included police trainers on deployments abroad.58 These militaries do so because 
hybrid, often littoral threats are distinct. And they are not new, either. There exists a 
“long-standing historical pattern in which the United States conducts a large-scale or 
long-duration counterinsurgency or stabilization operation about once a generation and a 
small or short-term mission about once every five to ten years.”59 In truth, the American 
military faces these nontraditional challenges far more frequently than it does inter-state 
conflicts. As the line blurs between war and crime, it may be more attractive for strategic 
planners to circumvent consideration of these challenges. 
What is remarkable about this pattern of conflict, however, is its irreverence for 
the preferences of policymakers.60, 61 Lyndon Johnson, who placed a premium on 
domestic reform, was eventually subsumed by a troop escalation in Vietnam.62 Bill 
Clinton delayed sending troops to the Balkans and resisted doing so in Rwanda, yet 
ultimately sent troops to Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Haiti, and Liberia over the course 
of his presidency.63 While candidate George W. Bush dismissed any interest in stability 
operations and nation building, President Bush launched two simultaneous large-scale 
counterinsurgency campaigns, and led the United States into the largest campaign of 
nation building since the Second World War and NATO into its largest stabilization 
mission in history.64 Even as President Obama initiated his Pivot to Asia, he was still 
negotiating the drawdown of two land wars while conflicts simmered (and flared) in 
Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, and the Congo.65 Even the most successful 
militaries in Western history have more often been involved in small wars than big 
ones.66 The British Army, for example, engaged in myriad low intensity “brushfire wars” 
across its empire.67 The American military too “has been drawn into literally dozens of 
small wars and irregular operations”68 since its inception, with its formative years defined 
by countless skirmishes with Red Coats and Native Americans.69 Even most large, recent 
conventional wars have included substantial nontraditional components such as guerilla 
tactics and postwar rebuilding.70 World War Two, for example, is famous for its 
partisans, but in no way unique. “American policy makers clearly don’t like irregular 
operations, and the U.S. military isn’t much interested in them, either,”71 but they will 
nevertheless continue to happen, and at increasing frequency according to Kilcullen’s 
trends. The Pivot to Asia, while perhaps an appropriate strategy for broad American 
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geopolitical interests, will not signal an end to unconventional threats, but may well 
compromise the U.S. Navy’s capacity to adequately respond. 
The realization of the frequency of these operations drives Kilcullen to reevaluate 
the very counterinsurgency theories he helped develop, concluding that the fundamental 
principle of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is flawed. The idea that “populations can be 
swayed if their conscious choices are influenced”72 ignores the fact, as Broken Windows 
has shown for decades, that behavior and environment dynamically shape each other.73 In 
light of over a decade of urban conflict, defense practitioners understand that violence in 
cities does not conform to conventional twentieth century views of warfare. Traditionally, 
an adversary would have a ‘head’ to target, a headquarters or central node that could be 
the object of attack.74 Yet, hybridized urban violence often has no head—the control node 
is “embedded in the system itself.”75 As a consequence, the primary project is not 
defeating insurgents or winning hearts and minds; “the project is the community.”76 And 
so we return to the Power of Context. 
Focusing on context, as Broken Windows practitioners came to understand when 
reclaiming New York City’s subway and streets, requires distinguishing between 
operational and strategic success. Brazil’s military policing unit (BOPE) is singularly 
effective at combatting cartels and gangs on a tactical level. Yet, the methods they have 
employed in the past alienate the poor and lock favelas into perpetual perceptions of 
conflict.77 The Israel Defense Force (IDF) has perfected a method of using the city as a 
medium for conflict, moving through walls in an effort to deny combatants a 
conventional theory of maneuver space.*78 And yet, such tactics terrify noncombatants 
and leave the urban space in tatters. While the BOPE and the IDF are operationally adept, 
neither Latin American organized crime nor Hamas terrorists have been entirely 
dislodged from their strongholds. This is, in some part, because both BOPE and the IDF 
neglect the power of context. Thus, while these forces “may be masters at manipulating 
the city as fluid operational space, they have an overly materialistic conception of the 
city—it is not just the buildings but also people. They ignore the social spaces in their 
strategies, which center overwhelmingly on manipulating material forces to their 
advantage.”79 In the urban social arena, militaries have a great deal to learn from 
community policing. 
And such lessons are not restricted to the cities. Increasingly crowded littorals, as 
we have seen, are critical in servicing the needs of a globalizing world. The criminal 
networks sheltered in urban settings harness the littorals to move people, weapons, drugs, 
and related contraband with impunity. Predictably, the connection between such hybrid 
threats and policing techniques is being increasingly recognized. Kilcullen asks, “what if 
we could combine what [he] learned in Baghdad about protecting urban populations from 
extreme violence with what law enforcement agencies know about community-based 
policing?”80 And as with Nagl, we see once again the conclusion that “the military could 
learn even more from police and emergency services” from how they delegate and 
disaggregate command.†81 Effectively combating hybrid threats means meeting the needs 
                                                
* Moving through walls is euphemistic. In actual fact, large holes are blown through the walls of adjoining 
houses. This helps soldiers avoid ambushes in hostile streets or narrow alleys. 
† There exists an expanding call for a dialogue between police and the military. Yet, what stands out is the 
degree to which practitioners and academics merely cite that need. Kilcullen exemplifies the narrow band 
of scholars who have endeavored to develop these statements of intent beyond pure conception, so as to 
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of the communities they infest. Operating in these environments without regard for the 
wider community is certain to choke the life out of cities, called “urbicide.”82 Such a 
population may be pacified, but the region neither serves nor enriches its inhabitants. 
Blunt force tactics produce “military urbanism,” a response to military-style incursions 
that “turns cities into fortresses and populations into denizens of occupied territory.”83 
What is needed is a strategy that can “combine policing, administration, and emergency 
services, backed up with military-style capabilities so that police can deal with well-
armed adversaries—capabilities traditionally associated with constabulary, gendarmerie, 
carabinieri, or coast guard forces.”84 Such a strategy would be more effective against 
hybridized threats precisely because it leverages greater capabilities than civil police 
possess yet less destructive tactical approaches than the military.85 It is logical to 
conclude that hybrid threats are best met with a hybrid strategy, one that equally blends 
the capabilities of the military with the theories of the police.86 
Any attempt to predict the exact location of a future threat or conflict would likely 
prove to be inaccurate.87 As a consequence, it is important to understand the function of 
Kilcullen’s megatrends. Note that we avoid the impulse to identify specific threats, 
countries, or actors most likely to precipitate conflict or intervention. Instead, these trends 
provide theorists with a threat forecast. Much like how climate modeling cannot tell us 
whether it will rain or snow next week, the demographic projections above say little 
about the near-term conflict forecast.88 Yet, just as with climate models, such forecasts 
“do suggest a range of conditions—a set of system parameters, or a ‘conflict climate’—
within which [future] wars will arise.”89 These projections illustrate trends. And while 
those trends do not say much about what happens tomorrow or the day after, they speak 
volumes about the forces steadily reshaping our world. These forecasts are unequivocally 
telling us that dense, networked, and littoral communities are an emerging global force. 
How navies meet (or fail to meet) the challenges associated with that rise will be dictated 
by their attentiveness to the unique constraints of securing brown and green waters. 
 
3.0 Theorizing Sea Power 
 
If, as we have argued, much of the future lies in the littorals, why does there 
appear to have been so little by way of conceptual investment or interest in them by large 
navies, particularly that of the U.S.? One interesting answer lies in the belief that strategy 
may serve in part as a matter of bureaucratic self-defense. To demonstrate this point, John 
Shy (professor emeritus at the University of Michigan) identifies three historically 
significant American military strategies: Sea Power, Strategic Air Attack, and Limited 
War (flexible response).90 In each case, Shy argues, these strategies were just as much 
products of the military that employed them as they were responses to the needs of their 
time.91 These strategies are legacies of an impulse towards self-justification, according to 
this lens, each a response to a branch’s crisis of legitimacy: in the Navy in the 1880s, in 
the Air Corps in the 1920s, and in the Army directly following the close of World War 
II.92 Shy suggests that each of these strategies was “promoted with a zeal that blinded its 
proponents to alternative possibilities and to its inherent shortcomings.”93 His argument is 
reminiscent not only of modern takes on institutional learning (as seen in Nagl 2005) but 
                                                                                                                                            
offer a credible foundation for debate. While we apply a divergent theory than Kilcullen, our intention in 
the coming chapters is similarly to exhibit the value in embracing theoretical crosspollination. 
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also of the bureaucratic politics model in foreign policy analysis (as seen in Allison 
1969), wherein government departments competing with one another for influence, 
funds, and power are instrumental in shaping policies best suited to their ends. In this 
instance, the individual branches of the military compete with one another to legitimize 
budgets in a zero-sum game, a competition that can produce a rigid adherence to strategy 
inimical to development. 
The first of the strategies Shy identifies, Sea Power, was the outgrowth of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s school of thought. According to Shy, the Sea Power doctrine proscribes 
that, “by offensive action a concentrated battle fleet could effectively deny the use of the 
sea to inferior naval forces and could pierce the coastal defense of any hostile power.”94 
Sea Power was a product of, and co-contributor to, the era of American expansionism and 
interventionism that swept in a series of small wars and low intensity conflicts from the 
Caribbean to the Philippines.95 It is one of countless examples of how strategy and 
foreign policy serve to reinforce one another, creating a set of interdependent needs that 
can, in and of themselves, substantiate the continuation of a strategy.96 In the case of Sea 
Power, the Navy argued that a strong foreign policy required a strong Navy to support 
offensive capacity, and that a strong Navy required bases abroad (in part because of the 
twentieth century need for coal replenishment). As a consequence, American foreign 
policy became focused on entrenching American footholds abroad, for the purpose of 
securing the Navy, for the purpose of an expanding foreign policy. The cycle was self-
perpetuating and only ended after contributing to World War I. The Sea Power doctrine 
suggests that “effective military action must be total, and that anything less is worse than 
useless.”97 And yet, today more than ever we see a blurring of the responsibilities of the 
soldier and the statesmen.98 The battles they fight are infrequently the symmetrical 
conflicts of warring nations, but often the “savage wars of peace” and “dirty little wars” 
of nation building.99 In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan asks the reader 
to ponder the “true end of naval warfare.”100 It is a rhetorical exercise, for the answer is 
obvious; the raison d’être of a navy is the “preponderance over the enemy’s ships and 
fleets and so control of the sea.”101 But what if the enemy has no cruisers or destroyers? 
What if control of the sea has been achieved, in relation to other conventional state 
actors, and disorder remains? Such are the questions of maritime security, as a distinct 
component of broader naval and military strategy, and mandate revisiting the 
conversation on sea power and the very definition of control of the sea. 
Yet, such an endeavor is fraught with division. Professor Colin Gray (director of 
the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading), for example, represents a 
camp that believes that the principles of strategy remain unchanged over time.102 For 
those who agree with Gray, “Mahan is (mainly) right, always has been and always will 
be.”103 John Reeve (senior lecturer at the University of New South Wales), on the other 
hand, argues that none but the broadest concepts of strategy extend beyond a given 
context and that our conceptions of strategy must change as do circumstances.104 
Spurring this divide is the reality that, as a consequence of his prolific writing, Mahan is 
easily misinterpreted and “the butt of much unjustified abuse.”105 In truth, Mahan’s 
theories are often more complicated than either side gives his work credit. He expressed, 
for example, in a very Sun Tzu style, that fighting is frequently tangential to the business 
of war.106 Mahan even wrote on littoral campaigns, mostly in The Gulf and Inland 
Waters.107 Nevertheless, the tradition of Mahan lives on in battles for control of the sea 
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and the “obvious blue-water preoccupations”108 of many of the world’s largest and 
growing navies. And yet, Mahan is not the only voice in the traditional naval strategic 
cannon. Julian Corbett’s work, for example, remains a popular alternative. Corbett 
returns Mahan’s navy to a broader political and economic context,109 consequently with 
less of an emphasis on the Mahanian-esque pursuit of decisive engagements. Still, both 
Mahan and Corbett (and their proponents) are frequently read in the lexicon of 
competition between armadas of conventional adversaries and the accompanying 
concerns of winning and exploiting control of the sea.110 No matter how one twists these 
canonical scholars, we cannot escape the fact that they help us very little in responding to 
the issues plaguing navies on a daily basis today (human trafficking, narcotics, piracy, 
IUU fishing, gunrunning).111 Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre in Australia (speaking of the Royal Australian Navy), 
summarizes the point: “fighting for control of the sea fits Mahan’s – and the navy’s – 
ideas about what a navy should be for. Unfortunately it does not fit the reality of naval 
strategy today.”112 
Geoffrey Till’s synopsis of the post-modern navy in his primer on sea power 
offers a good example of an increasingly popular alternative to Mahan’s conception of 
sea dominance.113 Post-modernism suggests that cooperative diplomacy, stability and 
humanitarian operations, and good order at sea can play instrumental roles in 
contemporary naval operations.114 Sea control in this context assumes a function different 
from what a modern take on Mahan prescribes. First, the theater of operations for sea 
control in the post-modern navy is littoral, a terrain with threats patently distinct from the 
open ocean that Mahanian writers envision.115 Second, post-modern navies conceive of 
security in a different theoretical framework. Post-modern navies view defense of the 
global system as a primary objective. As a consequence, defense against threats to 
worldwide commerce, shipping, and transportation encourage control of the sea, not for 
manipulation by one state, but for the common usage of all licit actors. And the attraction 
of this vision of sea power has even made inroads in the United States since the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and former Chief of Naval 
Operations) Admiral Michael Mullen once remarked, “where the old maritime strategy 
focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations 
rises not when the seas are controlled by one but rather when they are made safe and free 
for all.”116 We can even see threads of post-modernism in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower (CS21), to which we will return at greater length below. Robert Rubel, 
of the U.S. Naval War College, illustrates this point through the language of systems. 
Thinking of systems means emphasizing the interacting facets and gears that compose a 
wider network. Under such a rubric, it would be irrational to secure only one subsystem 
at the expense of others.117 As we will see, the Broken Windows theory is uniquely 
positioned to provide that same sense of systemic awareness. In this way, something 
previously inconsequential to a blue water navy, like transnational organized crime, now 
represents an exposed node and a point of weakness for the global system. Thus, post-
modern sea power shifts from a focus on dominance to a focus on supervision.118 
A second conceptual obstacle to the development of strategies of maritime 
security as distinct from blue water strategies is the way such missions are 
bureaucratized. This atomized approach to maritime security is enduring because 
strategists “and even (perhaps especially) university faculties tend to prefer theories of 
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conflict framed around a single threat–insurgency, terrorism, piracy, narcotics, gangs, 
organized crime and so on.”119 The consequences of such an approach, “counter-
terrorism, counter-insurgency, counter-piracy…might be fine in a binary environment, 
where one government confronts one threat at a time,” or frames it as such. 120 Yet, that is 
not the world we live in, a world of “complex, adaptive social systems such as cities, 
trading networks, and licit and illicit economies.” 121 To respond effectively to the needs 
of such dynamic environments, counterinsurgency scholar and practitioner David 
Kilcullen calls for a “unified field theory,” a theory that is “framed around the common 
features of all types of threats (rather than optimized for the particular characteristics of 
any one type of threat) and considers the environment in toto as a single unified 
system.”122 The littorals are such systems, qualitatively distinct from the high seas, and 
their rising prominence requires the attention of new and conceptually rigorous 
approaches to what navies do in green waters. As we will explore in the coming chapters, 
Broken Windows is the comprehensive theory that fits that prescription. 
It is also important to situate ourselves within a broader framework of the existing 
(mostly post 9/11) strategic literature. At the national level, there are four major white 
papers on strategy: the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the 
National Military Strategy, and the National Security Strategy. Throughout this chapter 
we made frequent reference to the 2014 QDR and the National Security Strategy. That is 
not to say, however, that the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military 
Strategy (NMS) are not relevant. In both of these publications we see many of the 
evolving themes noted across this chapter. The NDS makes note of the escalatory threat 
non-state actors pose to the international system,123 the risk of ungoverned or under-
governed territory being expropriated for use by such actors,124 and the pressures induced 
by population growth and climate change.125 The NDS even speaks to the instability 
brought on by transnational organized crime (TOC)126 and highlights the need to build 
capacity across regional partners.127 The NMS includes references to urbanization and 
population growth in the third world,128 the risks to coastal or near coastal population 
centers,129 the growing prominence of non-state groups,130 and the role of illicit 
trafficking networks in aiding the spread of terrorists and weapons.131 Again, the NMS 
addresses cooperative capacity building, particularly with respect to combatting 
trafficking and smuggling,132 and there is even a short section dedicated to “Transnational 
Challenges.”133, 134 
There is, additionally, the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), 
published in 2005. The NSMS is a short document (twenty-seven pages, including an 
appendix). It outlines three principles of maritime security: “preserving the freedom of 
the seas,” “facilitate and defend commerce,” and “facilitate the movement of desirable 
goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and 
material.”135 The first and second of these principles are common elements of naval 
strategy and relate to maritime security only in the very broadest definition of the 
concept. The last of the three fits squarely within our definition of maritime security, but 
is more an obvious statement of homeland defense than international strategy. In fact, 
while the NSMS does mention transnational crime and piracy, its primary international 
focus is on the threat of terrorism. The majority of the document is informed by the four 
objectives derived from these three principles (prevent terrorist and criminal acts, protect 
critical infrastructure and population centers, mitigate risks, and protect the marine 
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environment). And yet, the result is not so much an international strategy but a highly 
proficient domestic threat and vulnerability assessment (TAVA). Shoring up critical 
infrastructure, reducing the risk posed to significant targets, reducing recovery time in the 
event of an attack, and denying an adversary the opportunity to recognize and strike 
valuable assets, all found in the document, are components of a TAVA. The NSMS, 
therefore, is an ideal example of how maritime security should be addressed on a 
technical and strategic level within the United States and across ports servicing the 
United States. Though, while it broaches the importance of layered security and 
combatting unconventional threats (most notably terrorism), the strategy predominantly 
speaks to global shipping and drifts more towards statements of purpose in the broader 
international security context. The National Strategy for Maritime Security therefore 
brings us no closer to a serious discussion on a comprehensive strategy of littoral 
security. 
At the force level, we delve deeper below into the primary maritime strategic 
document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.* In addition, there exist 
still other important naval and maritime publications and statements, including Naval 
Doctrinal Publication 1 (NDP-1) and Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC). While 
maritime security is not the focus of NDP-1, there is still a short section on the need to 
build international capacity to combat transnational traffickers and terrorists using the 
seas for illicit purposes.136 The NOC, however, includes a whole chapter on the 
subject.137 This chapter offers a slightly more in-depth (and abbreviation rich) look at the 
same issues we have been discussing. The NOC was intended to give substance to A 
Cooperative Strategy’s broader strategic statements.138 It is therefore noteworthy that 
even here we see a lack of coherent strategy with respect to maritime security. Responses 
to seaborne threats continue to be framed as ‘counter-something.’ Counter-piracy, 
counter-terrorism, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and more become the 
cornerstones of a half-dozen unique and distinct international maritime security 
operations.139 Thus, even where maritime security receives long overdue attention, the 
way in which it is framed remains tied to combatting individual acts. This is more 
doctrine than strategy. And to borrow an analogy from Till, “if maritime theories are 
about the art of cookery, doctrine is concerned with today’s menu.”140 Put another way, 
strategy is how a military chooses to prioritize perspectives, while doctrine is more 
concerned with connecting this lofty conjecture to the practical reality of operating as an 
armed force. Both are important, but without the wider strategic framing, doctrine is 
inevitably shortsighted. This framing problem in the strategic literature is mirrored in the 
structure of security studies. Subfields on terrorism and piracy have grown rapidly, 
offering immeasurable value in their detailed investigations of specialized topics. And 
yet, the growth of sub-disciplines has also led to the ghettoization of literature, and we 
run the risk of increasingly ignoring the grey space as a matter of disciplinary purity. 
A compounding contributing factor to the fragmentation of literature on maritime 
security, piracy, and terrorism is their relative newness. Global maritime security in 
                                                
* In 2015, the maritime services published a revised Cooperative Strategy, to which the author responded in 
in a post on CIMSEC’s NextWar journal (See, Joshua Tallis, “The New US Maritime Strategy,” Center for 
International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) NextWar blog, March 13, 2015). However, for the purposes of 
understanding the impact of CS21 on acquisitions and strategic guidance, we focus on the original 
document, since the revision has not existed long enough to direct policy. 
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particular has risen in prominence alongside a renewed, post-9/11 interest in non-state 
threats. Again, the literature offers exposition. Prior to 2002, the term maritime security 
was virtually nonexistent in academia.141 Of the more than 16,000 Google Scholar hits 
for the phrase ‘Maritime Security,’ just over 200 were penned between 1914 and 1988.142 
Since 2002, the term’s usage has increased linearly,143 a testament perhaps to a growing 
interest in dissecting the various components of the broader notion of what good order at 
sea means. We can also see this emergence in practitioner literature. We will discuss, in 
the American domestic context, the role of CS21 (released in 2007) in raising the 
prominence of maritime security for the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps. In the 
international context, strategic documents have been even slower to emerge. NATO was 
the first of the major intergovernmental organizations to publish a modern maritime 
strategy document, Alliance Maritime Strategy, in March 2011. While the document hits 
all the right notes, mentioning piracy, terrorism, WMD proliferation, transnational 
organized crime, and even global warming, it does so in a notably cursory fashion. 
NATO does not define what it means by the “maritime environment” or “maritime 
security,” which, alongside the strategy’s brevity, suggests that member countries may 
have failed to reach a deeper agreement on what such terms signify. One year later, the 
African Union (AU) set out its own agenda in 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime 
Strategy. Far longer than the NATO document, the AU’s strategy is focused on rectifying 
the continent’s ongoing struggle with establishing maritime domain awareness (MDA). 
Its authorship appears motivated largely and logically by the untapped wealth of Africa’s 
long coastline, yet at times the document bridges into the weird (nestled halfway through 
is a section on “Giant Africa Aquariums”). Yet, more than anything else, the dominant 
impression from this comparatively lengthy text is that it is more a wish list than a 
strategy. The AU acknowledges the continent’s maritime porosity, but requires too much 
of a fundamental investment in capacity building to implement any comprehensive 
strategy. 
Finally, the EU published the European Union Maritime Security Strategy in June 
2014. It is a relatively comprehensive document, strongest in its attention to the technical 
details of integrating so many member states. While the strategy succeeds in presenting 
many employable proposals, the ongoing EU tension between interoperability and 
sovereignty remains an undercurrent throughout the text. Yet, what is really significant 
about these documents is not so much their content but their dates of release. Maritime 
security is clearly a new and evolving field. Despite the fact that the illegal trafficking of 
people was an industry worth between five and seven billion dollars by 2004, despite the 
fact that a “substantial proportion” of interdicted drugs are seized in the maritime 
environment, and despite the fact that terrorist organizations increasingly use the sale of 
narcotics to fund their campaigns,144 maritime security has only recently emerged on 
most countries’ radars. Only in the last thirty years has the international community come 
together to address maritime drug smuggling,145 and the response to human trafficking 
was tragically slow. Of the roughly one dozen international treaties on terrorism signed in 
the decades before September 11, only one (the SUA Convention) addresses acts of terror 
at sea.146 For those willing to wade into the muddy waters, international maritime security 
offers few obvious niches in the literature, though it does present the opportunity to 
substantively contribute to an evolving field. 
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Eisenhower said of the military, “If we have the weapons to win a big war we can 
certainly win a small one.”147 And yet, from Vietnam to Iraq, from Libya to Afghanistan, 
it is obvious that such guidance should be regarded with skepticism. Navies cannot 
remain effective against the range of global threats simply by tailoring themselves only 
for large-scale conflicts. In 1974, the Commandant of the Army War College, speaking to 
the lessons learned from Vietnam, wrote “it is most useful if one gets a force ready for an 
uncertain future rather than a certain future. There is great danger in being too certain 
about what the future will bring, and there’s much greater assurance in preparing for a 
future which you frankly admit you cannot precisely define.”148 To do so, balance is 
critical. In the coming years, navies will need to determine how to strike a balance 
between present and future threats, between modern and post-modern perspectives, 
“between preparing for a state-centric strategic future as opposed to a system-centric 
one,”149 and between a conventional high-seas strategy and one of maritime security. 
 
3.1 Strategy Versus Acquisition 
 
While some publications, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 
National Security Strategy, have begun addressing maritime security in broad strokes, 
these efforts often come in fits and starts. As recently as the 2009 joint publication on 
amphibious operations, the words urban and city are absent, and mention of littoral 
urbanization is absent in the 2012 doctrine on joint forcible entry.150 For over a decade, 
the American military has focused on a very narrow type of conflict.151 Yet, over the last 
several years, the military has slowly come to understand that remaining relevant and 
effective will require transitioning to a broader understanding of security. As the United 
States extricates its forces from the Middle East and Southwest Asia, strategists are 
likewise extricating their minds from the deserts and mountains to resume a conversation 
on littorals that was emerging before 9/11.152 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Department of the Navy published …From 
the Sea153 and Forward…From the Sea.154 These papers highlight a transition from 
securing exclusive control of the sea, to securing maneuver space in regional littorals 
reminiscent of our primer on post-modernism.155 These publications wrestle with the 
responsibilities of a virtually uncontested Navy in a unipolar world. Their subsequent 
guidance aims to ease the inevitable transition “as Naval Forces shift from a Cold War, 
open-ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus.”156 
In the 1990s, the Navy was preparing to retool and tackle the threats, not of an imposing 
national armada, but of the complicated geostrategic role of regional littorals. 9/11 
interrupted that transition, but the maritime services have begun to resume this theme.157 
In 2011, the Marine Corps Operations manual emphasized “complex expeditionary 
operations in the urban littorals”158 and the “shifting strategic focus to the littoral 
regions.”159 In 2012, the Navy created a Coastal Riverine Force to help combat threats 
particular to brown waters.160 And in 2007, the maritime services (the Navy, Coast 
Guard, and Marine Corps) published A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
(CS21, later revised in 2015161), which demonstrates yet another important step in the 
evolution of the strategic significance of the littorals. In order to critically analyze the 
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implications of this evolution, it is useful to juxtapose CS21 against the Navy’s ongoing 
approach to acquisition.* In other words, does the Navy put its money where its mouth is? 
A Cooperative Strategy is the first joint publication of its kind. It attempts to 
connect the sea services under an umbrella strategy, which is particularly noteworthy for 
its allusions to the post-modern naval principle of defending the global system.162 The 
document opens with the pledge, “our commitment to protecting the homeland and 
winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing 
wars.”163, 164 Not to understate the point, that sentiment is restated in bolded italics.165 
This calls to mind the transition of law enforcement from a crime fighting philosophy to 
one predicated on crime prevention, a shift facilitated by community policing and the 
Broken Windows theory. In fact, a number of themes we will highlight in Chapter Two 
resurface in CS21, most notably the rejection of a binary perspective on war and peace.166 
Indeed, the joint publication’s wider premise is also not unlike our own. Both the white 
paper and this dissertation agree that the primary focus of the U.S. Navy will undoubtedly 
remain the capacity to deter, and, if need be, win large-scale conventional and nuclear 
conflicts. Yet, both the joint publication and this thesis also recognize that it is impossible 
to ignore the growing significance of crowded, networked, and impoverished littorals. 
Finally, the response to this divergence is similar in both papers: simply acknowledge the 
differences between these two responsibilities. A Cooperative Strategy shows that the 
Navy is willing to consider that two distinct threats might best be met by two distinct 
approaches to strategy. 
The joint publication divides these two approaches into “Regionally 
Concentrated, Credible Combat Power” and “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored 
Maritime Forces.”167 Each is then further subdivided into a number of functional 
obligations. For the former group, these responsibilities include: containing regional 
conflict through forward deployed forces, deterring war among major powers, and 
winning wars when necessary.168 This first approach frames the Navy’s preference for 
perceiving its role more broadly, and describes how the Navy approaches the Asia-
Pacific more specifically. It is for this approach and that region that the newest nuclear 
powered Gerald Ford class carrier was constructed. It is likewise for this strategy and 
adversary in which context nuclear powered submarines and large stealth Zumwalt-class 
destroyers have been designed. Admittedly, maintaining the capacity to win large wars 
will inevitably require expensive hardware. Still, the budgetary dominance of these 
acquisitions also demonstrates a corresponding interest in their associated missions. This 
is supported by Secretary Hagel’s remarks when, in late 2013, he was quoted as saying 
the Zumwalt “‘sends an important sign’ about U.S. commitment to the Pacific region.”169 
Mr. Hagel stated that the destroyer is symbolic of the American rebalance of resources 
and attention to the Asia-Pacific.170 Thus, while the joint publication is equally split 
between the traditional and unconventional, we can see already that there remains a 
considerable institutional emphasis on symmetrical naval activities. 
                                                
* This is instructive because, as Lieutenant Commander John Bradford (USN) notes, “strategy and policy 
staff officers working on the Navy Staff (OPNAV) since CS21’s creation were directed to continually 
reference CS21 in the course of formulating and executing their work.” See, John Bradford, “The Maritime 
Strategy of the United States: Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, 
No. 2 (August 2011): 185. 
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The second approach—globally dispersed, mission-specific forces—is, however, 
a demonstrative conceptual step towards the threats highlighted above. Here A 
Cooperative Strategy emphasizes the need to respond to natural disasters, climate change, 
non-state actors, social instability, criminal elements, and forced migration.171 These are 
precisely the underserved issues that precipitate severe global threats (what the QDR 
refers to as “stressors,”172 and factors reiterated by the Naval Chief of Information173). As 
before, this category is subdivided into a number of functional obligations, including 
defending the homeland, cooperating with international partners (on operations such as 
humanitarian assistance and law enforcement), and combating local disruptions (threats 
such as piracy, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and arms trafficking) before they 
evolve into regional or global crises. These three responsibilities underscore the 
awareness that “increasingly urbanized littoral regions” and the unconventional threats 
they engender are fast becoming major points of concern for actors a world away.174 In 
this arena as well, the Navy’s acquisition program paints an insightful picture. The 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), with its shallow draft, comparatively expansive hanger 
space, large flight deck, small crew, fast speed, and sophisticated automation was 
designed to become the workhorse of the fleet. Even over budget, at around $400 million 
a ship, the LCS provides a cost-effective175, 176 alternative to sending a multibillion-dollar 
destroyer into littorals to combat pirates, terrorists, or traffickers in open-hulled speed 
boats.177, 178 The LCS’ small size optimizes its capacity to coordinate with other navies 
and coast guards, many of which do not have the port facilities, ships, or personnel 
sufficiently skilled to train with mammoth vessels.179 The LCS’ shallow draft also allows 
it to enter hundreds more ports than a larger ship, and some analysts contend that its 
speed and integration with manned and unmanned airpower increase the ship’s resilience 
to asymmetric threats.180 
Yet, the LCS has been repeatedly targeted for cancelation or truncated production. 
O’Rourke dedicates pages chronicling continued efforts to curtail the ship’s 
procurement.181 The LCS and its mission remain second to the Pivot to Asia. In a time of 
budget austerity, resources devoted to A Cooperative Strategy’s second approach will 
continue to be seen in opportunity cost of ships designed for combat with a symmetrical 
(Chinese) adversary in mind.182 Much of the debate surrounding the LCS stems from 
legitimate criticism of the ship’s performance and the Navy’s apparent build now, 
strategize later approach.183 And yet, the intensity with which the program has been 
targeted seems to exceed the standard criticism that routinely accompanies the launch of 
new classes of major surface combatants.184 There appears to be something different 
about the negativity surrounding the LCS. Thus while the current ship design may require 
modifications, critiques of its performance augur a deeper criticism, reflective of clashing 
schools of thought between the proverbial ‘big Navy’ and its post-modern wing. This 
criticism represents a fundamental misunderstanding about the duality of the Navy’s 
responsibilities, as seen in CS21. For example, “Secretary Hagel has correctly stated that 
the Littoral Combat Ship would not fare well in a major engagement with the future 
Chinese Navy.”185, 186 The Littoral Combat Ship would be a sitting duck against a 
Chinese destroyer. The LCS, however, was not built to stand against the PLA Navy. The 
Navy is in possession of a substantively and theoretically distinct ship than the classes of 
warships it is set to replace, and that is “precisely what the Navy wanted.”187 That the 
office of the Secretary of Defense saw the ship in a dramatically different light indicates a 
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failure on the part of the Navy to effectively communicate the differences between its two 
missions, again emphasizing the undercurrents of dueling strategic schools. With the 
capability to deploy helicopters and fast rigid-hulled boats, and with a flight deck and 
modular internal storage space easily fitted to humanitarian needs, the LCS is optimized 
for an entirely different set of missions than engaging the Chinese Navy. The ship could, 
however, play a significant role in the second of A Cooperative Strategy’s two missions, 
that of international maritime security. 
Moreover, that such a conclusion seems to lack traction, coupled with the debate 
around the LCS and the fervor with which many advocated its replacement, evidences 
more than just the Navy’s difficulty communicating its obligations. It highlights the 
enduring institutional resistance to addressing maritime security in the littorals as priority 
missions. This tradeoff will become increasingly obvious because of the very delicacy of 
naval acquisitions. As Dr. Thompson illustrates, the LCS may be here to stay strictly by 
default. Any wholesale replacement of the ship could take ten years to plan and execute. 
It would consequently come into production precisely when the replacement to the Ohio-
class ballistic missile submarine is expected to enter construction at a cost of five billion 
dollars a ship.188 With an annual acquisition budget of around fifteen billion dollars, there 
would simply be no money for an LCS replacement ship at the same time.189 And since 
the submarine is among the Navy’s preeminent priorities,190 there is no question which 
project would be scrapped if push came to shove. This would leave the Navy 
significantly undersupplied, and so is an unlikely avenue altogether. For a time, the Navy 
agreed to suspend the LCS’ run after issuing thirty-two of the initial fifty-two 
contracts.191 And while the exact status of the final warships was subject to rigorous 
debate, 192, 193, 194 the Navy’s commitment to supporting some LCS variant may signal, at 
a minimum, that the institution require new ways of operating in the littorals. 
As we will see in the coming case studies, the success of a community policing, 
Broken Windows approach to naval strategy by no means requires an embrace of the 
LCS specifically. Larger ships have their own advantages in humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and related missions,195, 196 not to mention that any 
strategy of maritime security would be impossible without broader command of the sea. 
The freedom of movement of American ships ensured by more conventional assets 
allows the Navy to engage across the spectrum of unconventional and non-kinetic 
missions. Though our argument does not require a resolution of any ongoing acquisition 
debates, “a division of labor is indicated in which different classes of warship are 
configured for different levels of danger.”197 While such an approach logically 
encourages greater cost-saving, and many of CS21’s missions call for extensive capacity 
building and training with smaller navies ill-equipped to couple with larger American 
vessels, the outsized criticism directed at the comparatively inexpensive LCS signifies the 
failure to reconcile budgetary priorities with the conceptual principles of littoral 
operations. 
For the time being, “most of the warships in the present and planned fleet aren’t 
well suited for littoral operations. They are too slow, they are designed for missions in 
deep water, and they are very costly to operate.”198 As a consequence, when read through 
the lens of ongoing acquisitions, we are forced to a more tepid conclusion about the 
significance of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. The Navy’s defense of 
the LCS encourages us to see the white paper as more than just lip service to the 
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importance of littorals and constabulary actions. And yet, acquisition realities make it 
obvious that CS21 falls far short of making these issues a priority. Still, even as 
investment lags, there can be no doubt that strategists are increasingly talking about the 
risks posed by the unconventional. The Pentagon is aware that, as Rhodes Scholar and 
retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl emphasizes, large conservative institutions 
require time and concerted effort to change and innovate.199 That the Navy is even 
discussing hybrid threats, global warming, and the illegal trafficking of people, drugs, 
money, and weapons is an encouraging sign that the evolution has begun. 
Finally, we conclude this section with one last note on strategy. An important 
balance for the scholar of security studies is the relationship between strategy and policy, 
which, as we have seen throughout this chapter, are closely intertwined. As we near our 
case studies, a word on strategy and its interaction with policy would be helpful. 
Professor Everett Dolman of the U.S. Air University’s School of Advanced Air and 
Space studies explains strategy as follows: 
 
The tactical thinker seeks an answer. And while coming to a conclusion 
can be the beginning of action, it is too often the end of critical thinking. 
The strategist will instead search for the right questions; those to which the 
panorama of possible answers provides insight and spurs ever more 
questions. No solutions are possible in this construct only working 
hypotheses that the strategist knows will one day be proved false or tossed 
aside. Strategy is thus an unending process that can never lead to a 
conclusion. And this is the way it should be: continuation is the goal of 
strategy not culmination.200 
 
The search for the right questions and the knowledge that new inquiries must inevitably 
replace such questions (and their answers) is equally true of strategy and academia.  
In scholarship derived from a problem-solving approach, there is an undeniable 
intimacy with policy. And yet, the nature of that relationship is significant. While the 
responsibility of scholarship should not be to draft policy, we should not shrink from the 
recognition of our role in political discourse. Such an engagement with policy may not be 
direct, but it is important to recognize. By shaping the context of academic and, if we are 
fortunate, public debate, the political scientist is held accountable not only to his or her 
peers, but to the communities we have the potential to enrich. Till writes that “maritime 
analysts and naval historians constantly bemoan the fact that the sea is given such scant 
intellectual regard in the study of international politics and history.”201 Rectifying that 
dearth begins with recognizing that strategy development and scholarship retain the same 
underlying impulse: the search for the right questions. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
 
What has changed? Why should the U.S. maritime services take maritime security 
seriously as a body for strategic development and investment in its own right? As 
Kilcullen illustrates, the increasingly hybridized nature of urban coastal threats will only 
compound preexisting stressors like climate change and poverty in the coming decades. 
Demographic and human geographic changes are placing new and significant stress on 
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the maritime domain, and projections indicate that these factors will continue to 
drastically reshape international security. The resulting pressures those forces will 
inevitably bring to bear on navies like that of the U.S. are unlike the traditional conflicts 
Mahanian strategies are optimized to combat. As a consequence, what has also begun to 
change is the U.S. Navy’s longstanding attitude towards these issues. While not 
groundbreaking in practical terms, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and 
documents like it are nevertheless invitations for “further experimentation.”202 The 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review’s references to non-state actors and their impact amid an 
interconnected world suggest that the Pentagon has begun to recognize the veracity of 
alternative security visions that only a decade ago it would have been unlikely to 
mention.203 We are consequently presented with a compelling picture of the substantive 
changes taking hold across littorals and naval theorizing. It is the need to address these 
changes that makes this dissertation relevant. The issues raised above—including 
austerity, sustainability, urbanization, poverty, globalization, global warming, and third 
world development—will become increasingly significant throughout the ‘Asian 
century.’ And while the Asia-Pacific may dominate navies’ attention and resources, 
finding an effective strategy of maritime security to meet the needs of the growing 
masses will be indispensable for national security and international affairs. 
In the Introduction, we divided the research question into two sub-questions: why 
should we consider the need for a new perspective in naval strategy, and what is the 
Broken Windows theory? In this chapter we turned to the first question; why does it 
matter? To answer, we looked at demographic and human geographic trends, gaining a 
better understanding of the global threat forecast over the coming decades. We also 
looked at how the Pentagon is thinking about the future, how that perspective has the 
potential to obscure important developments in the littorals, and how the U.S. Navy is 
slowly addressing some of these most pressing issues. As a consequence, we were able to 
underscore how Broken Windows’ contextual and communal approach to crime 
prevention could prove fruitful as a strong foundation for a new naval littoral strategy. 
Combined, these factors answer the second of our sub-questions, the ‘so what’ of this 
research. 
In a domain where “the international architecture of the twentieth century is 
buckling under the weight of new threats,”204 the risk of disorder and poor governance is 
among the rising themes in American national security publications. From the National 
Security Strategy,205 to the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review,206 to A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,207 ensuring law and order in the face of threats that 
recognize no boundaries is among the leading problems of the early twenty-first century. 
We live in a time when pandemics, global warming, and worldwide networks of crime 
and terrorism make events in the farthest corner of the planet relevant to every citizen of 
every country. Developing a sustainable strategy of maritime security capable of 
addressing the instability of such unconventional threats requires new ways of thinking 
about what navies do, and where they do it. 
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Chapter 2: Breaking Windows 
 
“A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed…”1 
 
1.0 The Power of Context 
 
At the center of the Broken Windows theory is the notion that confronting 
disorder does not necessitate the immediate resolution of complicated and amorphous 
‘root causes’ such as global economic trends or religious radicalization. It is an argument 
that proposes that thinking big might not mean acting big, embracing Archimedes’ 
perspective on leverage: “Give me a place to stand and I will move the world.”  By 
targeting perceptions, often through addressing small-scale disorder, even large-scale 
epidemics can be curbed. On the New York City subway, cracking down on fare-beating 
resulted in a dramatic turnaround for what was once one of the country’s most violent 
transportation systems. Above ground, policing quality-of-life misdemeanor crimes such 
as graffiti, prostitution, and aggressive panhandling helped reduce felony rates to their 
lowest level in years. In the maritime environment, understanding issues through the 
Broken Windows lens means placing a greater emphasis on understanding the interplay 
of perception and security. Doing so may look like offering more humanitarian assistance 
(HA/DR), combatting human trafficking, or targeting narcotics and arms trafficking. 
While these are catastrophic on a human scale, constabulary duties have always been 
small fish for the United States Navy.2 Yet, Broken Windows suggests that dealing with 
issues on the softer end of the threat scale can help restore a community’s confidence and 
ability to self-monitor. As human geographic and demographic projections anticipate a 
substantial rise in the conditions that produce these threats, such an approach may offer 
strategists what Archimedes ultimately lacked—a place to stand. Nowhere is this 
simplicity of disproportionate impact examined better than in Malcolm Gladwell’s The 
Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference. In it, Gladwell seeks to 
expose and explain the levers which move everything from fashion trends to syphilis 
outbreaks by identifying three components of epidemics: the Law of the Few, the 
Stickiness Factor, and the Power of Context.3 The impacts of these factors are variable, 
dependent on the type of epidemic being analyzed. As a consequence, identifying which 
‘law’ most directly applies to our discussion is a useful first step in understanding the 
logic behind Broken Windows. 
The Law of the Few explains the power of word of mouth campaigns through the 
social sway of a small cadre of influential individuals.4 For us, however, this first law is 
ultimately incidental. The Law of the Few helps explain the human mechanisms that 
drive social movements, not their content. The second contributor Gladwell suggests is 
the Stickiness Factor, the content component absent in the Law of the Few; if you want to 
make an impact, you need people to remember what you said or did.5 This factor is 
similarly incidental to our research. The quality of the argument presented here will 
invariably impact its stickiness, but this factor focuses more on the attraction of a 
message and less on its real world relevance. 
The third law, the Power of Context, stipulates that our environment influences all 
of us. That much seems obvious; clearly context impacts people. Yet, Gladwell’s 
contribution is in the depths to which he takes this assertion, demonstrating how 
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profoundly that contextual influence is in fact exerted. Clinical and psychological studies 
on everyone from pre-teens to seminarians suggest that our surroundings have an almost 
overriding impact on how we behave. Students may cheat on arithmetic tests but not 
spelling tests, or they may cheat at home but not at school, but there always seems to be a 
circumstance in which a student will cheat.6 Their environment informs how and when 
they break the rules, not if they will. Likewise, seminary students told they were late for 
delivering a speech were more prone to literally stepping over a man in need of help (an 
actor) than ones told they were early. Critically, before the experiment, both groups were 
reminded of the parable of the Good Samaritan (the theme of the sermon).7 Being in a 
rushed versus relaxed context was the only explanatory factor for predicting whether a 
seminary student would stop to help a person in pain while en route to deliver a sermon 
on the Good Samaritan. Subtleties of context do not merely inform our actions, they 
appear to instruct them. As you may suspect, “Broken Windows theory and the Power of 
Context are one and the same.” 8 Understanding how to influence the subtleties around 
the margins of an environment can reverse (in other words, tip) epidemics of crime, 
violence, and even maritime instability.9 Context can be changed, and therefore, so can 
actions—so the theory holds. 
 
1.1 Theory and Terms 
 
The Atlantic is over 150 years old. During its tenure as an opinion maker in 
American history, the magazine has published everyone from Mark Twain to Martin 
Luther King, Jr. It is therefore no small testament to the ingenuity and accessibility of 
George Kelling and James Q. Wilson that, amongst these figures, it is the piece they 
published in March 1982 entitled “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety” that endures as the single most reproduced article in the publication’s history.10 
The forceful simplicity of their argument, and the sensitive nature of police policy in the 
turbulent 1980s, combined to catapult Broken Windows into the major competitor to 
‘traditional’ views of police work.11 While Kelling in particular would go on to publish 
more specific elucidations of Broken Windows—notably with Catherine Coles in Fixing 
Broken Windows—this first article seemed to strike a chord in and beyond the field of 
criminology. 
This chord resonated, in part, because the foundation had been laid 13 years 
earlier, with a transcontinental experiment. In 1969, two cars were parked and abandoned 
with their hoods up.12 One was in Palo Alto, a wealthy California suburb at the center of 
Silicon Valley; the other was left in the Bronx, a rough borough of New York City.13 
Within ten minutes, individuals had set upon the car in the Bronx, many being families or 
white-collar workers. Within twenty-four hours, there was almost nothing left of it to 
take.14 The car quickly became a jungle gym for children, just a piece of rust on a dirty 
Bronx street.15 The fate of the Bronx car seems fairly obvious to anyone with a passing 
familiarity with one of New York’s grittiest neighborhoods. The Palo Alto car, not 
surprisingly, fared much better for a while, until Philip Zimbardo, the Stanford 
psychologist responsible for the experiment, hit it with a sledgehammer.16 Soon, the 
good-natured people of the Golden State, mostly middle class, had destroyed the vehicle 
and left it entirely overturned.17 
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The varied mindsets of Bronx residents—ranging from indifferent, to 
discouraged, to utter disregard—facilitated the early onset of vandalism there; the people 
of the neighborhood expressly believed no one cared what happened to abandoned cars.18 
In Palo Alto, the community expectations were different. Law and order was well- 
maintained, and people had dramatically different experiences and expectations of 
behavior. Yet, even in that comfortable suburban enclave, the smallest signal that no one 
cared (i.e. the sledgehammer to the car) dissolved communal restraints almost 
instantaneously.19 The experiment, while preceding the Atlantic article, is a proof of 
concept for Broken Windows. It tells us not just that perceived environmental decay 
encourages the rapid disintegration of community self-policing, but also that no 
neighborhood is immune to the Power of Context. 
The message, however, is not fatalistic. If Zimbardo had not smashed the car a 
week into the experiment, who knows how long Palo Alto’s residents would have 
continued to walk past it. Instead, the intent is to uncover why some communities 
precipitate behavior that results in action such as that in the Bronx, and how they may be 
altered to mirror Palo Alto. Criminologists have posited a number of theories about race, 
socioeconomics, narcotics, alcohol, and more to explain the turbulence of certain 
neighborhoods. While many highlight serious social issues, Broken Windows claims that 
none of these root cause explanations shares the same level of correlation with a 
community’s crime rate as does the prevalence of disorder. 
This thesis seeks to apply the practically tested lessons born out of the Broken 
Windows theory, methods of policing that were originally made possible through the 
problem-solving approach and that proved wildly popular in some communities. The 
accompanying policies are often referred to as Broken Windows policing or quality-of-
life policing. As the cases in the New York subway and New York City will highlight, 
through a qualitative narration of disorder’s impact on crime, law enforcement’s ability to 
leverage that hypothesized association produced a measureable result on the rate of 
violence. By adapting and applying the policing techniques emanating from Wilson and 
Kelling’s theory, it is our contention that the maritime security subfield can similarly 
conceptualize destabilizing actors across the world, even without a conclusion to the 
causal debate of root causes. 
The qualitative process tracing approach starts at the beginning of the chain, the 
initiating incident. It asks, how does one dent in an abandoned car, or one derelict 
building, truly spark urban decline? This gets to the fundamentals of Broken Windows, 
and in response Wilson and Kelling sketch the following example: 
 
A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. 
Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become 
more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers 
gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they 
refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of 
the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to 
sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.20 
 
 It almost sounds like Archie Bunker’s worst nightmare, and equally as dramatic. 
The truth is, however, that this outline has repeatedly proven illustrative of real world 
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cases. Disorder spreads steadily. First, a window is broken. If it goes unfixed, sociologists 
and police agree that soon all the windows of that building will likely be broken.21, 22 
Why? The destruction of property surely does not aggregate in certain districts because 
there is a disproportionate distribution of window-smashers to window-lovers; rather, the 
first broken window serves as a signal,23 like a sledgehammer to a car. It is a sign that no 
one cares, no one is watching, and there is nothing to stop someone from breaking the 
next one. Kelling and Wilson’s panhandlers are also broken windows.24 Muggers prefer 
to operate where people are already intimidated, they believe the chances of detection are 
lower where residents cannot even seem to keep their streets orderly.25 They begin to 
consume the area; eventually a mugging goes wrong and the neighborhood experiences a 
murder. Suddenly a series of events that started with an abandoned property ends in 
violent crime. The simplicity of the metaphor of a broken window belies the complex 
mechanisms of a community’s ability to self-monitor, and law enforcement’s ability to 
impose order, which a single signal of minor vandalism can in time unravel. 
Why was Broken Windows needed? Nationwide crime rates for the 1970s 
through the late 1990s certainly suggest something was not working. Kelling and Coles 
make the argument throughout Fixing Broken Windows that modern law enforcement’s 
crime-fighting approach was an ineffective way of addressing the damage caused by 
disorder.26 Such a style of policing should be familiar to anyone living near an American 
city. It is typified by police in their cruisers, always available for dispatch calls, reluctant 
to engage with pedestrians, and directly attached to computerized 911 networks.27 Police 
and the communities they serve grow apart, distrust builds, and disorder is compounded 
by inaction and a sense of loyalty to the profession.28 For example, many felt that the 
NYPD’s guiding philosophy during this time was plainly, “stay out of trouble.”29 Kelling 
and Wilson’s suggestion was to control crime through controlling disorder, not trying to 
catch every crime in the act. Order maintenance (quality-of-life policing)30 is the effort to 
constrain the behavioral and physical manifestations of disorder, which serve as signs of 
neighborhood decay.31 This is crime prevention, not crime fighting. By stemming 
disorderly conduct, and perceptions thereof, the process of degradation can be 
intercepted, and order maintenance can break the cycle. Most empirical research studying 
Broken Windows uses misdemeanor arrests as a measure of quality-of-life policing. Such 
crimes include typical low-level malfeasance such as graffiti, vandalism, prostitution, 
public drinking, etc.32 Note that Kelling’s definition of Broken Windows policing33 
accounts for the influence of more than just the physical environment on our actions. It is 
inclusive of a holistic understanding of context, to include behavior alongside more literal 
broken windows, as was Gladwell’s Power of Context. It is the intention of this research 
to apply that same perspective to maritime security by reframing the physical and 
behavioral domain of littoral communities, as expressed in the introduction. 
Notwithstanding the obvious need for innovation in the police force, this 
alternative community-based policing model was greeted with strong criticism. Police 
simply could not be bothered to address minor issues when there was “real” police work 
to be done.34 A half-century of reform in police strategy had led many to believe there 
had never been any other function for law enforcement besides crime fighting. This 
cognitive dissonance is not uncommon in large institutions with their own cultures and 
agendas. In the military, for example, “a remembered past has always more or less 
constricted both action in the present and thinking about the future,”35 regardless of the 
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accuracy of that remembered past. In reality, before midcentury, police were seen as 
primarily responsible for “crime prevention” and order maintenance, “keeping peace by 
peaceful means.”36 Even the very phrase “law enforcement” was not in use until the 
1960s,37 around the time that the idea of the criminal justice “system” first found 
expression.38 As a result, police were thrust into a systematized bureaucracy that 
effectively reduced their role to the apprehension of suspected criminals. 
Another significant point of friction was the legal pushback from libertarian 
advocacy groups that see order maintenance tactics as veiled attempts to target the rights 
of homeless individuals.39 Kelling and Wilson were frequent targets of attacks of 
classism and racism, prompting Kelling and Coles to directly address the subject of 
homelessness in Fixing Broken Windows. By presenting a nuanced understanding of the 
homeless community, Kelling and Coles hoped to substantiate their focus on order 
maintenance while demonstrating a commitment to helping the underserved as much as 
the rest.40 While successful implementation of community policing programs quickly 
won over officers, legal challenges threatened to make these gains obsolete. This was 
such a threat to the survival of Broken Windows policing that Kelling and Coles dedicate 
a full chapter, and broad sections of almost every other, to discussing the legal support 
for their position and explaining some misrepresentations they deem typical of suits filed 
by advocacy groups on behalf of the homeless.41 The compelling legal arguments on both 
sides have resulted in pitched court battles in every city or state that has implemented 
order maintenance legislation (Seattle,42 San Francisco,43 New York,44 Texas,45 
Baltimore,46 Miami,47 etc.).48, 49 
Finally, community policing undeniably sounds “soft,” a tone belying order 
maintenance’s proactive approach to crime prevention.50 Some law enforcement officials 
consequently regarded Broken Windows as beneath their profession, or beyond the scope 
of their responsibilities within the criminal justice system. This too is paralleled in the 
armed forces. Order maintenance is relegated to “operations other than war,”51 at best 
something to do while waiting for a real war, at worst a distraction and a waste of 
resources. State building and community support on a large scale have often been 
perceived as the sole province of the State Department, an atomized (and incomplete)52 
perspective on the role order truly plays in security. Yet, order maintenance reached 
receptive minds among police. New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, 
serving in that post from January 1994 to April 1996 (and again from January 2014 to 
present), quickly became a Broken Windows adherent. Bratton would prove critical in 
demonstrating on a massive scale the potential of order maintenance policing, uncovering 
associations between disorder and violent crime that Kelling and Coles, publishing Fixing 
Broken Windows in 1996, were only just beginning to notice.53 Two cases chronicling 
Bratton’s stewardship of New York City’s Transit Authority Police Department (TPD), 
and later the NYPD, illustrate the power of Wilson and Kelling’s concept when put into 
practice. These cases are also the two dominant studies in Broken Windows literature, 
and therefore an understanding of each covers a substantive scope of the field. While not 
the first implementations of order maintenance, New York’s experimentation was the 
largest and most potent demonstration of any early foray into Broken Windows. 
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1.2 The New York City Subway 
 
A day in the life of an average New York subway user in 1984 seems 
unimaginable now:  
 
Chances are [her] train was late, because in 1984 there was a fire 
somewhere on the New York system every day and a derailment every 
other week…[The car she] sat in was filthy, its floor littered with trash and 
the walls and ceiling thick with graffiti, but that wasn’t unusual because in 
1984 every one of the 6,000 cars in the Transit Authority fleet, with the 
exception of the midtown shuttle, was covered with graffiti – top to 
bottom, inside and out…Today the number two train accelerates to over 
40 miles an hour…but it’s doubtful [her] train went that fast. In 1984, 
there were 500 ‘red tape’ areas on the system – places where track damage 
had made it unsafe for trains to go more than 15 miles per hour. Fare-
beating was so commonplace that it was costing the Transit Authority as 
much as $150 million in lost revenue annually.54 
 
On any given day the system experienced over forty felonies (it would top fifty a 
day by 1989), and aggressive panhandling and the pervasiveness of petty crime had 
forced ridership to its lowest point in history.55 Extortion of passengers was common, 
with vandals disabling token machines and collecting fares from customers as they held 
open gates to the platform.56 In fact, the chairman of the New York City Metropolitan 
Transit Authority (MTA, Kiley) and the future TPD commissioner (Bratton) were both 
caught in traps such as this.57, 58 In short, life on the subway was dirty and dangerous. 
Then suddenly, from a record high felony rate, subway ridership improved and violent 
crime dropped seventy-five percent.59 How? 
In the 1980s, Kelling began consulting for the MTA. Around that time, in 1984, 
the newly appointed Transit Authority President David Gunn launched the Clean Car 
Program, a multi-billion dollar initiative to eradicate graffiti from the subway.60 As 
Broken Windows suggests, graffiti on a train provides “inescapable [proof] that the 
environment [a rider] must endure for an hour or more a day is uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable, and that anyone can invade it to do whatever damage and mischief the 
mind suggests.”61 It took military diligence to take back the over 5,000 cars used by three 
and a half million people a day.62 Special police units rode in and defended reclaimed 
trains,63 and any clean car with new graffiti was either fixed in the short changeover at 
the terminus of a route or removed from the tracks.64 It was not until May 12, 1989 that 
the final subway car was ultimately cleaned,65 at which time the MTA had accomplished 
one of the largest urban restoration projects ever attempted.66 And yet, crime persisted. 
Was Broken Windows broken? 
 Not exactly. As a problem-oriented policing approach, Broken Windows is best 
applied when law enforcement identify, in concert with communities, the problems most 
directly affecting them. Effective policing, therefore, requires effective problem 
identification. While the graffiti removal was a necessary prerequisite to taking back the 
subway, it was not the end of the line. Disorder had become so rampant in the system that 
even this massive undertaking was not enough to bring it under police control.67 The 
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deeper problem had always been broadly labeled ‘homelessness,’68 “and homelessness 
was not the TPD’s problem.”69 It was not until Kelling headed an investigative study for 
the MTA70 that the issue of disorderly criminal behavior was identified as the real issue. 
Once that occurred, officers were given the tools to begin tackling the appalling 
conditions of their underground world.71 In October 1989, Operation Enforcement kicked 
off to a slow start,72 and in April 1990 William Bratton took the reigns of the Transit 
Police Department.73 Like Gunn, Bratton was a Broken Windows disciple,74 and his 
leadership saw an instantaneous spike in enforcement; “ejections for misbehavior tripled 
within a matter of months after Bratton took office.”75 His primary target? Fare-beaters. 
 In 1990 a quarter of a million people were avoiding paying fares every day,76 and, 
like graffiti, Bratton saw fare evasion as a signal of disorder.77 Despite costing millions of 
dollars to the city annually, TPD officers had been reluctant to pursue youths hopping 
turnstiles. It took almost an entire day to process someone for a $1.25 misdemeanor;78 it 
just was not worth it. Bratton sought to change that. He remodeled a transit bus and 
turned it into a mobile station house, while officers had fare-beaters stand in daisy chains 
until they had a full haul; soon, processing times were down to an hour even as arrests 
increased, and the tide began to change.79 The full impact of order maintenance became 
immediately apparent; one out of every seven fare beaters arrested had an outstanding 
warrant, and one out of every twenty was carrying a weapon.80 Put another way, about 
one in ten arrests for a $1.25 offense yielded a felony or Class A misdemeanor arrest.81 
Nothing could have better exposed the links between disorder and crime than the proof 
that many fare beaters were not just misbehaving delinquents but possible felons or 
career criminals.82 Crime drops in direct correlation to an increased effort to maintain 
order because such policies put police in contact with violent offenders before any more 
offenses are committed.83 In other words, crime, and the individuals who engage in 
crime, are multidimensional. To their credit, “the bad guys wised up,” weapons were left 
at home, and everyone started paying their fares.84 By the early 1990s, crime was no 
longer a serious problem on the New York City subway, and, before the decade was out, 
it could be said to be “among the safest in the world.”85 
Some may argue that the subway case is too narrow an example to validate 
Broken Windows or use it to apply the theory to the littorals. Though New York’s 
subway is more extensive than most, it is in the end a “spatially bounded” network with 
defined points of ingress and egress.86 That, however, is precisely its advantage, serving 
as a contained natural experiment isolating many of the factors difficult to control in a 
city. The reclamation of the New York City subway was one of the largest municipal 
problem-solving exercises ever attempted, and its spatial restrictions make Bratton’s 
success difficult to attribute to anything other than direct police policy.87 Even more so, 
the root cause explanations often attributed to the decline in citywide (and nationwide) 
crime later in the decade do not apply: the subway was never a major drug market, the 
economy was still struggling, unemployment was on the rise, and the youth population 
had not shrunk.88 Target hardening, access restriction and managerial changes all played 
a role. But it was not until order maintenance was properly enforced that a ‘tipping point’ 
was reached and there were any noticeable changes in subway crime.89 The closed system 
gave Broken Windows an opportunity in which the many distracting variables endemic to 
large cities were naturally controlled.90 As a consequence, the physical environment was 
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restored, the runaway behavior was curbed, and the MTA now operates one of the most 
popular transit systems around. 
Among the most significant problems with taking Broken Windows into the 
maritime domain is the transition from urban to open. Even studies that have adopted 
Broken Windows in alternative disciplines have applied the theory overwhelmingly in 
urban settings. Wilson, Kelling, Sousa, and Coles have produced penetrating insight into 
the machinery of order maintenance, but their work remains tied to the basic metropolitan 
unit. No two cities are identical, but the existence of neighborhoods and communities is 
universal, even if at times their borders are ambiguous. The New York City subway 
experiment, however, suggests that habitation is not a prerequisite for the effectiveness of 
Broken Windows. Just as people do not generally live on the subway but rather use it as a 
means of transportation or employment, so too do people rarely live on open water but 
instead use it as a means of transport and economy. The mere presence of people in an 
area creates its own community with its own rules, or lack thereof. Like our “streets, 
parks, and sidewalks” the subway and waterways “belong to no one and therefore to 
everyone.”91 
The subway is one very small example relative to the global scope of this 
research. Nevertheless, its recovery lends strong support to Broken Windows as a theory 
of an overall behavioral, not strictly urban, condition. Broken Windows illustrates not 
only the mechanics of urban decline, but of human psychology. Indeed, the consensus 
among sociologists and police that one broken window inevitably leads to more is not 
dependent on the urban political-geographical setting of window breakers, but rather on 
their immediate context. This is Gladwell’s approach as well; The Tipping Point and the 
Power of Context are about creating, stopping, and altering epidemics on scales that are 
unencumbered by the confines of points on a map. In expanding Broken Windows 
beyond the basic city unit, we may run the risk of overextending its language; however, 
the literature supports the position that there is no concomitant risk of diluting the 
relevance of such principles. 
Moreover, over the last several decades the spheres of criminology and 
international security have been in slow convergence. As the world’s growing population 
continues to crowd ever more people into the sprawling slums and shantytowns of the 
third world, urban issues such as poverty and crime have slowly become crises of 
international proportions. The increasing urbanization and littoralization of the third 
world—the tendency for people to cluster along the water—is a breeding ground for 
violence and crime, as overburdened megacities lose control over large portions of their 
population. We addressed this convergence in greater detail in Chapter One. Now, we 
turn to the second of Broken Windows’ two most oft-cited case studies, New York City. 
 
1.3 From the City to the Sea 
 
Broken Windows is a problem-oriented theory. Its principles are intended to apply 
broadly, and each community is afforded the flexibility to identify the particular issues 
plaguing it. In New York City, rampant crime was just as significant a problem as it was 
in the subway, yet its causes and manifestations were by no means identical. The subway 
experiment is illustrative of Broken Windows’ impact in a closed system. New York 
City’s experience has proven to be more contentious, no doubt because of the 
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innumerable factors that may be attributed to crime reduction in such a large, open 
municipality. Nevertheless, the transition of William Bratton to Commissioner of the 
New York City Police Department (NYPD) in January 1994 suggests that the theory was 
an integral component of New York’s recovery strategy. 
As a young child, I remember driving with my family through the city (we lived 
in the suburbs, approximately thirty miles outside of NYC), and always being a bit 
nervous of highway mergers and intersections. At the time, the last vestiges of 
‘squeegeeing’ were beginning to be curtailed. Squeegeeing is the “unsolicited washing of 
car windows,” often by groups of washers approaching cars stopped at red lights or in 
heavy traffic by the entrances of tunnels, bridges, or mergers.92 While it sounds innocent 
enough, watching a crowd of men prowl between cars was a disquieting experience for a 
young boy. It was also unsettling for adults, as it turns out. Some squeegee-men who 
were denied compensation would fold themselves onto the hoods of cars to obstruct their 
passage, others would spit on windows or spray grimy water on them to obfuscate a 
driver’s vision, and occasionally vehicles might even be swarmed by a gang of squeegee-
men.93 Just as Bratton and Kiley had been trapped in subway fare extortions, so too did 
then-NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly have his car serviced and subsequently spit 
on as he and his wife drove through the city.94 Soon after, Kelling was contacted to help 
curb the pandemic.95 
Squeegeeing was punishable by a Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT, usually a fine), 
often called the “Disappearance Ticket” because those served rarely made a point of 
keeping their appointments.96 Missing a desk appearance resulted in the issuance of a 
warrant, but they were almost always lost in the flurry of outstanding warrants on more 
serious crimes. Police found themselves helpless in the face of obstinate offenders who 
were outside the law. Eventually, a street officer came to the common-sense realization 
that if patrolmen could access warrants themselves, they could arrest previous offenders 
on their beat and bypass the warrant-service unit entirely.97 In a matter of weeks, 
squeegeeing was almost eradicated as growing numbers of arrests demonstrated police 
commitment.98 Through a focus on small-scale crimes, signaling a renewed emphasis on 
order maintenance, Broken Windows policing had made its debut on the streets of New 
York and proved decidedly effective. Concurrently, in January 1994, William Bratton 
was appointed police commissioner. As in the subway, Bratton’s tenure saw an 
immediate spike in attention to quality-of-life crimes.99 One and one-half years into his 
stewardship, a city so recently overrun with crime had changed enough to declare “The 
End of Crime As We Know It” on the cover of New York magazine.100 
In 1992, New York experienced 2,154 murders and a total of 626,182 index 
crimes.101 In five years, murder rates were down 64.3% (to 770) and total index crime 
had been cut in half (355,893).102 By way of contrast, in 1994, murder rates declined 5% 
nationally, while they far exceeded that mark at 17% in New York.103 As he did with the 
subway, Bratton ensured that enforcement focused on perceptions of disorder, this time at 
a local level. High profile weekly meetings between top chiefs and precinct commanders 
ensured that middle management were made aware of their accountability to the Broken 
Windows approach; misdemeanor policing became the dominant means of conveying a 
sense of control and presence on every block in the city. And just as in the subway, it 
soon became obvious that low-level crimes were often perpetrated by violent offenders, 
or those with knowledge of such offenders: 
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A person arrested for urinating in a park, when questioned about other 
problems, gave police information that resulted in the confiscation of a 
small cache of weapons; a motorcyclist cited for not wearing a helmet, on 
closer inspection, was carrying a nine-millimeter handgun, had another in 
his sidebag, and had several high-powered weapons in his apartment; a 
vendor selling hot merchandise, after being questioned, led police to a 
fence specializing in stolen weapons.104 
 
Of course, not every minor incident led to such a find. Recall that in the subway, arrests 
of fare beaters only turned up a weapon or an outstanding warrant one time in ten. Yet, it 
was enough to turn the tide. Broken Windows policing allowed for the collection of 
“accurate and timely intelligence” by encouraging officers to interact with a subset of the 
criminal population they long ignored; local discretion allowed responders to follow up 
on the intelligence they gathered quickly, and proper oversight ensured that such 
discretion was employed effectively and appropriately.105 
There is no doubt that myriad factors were involved as well. We noted that crime 
rates across the country were shrinking, if not as dramatically as the rates in New York. 
Borrowing from Gladwell’s argument, Bratton, Kelling, and Sousa suggest that Broken 
Windows amplified such forces to create a tipping point in the fight against the crime 
epidemic,106, 107 adding compelling leverage to pre-existing trends. Yet, even as we saw 
in the subway example, when applied consistently, Broken Windows can create a tipping 
point in and of itself. Furthermore, while New York is only one city, each of its seventy-
six precincts is in truth a city unto itself, with distinct cultures, socioeconomics, and 
populations exceeding 100,000.108 Each of these precincts received the same policing 
style under Bratton, with the ability to tailor Broken Windows to their specific needs, and 
fully seventy-four out of seventy-six (over ninety-seven percent) did not differ 
significantly with respect to crime rate reduction.109 
The full story of New York has been outlined in detail in Kelling and Coles’ 
Fixing Broken Windows, Gladwell’s Tipping Point, Bratton’s Turnaround,110 and other 
works. The major lessons for our research can already be discerned without further detail. 
Both New York City and the NYC subway system illustrate the effectiveness of order 
maintenance as a means of violence prevention. The differences between the two 
highlight the flexibility inherent in Broken Windows, alongside its reliance on honest, 
transparent, and verifiable problem solving. Finally, its quick implementation by the TPD 
and NYPD demonstrates that Broken Windows can help retool large organizations to 
nimbly and judiciously enforce against pervasive disorder, employ timely intelligence, 
and interrupt the cycle of disorder and violence that Broken Windows would contend 
contributes to instability in hotspots across the globe. 
In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John Nagl argues that for an institution to 
learn and evolve, the rank and file must have an opportunity to transmit their experiences 
upwards. Subordinates must be encouraged to question policy, offer suggestions from the 
field, interact with higher ranks, and inform informal procedures rather than have them 
bureaucratically imposed from the top down.111 Broken Windows is best applied with 
such management. Bratton is renowned for his ability to restore order not just to cities (he 
was police commissioner in Los Angeles and Boston as well), but also to police 
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departments.112 Upon taking the reins of the NYPD, he immediately devolved power 
from a few dozen chiefs down to the seventy-six precinct commanders113 because true 
order maintenance requires an intimate familiarity with local context and custom.114 Law 
enforcement activities may only comprise about twenty percent of the daily workload of 
a police officer walking his beat.115 The other eighty percent of his time is spent on 
unofficial order maintenance—circumstances in which police use discretion to determine 
not only whether a crime has been committed, but also whether the behavior at issue 
requires formal censure or extralegal responses. This process necessitates the exercise of 
discretion on the part of officers,116 which anticipates that the daily routine of police 
cannot rely on “rote application of specific rules, but on the application of general 
knowledge and skill.”117 There is a degree of flexibility in how police respond to 
factually identical situations,118 and chiefs have come to accept, borrowing military 
parlance, the “war being fought by junior commanders…[with] the responsibility to make 
decisions on the spot.”119 
 “The American way of war,” on the other hand, has historically been “marked by 
a belief that the nation is at war or at peace; [a] binary nature of war”120 that resists the 
recognition that a soldier likewise may spend less than twenty percent of her career 
fighting ‘real’ wars. Further, today it seems fundamentally hard to know when states are 
at war and when they are at peace. The U.S. armed forces long adhered to the notion that 
“strategy begins where politics ends.”121 Despite a keen awareness that security is no 
longer so simple, the protracted and inconclusive conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
alongside instability across the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus, and Central 
America, demonstrate the continued lack of a strategic mindset fit to take the post-Cold 
War mantel. The midcentury American police focus on crime fighting rings similar. 
Police, like the military, retained a “remarkable aversion to the use of unconventional 
tactics,”122 despite the overwhelming rise in crime. The criminal justice system had 
“atomized” crime as befits the fractured nature of bureaucracies; yet, as each element of 
the system gained in efficiency, crime continued to get worse.123 Police experienced the 
same “Cult of the Offensive” that beguiles strategists,124 ignoring the benefits of an 
energetic defense in favor of a struggling offense. And yet, police managed to change, to 
allow for adaptive, nuanced techniques, embracing a more holistic approach to problem 
solving. 
Navies too have long theorized about their roles in peace and war, but the grey 
spaces in between are far less conspicuous. Broken Windows provides a strategy that 
largely dispenses with the binary assumptions of war and peace, that embraces the 
ambiguity between soldier and statesman and replaces it all with a framework that allows 
the police and military to fix real problems in a time when absolutes no longer reign 
supreme. Marine Corps General “Brute” Krulak said, “You cannot win militarily. You 
have to win totally, or you are not winning at all.”125 In the twenty first century, militaries 
have struggled to find a strategy that supports this heuristic, but Broken Windows has 
proven its relevance and utility, to those besieged by violence, as well as to those 
responsible for its implementation. 
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2.0 Broken Windows and Public Health 
 
Broken Windows is of course a metaphor, one that has gained such prominence in 
large part because its simplicity has elicited that stickiness to which Gladwell refers. Yet, 
metaphors can be too accessible, oversimplifying a concept to a point where its use 
becomes ubiquitous but its substance diminishes. We will demonstrate in this section that 
our application of Broken Windows is part of a continuum of interpretation that falls 
within the bounds of reasonable extrapolation. 
While Broken Windows gained prominence as a criminological construct, this 
dissertation is not the first time its theoretical underpinnings have expanded into other 
disciplines. Medicine, psychology, and sociology all engage with the powerful 
relationship Broken Windows posits between context and behavior. And speculation 
about that interplay has existed for far longer than the theory itself. Above we noted the 
1969 car experiment. In another study predating Broken Windows, academics at Johns 
Hopkins University established that, when it comes to neighborhood relationships and 
mental health, “space [i.e. context] in and of itself is an important factor.”126 Twenty 
years later, Kelling and Wilson capitalized on the validity of that hypothesis, and fields 
like public health have quickly made it their own. Papers on topics ranging from 
obstacles facing integrated care,127 to understanding self-esteem,128 to the spread of 
venereal diseases129 incorporate aspects of criminology for a fresh look at persistent, 
chronic issues. In one study, partially funded by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Louisiana-based researchers analyzed the gonorrhea rates of 26,600 people 
across fifty-five block groups (a census term) in the city of New Orleans.130 Using digital 
mapping features to plot all reported cases of the infection (reporting is mandated by law) 
and visual data collected by the University of New Orleans on street conditions in each 
block group, the researchers were able to construct a Broken Windows index131 to 
quantify the degree of disorder on a given street and compare it with the spread of 
venereal disease.132 The methods employed make it a telling example of how Kelling and 
Wilson’s theory has been adopted by the medical community.  
The researchers proceeded to map the other variables often associated with the 
spread of gonorrhea, such as the presence of liquor stores, the racial makeup of each 
block group, the marital status of those in the groups, and their level of poverty (all 
gleaned from census and city records).133 Of all the variables tested using a least squared 
regression, only the Broken Windows index and the poverty index showed any 
significant relationship with the predominance of gonorrhea across blocks, with the 
Broken Windows index expressing a higher degree of relation with disease rates than 
poverty.134 In fact, neighborhoods with low Broken Windows scores (orderly) and high 
rates of poverty showed no discernable difference in infection rates when compared to 
neighborhoods with low Broken Windows scores (orderly) and low rates of poverty.135 
The authors do not go so far as to determine the nature of any causality that this 
correlation implies, but the results nevertheless dramatically support the broader 
applicability of Kelling and Wilson’s idea. Measuring the deterioration of a neighborhood 
was a greater predictor of gonorrhea prevalence than any previous variable, including 
longstanding indicators such as race and socioeconomics. The report upends the 
traditional model of STI predictors, and despite stopping short of establishing causation, 
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the study does suggest a trial intervention program to assess the environment’s direct 
impact on high-risk sexual behavior.136 
The Louisiana gonorrhea case study focused primarily on a literal interpretation 
of Broken Windows, referring to the physical environment in which people live. While 
that environment impacted high-risk sexual behavior, it was the tangible setting of New 
Orleans that was the focus of examination. And for good reason—such a literal 
interpretation is easily observed and often produces useful propositions for practitioners. 
Yet, as Gladwell demonstrates with the Power of Context, environment can be interpreted 
far more broadly, to a state of mind. The seminary experiment from earlier offers a good 
example. It was the context of time (being late or early to deliver a sermon) that impacted 
the actions of those students, not something we can see, or touch, or hear. Studies that 
help forge a bridge between the more literal Broken Windows approach and Gladwell 
(and Kelling’s) broader contextual application include those like a 2003 survey of youth 
safety across Baltimore, Detroit, Oakland, Philadelphia, and Richmond.137 The paper 
established that feelings of fear at school among students were directly related to those 
students’ beliefs that their schools were disorderly.138 Once again, a majority of typically 
associated demographic variables appeared to be “less strongly associated with feelings 
of safety” when compared to disorderliness.139 Because, however, the interviews were 
conducted by phone, the authors could not evaluate, first-hand, the physical state of each 
respondent’s school. Instead, the authors used the reaction to the statement, “Kids can get 
away with almost anything at my school” to code for disorder.140 Because of this, the 
authors concede that the study is limited due to an inability to directly assess school 
conditions.141 It is not, though, a weakness for the theory at large. In this more emotional 
and constructed approach to the concept of disorder, papers such as this demonstrate a 
shift in the interpretation of Broken Windows within public health. This shift better 
reflects how the theory has long been used in criminology, an evolution from the literal to 
the metaphorical. Broken Windows and disorder are about how people feel about their 
environment (see Skogan),142 inclusive of behavioral disorder; in this case how they feel 
about the state of their school as opposed to any objective ‘reality.’ Contextualizing our 
surroundings, as these experiments demonstrate, is as much about how someone 
emotionally perceives their environment as the physical state of that space. It was this 
wider notion of context that allowed for a nuanced application of Broken Windows to 
New York City, and will likewise allow us to apply the theory to the maritime domain. 
 
2.1 Room for Debate 
 
Broadly, there are three issues with quantitative analyses of Broken Windows. 
They can be described as ‘chicken and egg’ disputes, ‘too much noise,’ and cause versus 
correlation. In the first, it is unclear in what direction variables are acting on one another, 
or if they are collinear. In the second, the abundance of variables (noise) makes it 
difficult to identify which variables are important. In the third, it is difficult to discern 
whether a relationship exhibits cause or merely correlation. Sampson and Raudenbush, 
for example, leverage the first argument to critique Broken Windows. They posit that 
disorder and violent index crimes (with the exception of robbery) are not linked in a 
causal chain or cycle, but are instead both symptoms of the same underlying cause 
(collinear).143 Controlling for collective efficacy (a neighborhood’s willingness to 
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intervene in its defense)144 and structural issues such as the blending of commercial and 
residential land use145 suggests that disorder may be part of a larger ecology of crime and 
not the initiating factor in the longer process of criminal decay.146 As a consequence, 
while patrolling disorder may have incidental effects on crime, from this perspective a 
Broken Windows approach is inefficient and unfocused, targeting a symptom of the same 
greater problem.147 
The legitimacy of Broken Windows is, however, not invalidated when other 
indicators are shown to have some relation to crime. The theory’s foundational premise is 
that crime and environment produce a feedback loop, and that crime builds on the 
presence of disorder. In our earlier example, one broken window did not decidedly cause 
a murder; rather, it initiated a series of events that produced that outcome. There are 
opportunities all along that chain reaction where intervening (at increasingly higher cost) 
could have prevented such an outcome, like fixing the broken window. Jang and Johnson 
say as much when refuting Sampson and Raudenbush’s criticism of the theory, 
explaining that Sampson and Raudenbush misinterpret the pathway through which 
disorder impacts crime. Sampson and Raudenbush explain, “a fundamental thesis of 
‘broken windows’ is that observed disorder directly causes predatory or ‘serious’ 
crime.”148 Jang and Johnson take issue with the word ‘directly,’ suggesting alternatively 
that “disorder indirectly causes crime via weakened informal social control.”149 In such a 
case, Sampson and Raudenbush’s conclusion that controlling for collective efficacy 
reduces the impact of disorder on crime would actually be proof positive of Broken 
Windows’ basic premise.150 To wit, controlling for self-efficacy is controlling for the 
very effect to which Broken Windows speaks. Sousa and Kelling argue that when they 
stated that disorder, if “left unchecked by community and neighborhood controls,” would 
lead to serious crime, it was an illusion to this indirect pathway.151 This disagreement 
over the direct or indirect path of disorder is illustrative once again of the conflict 
surrounding causality, this time representative of the direction of influence, the ‘chicken 
and egg’ debate. 
Wesley Skogan demonstrates statistically what Broken Windows theorizes: that 
there is evidence of a measureable causal relationship between community disorder and 
crime, even when other significant contributors to crime (the root cause factors) were 
controlled for.152 Yet, his findings are not universally acknowledged, even among Broken 
Windows proponents. Some Broken Windows literature embraces the murky endogeneity 
between environment and action (a feedback loop), suggesting they reinforce one 
another, arguing a different perspective on the question of direction of influence (chicken 
and egg).153, 154 Indeed, Kelling, Bratton155 and Sousa’s156 adoption of Gladwell’s tipping 
point argument (that Broken Windows ‘tipped’ the crime epidemic) is implicit 
recognition of the continuous dialogue between environment and crime, a view in concert 
with the theory’s precepts. 
The debate over causation remains unresolved.157 Jang and Johnson, for example, 
published a compelling critique of Sampson and Raudenbush.158 As a consequence, the 
argument for a clear, quantitatively proven causal link between disorder and crime 
remains one of the weaker points in the literature. Causation versus correlation is a 
particularly recurring disagreement in interpretations of Broken Windows’ statistical 
models, and it seems that the sheer volume of available data (too much noise) lends itself 
to ongoing disagreement. Crime is an expansive topic, as is disorder, and large cities 
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create an impossibly long list of noise in which models can invariably be shaped to fit.159, 
160 Harcourt and Ludwig, for example, employ such an argument to discredit Broken 
Windows research that uses single-city time-series data by creating their own theory, the 
Broken Yankees Hypothesis.161 The Broken Yankees Hypothesis suggests that when the 
baseball team does well, New Yorkers, united by a sense of common purpose and 
encouraged to bond with fellow bar and restaurant patrons, commit fewer violent 
crimes.162 Conversely when the team is doing poorly, residents of New York do not share 
a common goal and therefore crime escalates. And remarkably, there is some statistical 
evidence to suggest Harcourt and Ludwig are onto something.163 Most likely, the Broken 
Yankees Hypothesis is an aberration; there is no proven connection between the two 
variables (causation versus correlation). With a city full of possibilities, Harcourt and 
Ludwig could choose from hundreds of accidental correlates with crime. And while the 
authors were using such an example to criticize evidence in support of Broken Windows, 
the larger point is that some problems may be too complex to model effectively. It is 
difficult to unearth the relationships between key independent variables here, making it 
difficult to reasonably discern the impacts of variables upon one another. It is a 
confounding error, with high correlations to be found among innumerable factors. 
Harcourt and Ludwig’s use of baseball in their critique is instructive because 
sports are in many ways similar to our conversation. The obsessive collection of statistics 
on nearly every measureable metric provides, like crime, a trove of data to analyze. Yet, 
just as with crime, the abundance of information can make discerning coincidence from 
cause a difficult process. Nate Silver offers a similar example in The Signal and the 
Noise. From the first Super Bowl in 1967 through the thirty-first Super Bowl in 1997, the 
winning team’s conference appeared to be a leading indicator for stock market 
performance.164 If the winning team was from the original NFL, the market would gain 
an average of fourteen points on the year.165 If the winning team was from the original 
AFL, the market would lose an average of ten points on the year.166 Twenty-eight of the 
first thirty-one Super Bowls accurately predicted the following year’s trend. If you took 
this marker seriously, you would calculate there was only a 1-in-4,700,000 chance that 
the relationship was merely coincidental.167 If you took this marker seriously, you would 
have lost your shirt starting in 1998. In fact, since then the results have almost been 
entirely reversed, with AFL teams predicting a ten percent growth and an NFL team 
clinching victory just before the 2008 housing bubble burst.168 
Broken Windows’ expansion beyond the field of criminology has also resulted in 
a subsequent expansion of the debate surrounding the theory.169 Perhaps the easiest 
criticism to make of Broken Windows is that it is counterintuitive—it simply grates 
against how we internalize the world. In a letter to the editor forum of the journal 
Environmental Health Perspectives, one public health practitioner responds to the claim 
that gonorrhea rates could be connected to environmental disorder by saying, “My 
instincts tell me this would not be the case. The ‘Broken Windows’ are a consequence of 
the behaviors of that particular community and they are not the cause of the behaviors” 
(the chicken or the egg debate).170 The response of the theory’s supporters is twofold. 
First, the breaking of windows is unlikely to be connected to an unusual coalescence of 
window-breakers in a given location. Instead, there is an intimate engagement between a 
community and its environment, each changing and shaping the other. Second, as 
scientists (social or natural), our instincts are of great value. They are, however, 
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incidental to the reality of empirical methodologies. Our instincts tell us nothing about 
subatomic particles or evolution, and yet science assures us that such theories are highly 
predictive. Psychologists including Walter Mischel suggest that this disconnect between 
what we see and what we think we see happens for a reason: the human brain has a 
“reducing valve” that allows us to filter out the complexity in life.171 Broken Windows is 
not inherently intuitive, at least not in the magnitude it purports that we are influenced by 
the world around us. Without closing the reducing valve, the true relationship between 
disorder and violence is easy to miss. In New York, and cities around the United States, it 
was little noticed for decades. 
More powerful criticisms can frequently be advanced against the trials or case 
studies used to support Broken Windows. The Broken Yankees Hypothesis above was 
one such example. Another appeared in a paper investigating the cause of the dramatic 
downturn in homicide rates in New York City. That study suggests that dividing 
homicides by race would allow for a more accurate picture of causation.172 Factors such 
as firearm availability, changes in drug use, and increased incarceration rates were then 
compared to homicide statistics.173 Data was collected from the city’s Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner, its Human Resources Administration, the NYPD, New York State’s 
Division of Criminal Justice Services, and the U.S. Census for the period of 1990-
1999.174 The results show that decreases in African American homicides were strongly 
associated with decreases in crack cocaine consumption, Hispanic homicides were tied 
more to gun availability, and White homicides saw no strong predictive indicators among 
the variables tested.175 The authors conclude from this data that the cocaine hypothesis on 
crime reduction is supported, whereas the Broken Windows theory is not.176 
This is not altogether an inaccurate conclusion. Gladwell in fact agrees that the 
dip in cocaine use shows a relationship with decreased violent crime.177 That dip, 
however, was a nationwide trend in the 1990s, as were positive developments in the 
economy and changes in demography typically associated with lower crime statistics. 
The extraordinary collapse in crime rates in New York should therefore parallel other 
major cities if those indicators were the dominant causes of crime reduction. Yet they do 
not, nor do they explain the speed at which criminal behavior diminished in New York as 
compared to other cities.178 This is all the more noteworthy because New York City’s 
poorest had been hit hard with welfare cuts in the 1990s, and national aging trends 
(associated with lower crime) were not mirrored in a city that was actually getting 
younger.179 With respect to drug use specifically, cocaine had been in steady decline well 
before crime rates in New York showed signs of wavering.180 The study may obscure this 
confusion of long-term trend with short-term effect as a result of its analysis of the 
decade as a whole, whereas New York homicide rates dropped 64.3% in only half that 
time.181 Moreover, if anything, the confirmation that African American, Hispanic, and 
White homicide rates are associated with differing influences is an endorsement of the 
complications of tackling violent crime without Broken Windows.  One could easily say 
the police simply need to target cocaine consumption to decrease black homicides, but 
how many factors contribute to cocaine usage and dealing? Does that vary by race as 
well? Does it vary by socioeconomics? And how many factors contribute to each of those 
factors? The inherent multidimensionality of crime breeds an impractical web of 
complications, all of which can be associated squarely with a person’s environment. In 
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other words, “the strength and direction of [other variables] is always dependent on the 
local context,” and that is something police and their policies can noticeably impact.182 
Hope Corman and Naci Mocan show, using municipal monthly data from 1974-
1999,183 that “misdemeanor arrests [i.e. Broken Windows policing] have a significant 
negative effect on robbery, motor vehicle theft, and grand larceny.”184 Adding lag time, 
misdemeanor arrests also “have a significant impact in the case of murder.”185 This is 
again demonstrative of one of the broader issues in statistical criticisms (and indeed 
support) of Broken Windows—namely, identifying what variables matter most. As 
evidenced here, the long running changes in drug patterns throughout New York may 
correlate with dips in index crimes (particularly murder), but, seen at shorter intervals, it 
appears more likely that “the primary reason for the decrease in felony crimes in the 
decade of the 1990s is due to felony arrest and misdemeanor arrests,”186 in other words, 
more effective order-maintenance policing. 
Additionally, criticisms of Broken Windows often rely on homicide rates as the 
“sole outcome measure” for overall crime.187 Yet, “while homicide may be the most 
reliable measure of crime”—it is reported most consistently—“it is not necessarily the 
most valid measure because it occurs so infrequently.”188 Perhaps for this reason Corman 
and Mocan saw the immediate impact of misdemeanor policing on robberies and 
larcenies, but only recorded an impact on murder after including the statistical lag time. 
Unfortunately, this is not a debate we can resolve with any finality. In the end, the exact 
mechanism by which crime dropped in New York can never be known with scientific 
accuracy; the exact mechanism by which crime drops through the lens of Broken 
Windows is hard to gauge in no small part because quantitative studies yield such wildly 
opposing results.189 It is ultimately on the basis of the strong qualitative evidence 
discussed above that Broken Windows has gained predominance. What the public health 
and criminology literature illustrates is that Broken Windows suggests trends and 
influences, however counterintuitive, which place context and multidimensionality at the 
center of human behavior. And it is this qualitative evidence, alongside the advocacy of 
instrumental practitioners, which has offered compelling support of the theory’s utility. 
 
3.0 Roadmaps for Research 	
To understand how the Broken Windows theory relates to a number of other 
important spheres of research of potential interest, it is useful to disaggregate the theory 
into three components.* First, the Broken Windows theory is one of order, norms, and 
social behavior. Second, the theory is one of crime. Third, it is a theory of policing and 
how to mitigate crime, leveraging an understanding of its origins and the social structure 
in which it proliferates. Triangulating Broken Windows within these three streams of 
research provides a final means for placing this dissertation within a broader framing, 
from psychology, to critical studies on security, to wider debates in criminology. 
The first component of this triangle—the social psychological dimension of 
Broken Windows—can be seen throughout this chapter. Philip Zimbardo’s 1969 car 
experiment provided clear, early evidence of the interaction between neighborhood and 
context. Zimbardo’s experiment highlighted an emerging notion of how communities 
interact with their environment in the construction of social norms and, significantly, how 																																																								
* This novel breakdown was described by Christian Bueger in conversation with the author. 
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easily disorderly signals can fracture those norms. This emergence can also be seen in 
Wilner et al’s 1960 study (see the Hopkins research above) on the importance of the 
physical environment in understanding individuals’ mental health status. Of interest as 
well is Zimbardo’s infamous Stanford Prison experiment, conducted in 1971, in which 
randomly divided groups of ‘inmates’ and ‘prisoners’ adopted their hypothetical personas 
to frightening ends. The experiment served to reinforce Zimbardo’s earlier hypothesis 
that actions (both at the community and individual level) are guided not simply by 
internal rational considerations, but by external stimuli and perceptions. Zimbardo’s 
prolific experiments have sparked whole fields of study that cannot be relayed here, but 
represent a good starting point for those interested in investigating the psychological 
origins of Broken Windows and its reliance on a body of work that lays the foundation 
for understanding the role, construction, and destruction of norms of order. Beyond 
Zimbardo, we also noted an array of psychological studies upon which Broken Windows 
rests (take those on seminary students or on grade school cheating), all of which 
demonstrate again the direct relationship between perceptions of context (both physical 
and behavioral) and actions. Finally, Walter Mischel’s concept of the mind’s reducing 
valve—wherein we filter out complexity to aid in decision-making, occasionally leading 
to oversimplifications—helped us understand how we might not consciously recognize 
all the subtle ways in which our environment shapes our behavior. 
It is out of these norms that the theory also conceptualizes the roots of crime, how 
small scale disorder erodes communal self-efficacy and leads to more violent crime. In 
the example at the start of this chapter we sketched how a single Broken Window signals 
that the neighborhood is uncared for. This precipitates a flight of families and the 
degradation of the community’s self-policing. As the neighborhood becomes evermore 
disorderly, small-scale crimes escalate, perpetuating the cycle of criminality and the 
perception that the community is abandoned. This community-level focus, and 
particularly the emphasis on a neighborhood’s efforts to police itself, is reminiscent of 
another emergent literature—that of everyday security. As a critical study of security, 
everyday security literature aims to contextualize state-level power as average people 
experience it on a daily basis. Like our study here, everyday security places a premium 
on how communities perceive the state’s policing efforts and how that in turn shapes their 
relationship with their own neighborhoods. As Crawford and Hutchinson introduce the 
theory, everyday security offers two objectives: “drawing attention to both (1) the ways 
in which security projects are experienced, and (2) how individuals and groups deploy 
certain practices to govern what they understand and interpret as their own security.”190 
Crawford and Hutchinson even focus on many of the dimensions seen throughout this 
dissertation—“the temporal, spatial, and emotional features” of security.191 Ben Brown 
(of the University of Texas at Brownsville) similarly focuses on issues with the methods 
of policing themselves, dovetailing well with Crawford and Hutchinson’s approach. 
Brown writes to the ineffectiveness of increasingly invasive police operations and the 
resentment that combative tactics can produce within communities.192 By placing regular 
people in the foreground—everyday security, and critical studies more broadly, aims to 
expose the vulnerabilities communities face when policed by the state, advancing security 
studies away from a strict focus on state-level policies to an understanding of how those 
policies influence real people. 
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An emphasis on the lived experiences of policed communities also touches upon 
research on cultures of insecurity. Marie Breen-Smyth (formerly of the University of 
Surrey), for example, addresses not how we construct community policing but rather how 
security forces construct the community itself. She writes to the risk of marginalizing 
populations by categorizing them broadly as suspect communities.193 Breen-Smyth 
details, through a powerful autoethnography, the self-defeating repercussions of the 
impulse for police to construct and target ‘others.’* While many of the specific legal and 
contextual objections raised in some critical works on security do not transfer to this 
research, the spirit of their perspective persists. Combative approaches have often played 
an undeniable role in reclaiming ungoverned space. Yet, keeping that space, without 
committing ‘urbicide’ (see Chapter One) or descending into institutionalized 
disenfranchisement, requires attentive consideration of the objections these authors raise 
to the security studies status quo. In part this dissertation demonstrates how embracing 
the community-level focus highlighted in these critical works may be in the interest of the 
state as well, forging a bridge between critical and conventional studies of security. 
Armed with an understanding of what shapes communal disorder, and how 
disorder perpetuates an escalation in crime, we come to an understanding of how that 
informs policing as well. For Broken Windows approaches, this means being attentive to 
community concerns and focusing on interrupting the cycle of escalation at the softer end 
of the criminal spectrum (e.g. squeegeeing or fare beating). We referred frequently to 
these acts as signals of disorder. Martin Innes’ (of Cardiff University) work is a “natural 
successor to Wilson and Kelling’s ‘Broken Windows Theory,’” diving deeper still into 
such signals.194 Innes capitalizes on the relationship Broken Windows establishes 
between disorder and fear to better understand how some crimes generate greater fear in 
communities than others. These aptly named “signal crimes” help explain why 
neighborhoods may feel as if crime is getting worse even if overall rates of criminality 
decrease.195 And, as we noted extensively, a community’s perception is as important to 
the perpetuation of disorder as any objective reality.† Throughout this dissertation we will 
return time and again to the importance of how communities internalize their 
environment and what this means for littoral security.196 
Finally, our discussion on policing and order maintenance is important as well for 
an arena in which there is particularly little debate. Geoffrey Till regards ‘Maritime 
Security’ as a (confusing) rebranding of the more conventionally understood notion of 
good order at sea.197 However one chooses to label the issue, though, the dearth of 
conceptual work on such a longstanding notion is starkly evident. That Till dedicates so 																																																								
* The process by which states securitize various unconventional issues (or populations) is an area of robust 
critical debate, including in the maritime domain (as highlighted by Bueger). See, for example, Christian 
Bueger, “What is Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 53, (2015); Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, 
“Security Communities, Alliances and Macro-securitization: The Practices of Counter-piracy Governance,” 
in Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance, ed. Michael Struett, Mark Nance, and 
John Carlson (London: Routledge, 2013), 99–124. And, as we noted in Chapter One, Stephen Graham’s 
Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism provides a critical view on the new military urbanism. 
† Nigel Fielding (of the University of Surrey), a coauthor of Innes’, also describes the varying ideological 
constructions of community policing. He advocates building the institutional and theoretical foundations 
for enhanced community partnership in an effort to help construct community policing in the softer context, 
compared to zero-tolerance models (many truthfully born out of Broken Windows’ precepts, see the 
conclusion for more). See, Nigel Fielding, “Concepts and Theory in Community Policing,” The Howard 
Journal 44, No. 5 (December 2005): 460-472.	
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much space to order maintenance in his seminal book on Seapower is confirmation of 
maritime security’s growing importance on the naval strategic stage. That Till’s chapter 
on the topic is particularly theory-light, however, is confirmation of the work still to be 
done on developing frameworks of discussing good order. Till’s chapter, robust as it is, 
ultimately falls back on familiar mechanisms for discussing maritime security— 
specifically, through an evaluation of individual threats. Sequentially, and largely 
independently, Till covers shipping, terrorism, drug trafficking, and irregular migration, 
mirroring the conventional counter-threat approach to maritime security. It is our hope, as 
we prepare to proceed into the empirical portions of this dissertation, that the Broken 
Windows theory and its component parts—its aggregated theories on norms, crime, and 
policing—provide a useful framework for taking good order at sea beyond heuristics and 
into an employable, rigorous conceptual scaffolding. 
 
4.0 Methodology 
 
The first consideration when discussing methodology is identifying, broadly, 
whether a qualitative or quantitative approach best addresses the research question. To 
inform this determination, we began with an eye towards the various analyses already 
conducted of Broken Windows in criminology. These analyses, as seen above, fall 
generally into two categories—those debating the theory’s causal argument, and those 
leveraging the theory’s premises to inform specific questions of neighborhood disorder 
(or public health). The former are frequently quantitative in approach, like the study that 
introduced the Broken Yankees hypothesis as a means of critiquing Wilson and Kelling’s 
causal argument. The latter are frequently qualitative in nature, like the process-tracing 
narrative style initially used by Kelling and Wilson to introduce the theory in the Atlantic 
Monthly. Neither of these categorizations is exclusive, but they provide a valuable point 
of departure when determining methodologies. In this dissertation, as addressed above, 
we are interested not in contributing to the debate validating or disproving the efficacy of 
the theory, but in identifying whether the theory (as it currently stands) lends useful 
insights to the study of maritime security. Thus, an initial review of the criminological 
literature would suggest a qualitative framework for best answering our research 
question. 
As this research seeks to extrapolate from existing applications of the theory, 
positivism’s logical epistemological approach best fits the task laid forth in our research 
question. Within criminology’s similarly positivist framework, however, there is 
disagreement about the efficacy of varying methodologies in Broken Windows analysis. 
As explored, statistical examinations of Broken Windows are frequently contested for a 
number of reasons, notably the overwhelming volume (noise) of available data and the 
resulting debate over exactly which variables test Broken Windows, and which merely 
indicate a correlation. Significantly, many such analyses require that a Broken Windows 
approach already be implemented in order to measure results. So far, however, the theory 
has not been consciously implemented on any quantifiable scale in a naval setting. 
Modeling faces similar obstacles as statistical analyses, including the conflict over 
accidental correlates. This suggests that an empirical quantitative approach would prove 
unwieldy, if not impossible, and would drive criticism of the research towards a 
discussion over the variables and away from the viability of the theory at large. We see 
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this in the exploration of Broken Windows literature below. Quantitative measurements 
will be a factor in the evidence we use to support our investigation, but such data has 
proven too reductionist in existing applications as a foundational methodology. In 
general, qualitative research leaves room for the nuance and subtleties of context that 
Broken Windows emphasizes, while its empirical perspective still allows for an 
evaluation of the theory’s generalizability.198 
Within the qualitative framework, this dissertation employs three case studies: 
one primary study followed by two illustrative cases. Cases one and two, the Caribbean 
and the Gulf of Guinea respectively, are “most similar” cases, as categorized by 
Seawright and Gerring.199 They share a key geopolitical similarity: a high concentration 
of weak states, unable to leverage enough resources independently or act collectively to 
adequately counter the threats and actors operating offshore. They likewise share the 
causal factor of interest in this dissertation: the crime and disorder that will illustrate how 
maritime insecurity reflects key characteristics of Broken Windows. These cases differ on 
one subcomponent of this causal factor—piracy. In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy plays a 
much more prominent role in the literature than in the Caribbean (wherein it has virtually 
disappeared from most meta-analyses of maritime crime in the region). We begin in the 
Caribbean, where we will apply a process-tracing approach employing detailed 
description200 to expose the linkages between an array of insecurities present in the 
region. By demonstrating in depth how crime and insecurity in the Caribbean are 
multidimensional in nature and contextually informed, the two major lessons from 
Broken Windows we illustrated in this chapter, we build a bridge between Broken 
Windows as a criminological theory and the maritime domain. We conclude the 
Caribbean study with an exploration of the unique roles and responsibilities of the United 
States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is the only American hybrid military and law 
enforcement organization. It therefore “bridges traditional enforcement gaps between 
military and law enforcement organizations,”201 further facilitating the extrapolation of 
policing principles to the maritime domain. 
In the Gulf of Guinea, we will begin by demonstrating that similar crimes and 
similar actors, and thus the same linkages and conclusions from the Caribbean, are 
relevant in West Africa. This represents the “most” part of “most similar.” Second, we 
will turn to a discussion of the variant sub-factor, piracy. By illustrating that piracy can 
be integrated into the same narrative on maritime crime’s multidimensional and 
environmental nature, we demonstrate that a Broken Windows lens is capable of adapting 
to previously unexamined issues and is not unique in its application to the Caribbean. The 
third case study, the second of our illustrative cases, is the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore, which represents a “deviant” case from the Gulf of Guinea. In this third case 
study, we turn to evaluate a region that has responded forcefully to the threat of piracy. 
Unlike in the Gulf of Guinea (and, indeed, the Caribbean), the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore are bordered principally by three states (referred to in the literature as the 
‘littoral states,’ though geographically the southern most extension of Thailand is also 
part of the western edge of the Straits), two of which maintain strong to moderate 
capacity for action. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate that despite the concerted steps 
taken in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to address piracy, issues in problem 
framing and theorizing have led to obstacles in practice. Moreover, we will demonstrate 
that the literature on maritime security in Southeast Asia, some of the most mature 
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literature on the subject, has begun to reflect elements of a Broken Windows lens as 
theorists integrate new threats with enduring challenges. In so doing, Chapter Three (the 
Caribbean) provides the proof of concept upon which we rely throughout the remainder 
of our argument, while Chapters Four and Five demonstrate the concept’s overall 
generalizability. 
This unique, hybridized research framework is also derived of the singular 
demands presented by exporting a theory from one discipline to another. The 
methodology employed here is thus a fusion both of theory testing as well as theory 
building. In so far as the Broken Windows theory has never been employed in a maritime 
context, this dissertation plays a theory building role. Single, in-case examinations are 
common tools in such analyses. However, in so far as criminologists have already 
identified and debated the causal mechanisms of interest, this research is relieved of some 
of the heavier burdens in theory development. Thus, it also plays a theory testing role, 
taking existing concepts and stressing them in new ways. Cross case comparisons are 
typical tools for this type of analysis. Here, we fuse both. Case one, the Caribbean, 
represents an intense, in-case study to build our understanding of how the Broken 
Windows theory might be deployed in the maritime domain (providing a proof of 
concept). Then, using the language and scaffolding constructed in case one, the following 
cross case comparisons serve a theory testing role, introducing a previously 
unincorporated issue (piracy) and assessing the theory’s generalizability. 
Limited case availability, as a constraint of research at a regional level, presents 
obstacles to case selection,202 and shapes our methodology. Single case studies leave us 
unable to prove a theory’s generalizability, a basic component of theory building. Hall 
argues that applying process tracing to a small set of intensively examined cases, 
however, is a justifiable solution to limited case availability and a tool for theory 
development.203 Process tracing is also among the more successful qualitative approaches 
similarly employed in criminological assessments of Broken Windows—the theory was 
initially introduced through such a method—and is utilized across our cases (Chapters 
Three, Four, and Five). In choosing cases, we aimed to select littoral clusters 
axiomatically recognized as distinct regions, corroborated by distinct literatures. These 
would include the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Gulf of Mexico, for example. Cases also had 
to contain a persistent level of maritime crime and instability, the dependent variable in 
our analysis of our first cross case comparison. Our focus on navies and local state actors 
meant that regions with failed states were excluded, most notably the Gulf of Aden. The 
Broken Windows theory operates, as we will see below, under the expectation that 
communities can be induced to self-efficacy (or self-defense) through inclusive 
partnerships and problem solving alongside local authorities. In failed states, there is no 
capacity for communities to partner with a legitimate enforcement body, and 
consequently no opportunity to examine the role of community policing at a macro 
scale.* Our need to juxtapose two regions in our first set of comparisons with variations 
on one subcomponent of maritime crime, with shared independent variables (similar 
geopolitical contexts), constrained case selection. The Caribbean and Gulf of Guinea 
share a plurality of littoral states that struggle to project power in their maritime space. 																																																								
* None of this is to say other cases would not have provided valid insight, and indeed an avenue for 
expanding research on this topic would be the application of a similar investigation in other gulfs or seas. 
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The Mediterranean, on the other hand, is both too large a region to analyze in depth in the 
space provided, and presents too many variations in state power, culture, and wealth. One 
possible solution, selecting only a portion of the Mediterranean for study, meant 
artificially limiting an investigation whose primary focus is intended to emphasize the 
fluidity and multidimensionality of disorder in the maritime space, and thus at cross 
purposes to our research objective. The aim to juxtapose a third case against the second, 
both sharing the variant in the dependent variable but not sharing enforcement efforts 
(and consequently, differing state strengths and geopolitical compositions), further 
constrained case selection. Finally, among the most important criteria in case selection is 
the need to effectively scale up the Broken Windows approach from its urban roots to the 
maritime space. As discussed above, the social psychological nature of the theory should 
enable its application anywhere people (i.e. communities) exist. Nevertheless, a more 
sophisticated framework for case selection can help further justify the conclusions 
reached in the ensuing chapters. 
Cabral et al note: “Cities, urban areas, and urban sprawl are multidimensional 
systems comprising individuals, communities, society, and economy, in a common 
geographical location where different types and degrees of interaction occur.”204 
Discussing cities as systems means we explicitly (and intuitively) understand that urban 
areas exist as distinct geographical and sociological units. Without this fundamental 
isolation of the city as a base systemic unit of measure, any analysis at the urban level—
including in criminology—is difficult to justify. When Broken Windows is placed in this 
context, as part of a broader set of literatures discussing cities as systems, we can clearly 
discern that the theory’s precepts are not tied uniquely to an urban context but to a 
systemic one. We noted this specifically with respect to Broken Windows’ application in 
the subway case, which we explored as a systemic surrogate for the broader city of New 
York. Thus, the first major criterion for selecting cases with an eye towards scalability is 
the need to similarly identify systems, albeit larger ones. The logical escalation here is 
from urban to regional. Regions, like cities, are marked by distinct literatures that 
axiomatically identify them as self-evident systems. Like cities, regions are of course not 
perfectly closed. The inherent artificiality of isolating a city from its peri-urban and 
hinterland roots is equally at issue in isolating one region from that of an adjacent one. 
That both cities and regions are recognized units of sociological (and criminological) 
study, however, suggests that regions may prove capable systemic surrogates for the 
urban environment at a larger scale just as the subway was a surrogate at the smaller end. 
A second obstacle to scalability comes in understanding the demands on data, and 
consequently what type of data the project requires. As noted earlier, this dissertation 
does not seek to weigh in on the debate surrounding the efficacy of the causal 
mechanisms that the Broken Windows identifies. We do, however, seek to identify if the 
mechanisms that drive disorder according to the theory (context dependency and 
multidimensionality) are present in our cases. Identifying the presence of the 
mechanisms, or themes, most fundamental to the Broken Windows theory across case 
studies would suggest that the theory’s lens provides some utility in the maritime context. 
(Notably, this thematic approach is yet another consideration in favor of answering our 
research question from a qualitative framework.) This approach, however, requires the 
availability of a significant amount of descriptive data. Finding such data, barring field 
research within each region (which was beyond the resource constraints of this project), 
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is most easily found aggregated at the regional level. Organizations like the United 
Nations, which compiles the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, for example, use 
regions as their primary (and often smallest) unit of measurement. This demand for 
descriptive and uniform data (collected for a given area across a range of topics, from 
narcotics to human trafficking) is even more difficult in the maritime context. There, 
greater geographic distances and imperfect reporting make data collection and informed 
analysis at a smaller level exceedingly difficult. 
Even at the regional level, however, within each chosen case it was not always 
possible to explicitly define exact borders. Assessments of the Caribbean, for example, 
may vary from the narrowest view of the region (core island states), to wider ones 
including portions of Central and South America, to assessments on continental or even 
hemispheric scales. This is important for its influence on the consistency of evidence 
available across sources, as some analyses may include the Caribbean in a discussion of 
North America at large, while others may discuss only Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) states explicitly. Moreover, the nature of transnational crime obscures our 
ability to remain rigid in our understanding of regional boundaries. For example, “It is 
almost impossible to analyze smuggling in the Caribbean only, as smugglers do not often 
pay attention to the analytical boundaries of historians and criminologists.”205 The illicit 
flows that will dominate our case studies do not easily match political categorization. For 
this reason, to the degree possible, we aim in our cases (primarily the Caribbean and the 
Gulf of Guinea, the most geographically obscure) to identify ‘core’ versus ‘peripheral’ 
states to help frame the conversation without artificially excluding certain evidentiary 
sources. 
Thus, while case selection at the regional level is informed by the need to 
effectively expand the Broken Windows approach, it is also born of a practical 
consideration when assessing how best to scale up the theory thematically. Iconic cases (a 
conventional case selection method in qualitative research) offer the best synthesis of 
these two criteria. Iconic regional cases are both axiomatically regarded as distinct 
systems and are rich with data because of their visibility. Finally, these scaling 
considerations further help narrow the universe of appropriate cases, most notably by 
disqualifying the Mediterranean Sea. Bifurcating the Mediterranean, as had been 
suggested, would nullify its value as a reasonably self-evident system and thus invalidate 
its surrogacy for an urban system. 
 
4.1 Evidence 
 
The techniques used to support our methodology require a mixed sourcing to 
include interviews, document analysis, media sources, and quantitative data sets. The 
reason for incorporating multiple methods is that no singular source of information 
dominates the thesis; rather, this work presents an inclusive, holistic understanding of the 
case studies and associated disorders while attempting to control some of the biases 
inherent across methods. For example, document analysis of Department of Defense and 
congressional records on fleet numbers, budgets, and procurement proposals offers a 
compelling look at how resources are currently distributed and prioritized, yet may be of 
limited relevance regarding the more counterfactual elements of this research (e.g. what 
would happen if those resources were not distributed in such a way). While document 
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analysis research on military doctrine allows for an investigation of how navies express 
their interests, it is not always indicative of the ultimate practical application of such 
interests. 
In general, quantitative data consisting of preexisting statistics was used to 
identify the most pervasive types of disorder per region. Business initiatives such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the International Maritime Organization collect, 
code, and disseminate maps and data on piracy worldwide. Intergovernmental 
organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, various American 
federal agencies such as the Department of State, and nongovernmental groups including 
the International Labor Organization and the International Organization for Migration are 
all sources of data providing estimates on human trafficking, labor trafficking and drug 
smuggling. Taken together, this statistical material does not provide a definitive list of the 
most pressing issues in a given region, but offers context and a point of departure for 
further investigation. 
Semi-structured interviews with senior maritime service-members contributed 
context to the data culled from the above sources, socializing the author to the research 
area, and are included as appendices. Interviewees were afforded the right to speak 
anonymously (see interview consent form for details). Security experts, government 
employees, and researchers working in think tanks comprised another valuable 
community for investigation. Informal meetings with U.S. naval and Coast Guard staff, 
DOD civilians, members of the intelligence community, and industry personnel acted to 
provide invaluable if intangible background knowledge. These interviews and 
experiences were leveraged during one year of fieldwork in Washington, DC, as well as a 
follow-up write up year. 
General textual sources played an equally important role as those methods already 
discussed. We touched on the use and significance of document analysis from 
governmental sources. The Congressional Research Service and various U.S. federal 
agencies were used extensively as primary sources of data and current strategy. Media 
reports, mostly digital copies of prominent print sources (e.g. The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal) and industry publications (Defense News, 
Stars and Stripes, etc.) were used as a means of accessing data and opinions, including 
public reaction to government policies. Still others provided relevant non-partisan 
scholarly analysis on topics ranging from government spending to military hardware. 
Finally, secondary sources of academic literature were used throughout this research. 
Taken together, with the exception of illustrative interviews, this research does not aim to 
produce new data or information, but rather to present largely preexisting information in 
a novel light through the application of Broken Windows. As the U.S. Department of 
Defense publishes annual long-run shipbuilding plans at thirty-year lengths, and the 
midcentury mark is a point of focus for population modeling, climate modeling, and 
policy planning, the year 2050 will serve as an appropriate horizon for which this 
dissertation has predictable application. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 
We opened this dissertation by exploring the environment of millions of 
impoverished people, living in dense and dangerous slums across the world. For them, it 
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is a crowded life amid the flux of licit and illicit trade networks, constantly winding 
through the informal settlements of urban peripheries. Such settlements punctuate the 
coasts throughout the Caribbean, West African, and Southeast Asian littorals. It was by 
way of such an introduction that we were able to best define the amorphous concept of 
littoral, the geographic focus of this thesis. With an understanding of where our research 
was aimed, we turned to the research question itself. Doing so allowed us to identify 
several other important features: who this research is discussing (maritime state actors, 
primarily the U.S. and states within case regions) and when in time our focus lies (from 
now to midcentury). In the sections on Methodology and Evidence we turned to the more 
technical considerations of how this thesis was to be constructed, discussing the need for 
a qualitative empirical approach and a variety of mixed evidentiary sources. Yet, two 
important components, what the Broken Windows theory is, and why this type of 
research is necessary, remained unaddressed. To answer effectively, the bulk of this 
second chapter was devoted to explaining the theory and literature of Broken Windows. 
Such an exploration allowed us to become familiar with Broken Windows’ content, as 
well as to discuss its relevancy beyond the field of criminology. Two critical lessons 
learned emerged in this discussion. First, Broken Windows embraces the 
multidimensional nature of disorder. Second, it does so by understanding crime through 
an environmental domain. Such a review also highlighted a number of unresolved issues 
in Broken Windows research, particularly the role of establishing a statistical causal 
relationship between disorder and index crimes. While it is clear that Broken Windows is 
not a perfect theory, we concluded that our research could nevertheless exploit the 
conclusions of the theory’s practical implementation of order maintenance policies—
multidimensionality and context specificity—as bases through which to understand 
maritime security, even while the causal debate continues to rage. 
With a better grip on who, what, where, when, why, and how, we are left only 
with our original research question—can the Broken Windows theory provide a lens for 
theorizing maritime security in the littorals? To find an answer we will turn next to 
present three case studies. The first, and largest, paints the security context in the 
Caribbean, building slowly, issue by issue, until a multidimensional picture emerges 
bringing transnational crimes into relief with individual communities. Thereafter, we will 
turn to the Gulf of Guinea, wherein we build upon the linkages and themes highlighted in 
the Caribbean case to demonstrate the applicability of our framework to new settings. 
Importantly, we will also incorporate a new issue into the equation—piracy—illustrating 
a critical element of flexibility (and thus, generalizability) in our construct. Finally, we 
will conclude with an investigation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, a region that 
has received substantial investments in maritime security. Focusing on these investments, 
and determining how (if at all) a Broken Windows approach would inform security 
efforts in the region helps further underscore the theory’s utility and generalizability. 
Across all three chapters, we ultimately discern that Broken Windows’ two primary 
themes, as distilled here—multidimensionality and context specificity—prove capable 
and useful lenses for assessing maritime security. 
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Chapter 3: Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean 
 
“In the trippy semiotics of the drug war, the cops dress like bandits, and the bandits dress 
like cops.”1 
 
Part One: The Physical Environment 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
We began this dissertation in an effort to understand how the Broken Windows 
theory could be used as a lens through which to frame a theory of maritime security in the 
littorals. To answer that question, we dedicated our first two chapters to understanding 
two important sub-questions: what warranted a revisiting of maritime security, and what 
is the Broken Windows theory. In this chapter, we return to the central component of our 
research question: how can we use the Broken Windows theory in the maritime space? 
To answer this question, we will describe in depth the multidimensional nature of 
Caribbean security. We will draw on this theme throughout the case study by illustrating 
that actors in the Basin have long advocated a perspective on security that mirrors this 
multidimensionality. Our use of the Broken Windows theory is further validated by the 
understanding that Caribbean authorities have in fact already settled on community 
policing (of which Broken Windows is a subset theory) as a consensus enforcement 
model on land. We likewise validate the value of the research question by underscoring 
the need for more community-oriented enforcement models—employing lessons learned 
on urbicide in Chapter One. Finally, we illustrate that context is diffuse across the 
multidimensional spectrum of Caribbean maritime security, offering a new domain in 
which hybrid threats can be addressed under one governing theory. 
Counter-narcotics, from a narrow perspective, is the effort to eradicate the 
sources of drug production and dismantle the networks that profit from their 
distribution. At the broadest level, however, nearly every act of law enforcement 
and national security in the Caribbean can be seen as a form of counter-narcotics 
policing. Money laundering, terrorist financing, drug abuse, homicide, ransom 
kidnapping, forced prostitution, irregular migration, and perceptions of failed 
governance are all interconnected elements of the smuggling and sale of drugs, as 
we will see in this chapter. From the Caribbean’s permissive attitude towards lax 
banking regulations, to government corruption, to local crime, to the illicit 
international trafficking in people and weapons, the movement of narcotics 
through Caribbean communities is made possible by, and contributes to, a much 
broader regional maritime insecurity. Thus, even while efforts at countering this 
trade in drugs have been renewed and redoubled since the temporary withdrawal 
of resources after 9/11, a truly effective maritime counter-narcotics strategy is one 
that places drugs within this wider, multidimensional framework. Doing so, 
however, requires an understanding of how these myriad crimes and disorders 
interact. In the ensuing sections, we will endeavor to highlight this interaction. By 
directly observing the multidimensional nature of Caribbean instability, and 
placing crime in a broader contextual narrative, we take the largest single step in 
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demonstrating the applicability of Broken Windows as a theoretical foundation 
for a strategy of maritime security. 
The Caribbean Basin is among the most fragile littorals in the world, threatened 
by powerful currents of environment, economics, and crime. Such a multidimensional 
dynamic of stability, security, and sovereignty is not new to those who live and govern in 
the region. As Prime Minister L. Erksine Sandiford of Barbados notes: 
 
Our vulnerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to hurricanes and 
earthquakes; economically, to market conditions taken elsewhere; socially, 
to cultural penetration; and now politically, to the machinations of 
terrorists, mercenaries, and criminals.2 
 
Hybrid threats dominate the Caribbean, not easily characterized as internal or external in 
origin. For that reason, research on the security of small states has evolved over the last 
two decades away from purely state-level power relations. The “preoccupation with 
external security has given way to recognition that internal security issues are not only 
important in their own right, but also they complicate, and sometimes aggravate, external 
challenges.”3 This sentiment has become such a staple in discussions on Caribbean 
security that at least four authors in one anthology alone, Ivelaw Griffith’s Caribbean 
Security in the Age of Terror, pointedly emphasize the multidimensionality of small state 
defense.4 The range of social, political, criminal, and economic obstacles facing 
Caribbean states compelled them to view security from this broader perspective.5 Another 
Barbadian Prime Minister, Owen Arthur, summarizes the regional attitude as follows: “It 
would be a fundamental error on our part to limit security concerns to any one area while 
the scourge of HIV/AIDS, illegal arms and drug trafficking, transnational crime, 
ecological disasters, and poverty continue to stare us in the face.”6 
While such a perspective is common among Caribbean law enforcement 
practitioners, politicians, and local academics, it has made only a small impact on 
security strategies across the Basin. In a region fractured by so many small states, 
international cooperation often only comes at the behest (and expense) of an external 
patron.7 And while the region’s chief patron, the United States, has invested heavily in 
multinational institutions and capacity building, the U.S. has struggled to embrace a 
regional security outlook matching that of local actors. This was exacerbated by the 
United States’ seismic shift in priorities following the events of September 11. In the 
months and years after the attacks, the United States executed a massive transition of 
resource allocation, placing the greatest emphasis on counterterrorism operations. With 
limited deployable resources, much of that shift was manned and supplied by American 
assets in the Caribbean. Three-quarters of Coast Guard cutters and related aircraft, 
heavily drawn from the Caribbean, were tasked to counterterrorism responsibilities such 
as critical infrastructure protection for ports and tankers.8 Half of the Coast Guard’s 
federal agents responsible for combating drug trafficking, the signature crime in the 
Caribbean, were reassigned as air marshals.9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
moved approximately 400 agents from counter-narcotics to counterterrorism missions.10 
From the perspective of the era, this divestment of Caribbean resources devoted largely to 
drug trafficking was an easy choice. The Caribbean core, apart from the rest of Latin 
America (and excluding rim states like Colombia and Mexico), was seen to face virtually 
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no direct threat from terrorism. While South and Central America ranked high on tables 
of international terror attacks in the years leading up to 2001, “the Caribbean sub-region 
remained absent from the radar screen tracking global terrorism.”11 In an American 
context then defined by the threat of internationalized terror, a region at no perceived risk 
or relation to terrorism could afford to cede resources. This was supported even further 
given the Department of State’s 2002 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations in which 
none of the organizations listed appeared to have any overt connection to drug trafficking 
in the Caribbean.12 Thus, while there persisted a widely acknowledged theoretical 
“connection between international terrorism and illicit drugs,” the lack of apparent 
evidence to that point doomed the region to irrelevance in an American conception 
centered on terrorism.13 
Yet, such a narrow perspective on security is exactly what Caribbean experts have 
long argued against. While responses to insecurity (crime, terrorism, piracy, etc.) may be 
atomized and bureaucratized, the nature of political violence is infrequently so well 
defined. The choice between counter-narcotics and counterterrorism is artificial, as the 
United Nations International Narcotics Control Board argued when it urged the United 
States and others “not to reduce their drug control assistance in favour of measures 
against terrorism but to look for new ways to combine both.”14 In that spirit, this chapter 
seeks to place a variety of security issues endemic to the Caribbean into a related 
framework. In so doing, we will demonstrate how the Broken Windows theory helps us 
conceptualize America’s interest in Caribbean defense in a manner that ensures human, 
national, and regional security, avoiding false choices on enforcement options. 
Throughout this chapter, it is important to remain cognizant of the primary 
lessons established in Chapter Two. There, we discerned two themes in our discussion of 
the Broken Windows theory—that crime is context dependent and multidimensional. 
First, at the social psychological core of the theory, lies the expectation that rational 
actors only behave rationally within a given set of restricting parameters (their context). 
Human behavior is inexorably tied to how we contextualize and internalize our 
environment. Gladwell illustrates just this point with his alternatively named Power of 
Context, calling our attention to experiments conducted with populations from 
seminarians to grade school students. Likewise, signals of government abandonment and 
community neglect act on the social psyche and create the conditions in which high-risk 
behavior (unsafe sex, drug abuse, crime) is more likely. Because of the spotlight this 
shines on perceptions of insecurity, Broken Windows places a premium on a 
community’s sense of safety. By focusing on a population’s attitude, community policing 
can make an impact on violent crime rates in part because it increases a community’s 
willingness to act in its own defense (self-efficacy). 
The second lesson, multidimensionality, came when we evaluated the real-world 
applications of this theory. It became evident, in both the New York City subway and the 
streets themselves, that addressing the seemingly small gripes of the city’s residents 
(farebeating or window washing) had compounding success on crime prevention. This 
was the case in part because of the signal such initiatives sent to the public, that 
something new and responsive was being done to combat crime (context, as described 
above). Yet, practical experience taught that there was an added element to the success of 
cracking down on lower-order threats. It soon became apparent that those who committed 
petty crimes were often the same individuals, or knew of those individuals, who 
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committed more serious ones. Policing a city’s broken windows proved effective not only 
for its hypothesized social psychological component but also because of the operational 
impact of placing line officers in direct contact with those most at risk. 
Both of these themes support a perspective on security that is multidimensional 
and context dependent. Moreover, the themes above suggest a vision of security that 
places the most pervasive and endemic issues (however ‘small’) at the top of the priority 
scale, precisely because they provide the daily context for the vast majority of people. 
One of the Broken Windows theory’s signature emphases is on problem solving at the 
community level. By taking seriously the ‘quality-of-life’ crimes that plagued New York 
City, the NYPD helped stabilize a city gripped in a perceived epidemic of violent crime. 
The same can be true on the world stage. Homicides in the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, and Puerto Rico seem irrelevant to the average American. Yet, as we will see, 
rising crime rates in these countries are directly related to the widespread trade in small 
arms and light weapons across the Caribbean Basin, which in turn are all interrelated with 
narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, and even terrorism. No element of Caribbean 
security can be understood outside of this multidimensional context. When police treated 
violent crime as a symptom of disorder, combating context over crimes, they quickly 
learned that securing community attitudes often meant impacting crime on a wider scale. 
The same principle applies on a global level. An American maritime security strategy 
guided by the Broken Windows theory emphasizes the endemic security issues that shape 
regional context, just as squeegeeing or farebeating shaped perspectives in New York. 
The Broken Windows theory is fundamentally one of context, and the strategic 
applications it engenders therefore necessitate a shift in the very way we frame security 
(i.e. its multidimensionality). To help assess this dynamic nature of Caribbean insecurity, 
this chapter explores transnational crime in its myriad facets by analyzing where and how 
illicit networks and flows interact at the macro-level. In the Caribbean, the most obvious 
and pervasive issue is that of narcotics trafficking, and so it is there that we start. 
 
2.0 Narcotics 
 
2.1 Overview 
The Caribbean’s geographic location has long been among the region’s most 
lucrative commodities. For centuries, goods and people have moved between North and 
South America, between Africa and the Americas, and between Europe and the 
Americas, all passing through the Caribbean Sea. Since the completion of the Panama 
Canal, that traffic expanded to include commerce and migration from Asia and the 
Pacific utilizing the Caribbean as a transshipment point for destinations farther afield. At 
the convergence of major sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the Caribbean Basin is 
home to two of the world’s largest chokepoints (the Panama Canal and the Caribbean 
Sea).15 Ten percent of American trade still passes through the canal, while countries such 
as Chile, Ecuador, and Japan are even more dependent on safe passage through these 
shipping lanes.16 The Florida Strait, the Mona Passage, the Windward Passage, and the 
Yucatan Channel are all sea lines crossing the Caribbean to join Atlantic, Pacific, and 
Gulf of Mexico shipping.17 Today, the Caribbean remains at “‘the vortex of the 
Americas…’ a bridge or front between North and South America” and the wider world.18 
And while the significance of this bridge was “dramatised in geopolitical terms during 
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the Cold War,”19 the subtler role of the Caribbean in contemporary politics and conflict is 
no less impactful. For nearly a half century, the Caribbean Basin “has also been viewed 
as strategic by non-state drug actors…not in terms of geopolitics, but geonarcotics.”20 
The very concept of geonarcotics, the internationalized non-state distribution of illicit 
drugs and precursor chemicals, was made possible largely by the Caribbean’s distinct 
geographical identity as a cluster of small and comparatively weak, resource-poor nations 
at the world’s crossroads. 
The drug trade is, at its roots, a business venture. It grew in size to meet the scale 
of demand emanating from the West, most heavily the United States. As post-War 
disposable income met baby boomer adolescence, the United States became an 
increasingly lucrative market for narcotics. Through the early 1970s, a growing 
percentage of American-smoked marijuana originated in Colombia’s Guajira Peninsula, 
an isolated jetty thrust into the southern Caribbean Sea.21 As the decade progressed, so 
too did the American palate. By the end of the 1970s, “U.S. consumption patterns were 
increasingly moving to cocaine,” and Colombia followed suit.22 By 1979, Colombia had 
already begun to structure its control over the flow of cocaine. At the time, the majority 
of coca cultivation remained in Peru and Bolivia, but processing and trafficking were 
increasingly centered on Colombia,23 with its access to both Caribbean and Pacific 
littorals. As cultivation was consolidated in Colombia, the country concurrently gave rise 
to the most infamous (and romanticized) personalities in drug lore. Reminiscent of the 
public fascination with Chicago’s mobsters or New York’s Mafioso, the 1980s witnessed 
the prominence of men like Pablo Escobar Gaviria, “whose tales updated the popular 
image of the drug kingpin and earned their subject something close to a cult following.”24 
At the helm of the Medellin Cartel,* Escobar rose to become one of the wealthiest 
criminals in history. Yet, Escobar’s larger than life, self-styled Robin Hood persona 
belied a series of global shifts that would inevitably dislodge Colombia’s organized crime 
networks from the pinnacle of the drug trade. Escobar was killed in 1993. His death 
provided a brief moment of opportunity for the rival Cali Cartel, “but they too came 
down in short order.”25 Colombia would continue to remain the major global source for 
cocaine, but the “balance of power shifted.”26 At the heart of this shift was geography, or 
better yet, geonarcotics. 
The closer cocaine (or any drug) comes to an American consumer, the greater its 
value becomes. For this reason, many drug smuggling operations in the Western 
Hemisphere set their sights on the United States. And they have been unreservedly 
successful, though the tactics they employ have varied considerably over the decades. By 
the end of the 1970s, “entire fleets of speedboats lining up to offload drugs from mother 
ships were the norm.”27 Fishing boats and coastal freighters served as inconspicuous hubs 
from which so-called go-fast boats could on- or offload cargo stashed in coves and safe 
houses.28 Yet, the free-for-all elicited a considerable American response. By 1982, the 
                                                
* We use the word ‘cartel’ in its vernacular connotation as a euphemism for criminal groups. In fact, 
transnational criminal organizations do not always fit the economic definition of a cartel (collaborating to 
fix prices), which explains much of the street violence across the Caribbean Basin. (See, Patrick Radden 
Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated,” New York Times, June 15, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-
billions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&.) In other Caribbean states, alternative names are used to convey the 
same concept. In Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican Republic, the word mafia is common, while in 
Jamaica the word posse is used for the same purpose. 
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South Florida Task Group had forced traffickers to transition from mother ships to 
aircraft, dropping payloads for elusive speedboats to collect and conceal.29 As cocaine 
distribution continued to grow in complexity and competency in the 1980s, American law 
enforcement presence similarly continued to build.30 In an effort to evade the tightening 
grip, traffickers in the late 1980s transitioned away from shuttling narcotics between the 
Bahamas and South Florida (the preferred avenue at the time) and increasingly turned to 
the nexus of Puerto Rico and the Lesser Antilles.31 Yet, American law enforcement was 
determined to close the Caribbean corridor. Radar placements in the Mona passage 
(between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic) and Anegada passage (between the 
British Virgin Islands and the Lesser Antilles) made the use of aircraft increasingly 
risky.32 Another blow was dealt in the early 1990s, when the American anti-drug effort 
went multinational. This was an indirect result of the actions of traffickers, as drug use in 
the Caribbean began to spread following the practice of offering drugs in lieu of cash 
payments for distribution services.33 The combination of American enforcement and 
growing regional opposition to the traffickers brought a decline in the popularity of the 
Central and Eastern Caribbean Sea smuggling lines, at the time the “lowest cost supply 
route.”34 Yet, demand for a range of narcotics persisted, and so did the trade. In search of 
new avenues, the most obvious alternative became crossing the U.S.–Mexico border (the 
route next in cost efficiency).35 
The rise of Mexican cartels was a direct result of Colombian criminal syndicates’ 
efforts to more effectively deliver their products to market. The transition in power 
became a matter of fact when Colombian networks began paying Mexican smugglers in 
cocaine instead of cash. With this shift in compensation, Mexicans became investors and 
wholesalers instead of merely “logistical middlemen.”36 The American border is the 
“single most lucrative bottleneck in the drug supply chain, the point where the most value 
is added,” and the Mexican criminal groups that operated on the border (mostly 
smuggling people at the time) “possessed the most enviable situational advantage of all: 
territorial control of the approaches to the U.S. border.”37 Soon, Mexican cartels had 
displaced Colombian organizations as the premier movers in the region. As with the 
Caribbean Sea route, this shift prompted heightened enforcement efforts on the United 
States’ southern border. The American government began to emphasize efforts against 
Mexican distribution schemes, notably “the Arellano Felix organization in Tijuana, the 
Carillo-Fuentes organization in Juarez, and Cardenas Guillen in Tamaulipas and Nuevo 
Leon.”38 The increased presence once again highlighted the flexibility of the drug trade. 
This cat-and-mouse game is commonly referred to as the balloon effect, when 
enforcement efforts in one region or domain simply open enforcement gaps in another. 
This effect was on full display in 1993, when President Clinton’s anti-drug directive 
produced a considerable shift in trafficking routes through the transit zone, but 
precipitated no accompanying shift in drug use or sales.39 Before the directive, as much 
as eighty percent of cocaine shipments had entered the United States through Mexico. 
After, as much as eighty percent of American-bound cocaine was once again delivered 
via the Caribbean Sea.40 
Today, the Caribbean remains a vital link in the distribution of narcotics. In fact, 
despite the decline in public fascination, this century’s kingpins, like the recently 
captured Chapo Guzman, sell “more drugs today than Escobar did at the height of his 
career.”41 Part of the reason for the persistence of the Caribbean smuggling route is the 
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exponential increase in sale price of cocaine as it approaches American consumers. The 
Sinaloa cartel, for example, the cartel Guzman headed and the largest in Mexico, 
 
Can buy a kilo of cocaine in the highlands of Colombia or Peru for around 
$2,000, then watch it accrue value as it makes its way to market. In 
Mexico, that kilo fetches more than $10,000. Jump the border to the 
United States, and it could sell wholesale for $30,000. Break it down into 
grams to distribute retail, and that same kilo sells for upwards of 
$100,000—more than its weight in gold.42 
 
While the figures vary, the principle holds true whether that kilo flows through the U.S.-
Mexico border in a false panel on a truck or a hollowed-out fuel tank on a fishing trawler 
heading for Miami. These combined efforts support a multibillion-dollar industry as 
lucrative and logistically complex as any licit global enterprise. The proceeds, however, 
are notoriously difficult to assess. 
The U.S. Department of Justice places the revenue from American sales of 
cocaine for Colombian and Mexican networks between the wide range of eighteen and 
thirty-nine billion dollars annually—figures The New York Times rejects out of “a spirit 
of empirical humility.”43 The RAND Corporation provides a significantly reduced 
assessment, hypothesizing that Mexican cartels see revenue closer to $6.6 billion.44 Even 
with more conservative figures from RAND, the Sinaloa cartel, which controls between 
forty and sixty percent of the cocaine market, would net approximately $3 billion 
annually.45 By way of comparison, that is equivalent to the gross revenue of major 
corporations such as Netflix or Facebook.46 General John Kelly, Commander of U.S. 
Southern Command, told the House Armed Services Committee that his estimates place 
revenue closer to eighty-four billion dollars annually, though his figures include the 
distribution of cocaine worldwide.47 Kingpins like Chapo oversee organizations as 
sophisticated as any multinational, “doubly sophisticated…because traffickers must move 
both their product and their profits in secret, and constantly maneuver to avoid death or 
arrest.”48 In fact, the Sinaloa Cartel “might be the most successful criminal enterprise in 
history.”49  
Whatever the speculated revenue of drug trafficking, one thing is fairly certain—it 
is highly unlikely that any licit Caribbean endeavor could compete in size, influence, and 
presence. Today, ninety-seven percent of analyzed U.S.-bound drugs emanate from one 
country, Colombia,50 much of which passes along Caribbean routes. And the trade is 
crushing local governments. The United Nations Drug Control Program estimates total 
regional earnings for the illicit drug industry at almost half the GDP of Jamaica or 
Trinidad.51 Suriname, a small South American nation on the southern tier of the 
Caribbean Basin, has been entirely subsumed as a transshipment point for drug running; 
“no other economic activity in Suriname can compete in profits.”52 The same is true for 
many of the small island nations and littoral states dotting the Basin. And yet, despite the 
apparent efficiency with which illicit markets distribute their products, there is a great 
deal of experimentation and controlled chaos in the flow of narcotics across the 
Caribbean. Organized networks succeed in their endeavors by disorganizing, fracturing 
and federalizing responsibilities within a broader shared infrastructure. The Sinaloa 
cartel, for example, is occasionally referred to as the Federation because of its 
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semiautonomous structure.53 This structure isolates risk and produces more responsive 
operational models. It also makes it even more difficult than in the past to identify basic 
information, such as the size of an organization. Author Malcolm Beith speculates that 
Chapo had as many as 150,000 employees at any given time.54 Professor John Bailey, on 
the other hand, projects the number may be as low as 150.55 Part of the discrepancy stems 
from the varied characterization of salaried employees and contractors, a distinction with 
considerable implications for our conceptualization of what it means to be an organized 
criminal network. Narcotics trafficking is highly adaptive and creative. Combined with 
immense capital resources and strong demand in the United States, this creativity 
engenders myriad routes, tactics, and modes of transportation. 
 
2.2 Current Routes and Trends 
 
As expected, after the 1990s boom in Caribbean Sea routes, American efforts 
emanating from Florida surged, again opening a resource gap in enforcement along the 
Mexican border. Cocaine interdicted in the Caribbean in the late 1990s and 2000s 
dropped to only five percent of total intercepted cocaine, while the Mexican route 
flourished.56 That figure roughly held until 2012, when the percentage of overall cocaine 
interdicted in the Eastern and Central Caribbean rose to nine percent.57 The Mexican drug 
wars, which began in earnest in late 2006, had hastened a process of re-conquest for drug 
traffickers on trans-Caribbean routes. With law enforcement presence growing on the 
Mexican border, and the murderous competition of rival Mexican cartels, trafficking is 
ebbing back towards the Eastern and Central Caribbean once again. A number of 
anecdotes support this observation, though as with any illicit trade we are forced to 
extrapolate heavily from the few visible points of reference. In 2013, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) reported a 483% increase in cocaine washing up along Florida’s 
coast compared to the previous year.58 Also in 2013, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) reported that eighty-seven tons of cocaine were intercepted in the 
Caribbean transit zone over the previous twelve months—almost double the 2011 
interdiction rates.59 Cocaine processing equipment, uncovered in the Dominican 
Republic, likewise indicates an effort to expand production facilities in the Caribbean.60 
Sizeable increases in drug trafficking in Puerto Rico made headlines in 2014, spurring 
speculation that inter-cartel violence in Mexico had precipitated “shifting patterns by 
traffickers in Colombia and Venezuela.”61 In that same year, U.S. law enforcement 
calculated that Caribbean cocaine seizures rose nearly twenty percent since 2011.62 The 
agent in charge of the DEA’s Caribbean division suspects such indices do not portend 
“just a one- or two-year blip.”63 While the Caribbean never ceased to serve as a highway 
for illicit distribution chains, indicators such as these suggest an invigorated interest in 
the maritime domain as an avenue for transport. 
The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), a product of the 
United States Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL), is the signature U.S. government document on narcotics 
trafficking. The report identifies two primary categories in the narcotics trade: major 
illicit drug producers and major drug-transit countries. The report defines a major illicit 
drug producing country as “one in which: (A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium 
poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca 
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is cultivated or harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis 
is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the president determines that such illicit 
cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States.”64 A major drug-
transit country is defined as one: “(A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic 
or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United 
States; or (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances.”65 The 2014 
INCSR lists twenty-two countries as either major production and/or distribution countries 
of significance. Seventeen are in Latin America, fourteen of which dot the Caribbean 
Basin. They include the Bahamas, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
and Venezuela.66 Venezuela is further isolated, as one of only three nations to be 
identified as “having ‘failed demonstrably’ during the previous twelve months” to 
address narcotics trafficking and production.67 A memorandum detailing Venezuela’s 
particularly deficient status is included alongside the other named and shamed states 
(Burma and Bolivia).68 The report concludes with a country-by-country assessment of 
counter-narcotics efforts.* The Department of State’s report also identifies major 
precursor chemical source countries. Precursor chemicals are necessary for the 
processing of some harvested narcotics, and central to the production of synthetic drugs 
like methamphetamine or ecstasy. The Caribbean Basin hosts six major precursor 
chemical source countries: Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Mexico.69 Precursor chemical interdiction is incredibly complicated given 
the myriad licit uses for many of the products labeled as precursors. 
Varying sources and limited data point towards an incomplete picture of the most 
frequented Caribbean trafficking routes. Of the states listed above, commonly noted 
Central and Eastern Caribbean transshipment points typically include Jamaica, the 
Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, “though probably every 
island in the Caribbean has at one point been used in some way or another by the 
traffickers.”70 Puerto Rico in particular is fast becoming a significant destination for 
traffickers, and Trinidad and Tobago, Curacao, Bonaire, Cuba, and a host of small islands 
in the Lesser Antilles have all been identified as popular transshipment sights as well.71 
In the Lesser Antilles, the most frequent English-speaking transshipment points include 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Anguilla, Monserrat, and the British Virgin Islands.”72 In the Greater 
Antilles, the most commonly used transit routes again include Cuba, Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic, all frequently operated as “springboards to penetrate Puerto Rico or 
the continental United States.”73 According to a DEA threat assessment, Jamaica, St. 
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are the major Caribbean actors who play a 
significant role in marijuana exportation.74 With respect to methods of transport, the 
assessment reports that traffickers in the Bahamas, Haiti, and Puerto Rico consistently 
utilize the most diverse means of conveyance, including go-fast boats, containers, 
airfreight or air drops, and hidden compartments in vessels.75 Barbados and the 
Dominican Republic primarily utilize go-fast boats and containers, while Trinidad and 
Tobago’s smugglers appear to prefer go-fast boats predominantly.76 A Panamanian 
flagged vessel interdicted by the United States Coast Guard 780 nautical miles west of 
                                                
* In the interest of time and space, and in line with our macroscopic interest in illicit flows, we leave 
exploration of the fourteen individual countries to the reader. 
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Peru in 1995 demonstrates just how internationalized narcotics trafficking has become; 
documentation onboard confirmed it had smuggled cocaine all across the Caribbean.77 
The ship, Nataly, called in Belize, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, 
Panama, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, and even 
Louisiana.78 The Nataly, eventually intercepted in the Pacific Ocean, had also called in 
Ecuador and demonstrates the relative simplicity of moving between oceans. 
 
Figure 1 “Drugs Trafficking in the Caribbean,” Economist, May 24, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21602680-old-route-regains-popularity-drugs-gangs-full-circle. 
Given the clandestine nature of smuggling, anecdotal information from ships like 
the Nataly offers some of the best insight into an otherwise opaque trade. More often than 
not, traffickers cross the transit zone with “almost complete impunity, using the myriad 
hidden bays, rivers, unmapped islands, ports,” crowded littorals, small fishing villages, 
and open ocean to evade detection.79 In the cross-border effort to remain under the radar, 
both literally and metaphorically, traffickers are aided by the diversity of political and 
geographical climes available within such a small radius. Each island and littoral state 
provides a unique set of geopolitical factors, enabling trafficking in variable ways. 
Trinidad and Tobago, for example, is only seven miles from mainland South America 
and serves as an ideal route for traffickers leaving Venezuela via the Orinoco River—
police are obstructed from pursuing them beyond the international border.80 The 
proximity also means that small craft, even local pirogue,81 can make the journey quickly 
and inconspicuously. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is similarly well-positioned 
geographically, and offers an added allure with lax flag of convenience ship registration 
that has attracted Colombian smugglers for decades.82 Flag of convenience laws allow 
ship owners to register vessels in states other than their own, which in turn makes it 
difficult to implicate ship owners in any crime undertaken with the use of the vessel.83 
The Bahamas, to the north, provides a different set of attracting qualities. Only sixty 
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miles from Florida, the Bahamas offers twenty-nine islands and 661 cays (keys) within a 
stone’s throw of mainland United States.84 It also sits astride three major sea lines of 
communication “connecting the Panama Canal, the South Atlantic, and the North 
Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico.”85 All of this is contained with a national oceanic 
jurisdiction of more than 250,000 miles—far greater than the Royal Bahamas Defense 
Force can reasonably patrol.86 
The most significant conclusion from an overview of narcotics trafficking in the 
Caribbean is the versatility with which suppliers adapt (at a macro level) to meet the 
pressures of demand and enforcement. In the maritime domain, “everything from modern 
container ships to rusty small freighters, to fishing boats, to small ‘go-fast’ craft” have 
been used to move drugs.87 Frequently, trafficking through such means, especially small 
boats, is “decidedly low-tech.”88 Go-fast boats are a popular means of conveyance 
because, other than GPS and cell phones, they are largely free of complex 
instrumentation. Yet, just as narcotics traffickers have expanded their geographical routes 
and methods, so too have they experimented with the physical means of conveyance. One 
of the fastest-growing alternatives to the ubiquitous Caribbean go-fast boat is the narco 
submarine (or narco-sub). A narco-sub is a “custom-made, self-propelled” submersible or 
semi-submersible used to transport narcotics and related goods.89 The Colombian cartels 
in particular have featured heavily over the last two decades in the development of 
submersible technology,90 even buying at least one submarine from the Russian mafia.91 
It is within the last decade, however, that narco-subs have gained serious traction in 
response to repeated successes in narcotics interdictions in the mid-2000s.92 In part, go-
fast boats began carrying smaller loads across more crafts to mitigate risk.93 Yet, 
increasingly, narco submarines began to play an important role in the effort to diversify 
maritime smuggling techniques. 
Narco submarines come in two varieties, Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles 
(SPSS) and Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV).94 They are purpose-built machines, 
designed by engineers, constructed in parts under the thick cover of the Amazon forest, 
and floated like logs down river for assembly and deployment.95 Joint Interagency Task 
Force South (JIATF-South) first detected an SPSS in operation in 2006.96 In less than 
three years, the task force was identifying up to sixty SPSS events annually, delivering 
more than 330 metric tons of cocaine.97 Through the summer of 2012, JIATF-South 
confirms 214 documented SPSS events, though only forty-five were disrupted.98 The 
Colombian navy has also facilitated the interdiction of several diesel-powered 
submersibles, each with a similarly impressive cache of cocaine.99 At a cost of 
approximately one million dollars a vessel, each narco-sub has the capacity to reap one 
hundred times that figure in revenue.100 For that reason, such craft are “effectively 
disposable” for traffickers.101 In the unlikely event of interdiction, the submarine can be 
flooded with water, taking evidence to the depths while operators are pulled from the 
sea.102 JIATF-South recorded five Caribbean SPSS disruptions between July 2011 and 
June 2012, with each vessel carrying over 6.5 metric tons of cocaine,103 or more than 
fifteen times the entirety of cocaine interdicted in Jamaica in one year. The fully 
submersible variant can traffic a hefty ten metric tons of cocaine up to 6,800 nautical 
miles.104 That is enough range to reach as far as Africa. From Colombia’s Caribbean 
littoral, an FSV can venture to Florida, Texas, or California in ten to twelve days, likely 
without a hint of detection.105 As one of many methods of distribution, which also include
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“go-fast boats, airplanes, the hiding of narcotics inside bulk containers and smaller 
commodities, drug mules”106 and more, narco submarines provide a resiliency and 
carrying capacity that is quickly forming a central role in transnational crime. While far 
fewer in number than go-fast boats, SPSSs and FSVs potentially pose “an even more 
insidious threat to the security of the United States,” in the words of former JIATF-South 
Director Vice Admiral Charles Michel.107 Such narco-subs exemplify the nature of the 
hybrid threat. In many instances, the actors in control of such vessels retain criminal 
motives. Yet, the construction and deployment of these craft (not to mention the 
cultivation of the products they carry) frequently require political control of territory. 
And the capacity to move not just drugs, but people, money, and weapons (all of which 
we will explore below) means such submersibles encapsulate an inherent capacity to 
threaten international security. 
 
2.3 Trafficking Flows 
 
Within days in April 2014, investigators on the island of Puerto Rico intercepted 
two boats, each with millions of dollars of cocaine stashed onboard. In the first instance, 
law enforcement uncovered 1,774 kilograms of cocaine; in the second, agents uncovered 
1,530 kilograms.108 The rising frequency of such interdictions in Puerto Rico has 
attracted national attention, resulting in a New York Times profile recounting one such 
interception: 
 
With its navigation lights off, the 35-foot speedboat raced north toward 
Puerto Rico one night this month, its two large engines at full throttle. 
Above, a Coast Guard helicopter chased it and then let loose a few 
warning shots. But the boat roared ahead. Then, thwack, the crew on the 
copter shot out one of [the] engines. By dawn, the frenzied scramble had 
come to an end and 1,280 kilograms of cocaine—worth about $37 million 
on the street—were in federal hands, much of it scooped from the 
Caribbean Sea, where the smugglers had tossed the bales.109 
 
Dramatic scenes such as this are a staple of life in counter-narcotics; hardly a 
week passes without one agency announcing a significant arrest or interdiction. 
And such are increasingly familiar sights on American soil. 
The jewel in the Caribbean trafficking crown is Puerto Rico. The reason is readily 
apparent; “once cocaine successfully reaches Puerto Rico, it has reached the U.S. 
homeland.”110 Yet, Puerto Rico is only one stop on a long journey. Traditionally, the 
island of Hispaniola has served as a midway point in this trip. In 2013 SOUTHCOM 
Commander Kelly noted an increase of three percent (to thirty-two metric tons) of known 
cocaine passing through the island.111 Haiti, on the western end of Hispaniola, is an 
obvious target because of its endemic struggle with inadequate and corrupt 
governance.112 Yet, it is the island’s larger eastern state, the Dominican Republic, which 
may be the Caribbean’s largest island transshipment hub. As the “first point of contact for 
Puerto Rican operators,” the Dominican Republic plays a central role in the “US/New 
York/Miami/Puerto Rico/Dominican Republic axis” that moves narcotics throughout the 
transit zone.113 In 2013, the U.S. military predicted that a full six percent of all U.S.-
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bound cocaine would transit through the Dominican Republic.114 That is nearly half of all 
the cocaine passing through the Central and Eastern Caribbean (around fourteen percent 
of total interdictions in 2013),115 indicating that a plurality (perhaps even a majority) of 
cocaine trafficked via Caribbean islands passes between the Hispaniola–Puerto Rico 
corridor. 
Dominicans make up a considerable portion of the immigrant population on the 
East Coast of the United States, particularly in New York. The number of Dominican 
immigrants in New York is so large that “Dominicans have created truly binational 
societies between the US and the Dominican Republic.”116 Better standards of living in 
the United States also mean that New York-based Dominicans contribute heavily to the 
Dominican economy through remittances. As David Kilcullen explored in Out of the 
Mountains, remittance networks are one of the many ways communities remain 
interconnected (a ‘megatrend’) with the wider world.117 Kilcullen demonstrates this effect 
through Jamaican posses, which extort Jamaica’s massive remittance system to fund 
illicit ventures and their rule of garrison districts.118 International ties like remittances 
also contribute to trafficking, concealing illicit flows embedded within licit traffic. In 
much the same way, the heavy exchange of remittances, people, and goods between 
Dominican binational communities forms the basis for many Dominican smuggling 
routes. And this fundamental infrastructure of smuggling is a commodity in its own right. 
Such networks are by nature highly adaptable and can be easily co-opted by other actors 
or for the transport of alternative products. Thus, the existence of Dominican smugglers 
operating between the Caribbean and the United States has attracted attention from more 
than just law enforcement. The Drug Enforcement Administration believes that 
“Colombians are directly organising groups and routes in the Dominican Republic”119 in 
an effort to capitalize on this preexisting infrastructure. Whether organized by external 
forces or internally connected by ethnic ties, the centrality of the Dominican–Puerto 
Rican drug route now pervades Dominican language and culture. Dominican immigrants 
living in the United States are sometimes called “Dominicanyorks and are resented in the 
Dominican Republic, in major part because they have been stereotyped as being drug 
dealers.”120 
Trends rarely persist in the cat-and-mouse game of narcotics smuggling. As 
Puerto Rico grows as an attractive destination for Caribbean smuggling operations, 
efforts to evade detection and simplify shipment routes have resulted in increased 
attempts to bypass Hispaniola entirely.121 According to a Puerto Rico-based Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent, Angel Melendez, “cocaine is increasingly 
trafficked in larger amounts directly north from Venezuela on boats that refuel at sea 
during the roughly two-day voyage.”122 With the stronghold the Dominican Republic has 
on transshipment, and the strategic placement of ethnic and familial ties in New York, it 
is unlikely that Hispaniola will disappear from the trade. Nevertheless, as history proves, 
the drug market is highly adaptable. While squeezing the balloon at one end (i.e. the 
Dominican Republic) may decrease cocaine traffic through the island, experience 
suggests that the excess ‘air’ will simply find a place elsewhere. 
One such ‘elsewhere’ is Jamaica, which originally made its mark in drug 
trafficking through marijuana. Alongside Belize (and a few smaller islands), Jamaica 
grows and exports marijuana for regional consumption, mostly in the Bahamas, Guyana, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and the Eastern Caribbean.123 Inevitably, with the dramatic rise in 
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sale price to American consumers, Jamaican marijuana eventually made its way into the 
United States as well. Jamaica remains the largest Caribbean supplier of marijuana to the 
United States.124 Yet, as we noted with Dominican smuggling networks, the infrastructure 
of trafficking is easily co-opted, and illicit marijuana distribution provided an avenue for 
more expansive smuggling operations. A similar trajectory took place in St. Kitts and 
Nevis. There, marijuana production attracted smugglers who sought to co-opt “the 
clandestine links already established by the locals”125 to develop alternative cocaine 
trafficking routes. Some Jamaicans, especially those who make their living on the coast, 
are made uneasy by the prospect of similar infiltration migrating into their towns: 
 
Anxiety is expressed by a few residents of the tiny fishing village of 
Forum, on Jamaica’s southern coast, where the main road leads past 
rickety wooden shacks to a rocky shoreline lined with small boats. ‘If the 
drugs take over, this place will never be the same. It will be bad, bad,’ 
fisherman Oneal Burke said as he scaled fresh red snapper.126 
 
And in much of Jamaica, that anxiety has long since been validated. The central 
Caribbean region has reemerged as a route of favor for traffickers,127 and Jamaica appears 
to play a significant role in that nexus. The scene along parts of Jamaica’s southern coast 
already threatens hamlets like Burke’s: 
 
Assault rifles at the ready, police in a speedboat scan the coastline as they 
slice through the slate-gray water, aware that the rocky shorelines and 
fishing villages that line parts of southern Jamaica are not always very 
sleepy these days.128 
 
In the first half of 2013, cocaine seizures in Jamaica doubled over the 
previous year.129 Yet, that doubled figure only came to 354 kilograms,130 paltry 
when compared to individual hauls of over 1,000 kilograms in Puerto Rico and 
elsewhere. Thus, while Jamaica is widely suspected of being an increasingly 
popular transshipment point for northward bound cocaine, it does not rank highly 
on the list of Caribbean seizures by volume.131 The U.S. government nevertheless 
maintains that Jamaica is a “major drug-transit country.”132 While interdiction 
rates lag, tight-knit island communities also exhibit prescient concerns. The 
corrosive impact of the trade has made itself felt throughout the social fabric of 
the country, as expressed by the fishermen of Forum. The national security 
minister, in a speech to the Jamaican parliament a decade earlier in 2002, stated 
“the illegal drug trade has become the taproot for crime and violence in our 
country today.”133 While poor interdiction numbers offer little empirical support 
for claims of Jamaica’s rise in the drug trade, sensitive popular sentiments such as 
these do. Drug abuse serves as yet another indirect indicator of drug trafficking, 
and only serves to fuel social tension. Payment in kind, instead of in cash, is a 
common financing alternative for drug networks. This invariably breeds drug 
addiction growth within communities, and Jamaica is one such victim of this 
phenomenon. The country now “harbors thriving cocaine and marijuana markets,” 
which are still further evidence of the island’s heavy use as a transshipment 
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point.134 Yet, while the Eastern and Central Caribbean may be growing in 
popularity among criminal organizations, these routes still pale in comparison to 
the sheer size of the trade along the Western Caribbean littoral. 
According to Vice Admiral Charles Michel, “The Mexico/Central American 
corridor, which includes the waters of the Eastern Pacific and the Western Caribbean, is 
the primary threat vector toward the United States, accounting for more than 90 percent 
of total documented cocaine movement.”135 Eighty percent of this traffic makes first 
landfall in Central America, with the remainder heading directly for Mexico.136 About 
thirty-five percent of all outward-bound cocaine makes landfall in Honduras alone.137 
Moving primarily in go-fast boats—“open hulled boats anywhere from 20 to 50 feet in 
length with one to four powerful outboard engines”—traffickers move as much as three 
and a half metric tons of cocaine as they ferry between Honduras (principally) and 
Colombia.138 Of the 568 go-fast events documented by JIATF-South’s Consolidated 
Counter Drug Database in 2011—which carried 490 metric tons of cocaine—ninety-four 
percent “were along the Central American isthmus into Honduras, Guatemala and 
Mexico.”139 Increasingly, narco submarines are also being used, and the DEA estimates 
as much as thirty percent of the maritime movement of drugs in this corridor is now 
undertaken by these vessels.140 
This traffic, between South America and Central America, is the primary instance 
of maritime conveyance for most cocaine exiting the source zone. Here, between Central 
America and Colombia and Venezuela, eighty percent of U.S.-bound cocaine first moves 
by water.141 Once in Central America, much of the onward smuggling takes place 
overland. Of those shipments that do progress on water, many embark along the Western 
Caribbean shoreline, using the Bay Islands as a point of departure.142 The Bay Islands are 
within reach of the small Colombian islands of San Andrés and Providencia, and the 
modern inhabitants of the island trace their lineage to English-speaking immigrants from 
Belize, Jamaica, and other British Caribbean possessions.143 Thus, Bay Islanders 
frequently share ethnic and economic similarities with English-speaking Caribbean 
communities across the Basin, as well as a shared history of “small-scale smuggling.”144 
The geographical position at the crossroads of Central America, South America, the 
Western Caribbean, and Mexico, alongside the historical and linguistic ties to varying 
parts of the Basin, all converge to make Honduras and its islands a predictable victim of 
the narcotics trade. 
The United States regards all seven of the Central American states—Belize, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—as “major drug transit 
countries.”145 And while they persist as actors in the trade, their individual roles are 
constantly in flux. As traffickers diversify their product lines to include designer drugs 
like methamphetamine, the littoral states of Central America are now playing a greater 
role in the trafficking of precursor chemicals. Multiple tons have been seized in Belize, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.146 Given the lack of climate and soil requirements 
for the production of synthetic drugs, the passage of precursor chemicals through Central 
America and the Caribbean may portend a geographical expansion of methamphetamine 
and ecstasy production.147 In Guatemala, this production is already an issue of increasing 
significance.*148 
 
                                                
* For a deeper assessment of existing U.S. efforts to combat drug trafficking, see Appendix D. 
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2.4 Summary 
 
In the words of former Foreign Policy editor Moises Naim, “borders are a 
trafficker’s best friend and an enormous headache for those fighting him. This asymmetry 
is not new, but it has become more acute.”149 The capacity to transfer an illicit product 
between jurisdictions is a commodity in its own right. The infrastructure and networks 
required to facilitate this kind of movement are immense, clandestine in character, and by 
nature resistant to the efforts of single actors, even large ones. Even the myriad 
international partnerships in the Caribbean struggle to overcome the fundamental obstacle 
of international borders. Yet, the single greatest impediment to combatting narcotics 
trafficking is the perception that simply catching enough ‘bad guys,’ or interdicting 
enough cocaine, will solve the problem.* Even in instances of high confidence 
intelligence, the Commandant of the Coast Guard concedes, “there aren’t enough ships to 
catch them all…We’re giving 60 percent of what we know, literally, a free pass.”150 This 
pertains despite the fact that the war on drugs represents “the largest deployment of 
money, technology, and personnel that humankind has ever devoted to stopping drugs 
from moving across borders,”151 costing the United States an estimated $200 billion 
annually in direct healthcare and enforcement costs related to cocaine alone.152 Given the 
scale of the narcotics trade (the DEA estimates $60 billion in illicit proceeds are 
laundered through the Caribbean annually),153 even frequent high-quantity interdictions 
have done little to slow the movement of drugs worldwide. All this suggests that the issue 
of narcotics trafficking is not one to be solved by sheer scale of investment. The value of 
drugs entering the United States is simply too high for the U.S. to impart a meaningful 
enough penalty to deter trafficking. 
Since the launch of the war on drugs, the United States has constructed an 
immensely expensive apparatus devoted to counter-drug operations. At the federal level 
alone, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Customs and Border Patrol, the Marshals Services, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, the Coast Guard, and countless other national agencies are funded for 
counter-drug missions at an estimated price of twenty billion dollars annually.154 Yet, 
despite the colossal size of the counter-drug apparatus, the task of detection and 
interdiction is exponentially larger. To be sure, there have been a number of successes 
over the years. Aid money to Colombia helped decapitate the leadership of the Medellin 
and Cali cartels,155 which helped dismantle large portions of their organizations. Weekly, 
news reports relay daring arrests and high-profile corruption charges. Yet, such successes 
come with little reward. Even when transnational organized crime was structured in a 
more hierarchical format, the death of a kingpin like Pablo Escobar had virtually no 
impact on cocaine production and distribution.156 Later, arrests of top leadership of both 
the Arellano Felix criminal organization and the Gulf Cartel in the early 2000s were 
similarly met by imperceptible changes in gross narcotics trafficking.157 More 
                                                
* This is in the mold of midcentury American policing, profiled in Chapter One. This strategy of policing 
focuses on catching criminals in the act and responding quickly (via 911 call centers) to crimes in 
commission. Yet, in both policing and drug interdiction, police rarely respond quickly enough to catch a 
crime in commission. Instead, they remain apart from the communities they are devoted to serving, over 
time becoming mistrusted and perhaps even adversarial. 
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significantly, decapitation of cartels and a focus on interdictions ignore important 
changes in the structure of trafficking. As we explored above, Colombian organizations 
began losing dominance when they enabled Mexican TCOs to act as wholesalers. Today, 
that process has continued to devolve the narcotics trade. Crossing borders adds the 
greatest value to cocaine as it moves, shifting power and earnings to the “middle of the 
distribution chain, to the points where the greatest opportunities exist for high-value 
cross-border transactions, diversification, and strategic partnerships.”158 Opportunistic 
middlemen constitute networks of shared smuggling infrastructure moving goods in 
shifting patterns shaped by the demands of the market. The arrest of a distant kingpin in 
Mexico, or the interdiction of a small shipment in Jamaica, means relatively little to a 
facilitator in the Dominican Republic or Honduras. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that counter-narcotics operations have met limited 
success, despite being the signature American maritime security task in the Caribbean. As 
we have seen, the reasons for this failure are born out of two significant misperceptions. 
First, “we still speak of drug ‘cartels,’ but the drug business today has largely dissolved 
the heavy organized crime-like operations of the past and works in more nimble, less 
traceable ways.”159 The perception of transnational organized crime as corporately 
hierarchical instead of fluidly franchised produces flawed strategies, most notably 
institutional decapitation. Yet, as we explored in Chapter One, hybrid threats in the 
modern age are frequently characterized by decentralized actors operating in formations 
more akin to swarms than coordinated groups. Decapitation of senior leadership makes 
little impact on the semi-autonomous middlemen and small-scale actors who carry out the 
drug trade. In the Dominican Republic, for example, in the “absence of a mafia controlled 
by one or even a few capos…the state fights a Hydra of decentralised and localised gangs 
without hierarchy or enduring central control.”160 Second, narcotics trafficking is not a 
conventional security issue. It is too extensive for the Coast Guard to handle on its own, 
and seen as too unconventional for the Navy to address with any enthusiasm (see Chapter 
One). JIATF-South’s mission is to deny traffickers the use of over six million square 
miles of sea and airspace.161 Despite accounting for over half of all drug seizures by U.S. 
authorities,162 the Coast Guard (alongside the Navy, CBP, DEA, and others in the Task 
Force) is fighting a losing battle. With the shifting structure and focus of the Navy, this 
effort will only become more difficult. The answer, consequently, comes not from 
budgets or force deployments but—as we explored in Chapter Two—in how we frame 
the problem. 
 
3.0 Local Crime 
 
 Narcotics trafficking garners international concern because it crosses borders. 
Yet, the individual criminal incidents that collectively constitute transnational crime 
necessarily occur within nations, districts, and communities. The adage—all politics is 
local—is consequentially equally true of transnational crime and terrorism. Even global 
enterprises must operate within local contexts. In the Caribbean Basin, that context is 
often informed by alarming crime rates, including some of the highest murder rates in the 
world. Local crime is, therefore, the dominant political concern for many of the region’s 
inhabitants. And because local crime and related social grievances monopolize the 
limited resources of Caribbean lawmakers, regional security is typically left to foreign 
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bodies, financed (and as a consequence, tailored) to the needs and assumptions of 
someone else’s strategic perspective.163 Engaging and incentivizing the necessary 
participation of Caribbean partners to combat illicit trafficking require incorporating the 
region’s emphasis on the home front. And the regional focus on crime is an important 
one. Not only do rising crime rates obviously impact human security, they can have 
disastrous consequences on economies dominated by the tourism industry. In 2002, the 
British government issued a crime advisory for Trinidad and Tobago, a regular product 
issued by Western governments. Yet, the memorandum was seen as such a threat to the 
Trinidadian economy that it sent the government into a “tailspin.”164 The prime minister 
dispatched a special delegation to both New York and London in an effort to have the 
advisory withdrawn.165 Similar advisories for Jamaica, issued in response to increased 
shootouts between police and posses (drug traffickers), had a direct impact on tourism 
and the economy.166 
The scale and scope of narcotics trafficking would imply that indeed quite a large 
number of individuals participate in or facilitate the movement of illegal substances. In 
fact, organized or semi-organized networks cannot keep apace with demand. To keep 
product moving across the American border, large criminal groups frequently license the 
use of their routes to small or individual actors. Despite ‘taxes’ of up to sixty percent, 
moving narcotics is so lucrative that there is no shortage of part-time traffickers to fill 
demand.167 Such was the case with a Mexican business owner, ascribed the pseudonym 
Don Alfonzo. Alfonzo uncovered that some of his employees were using company 
vehicles to transport narcotics to supplement their incomes (one successful trip was worth 
a year’s salary).168 Instead of turning them into the police, Alfonzo approached them with 
a proposition. He would finance their purchase of narcotics (the largest up-front cost) and 
allow them to continue using his vehicles to cross the border while taking a percentage 
off the top.169 Alfonzo’s successful small-scale network operates largely independent of 
the major Mexican cartels. Over the years, businesses like this “have quietly prospered, 
no more affected by the cartel wars than by the billions of dollars the U.S. and Mexican 
governments have deployed to stop the trade.”170 Such entrepreneurs are aware that drugs 
offer the prospect of significantly enhanced supplemental income at minimal risk—
Alfonzo jokes, “I think in this town the construction business is riskier than moving 
drugs.”171 In Alfonzo’s words, 
 
The gringos and the police here are busy chasing the big guys, and if they 
go after the small guys like us they will need to build a new jail the size of 
this whole town. The economy of this entire region would go bankrupt. No 
government can touch this. Why should they? The big guys give good 
theater and are good for politics. We don’t.172 
 
Even those who do not physically transport drugs—by choice in Alfonzo’s case or 
by force in many others—are implicated in the trade. The logistical challenges of moving 
drugs across vast distances require an extensive support network. Costa Rican Coast 
Guard director Martín Arias describes how a boat laden with cocaine traveling from 
Colombia to Mexico “could require as many as 24 other boats along the way to 
successfully complete the journey.”173 David Chacón, the president of a fishing 
cooperative on Costa Rica’s Pacific coast, explains that local fishermen are press-ganged 
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by traffickers to rendezvous at sea with fuel and rations as part of a series of way 
stations.174 In Costa Rica, as with many Caribbean and littoral Central American states, 
the existing coast guard forces are ill-suited to police the entirety of the country’s 
borders, leaving exposed the “economic vulnerability” of small fishing communities to 
predation.175 And there is no shortage of avenues through which communities are 
enveloped into the trade. Falcons, lookouts employed by the cartels, are paid as much as 
one hundred dollars a month “just to keep their eyes open and make a phone call if they 
notice an uptick in border inspections or a convoy of police.”176 Trafficking is so 
extensive, and the culture so pervasive, that the DEA speculates there are cities in which 
“virtually every cabdriver is on the payroll.”177 In the words of former DEA agent 
Michael Braun, “they have eyes and ears everywhere.”178 The drug culture in the 
Caribbean is not one that can be addressed by high profile arrests or interdictions. Drug 
abuse and widespread participation in narcotics trafficking erode the efficacy of the state 
and the self-efficacy of communities ubiquitously. 
On the low end, police estimate that roughly sixty percent of crime in Caribbean 
Basin countries is related to drugs.179 That figure is considerably higher with regard to 
violent, gun-related crimes. In 2004, the Colombian president Alvaro Uribe alleged that 
“more than 90 percent of the crime in Colombia” was perpetrated with illegal firearms.180 
Indeed, perhaps the most significant connection between narcotics trafficking and local 
crime is its impact on homicides. The reason is simple; much of the revenue from selling 
drugs is funneled directly into arms trafficking.181 Just as Jamaica’s or St. Kitts and 
Nevis’ marijuana smuggling networks were co-opted for cocaine trafficking, so too are 
cocaine networks co-opted for returning guns to transit and source countries. The groups 
operating these networks are often related; “narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling 
along the Andean Ridge are closely interlocked. Groups involved in narcotics also are the 
leading traffickers in armaments and much of the money used for arms purchases is 
generated by the narcotics trade.”182 One typical gun running case documented in 
November 2001 involved Panamanians, Israelis, Mexicans, and Guatemalans trafficking 
weapons through the transit zone and into Colombia.183 Another case from the 1990s 
documented the Medellin Cartel’s purchase of Israeli weapons using the Antiguan 
defense force as a legal cover for the shipment.184 These weapons are then used to defend 
transit routes from competition, terrorize the public into submission, and battle security 
forces. The avalanche of small arms and light weapons (SALW) pouring into the Basin 
has helped it become the most deadly region in the world. Eight of the ten countries with 
the world’s highest homicide rates are in the Caribbean Basin, and include Honduras, 
Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Venezuela, and 
Colombia.185 And the impact of murder rates that rival those of warzones cannot be 
understated. 
A 1996 survey in Latin America identified gun crime as the leading 
socioeconomic issue facing the region.186 In the intervening two decades, little headway 
has been made. In the last ten years, Jamaica has only fallen from number one to number 
six on the list; the country still experiences more than one thousand murders a year on 
average (since 2004).187 The island is swamped by the epidemic. Drugs are traded for 
guns in an exchange that exacerbates both local crime and international narcotics 
trafficking.188 The U.S. Department of State estimates homicide conviction rates at only 
five percent.189 According to Omar Davies, former Jamaican Minister of Transport, 
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Works and Housing, and former Minister of Finance and Planning, “‘vicious criminal 
organisations’ permeate every level of society…[And] the loss of lives from serious 
crime is the biggest burden to the country.”190 Jamaica even struggles to find enough 
places to house all the bodies. Jamaica has been without a national morgue since the 
1970s, resulting in inadequate autopsy facilities and the frequent contamination of 
evidence.191 Bodies are stored in funeral homes that are paid so little (six to ten dollars 
per body, per day) that they often cannot afford to even keep them refrigerated.192 One 
consultant to the Jamaican police noted that he has “never seen such deplorable 
conditions and lack of support from a government to resolve these issues.”193 The former 
mayor of Kingston, Desmond McKenzie, noted plainly, “the simple fact is the 
government has failed miserably.”194 Puerto Rico, too, is not immune. In 2012, homicide 
rates on the island peaked at 26.5 per 100,000 people.195 This too is directly related to 
narcotics trafficking; the Coast Guard estimates that seventy-five percent of homicides in 
Puerto Rico can now be tied to the trade.196 Yet, of all the death and gun use in the 
region, Honduras lays claim to the title of the most violent place on the planet. Much of 
this violence takes place in San Pedro Sula (the deadliest city on Earth) and along the 
Guatemalan–Honduran border,197 both major transshipment chokepoints. 
In Honduras, transportistas (trafficking groups) and territorial gangs are in 
constant struggle over control of the world’s most frequented cocaine passageways.198 
Murder rates are highest in these “highly concentrated urban centres and strategic points 
(the Atlantic coast and border regions).”199 Maras (gangs) and pandillas (youth gangs) 
emerged in Honduras emulating the model of American gangs in the 1980s and 1990s 
and have been a major feature of these violent turf wars ever since.200 The numbers of 
gang involvement are so high that estimates project as many as 151 maras members per 
100,000.201 Regionally, the numbers are no better. Guatemala stands at 146 per 100,000, 
and El Salvador is at a staggering 318 per 100,000.202 Between 2005 and 2014, more than 
40,000 people were killed in Honduras, the vast majority with a gun.203 In 2012 alone, 
Honduras witnessed more than 7,000 violent deaths, and the figures have risen more than 
200 percent since 2005.204 A homicide rate of 85.5 per 100,000 people is more than eight 
and a half times the global average.205 Illegal weapons, purchased with the proceeds of 
drug running and smuggled through many of the same mechanisms, drive Honduras’ 
murder epidemic.206 As is the nature of illicit trades, estimates on the number of SALW 
in the country are variable. Extrapolating the number of firearms based on the number of 
homicides would suggest the presence of around 420,000 illegal weapons in Honduras.207 
The United Nations Development Programme estimates closer to one-third of the 
firearms in Central America are in Honduras, which would place the figure much higher, 
between 800,000 and one million weapons.208 While the relationship between traffickers, 
gangs, and firearms may be complex,209 the hyperbolic case of Honduras demonstrates 
just how interconnected they are. And gun violence is not simply at issue because of the 
rampant homicides (as if that were not enough). Just as with the movement of drugs, the 
trafficking of guns is itself a lucrative and complex international endeavor. The spike in 
crime across the Caribbean Basin can be directly tied to the impact of “a combination of 
drugs and money in the form of the naked display of power, through the use of arms.”210 
In 2000, Trinidad’s Attorney General conveyed the scope of the relationship between 
transnational crime and local communities: “There is a direct nexus between illegal drugs 
and crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, maltreatment of children by 
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parents and other evils.”211 He went on to note that this disorder “changes democratic 
institutions, erodes the rule of law, and destroys civic order with impunity.”212 The 
relationships expressed here, between crime, disorder, and perceptions of eroding 
institutions, are all elements of the Broken Windows theory as explored in Chapter Two. 
We turn next to making these links even clearer. 
 
3.1 Lessons Learned 
 
Given the length of our primary case study, and the unique parallels between local 
crime in the Caribbean and our discussion in Chapter Two, it would be instructive at this 
point to step outside of our narration to analyze the regional and international response to 
Caribbean crime and its implications on our thesis. The interplay of local crime with 
international trafficking is not lost in American maritime strategy, if perhaps only 
implemented on a small-scale. In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in 
2014, SOUTHCOM Commander Kelly recognized that this “skyrocketing criminal 
violence exacerbates existing challenges.”213 In his words, the Caribbean Basin (and 
Latin America) “remains the most unequal and insecure region in the world.”214 The 2014 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report also notes that “criminal activity in 
Caribbean states…is of deep concern to the United States.”215 In recognition thereof, the 
United States has utilized the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative to foster crime 
prevention programs in an effort to specifically address “citizen safety.”216 In one such 
initiative approximately 2,500 Caribbean police officers were trained in the Dominican 
Republic.217 These training exercises help build the capacity of law enforcement to meet 
the needs not only of investigating complicated crimes (for example, forensic accounting 
for international financial crimes), but also of mitigating the local fallout from 
transnational crime.218 The Department of State credits such mentorship programs in St. 
Kitts and Nevis, for example, with reducing homicides by forty-one percent.219 
These programs came in response to the drastically changing nature of Caribbean 
crime. The threat of local crime became so profound, indeed so hybridized (the blending 
of crime and war), that Caribbean law enforcement underwent its own parallel 
hybridization in the 1990s. In Jamaica, for example, the fear of the economic impacts of 
violent crime prompted a militarization of police command when Colonel Trevor 
MacMillan was seconded from the army to the police.220 Yet, while militaries frequently 
provide superior logistics and resources, this militarization of local police work was 
doomed to failure. As police departments experienced in the United States in the 1980s 
and 1990s, a combative posture frequently alienates the very communities authorities 
need to reach. Kilcullen arrives at the same conclusion in his discussions about American 
military action in Mogadishu and the Jamaican siege of the Tivoli Gardens garrison 
district (both examples of urbicide),221 similar to our discussion of Israeli and Brazillian 
tactics in Chapter One. Today, in light of the shortcomings of military tactics in police 
contexts, the field of community policing research has attracted significant attention from 
Caribbean law enforcement. The relationship between local crime and transnational 
crime sketched in this subsection mirrors that of quality-of-life crimes and index crimes 
discussed in Chapter Two. Quality-of-life crimes create the chaotic conditions upon 
which more serious crimes graft, and these more serious crimes perpetuate a 
community’s inability (or disinterest) to police yet more crime. As with our earlier 
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conversation on causality, there remains an element of endogeneity, or a feedback loop, 
which makes it difficult to assess empirically which is the proverbial chicken and which 
the proverbial egg. Yet, what we do know is that tackling the former can mitigate the 
latter. And this should be true of crime virtually anywhere in the world. This is made 
evident by the fact that NYPD officers have deployed to the Caribbean, as in Haiti, to 
serve as advisors to local law enforcement.222 Even the statistical software introduced by 
Commissioner Bratton in New York City to map crime on a neighborhood level has 
become popular across the Basin. Both the Costa Rican Ministry of Public Security and 
the Panamanian National Police (PNP), for example, have begun implementing 
COMPSTAT (comparative statistics).223 
The adoption of technologies closely related to the Broken Windows theory is 
also accompanied by the adoption of many Broken Windows precepts. The Association 
of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) acknowledged community policing (of 
which Broken Windows is a subset) as its preferred, “modernised” strategy back in 
2001.224 On the conceptual level, community policing is popular throughout the Basin. 
The ACCP has partnered with the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice at the 
University of the West Indies to help better understand and pursue community 
policing.225 The Regional Police Training Centre in Barbados incorporates the model in 
its courses, noting on its syllabus for Recruit Training that students will be “exposed to 
the concept of Community Policing.”226 More senior officers are also eligible to enroll in 
a two-day seminar entirely devoted to community policing.227 In 2012, the Bahamian 
government launched Urban Renewal 2.0, an array of community policing programs 
aimed at tackling the schism between neighborhoods and law enforcement.228 The United 
States likewise supports community policing initiatives in the Bahamas, as well as in 
Belize,229 Costa Rica,230 the Dominican Republic,231 El Salvador,232 and Guatemala.233 
The Panamanian National Border Service (SENAFRONT) is particularly noteworthy for 
its incorporation of community-oriented missions in addition to its traditional 
responsibilities.234 On the conceptual level, community policing has certainly won the 
day. 
Yet, despite the strong preference for community policing techniques among 
Caribbean law enforcement, a number of factors slow the implementation of community 
policing theories. First, despite the organization’s consensus, it has met difficulty 
convincing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to pursue an integrated approach to 
policing.235 For reasons of geography and politics, “the tendency has been for individual 
countries to pursue their own national law enforcement strategies,” independent of one 
another.236 ACCP thus joins the “International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance 
Programme (ICITAP)… the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the 
Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC), the Regional Drug-Law 
Enforcement Training Centre (RDLETC), the Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)…the Caribbean Anti Money Laundering Programme 
(CALP),” the Regional Security System, and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) as one of many organizations struggling to build a unity of effort.237 
Second, local disillusionment with crime perpetuates demands for heavy-handed rhetoric 
and action.238 This is explained in part by the small geographic and demographic 
dimensions of Caribbean states, which generate a distinct sociology in which even small 
spikes in crime can create “panic-driven concerns.”239 In this atmosphere, both “public 
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mood and political expediency” make the application of some community policing 
models “a dim prospect.”240 Ironically, the effort to bring security and trust down to the 
community level is imperative for addressing such pervasive attitudes of inadequate law 
enforcement and instability, the very malefactors that contribute to high crime rates 
according to the Broken Windows theory. 
 As General Kelly noted to Congress in 2013, regional security concerns, left 
unaddressed, have the potential to rapidly escalate into threats to the homeland.241 For 
this reason, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower includes among its 
guiding principles the obligation to limit regional conflicts.242 Understanding how local 
crime is related to regional disorder helps us conceptualize just how sophisticated an 
endeavor it is to mitigate regional insecurity. Crime in the Caribbean has become such a 
complicated and integrated part of the regional discourse on security that some scholars 
have even called for a distinct “Caribbean Criminology.”243 We would, however, suggest 
that there is no need for an entirely new paradigm on crime, nor is there anything wholly 
new about crime in the Caribbean. What is instead lacking is an application of 
criminological theories, like the Broken Windows theory, on a regional scale. This has 
been advocated, on a conceptual level, by ACCP, which unequivocally supports the 
community policing paradigm. As we noted earlier, Caribbean regional initiatives often 
require an external patron, thus shaping the initiative’s objectives in the eyes of the 
funder. At the termination of external funding, many of these initiatives are unsustainable 
in the ensuing financial vacuum.244 By integrating actors through the prevailing local 
practitioner consensus on best practices, a Broken Windows maritime security strategy 
offers a theoretical avenue for ensuring unity of effort across stakeholders. This unity is 
paramount, given that “the issue of crime is indisputably a regional security challenge 
and not merely a challenge for states within the region.”245 Any effective (and cost-
effective) maritime strategy will have to address community policing if it intends to 
foster and utilize local partnerships. 
 
4.0 People 
 
The crime goes by many names: trafficking in persons (TIP), involuntary 
servitude, slavery, forced labor, debt bondage, sex trafficking.246 While definitions vary 
across these terms, they are all at heart characterized by the “act of recruiting, harboring, 
transporting, providing, or obtaining a person for compelled labor or commercial sex act 
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion.”247 Such a definition (that of the United 
States Department of State, and similar in language to that of the UN)248 fosters some 
interpretations that the word ‘trafficking’ might not immediately conjure. For example, 
an individual need not necessarily be physically moved in order to be a victim of 
trafficking. Children under the age of eighteen, for instance, cannot legally consent to 
prostitution under American (and much international) law.249 Thus, any child engaging in 
prostitution while employed in the services of a pimp or brothel is by definition a 
trafficking victim. Even those who move willingly may be victims of trafficking. If an 
individual is enticed to move based on fraudulent employment claims, and is then held 
with confiscated passports or charged exorbitant fees for his relocation, that person is a 
trafficking victim regardless of whether he moved under his own volition. Human 
trafficking is also frequently confused with human smuggling. And there are similarities 
Muddy Waters: 
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory 
 89 
to be sure. Both frequently involve the movement of people in deplorable conditions, and 
both populations are vulnerable to abuse. Yet, the primary difference between the two is 
that smuggled individuals acquiesce (for lack of a better word) to their movement, paying 
or compensating smugglers for their services. Trafficking victims, on the other hand, are 
universally characterized by their lack of consent (or inability to legally consent, in the 
case of minors).* In this section, we explore the impacts of both of these vast, irregular 
movements of people throughout the Caribbean Basin and their interplay with the crimes 
and insecurities addressed thus far. 
 
4.1 Human Trafficking 
 
In the Western Hemisphere, between 2007 and 2010, children accounted for 
twenty-seven percent of all documented trafficking victims according to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).250 Trafficking in children is most 
common along the periphery of the Caribbean Basin, predominantly in Central America 
and the northern tier of South America.251 These two sub-regions detected higher rates of 
children trafficked than adults.252 With respect to gender, a wide majority of trafficking 
victims in the hemisphere are female (both women and girls).253 In the reporting year 
before the publication of UNODC’s 2012 Global Trafficking in Persons Report, forty-
four percent of victims (likely underestimated) were trafficked for the purposes of labor 
exploitation.254 The percentage of victims trafficked in the Caribbean and Latin America 
for the purposes of forced labor is higher than in both Europe and Central Asia.255 In this 
region, profits from coerced domestic servitude are estimated at half a billion dollars, and 
forced labor at one billion dollars, annually.256 The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) estimates 1.2 million forced labor victims in the region.257 
The majority of detected victims in the Americas, however, were trafficked for 
sexual exploitation. Sex trafficking in Latin America is estimated to generate 
approximately $10.4 billion annually in business, according to the ILO.258 The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) places that figure closer to sixteen billion 
dollars annually.259 The ILO estimates there are 400,000 victims of forced sexual 
exploitation in the region,260 which would average out to an annual profit of twenty-seven 
thousand dollars exploited off of every individual sex-trafficking victim.261 Human 
trafficking has historically been regarded as less of an enforcement concern in the region 
compared to narcotics. As a consequence, the penalties for human trafficking are 
frequently less than those for narcotics trafficking. Skyrocketing profits and lower risks 
(compared to narcotics) have driven the trade in human beings to new heights. 
Trafficking in persons is likely the fastest growing illicit trade in the world,262 and the 
second-most prevalent transnational crime in the Caribbean after narcotics smuggling.263 
Generally, trafficking in the Western Hemisphere is intraregional. Victims 
detected in North and Central America typically originated from North and Central 
                                                
* This confusion is particularly conflated in Spanish. The most appropriate translation for human trafficking 
is “la trata de personas (the trade of people).” The most frequently used phrase, however, is the more 
literal sounding “el tráfico de personas (the traffic of people).” While the latter sounds closer to the English 
terminology, it is a false cognate and means something more akin to human smuggling. See, U.S. Library 
of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
by Clare Ribando Seelke, CRS Report RL33200 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information 
and Publishing, July 15, 2013), 2 (footnote 9). 
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American states; the same pattern is true of South America.264 Francis Miko, a 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) analyst, relays that most hemispheric victims are 
trafficked from Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Mexico 
(mostly Caribbean Basin states).265 Just as with narcotics, however, the Caribbean Basin 
is also a major channel for transshipment, including the interregional flow of Asian 
trafficking. Victims from East Asia make up more than twenty percent of total detected 
victims across the Western Hemisphere.266 More specifically, South and East Asian 
victims accounted for between twenty-seven and twenty-eight percent of detected victims 
in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean,267 while they accounted for ten 
percent in South America.268 In other words, one of every five detected victims in the 
hemisphere was trafficked from Asia.269 Chinese victims have been found in Venezuela, 
Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador, and East Asians in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and some 
Caribbean island states.270 On the other hand, South American, Central American, and 
Caribbean victims were detected in “significant numbers” across Western and Central 
Europe, and to a lesser extent in the Middle East and East Asia.271 The 2012 Global 
Report on Trafficking in Persons, published by UNODC, records that victims from South 
America were uncovered in eighteen countries within the region and twenty-three 
without.272 North and Central American and Caribbean victims were detected in sixteen 
countries within the region and thirteen without.273 While comprising a proportionally 
small segment (seven percent) of victims detected in Western and Central Europe, South 
American and Caribbean victims were recorded routinely trafficked to Spain.274 
Dominicans appear particularly at risk, with trafficking flows ending in at least eighteen 
countries worldwide.275 
As with legal migration, in both intra- and interregional cases, the general trend is 
‘south to north’ trafficking, from poorer to wealthier regions. In line with this, a large 
degree of victims detected in the United States originate from the Caribbean Basin, states 
of which are generally perceived as less developed. Yet, South-North migration is true 
even on less extreme scales. Most detected trafficking victims in Mexico are Guatemalan, 
most trafficking victims in Guatemala are from El Salvador and Nicaragua, and many 
trafficking victims in El Salvador originate from Honduras.276 The Bahamas, which has a 
thriving tourism industry, demands low skilled and low priced labor, which is frequently 
supplied by irregular (sometimes forced) migration from Haiti, Jamaica, and Cuba.277 
Thus while the Caribbean Basin is often spoken of as a source region in the trade of 
people (as most countries are so labeled in the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report), the 
intraregional flow is equally dynamic. 
 
Risk Factors 
 
Figures on human trafficking are ambiguous not only because of its clandestine 
nature, but because of the sheer scale of individuals at risk. The United States Department 
of State suspects that at least 100,000 Latin Americans are trafficked across national 
borders annually, many from Caribbean Basin states such as the Dominican Republic and 
Colombia.278 The State Department has estimated that perhaps as many as one million 
children are employed as domestic workers in Latin America, leaving them highly 
vulnerable to coercion and trafficking.279 The International Labour Organization 
estimated in 2010 that fourteen million children worked in Latin America, two thirds (9.4 
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million) in unsafe conditions.280 While child labor may not always qualify as human 
trafficking, it serves as a significant risk factor for forced labor. This also operates on a 
family level. Children of parents in forced labor are significantly more vulnerable to 
forced labor and trafficking themselves.281 The ILO explored this hypothesis in 
Guatemala, where over forty percent of those with jobs were recruited under deception or 
coercion, and where eighteen percent of working children had parents who were victims 
of (or vulnerable to) forced labor.282 The ILO also estimates that almost two million 
people across Latin America are victims of forced labor, many of whom may be (or 
become) trafficking victims.283 On an individual basis, the list of risk factors is extensive: 
“poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, a history of physical or sexual abuse, homelessness, 
drug use, and gang membership” all increase the likelihood of being trafficked.284 Even 
climate change and natural disasters are risk factors. More extreme weather occurring at 
greater frequency destabilizes communities and causes considerable dislocation. After the 
earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, hundreds of thousands of orphaned children found 
themselves at risk of trafficking.285 From a demographic perspective, children and 
women are most at risk. Women and children from the Dominican Republic and Guyana 
have been detected trafficked into Venezuela, while Venezuelan children have been 
detected trafficked into Guyana for sexual exploitation in the rural mining 
communities.286 Panama is noteworthy as a destination for Colombian and Central 
American women trafficked for sexual exploitation.287 And while children are most 
frequently trafficked for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude, they have also been 
victimized for “illegal adoptions, for use as child soldiers…and to work for organized 
crime groups.”288 Venezuelan children, for example, have been trafficked into Colombia 
and pressed into service as child soldiers for the guerillas operating there.289 With regard 
to industries, the United States Department of Labor reported in 2012 that children in 
Latin America were coercively employed in the production of “bricks, gold, coffee, 
sugarcane, and other agro-export crops.”290  
Beyond the statistical risk factors endangering potential victims, there is the 
culture of movement in the Caribbean. On a per capita basis, the Caribbean Basin 
exhibits “extensive migration, with a rate of movement in relation to the population that 
may be one of the highest in the world.”291 Of the thousands of economic migrants 
transiting from Haiti to the Dominican Republic alone, many lack adequate 
documentation and are forced to resort to human smuggling.292 And while smuggling is 
not the same as trafficking, being smuggled is an associated risk factor for further 
victimization. The same networks occasionally run both smugglings and trafficking 
operations, the former easily morphing into the latter,293 indicating a shared infrastructure 
as well. This places migrants at significant risk of trafficking, either through exorbitant 
smuggling fees or forced labor.294 Migrants are at risk of kidnapping for ransom too. 
Kidnappings have the potential to escalate into trafficking if perpetrators sense an 
opportunity for greater profit. Kidnapped migrants have been forced to pay off their 
smuggling “debt” through forced labor, domestic slavery, sexual exploitation, or even 
recruiting other migrants for trafficking.295 The International Organization for Migration 
noted in a 2005 report that the region’s open borders, poorly regulated prostitution 
industry, and generally liberal enforcement of entertainment visas and work permits make 
trafficking considerably easier.296 Curacao, for example, allows prostitution by permitted 
non-nationals in the zone of Campo Alegre, but regulation is so minimal that illicit 
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prostitution (and thus trafficking) is present outside the zone.297 St. Lucia provides yet 
another example, in which loosely regulated entertainment visas have been thought to be 
related to illegal prostitution.298 These lax travel restrictions have contributed to the 
ongoing rise of sex tourism in the Caribbean. The Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago have all been identified as destinations 
of concern in this industry.299 According to interviews of individuals in Jamaica, 
Barbados, St. Lucia, the Netherland Antilles, and the Bahamas, all believed there was a 
connection between sex tourism and human trafficking in the region.300 As sex tourism 
continues to expand into the Caribbean, in part due to attempted crackdowns in Southeast 
Asia, regional countries will continue to face mounting pressures to balance the needs of 
a hospitality economy with the demands of enhanced travel restrictions. 
Yet, perhaps the most relevant risk factor for trafficking is the presence of 
preexisting transnational networks.301 These groups and individuals are at heart 
capitalists, and any opportunity to diversify ‘products’ means both a greater chance for 
profit and more distributed risk. Like drug smuggling, human trafficking networks are 
frequently disaggregated, characterized by small groups temporarily collaborating with 
other small groups on an “ad-hoc basis.”302 As a consequence, the architecture for human 
trafficking is often shared with that of narcotics. In Guatemala, such crime syndicates are 
known to traffic Central American women.303 In Mexico, where much of the research on 
trafficking has taken place,* Los Zetas (a breakaway group of the Gulf Cartel) have 
become prominent in human trafficking.304 Mexican organizations have even partnered 
with other ethnic cartels, including Ukrainians and Chinese, to further diversify into 
human trafficking.305 “By chaperoning other shipments against a fee,” narcotics networks 
have expanded into virtually “every illicit product entering the United States.”306 In fact, 
many organizations (particularly Mexican) grew as human smuggling networks before 
taking to narcotics.307 The multidimensional dynamic of maritime security in the 
Caribbean cannot be on greater display than in the relationships among crime, narcotics, 
and human trafficking. Context, as we are also beginning to see, is an equally important 
actor, if often in the subtext. 
 
Fallout 
 
The fallout from human trafficking on Caribbean communities is acute, even 
beyond the basic, unquestionably heinous concept of trading in human beings. The 
impact on communities, which the Broken Windows theory identifies as of compounding 
significance, is particularly devastating. The International Organization for Migration 
illustrates this, as well as the multidimensionality of human trafficking: 
 
The appearance of a victim of human trafficking in a country usually 
means that there are one or more criminal groups that are manipulating 
                                                
* CRS’ Clare Seelke notes that “despite the relatively large number of victims trafficked for forced labor in 
the region, there are relatively few studies on the topic.” As a result, as with most elements of illicit trade, 
we are forced to extrapolate upon the available points of reference. See, U.S. Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, by Clare 
Ribando Seelke, CRS Report RL33200 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, July 15, 2013), 6. 
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official or unofficial mechanisms to deceive, recruit, transport and exploit 
persons. These organizations are often linked to criminal activity, 
including arms and drug trafficking and money laundering. Consequently, 
this may indicate corruption among officials that facilitates the illicit 
activities of human trafficking.308 
 
Victims of trafficking send a powerful signal of widespread disorder, violence, 
mistrust, and collusion. They signify a broken system. And this signal is conveyed 
in more than simply conceptual terms. 
 In Chapter Two we noted the extensive relationship between the Broken 
Windows theory and public health research (including that on sexually 
transmitted infections, STIs, like gonorrhea). Human trafficking presents acute 
risks to public health through the same mechanisms. Victims forced into sex work 
are at significantly higher risk of contracting and transmitting HIV/AIDS and 
other STIs.309 Human trafficking is also directly related to local crime and the 
narcotics trade. Victims are frequently pressed into service for gangs and cartels 
to steal, produce, and smuggle drugs, even kill.310 Reports chronicle that Mexican 
organizations have forced children to serve, not only as lookouts and mules, but 
also as assassins.311 Informants to an IOM study in Jamaica noted that boys were 
used as “watchdogs” for drug dealers, who sexually abused them, while girls were 
sold on the local sex trade.312 The impacts of these crimes are similar to those 
discussed in the sections above. Human trafficking, therefore, can be seen to have 
as corrosive an impact on Caribbean society and security as narcotics trafficking 
and local crime, though it receives comparatively less attention. 
 
4.2 Irregular Migration 
 
Irregular migration (migration through unofficial, often illegal, channels) is driven 
by an array of pull and push factors. Obvious pull factors include the prospect for 
employment or reuniting with family members already living abroad. More subtle, 
contextual pull factors include favorable notions of migration, which is “perceived very 
positively by Caribbean peoples” as a mechanism for progress.313 Push factors include 
much of what we have discussed in this chapter (crime, corruption, unemployment). In 
Central America, for example, excessively high crime rates have pushed migrants 
northward, to Mexico and the United States.314 And, as with human trafficking, this is 
seen on a sub-regional as well as interregional scale. In fact, while much of the 
undocumented population in the United States crosses the U.S. border through Mexico, 
there has actually been a negative net flow of licit emigration from Mexico into the 
United States. Most immigrants traveling north through Mexico and Florida are of 
Central American and Caribbean origin. Mexico can only respond to a handful of the 
masses flooding its southern borders. The country deports more than 100,000 Central 
American migrants every year, many in a bid to reach the United States. 315 The United 
States, meanwhile, has witnessed a “44-fold increase in Haitian migrants in the Mona 
Passage” in the last several years.316 Between 2005 and 2012, Southern Command 
detected a total of 200 Haitian migrants in the passage; in the first few months of 2013, 
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more than 2,000 were detected.317 Facilitating this surge are many of the same networks 
and smuggling infrastructure seen throughout this chapter. 
The media and politicians still favor the term ‘coyote’ as a label for those who 
help illegal migrants over the Mexico–U.S. border (one of the busiest mixed migration 
routes and the most crossed border in the world).318 Yet, in recent years, greater 
enforcement efforts on the border and rising migration rates from Central America and 
the Caribbean have acted in concert to raise the cost of transit from only three hundred 
dollars in the mid-1990s to several thousand dollars in the early 2000s.319 Larger, 
integrated networks have an advantage in coordinating more expensive and complex 
operations, and thus, the “old-fashioned coyote may soon be obsolete.”320 If the coyote 
were the “small-scale entrepreneurs,” their replacements, polleros, are “professional 
smugglers.”321 The longer the distance an immigrant needs to travel, the more likely they 
will need to employ the services of a criminal network to help them move.322 And today, 
people are moving considerably farther distances than they were only a decade or two 
ago. Migrants from China’s Fujian province or Thailand, for example, rely on 
sophisticated networks to help move them half way around the world (frequently by sea) 
to Central America or Mexico before continuing overland to the United States or Latin 
America.323 Regionally, similar forces are at work. Pulled by economic potential and 
pushed by criminal insurgencies, migration from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador 
rose sixty percent on the year in 2013.324 Similarly, most asylum claims in Mexico 
originate from Central America, and all three major North American countries have seen 
a rise in asylum claims from the Caribbean Basin.325 As with human trafficking, the 
context in which irregular migration takes place is significant. Dire circumstances 
produce a pervasive desperation, which can push people to escape at any cost. 
Unemployment rates in the region are “among the highest in the world, up to 42,9 per 
cent in Guatemala and 44,6 per cent in Honduras.”326 The concurrent spike in gang 
membership and criminal violence throughout the Basin has made things even worse. In 
the words of one Salvadoran migrant: “we are going to die, one way or another.”327 The 
sudden arrival of tens of thousands of Caribbean children on the U.S. southern border in 
2014, sparked by nothing more than a rumor, speaks to the panicked context in which this 
massive scale of migration takes place. This was confirmed only months later, in early 
2015, when the announcement of an American–Cuban rapprochement triggered a 
massive wave of Cuban migrants, many afraid that the ‘wet foot, dry foot policy’ would 
soon be repealed (despite Coast Guard statements to the contrary). Migrant smuggling 
networks expanded in the Caribbean in 2014 largely because “new laws in Cuba and 
erroneous perceptions in Haiti of changes in U.S. immigration policy” have increased 
flows from the Eastern Caribbean.328 The U.S. Coast Guard announced that nearly 10,000 
Cubans, Haitians, and Dominicans were caught attempting to illegally enter the United 
States by sea in fiscal year 2014.329 In FY13, that number was only slightly lower, near 
seven thousand.330 Migrants are increasingly entering the Dominican Republic through 
Haiti (the largest demographic of interdicted migrants) to take small boats to Puerto 
Rico.331 This can be seen as mirroring the narcotics flows transiting the same routes 
(occasionally even using the same boats—see Appendix A). 
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Sub-regional irregular migration in the Caribbean Basin takes place for much the 
same reasons as migrants flow to Mexico and the United States. Uneven* prospects for 
employment and varying levels of governance act to direct Caribbean migrants across the 
Basin, often in illicit ways. Barbados, for example, has strong literacy and per capita 
income numbers, and ranks high in the UN Human Development Report’s Human 
Poverty Index, thus making it an attractive destination for irregular migration.332 
Bermuda, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago, considered “borderline countries” 
(between developing and developed) are also enticing destinations,333 as are the 
Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica, the Netherland Antilles, and St. Lucia.334 It is within this 
flow of people that human trafficking is nestled even more deeply, and it is the 
undocumented status of irregular migrants that places them at heightened risk of 
trafficking. The cons used to deceive trafficking victims—predominantly employment 
offers—are made all the more believable by this pervasive irregular migration pattern. 
The Bahamas, whose geographic position between Florida, Haiti, Jamaica, and Cuba 
makes it a hub for such activity, offers an illustration.335 Small boat and plane captains 
are alleged to be in frequent transit between Hispaniola and the Bahamas, advertising 
construction and hospitality jobs in the country.336 Guyanese migration to Barbados is 
similarly spurred by agencies advertising employment overseas.337 In Guyana, Jamaica, 
and Suriname, children are often solicited by recruiters who offer cash incentives to 
impoverished parents for their services.338 Industrious Haitian boat owners also charter 
migrants to the Bahamas for a cost,339 all to serve the needs of a burgeoning tourism 
sector. While such trips may not be coerced, in the most direct sense, they are 
nevertheless very dangerous. Boats are frequently loaded beyond capacity, and reports of 
migrants drowning in sinking vessels are tragically common. After three successive fatal 
incidents involving individuals from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Jamaica 
in 2013, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees “expressed its official 
concern” over the plight of economic and political migrants.340 In one incident, more than 
one hundred Haitians were crammed into an “overloaded sail freighter,” which ran 
aground off of the Bahamas’ Staniel Cay.341 Thirty migrants died before the U.S. Coast 
Guard and Royal Bahamian Defense Force arrived.342 This tragedy is part of a wider 
trend in the northern Caribbean, which saw a steep rise in maritime deaths between 2012 
and 2013.343 
Just as with human trafficking, human smuggling and irregular migration present 
a number of challenges for communities. We have already addressed how smuggling 
places migrants at risk of trafficking, which opens communities up to the exploitative 
schemes of transnational crime. We have also discussed how illicit networks are 
multidimensional, opportunistic, and capitalistic, expanding into a range of 
interconnected trades.344 To put it simply: “clearly, criminal networks can move just 
about anything on these smuggling pipelines.”345 Criminal networks may even use human 
smuggling to swell their ranks. The deputy commissioner of police in Guyana once 
voiced concern that “foreign mercenaries” were augmenting gang membership in the 
                                                
* GDP per capita is as low as one thousand dollars in Haiti, and as high as twenty thousand dollars in 
Trinidad and Tobago. Life expectancy ranges between sixty-one and over seventy-eight, while adult 
literacy can be as low as sixty-two percent and as high as one hundred percent. See, International 
Organization for Migration, Exploratory Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Caribbean Region, 
Second Edition (Washington, DC: IOM, 2010), 25. 
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country.346 There are similarly public health risks that accompany the mass underground 
movement of people. In the midst of the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the 
commander of Southern Command told an audience at the National Defense University 
that the spread of the disease in Central and South America was worth considering.347 
Haiti and Central America are of particular concern348 because of poor healthcare and 
their significant roles in irregular migration. General Kelly noted especially that the 
individuals smuggled by transnational criminal networks into the United States may be 
infected and enter without medical oversight.349 And the fear may not be merely 
theoretical. The region is a cauldron for epidemiological tragedy; the Caribbean is in fact 
the hardest hit region in the HIV/AIDS epidemic after sub-Saharan Africa.350 In a visit to 
the Costa Rican–Nicaraguan border, General Kelly recounts meeting several African 
migrants. The men told U.S. embassy personnel they were Liberian and had been 
traveling for a week, with the aid of a network from Trinidad, to the United States 
(illegally).351 The General noted that those men could have made it all the way to New 
York City within Ebola’s incubation period.352 And while fear of Ebola in the West was 
almost certainly overblown, the premise is nonetheless significant. Smuggling helps 
transport not only people, narcotics, and goods, but also diseases which can ravage the 
underprepared littoral and small island states of the Basin. 
Finally, there can be no greater metaphor for the implementation of the 
Broken Windows theory in maritime security strategy than the impact of climate 
change on local communities. As climate change becomes an issue of greater 
concern for Caribbean islands and littoral states, issues of irregular migration and 
human trafficking will only become more significant. Storm surges, flooding from 
changing precipitation patterns, extreme weather, coastal erosion, and droughts 
will all “disrupt trade routes, threaten lives, and drain national economic 
resources,”353 pushing climate refugees into greater motion. The demographic 
factors addressed in Chapter One, “coupled with climate change, will impose 
extreme stress in the region.”354 The 2010 earthquake in Haiti, while not related to 
climate change, illustrates just how much upheaval natural disasters can bring to 
bear on irregular migration patterns. Even efforts to combat drug smuggling, such 
as the crop dusting of wide swaths of farmland, can damage the environment and 
instigate irregular migratory flows.355 As Caribbean communities continue to 
respond to the stimuli of their environment, any theory of maritime security must 
take pains to acknowledge and address the context within which these lives are 
lived. 
 
Repatriation and Deportation 
 
Of those irregular migrants and asylum seekers detected during passage, the vast 
majority are repatriated to their country of origin. While not an illegal flow, this irregular 
migration pattern is nonetheless noteworthy. The Bahamas, for example, consistently 
repatriates Caribbean nationals to their countries of origin, chief among them Haiti and 
Jamaica.356 Migrants from Hispaniola make up such a significant proportion of irregular 
migrants, in fact, that Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the only two Caribbean 
countries for which nationals are required to procure a visa before entering Barbados.357 
Yet, perhaps the greatest flow comes in the form of deportations, and the numbers can be 
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staggering. The high gang membership figures noted in the section on local crime are 
owed in large part to this practice. Some estimates say that as many as seventy percent of 
gang members arrested in the United States are eventually deported,358 most to the 
Caribbean Basin. As a consequence, gang networks have gone multinational—so much 
so that anti-gang investigations in the Caribbean Basin have direct impact for American 
law enforcement. Some such cases originating or pursued in the Basin have led to “a 
homicide arrest in Oklahoma City, the prosecution of felony extortions in Annapolis and 
the capture of one of the FBI’s top ten most wanted fugitives…in El Salvador.”359 These 
gangs are tethered to affiliates across Latin America because of such widespread 
deportation. According to the FBI, “MS-13 [Mara Salvatrucha] gang leaders in El 
Salvador have initiated assassination plans against U.S. law enforcement personnel” and 
targeted Americans throughout the region.360 MS-13 poses such an obstacle to law and 
order in the region that General Kelly included the gang in his written remarks to 
Congress in 2014. He notes that the group has a particularly strong American presence in 
California, North Carolina, New York, and Northern Virginia.361 MS-13 “specializes in 
extortion and human trafficking,” and has succeeded in part because deported members 
help provide international reach.362 As with crime and narcotics trafficking, Honduras has 
suffered exceptionally from deportations. Migrants are sent back en masse from 
American prisons, many members of Barrio 18 and MS-13.363 In testimony before 
Congress, General Kelly relayed the estimates of the National Drug Threat Assessment 
that Mexican-based TCOs now operate in at least 1,200 American cities.364 Deportations 
are such a staple of the American criminal justice system that, despite sour relations on 
most issues between the United States and Venezuela, the two principally coordinate on 
just two missions: maritime narcotics interdiction and fugitive deportation.365 Yet, this is 
not solely an issue of American providence. Intraregional criminal deportation is also a 
frequent occurrence. Barbados, which we noted was a borderline country and the target 
of regional irregular migration, allegedly deports around twenty Caribbean nationals a 
week, principally to Guyana, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and 
Tobago.366 Deportation and repatriation thus serve not only to facilitate irregular 
migration, but also as unexpected contributors to transnational and local crime.* 
 
5.0 Terror† 
 
Finally, no conversation on maritime security would be complete today 
without mention of terrorism. As we noted in the introduction to this case study, 
terrorism is frequently an issue at the periphery of the Caribbean. Colombia, on 
the edge of the Caribbean Sea, is the major exception with its ongoing struggle to 
wrestle territorial control away from Marxist terrorist organizations such as the 
FARC. Nevertheless, for the same multidimensional reasons explored throughout 
this chapter, terrorism remains an issue of significance for broader Caribbean 
                                                
* For more on the regional response to human trafficking, see Appendix D. 
† In this section, we choose not to use the word ‘narcoterrorism.’ Like terrorism, the term is highly 
politically charged, and perhaps even less well-defined. André Hollis, in Thachuk’s anthology on 
transnational crime, offers a brief account and history of the terminology. See, André Hollis, 
“Narcoterrorism: A Definitional and Operational Transnational,” in Transnational Threats: Smuggling and 
Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley Thachuk (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2007), 24-26. 
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Basin maritime security. In many ways, an analysis of terrorism in the Basin is 
emblematic of how the individual sections discussed above are even more tightly 
related. 
The extensive infrastructure for moving people and goods in the 
Caribbean can just as easily be co-opted for use by terrorist organizations. By 
forging relationships with transnational criminal networks, and establishing their 
own, terror organizations absorb the capacity to “exploit porous borders and 
ungoverned zones at will,” just as do TCOs.367 This is particularly troubling when 
coupled with the scale of human smuggling discussed in the previous section. The 
commander of Southern Command warned Congress in 2014 that the same 
networks that facilitate human smuggling and narcotics trafficking could as easily 
be leveraged by terrorists.368 This sentiment was echoed by Vice Admiral Michel 
in his testimony to Congress in 2012.369 Terror operations launched against the 
United States or Europe could be concealed and facilitated in the Caribbean for 
the same reasons illicit trafficking passes through the Basin: prime geographic 
and political positioning. The Caribbean is “easily a strategic gateway to all the 
Americas and Europe, and is accessible by modern air and sea carriers so that it 
could become a link to any part of the world.”370 The political relationships 
maintained by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France provide avenues 
for migration and transportation that further facilitate the “easy movement of 
people, money, and arms.”371 The CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and 
Security notes that terrorists could utilize the region’s lax banking regulations, air- 
and seaport facilities, and vast shipping networks to facilitate attacks or 
financing.372 The reality is, the infrastructure of transnational crime, which 
supports human trafficking and smuggling, as well as narcotics and weapons 
trafficking, “could easily facilitate terrorist operations.”373 
While no available evidence suggests any widespread collaboration 
between terrorist organizations and human smugglers, analysts have not ruled out 
the feasibility of such a scenario.374 And in a considerable shift from the reports 
issued just after 9/11, the U.S. Department of State now asserts that at least twelve 
of the world’s twenty-five largest terrorist organizations have ties to narcotics 
trafficking.375 Drug traffickers in the Caribbean Basin have been documented 
selling transport to “non-Latins” seeking to enter the United States illegally.376 
Hezbollah has also been accused of engaging in human trafficking in an effort to 
fund its operations,377 which demonstrates the technical capacity for human 
smuggling as well. A case in U.S. District Court, US v AJ Tracy, highlights both 
the ease with which such pathways can be used by terrorists, and the difficulty in 
gathering substantial intelligence to that effect. Anthony Joseph Tracy, an 
American-born white male, converted to Islam while in the prison system.378 As 
the leader of an international human smuggling ring based out of Kenya, Tracy 
admits to facilitating the emigration of nearly 300 Somalis to the United States 
over seven months in 2009 (five to ten a week).379 Using fake documents, Tracy 
would obtain visas for his clients to travel to Cuba, booking round trip flights to 
demonstrate an intent to return to Kenya. Two representative clients, K.A. and 
D.H. (Somali men in their early twenties), traveled to Cuba from Kenya via Dubai 
and Moscow.380 From Cuba, their trail becomes muddled, transiting South 
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America (perhaps also Honduras) to arrive in Mexico, where they successfully 
crossed the border into the United States.381 Tracy facilitated his business through 
the use of a contact in an unnamed South American embassy, where he secured at 
least three visas for Somali men.382 While Tracy maintains that he did not 
knowingly facilitate the transport of terrorists into the United States, he does 
admit that he was approached by al-Shabaab for the use of his services.383 
Terrorism is likewise complicated by the Caribbean attitudes we have 
noted at length. The need to generate revenue in such resource-poor countries 
means that Caribbean states are incentivized to make freedom of movement a 
priority. This is no more evident than in the practice of selling citizenship. Merely 
by demonstrating sufficient assets, some Caribbean islands will grant long-term 
residency visas (which attracts criminals and, perhaps, terrorists).384 There are 
legitimate uses of this service, to be sure. Hadi Mezawi, a Palestinian man living 
in the UAE, obtained full citizenship in the small island of Dominica (without 
ever having been there) for the sum of around $100,000.385 The freedom of 
movement this offers can be a lifeline for individuals whose countries or 
nationalities impose upon them severe travel burdens. Such ‘investor visas’ are 
not exclusive to the Caribbean, but the very low barrier for entry makes the region 
a popular choice.386 Nowhere is the process faster, and more worrisome, than in 
Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis. A passport from Dominica does not require a 
visa in over fifty countries; one from St. Kitts and Nevis does not require a visa in 
nearly 140 countries.387 And St. Kitts can process an application from start to 
finish in three months, without the applicant ever visiting the island.388 Such 
programs are so popular that a firm in Dubai is developing a community in St. 
Kitts where individuals can “buy citizenship and property at the same time.”389 
While we underscore there is no evidence of such programs being used by 
terrorists, the vulnerability of these visa and citizenship offers to nefarious use is 
one that deeply concerns governments and analysts. Canada has long placed visa 
requirements on Dominica passports over concerns that transnational criminals 
employed them.390 In 2010, Britain considered doing the same.391 Even Caribbean 
officials recognize the risk. Despite supporting the program, a St. Kitts opposition 
leader, Mark Brantley, conceded that the government does not have “sufficient 
controls” in place to ensure that “bad people, for want of better language, do not 
get access to citizenship.”392 Hinting to these same fears, Grenada suspended its 
program after September 11, and St. Kitts closed its program to Iranians 
(previously a major applicant pool) in the wake of an attack on the British 
Embassy in Tehran in 2011.393 Nevertheless, in 2013 the Associated Press 
reported that Antigua and Barbuda was launching a new citizenship program, and 
Grenada was considering reviving its own.394 
Despite the potential for terrorist attacks staged in the Caribbean, many 
experts agree that there remains little conclusive evidence that any such plans 
exist.395 That is not to say, however, that there is no terrorist activity in the 
Caribbean at all. While evidence of plans for terror attacks are scant, the same 
cannot be said for evidence of terrorist financing and support.* The Lebanese 
                                                
* Much of this support is facilitated through the corrupt system of money laundering found throughout the 
Basin, which we will explore in greater detail in Section 7.1. 
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group Hezbollah, listed as a terrorist organization by the United States (and its 
military wing labeled a terrorist organization by the European Union), offers the 
most sophisticated example. Hezbollah established a presence in the Tri-Border 
area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina in the mid-1980s and has since grown 
into a significant regional player.396 Early after September 11, academics 
hypothesized that sympathizers in that region had raised upwards of $50 million 
in support of known or suspected terrorist organizations (dominantly 
Hezbollah).397 It should be noted that the region also hosts “support activities” for 
Hamas, Amal, the Party of Islamic Unification, and factions of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood.398 And while the Tri-Border region is beyond the scope of this case 
study, evidence suggests that Hezbollah has been financed in part by narcotics 
trafficking in Latin America. In May 2013, this was reinforced when Assad 
Ahmad Barakat, the head of Hezbollah’s activities in the Tri-Border area, was 
arrested in possession of two kilograms of cocaine, which he intended to sell in 
the Middle East to help fund the organization.399 His arrest verified that a “wing 
of narco traffickers” was in fact operating in Latin America in support of Middle 
Eastern terror.400 The former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American 
States, Roger Francisco Noriega, noted in 2013 that Hezbollah was involved in a 
diverse array of criminal enterprises in Latin America, including narcotics 
smuggling, gunrunning, human trafficking, money laundering, and 
counterfeiting.401 According to the Naval War College, these endeavors generate 
approximately $10 million annually.402 
Iran, designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terror,* is also a 
source of concern in the region.403 In 2013, an Argentine special prosecutor 
investigating the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires 
accused Iran of establishing terrorist networks “throughout Latin America.”404 
The report in which this allegation was made names the Caribbean Basin states of 
Surname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Colombia as possible locations with an 
Iranian presence.405 Alleged Iranian collusion with narcotics trafficking406 and 
access to the Caribbean through partners like Venezuela only serve to fuse terror, 
transnational crime, and international relations in still more complex ways. Two 
Venezuelans were also sanctioned in 2008 in relation to Hezbollah financing.407 
And while Hezbollah may be interested in securing financial support in Latin 
American, some indications suggest Iranian factions see the region in more 
violent hues. Reports of an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in 
Washington, DC in 2011, for example, involved a suspect soliciting aid from an 
agent posing as a Mexican cartel-member.408 
Not only is it important to uncover any relationship between terrorism and 
narcotics trafficking, it is even more significant to note that the two are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Some politically motivated organizations and 
individuals, “out of necessity or convenience, do business with drug traffickers to 
                                                
* Cuba was also designated a state sponsor of terror by the United States from 1982 until 2015, though even 
before 2015 the U.S. government’s Country Reports on Terrorism (2013) noted that there was no recent 
evidence that the Cuban government was arming or training terrorist groups. See, United States Department 
of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013: Executive Summary, (Washington, DC: DOS, April 2014), 
19). 
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fund their cause while others will circumvent the intermediary and deal directly in 
the drug business.”409 Thus, while transnational crime is recognized as a far 
greater threat to the Caribbean Basin than terror,410 the nexus between the two is a 
matter of increasing concern. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, in the Spanish 
acronym) offer prime examples of how the line is blurred between terror and 
trafficker. The FARC, staged in Colombia’s hinterland, began as an ideologically 
motivated left-wing terror organization. The group’s original intersection with 
narcotics was therefore seen as a mechanism to finance a political cause, which 
was accomplished by taxing or selling protection to local coca growers. As the 
organization began to operate greater effective control over territory, its capacity 
to exact greater revenue from the trade enhanced, and its mission slowly shifted 
from political to capital. Simultaneously, the FARC came under increasing 
pressure in the 1990s as right wing paramilitary forces organized in opposition, 
raising the cost of operations.411 By the middle of the decade, the FARC had 
largely solidified their position as the intermediaries between coca farms and 
cartel-run processing labs.412 The FARC soon leveraged its extensive territorial 
control to directly coordinate coca growth and even its own cocaine production,* 
the products of which now contribute as much as fifty percent to FARC’s 
budget.413 The Colombian government estimates the FARC earned nearly $800 
million in cocaine revenue annually in the years after 9/11.414 Time Magazine 
placed that figure closer to $700 million,415 while Rhea Siers (of The George 
Washington University’s Elliott School of International Relations) relays more 
conservative estimates between seventy-five and one hundred million dollars 
annually.416 The remainder of the budget is supplemented by kidnappings for 
ransom and related extortive and criminal schemes.417 With profits like these, 
“rebels turn into traders”418 and political objectives are left as veiled excuses for 
the pursuit of financial gain. Drugs became the FARC’s raison d’être.419 The 
AUC offers a mirror image of the FARC. The AUC was formed in 1997 as a 
right-wing response to the FARC, when drug barons across Colombia banded 
together to create a network of militias to defend themselves against militants.420 
The AUC was thus, from the outset, an instrument of narcotics trafficking, with 
its roots in the cartel armies of the 1980s.421 The group reached a peace settlement 
with the Colombian government in 2003422 but until that time, estimates suggest 
that seventy percent of the AUC budget was supplied by cocaine revenue.423 
In recent years, the Colombian government has progressed significantly in peace 
negotiations with the FARC as well. The number of FARC militants has been reduced by 
as much as half since 2001.424 Signals of de-escalation, however, may not portend good 
news for narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean. The particular skill sets associated with 
terrorism are equally well-suited to a variety of criminal activities. When terrorist 
organizations wane, it is inevitable that at least some former terrorists, with years or 
                                                
* The FARC has also been involved in human trafficking. One Colombian NGO estimates that between 
2001 and 2009, three quarters of a million women were sexually exploited, raped, or enslaved in Colombia 
by groups like FARC. See, General John Kelly, “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States 
Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, 
House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 26, 2014), 20. 
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decades of professional expertise in illicit operations, will shed their ideologies and 
gravitate towards crime for profit. This trend can be seen globally. The Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), for example, largely eschewed the world of drugs for the 
duration of its armed campaign against the British. The group frequently operated as 
vigilantes and did, in fact, help keep the burgeoning drug trade of the 1980s and early 
1990s out of Belfast. Alongside ceasefire agreements in the mid-1990s, however, came a 
steady rise in Northern Irish drug consumption, aided both by the dissolution of the 
IRA’s armed opposition to the trade and also the prevalence of skilled and available 
labor. The IRA itself turned to the smuggling of illicit goods and counterfeits to help 
sustain itself. In the mid-2000s, estimates placed IRA revenue from smuggling at 
between $7.7 and $12.3 million annually.425 The IRA is also suspected to play a major 
role in the Dublin heroin market, and some relationships exist between the IRA and the 
FARC.426 
In some instances, terrorist organizations move en masse from terror to crime, 
saving foot soldiers the hassle of finding work on their own. For example, the Abu Nidal 
Organization, a Palestinian terror group, evolved from a largely political agenda to one 
increasingly defined by “gunrunning, extortion schemes…and even a coupon fraud 
scheme.”427 In Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN), a left-wing paramilitary 
group founded in the same year as the FARC, evolved down a similar path. At its 
inception, ELN was regarded as even more politically motivated than its ideological 
competitors (FARC).428 For that reason, like the Provisional IRA, the ELN chose to 
remain largely outside of the narcotics business.429 Since cresting in influence and 
membership in the 1990s, however, the group has increasingly allied itself with criminal 
gangs that principally serve the drug industry.430 And while terrorist and paramilitary 
violence have racked Colombia for half a century, it is these criminal bands (bandas 
criminales, called bacrims) that are now regarded as the country’s single greatest rising 
threat.431 These groups have moved in to fill the void left by the stream of demobilized 
paramilitary groups in the country.432 In 2010, the Colombian think-tank Indepaz 
reported that approximately a dozen new bacrims had emerged across Colombia in place 
of the AUC and were now the cause of even more violence than the FARC.433 These 
criminal bands, despite inheriting the legacy (and some personnel) of former terrorist and 
ideological movements, display no political agenda.434 This may illustrate a potential 
evolution for parts of Hezbollah, as well. When financing from Iran waned in 2006, the 
organization became far more active in illicit trades in Latin America and West Africa in 
an effort to compensate.435 While the group still maintains its ideological agenda, 
Hezbollah has been shown to be diversely involved with the FARC and transnational 
crime in the Caribbean Basin.436 In 2008, for example, Operation Titan (a joint U.S.–
Colombian investigation) uncovered a cocaine ring directing profits to Hezbollah.437 In 
2010, a Lebanese man was arrested selling cocaine to Los Zetas to fundraise for the 
Hezbollah as well.438 Mexican cartels are also believed to have partnered with Hezbollah 
in the trafficking of precursor chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine.439 
Despite this growing evidence, threats of sequestration forced the cancellation of one of 
only two counterterrorism exercises planned for Southern Command in FY13.440 
While the relationship between terror and narcotics was once predominantly 
thought of as theoretical, the last two decades have shown the relationship to be “real and 
growing.”441 At a DEA symposium held in Washington, DC only two months after 
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September 11, then-Administrator Asa Hutchinson noted the “extraordinary link between 
drugs and terrorism.”442 To illustrate this point, former DEA Assistant Administrator for 
Intelligence Steven Casteel noted that, two days prior to 9/11, law enforcement “seized 
53 kilos of Afghan heroin in New York. It was being distributed by Colombians, to show 
you the [potential] link.”443 Thus, we come full circle. Terrorist organizations have the 
capacity to leverage the smuggling and trafficking architecture of the Caribbean to 
fundraise or even stage attacks. Yet, such organizations may also fuse with the narcotics 
industry, seemingly becoming more invested in profit than ideology. Finally, partnerships 
with criminal gangs link terrorism to local crime. As terror organizations search for 
financial independence in the wane of state sponsorship, the financial relationships 
between these two worlds are increasingly significant.444 CRS analyst Raphael Perl notes 
that both terror groups and transnational organized crime function best in an environment 
of intimidation and fear,445 creating a climate in which people feel helpless and 
abandoned by traditional security guarantors. In this critical dimension, there is virtually 
no difference between transnational crime and terrorism. And in a theoretical construct 
that takes aim at context, counterterrorism and counter-narcotics (no matter how complex 
the underlying relationship) can and should pursue the same objective: changing the 
culture of Caribbean security. 
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Part Two: The Psychological Environment 
 
6.0 Halftime 
 
As explored through the lens of the Broken Windows theory and the 
community policing framework, these past sections have demonstrated the patent 
interconnectedness of local crime, transnational trafficking (in people, drugs, and 
goods), and terror. And if theory is useful to governments because it helps 
distribute scarce resources, the existing theories for security in the Caribbean 
Basin fall far short. In the narcotics context, we explored how Coast Guard, naval, 
and Homeland Security personnel are routinely underfunded for blanket patrols 
and interdictions—so much so that, according to both General Kelly and Admiral 
Michel, three quarters of high-confidence trafficking incidents go unchecked 
because the ships and aircraft required to interdict them do not exist. Partnerships, 
which help distribute this massive cost, are slow in forming and easily dissolved 
in large part because the American approach to regional security bypasses many 
of the primary political and community concerns regarding local crime. Yet, as 
we explored in Section 3, local incidents are inevitably part of a wider fabric of 
criminality and insecurity. And efforts to mitigate irregular migration are even 
more underfunded than narcotics, though nearly as corrosive to communities and 
regional order. Finally, terrorism touches on each of these worlds by viewing it as 
part of a multidimensional framework on security. As we can see, signals of 
disorder prevail in the Caribbean Basin, while overwhelmed law enforcement 
cling to a midcentury model (interdiction-oriented) out of favor in communities 
across the United States. 
Until this point, we have primarily discussed the impacts to physical and human 
security of the Caribbean’s dynamic criminal environment. We have seen how the 
maritime domain supports an expansive trade in illicit goods—from narcotics to weapons 
to people—and bears witness to the ensuing local fallout from these transnational crimes. 
The multidimensional construction of the Broken Windows theory is well-equipped to 
frame the interrelated components of this extensively interwoven system of criminality. 
As we explored in Chapter Two, the Broken Windows theory is capable of addressing 
complex and causally obscure security dilemmas. By directly addressing endemic 
concerns and fears, the theory employs a community’s perception of crime as a 
mechanism for impacting real change. In other words, by targeting context (perceptions 
of crime, physical decay, appearances of governmental abandonment, pervasive acts of 
petty crime) authorities are able to influence epidemics of crime in a way that has proved 
more successful than the midcentury policing model. Multidimensionality thus represents 
the first major theme in this discussion. The second major theme interwoven throughout 
the conversation above was context. We underscored the role of context both in 
identifying the local perspective on security as well as in providing for a better 
understanding of the broad impact of enforcement efforts. Context, as we explored in 
Chapter Two, is the signature lens through which the Broken Windows theory guides 
analysis. As we also emphasized in the previous chapter, context is far from narrowly 
defined. We noted that both Kelling and Gladwell’s proffered definitions of context 
include a psychological component, incorporated across Broken Windows research in a 
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variety of disciplines. Recall, for example, the study on attitudes towards school safety, 
or the seminary students to whom Gladwell turned our attention. Such research 
underscored the psychological significance of synthesizing and internalizing our 
environment, the filter through which we process the physical world. Thus, given the 
fundamental significance of the perceived environment to Broken Windows literature, we 
shift our focus in the remaining subsection to address two factors that influence heavily 
the perception of Caribbean security—money laundering and corruption. 
 
7.0 Money Laundering and Governance 
 
7.1 Money Laundering 
 
 In light of continuous resource shortfalls and the devastating threats posed by 
natural disasters, which can handily erase a year’s GDP,446 small island developing states 
(SIDS) have become known for pursuing creative opportunities for financial gain. 
Tuvalu, in the Pacific, is perhaps even infamous for this. The state makes a considerable 
portion of its revenue from licensing its domain tag, .tv, to major websites (such as 
MLB.tv). The small island has even leased its country telephone prefix (688) for use by a 
phone sex company.447 Tuvalu also has a booming international finance industry, despite 
being a virtual microstate. In fact, island states across the world, particularly in the 
Caribbean Basin, have become renowned financial centers. All that is necessary is a 
small shelter with enough electricity to power some servers, and an international bank is 
born. Just as the easy movement of people facilitates greater revenue for the Caribbean’s 
tourism sector, so too does the easy movement of money facilitate a lucrative banking 
sector. And just as the easy movement of people obscures and facilitates myriad 
trafficking and smuggling operations, so too does the easy movement of money. Lax 
banking restrictions breed corruption, and “the problem is compounded by the fact that 
many Caribbean governments provide tax havens that [further] attract criminal 
elements.”448 Of the major money laundering countries identified in the 2014 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, one quarter of the list are Caribbean 
Basin nations and territories. They include: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, the 
British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, St. Maarten, and Venezuela.449 
The Caribbean is recognized as such a focal point for money laundering that, in 2013, 
eighty percent of the UNODC’s Global Programme Against Money Laundering training 
participants were Caribbean states and territories (Antigua, Anguilla, BVI-Tortola, 
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines).450 In this vortex of illegal money, the Cayman Islands’ financial system is 
notorious for providing perhaps the best “climate” for laundering, facilitating the 
cleansing of as much as ten billion dollars in criminal proceeds annually.451 (The use of 
the word ‘climate’ here is noteworthy. Even in a trade increasingly migrating to 
cyberspace, human perceptions continue to play an important role in financial crimes.) 
With a population under 60,000, the Cayman Islands have attracted more than six 
hundred banks (virtually one bank for every hundred people), “several thousand mutual 
funds and tens of thousands of offshore businesses.”452 Other states, competing for the 
windfall of cash from offshore financing, provide an equally liberal climate for 
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laundering. St. Kitts and Nevis, for example, permits the establishment of corporate trusts 
designed to completely conceal the identities of proprietors.453 
The same characteristics that make the Caribbean attractive for narcotics and 
human trafficking also make it appealing for cash smuggling and money laundering. 
They include: a modern IT infrastructure, a large English-speaking population, expatriate 
Westerners living on the islands, émigrés living in the United States and Central 
America, geographic proximity between North America and South America, access to 
Europe, and the presence of transnational crime.454 Thus, while the Caribbean is 
frequently portrayed as an exporter in the flow of illicit goods, the region is in fact also a 
massive importer—of smuggled cash. The New York Times explains how the process 
works with respect to Mexican cartels (which can be extrapolated to the system at large): 
 
Cash is collected in small denominations from individual buyers and then 
bundled in great stacks of broken-in bills that are used to pay 
wholesalers…These bills are counted, hidden in the same vehicle 
compartments that were used to smuggle drugs in the opposite direction 
and then sent to stash houses in Los Angeles, San Diego and Phoenix. 
From there, they move across the border into Mexico.455 
 
While cash likely returns to traffickers using many of the maritime methods discussed 
earlier, most interdicted shipments occur in airports.456 The Department of Homeland 
Security suspects this trend may simply be a result of the enhanced screening available 
for air travel when compared to land and sea conveyance (especially small maritime 
vessels).457 And while money laundering is increasingly trending digital, the all-cash 
business of illicit smuggling continues to necessitate the movement of bulk shipments of 
cash. These shipments, running parallel and in reverse to trafficking flows ebbing through 
the Caribbean transit zone, employ an equally diverse range of techniques—“from cash 
stuffed in the mail or carried in small amounts by couriers known as ‘smurfs’ to complex 
laundering operations involving front companies, offshore banks, and correspondents and 
intermediaries in multiple countries.”458 Law enforcement has interdicted Colombian 
bound cash transiting the Caribbean “secreted into cars, dolls, television sets,” and even 
in “shipments of bull semen” (seriously).459 Remittance networks, which we referenced 
in Section 2.3, are yet another source facilitating the movement of money throughout the 
region, and have been shown to exacerbate money laundering and related crimes.460 As a 
depiction of the scale of remittance networks, which support entire economies in the 
Caribbean, one large money transfer company has over 300 branches on Jamaica 
alone.461 Once safely back in the hands of trafficking ringleaders, smuggled cash is used 
for a variety of applications. Some is used to pay bribes to keep networks open, some is 
reinvested in purchasing cocaine from wholesalers, and some is laundered by laundering 
professionals for fees upwards of fifteen cents on the dollar.462 An unknown quantity may 
also be destined for terror financing, a nexus we highlighted in Section 5. Former DEA 
Administrator Asa Hutchinson noted to this effect that there is a “strong case to be made 
that drug trafficking proceeds are being funneled to terrorist organizations,”463 the 
potential for which was made clear in DEA Assistant Administrator Casteel’s remarks on 
the relationship between cocaine distributors and Afghan narcotics producers. Finally, 
while bulk cash payloads frequently make their first stop in Mexico, trends from airport 
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seizures suggest that most illegally transported money is ultimately destined for points 
farther afield,464 likely moving by maritime means at some stage. 
The scale of bulk cash being smuggled across the transit zone is difficult to 
imagine (in Section 2.4, we relayed that the DEA estimates Caribbean money laundering 
of the proceeds from transnational crime exceeds sixty billion dollars annually). In fact, 
so much money crosses between the United States and the transit zone that it is difficult 
to launder all of it—and so it begins to pile up. One Chinese-Mexican businessman, 
allegedly involved in the supply of precursor chemicals for the production of 
methamphetamine, was arrested in 2007 with $206 million in cash piled in his home (the 
largest single such seizure in history, and this from a midlevel trafficker).465 The 
movement of cash intended for laundering, corruption, and investment in expanding 
transnational crime has even produced several models for bulk cash smuggling. The 
Department of Homeland Security categorizes these into two headings, the Insource 
Model (in which shipments are handled internally) and the Outsource Model (in which 
cash smuggling is contracted out).466 The former has obvious advantages in maintaining 
control over large sums of money, while the latter ensures greater diversity of smuggling 
routes and allows transnational criminal networks to employ local trafficking 
infrastructure.467  
The United States does provide technical assistance to help Caribbean authorities 
tackle the complexities of modern day money laundering. Alongside the Association of 
Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA), the FDIC has provided anti-money 
laundering (AML) seminars in the Caribbean, which have served representatives from 
states including Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic.468 Nevertheless, the unobserved linkages 
between money laundering, transnational crime, and even terrorist financing remain 
extensive and “only exacerbate the challenges faced by the financial, law enforcement, 
supervisory, and intelligence communities.”469 The Caribbean Financial Action Task 
Force (CFATF), established on the European model in 1992,470, 471 contains twenty-nine 
local members and aims to help coordinate AML efforts across the region. Much of this 
is directed through the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Program (CALP), which went 
into force in March 1999.472 Yet, the CFATF’s effectiveness is limited by the funding 
constraints, strategic disputes, and transnational dilemma that plague most Caribbean 
security institutions. And as with all the transnational crimes discussed in this chapter, the 
persistence of money laundering makes it all the more difficult to address related 
insecurities. Money laundering acts as a lubricant for the diversity of Caribbean crime, 
washing assets originating from a range of criminal enterprises, collectively referred to as 
predicate crimes. Yet, while the presence of widespread transnational crime places the 
Caribbean at heightened risk of money laundering, it is the permissive attitude towards 
financial services that has served to propel the problem into an endemic culture. As a 
consequence, AML is not accomplished strictly by transferring technical knowledge, but 
requires the recalibration of local government perspectives on the value of addressing 
money laundering. Thus, in so many ways, the issue of money laundering exemplifies the 
challenges discussed throughout this chapter; it is intricately interwoven with a variety of 
criminal activities, aggravated by an environment that invokes a sense of complacency, 
and is particularly difficult to combat due to its transnational nature. As with drug 
smuggling, irregular migration, terrorist financing, and gunrunning, when it comes to 
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money laundering, “no individual country or single region stands alone—each is 
connected by a trail of dirty dollars.”473 
 
7.2 Graft and Corruption* 
 
 Corruption and money laundering, like all of the transnational elements discussed 
here, are interconnected. The extensive infusion of corruption and graft in regional states 
ensure that the Caribbean’s offshore banking services remain “ideal” for the laundering 
of criminal money.474 Thus, through corruption, Caribbean states become facilitators of 
grey and black market economies that encourage the development of yet more illicit 
ventures.475 The implications of corruption are potentially volatile. This is on full display 
across feral and under-governed communities, as we discussed in the first chapter. 
Garrison districts in Jamaica offer one such example of the result of the fusion of 
governance and crime through corruption. In these communities, 
 
lowly paid police officials are bribed and co-opted by the drug ‘dons’ or 
lords – the de-facto leaders of these areas – with guns and money to ensure 
community support for the [political] party [associated with that 
neighborhood]. The authorities are essentially providing ungoverned 
functional spaces for the illegal gangs to operate...476 
 
In 2010, the Jamaican government relented to American pressure to arrest the 
head of one such district, Christopher Coke, the leader of the Shower Posse syndicate. 
Coke reigned in the Kingston community of Tivoli Gardens as the de facto mayor, 
delivering political support for his patrons and administering a wealth of extralegal social 
and judicial services in his fiefdom. However, Jamaican efforts to catch Coke epitomized 
the pitfalls of urbicide we explored in Chapter One. The community of Tivoli Gardens 
was literally besieged by police and the military, and several community members were 
killed as they defended their neighborhood. The tactics employed by Jamaican forces 
typify the shortcomings of cutting military strategies and pasting them in police 
scenarios. A cable, sent by the U.S. embassy’s chargé d’affaires Isaiah Parnell, is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
Assault on Tivoli Gardens Stronghold 
 
2. Following two days of civil unrest and gang-related violence in several 
parts of the metropolitan Kingston area, at midday on May 24 the 
                                                
* It should be noted that not all scholars normatively assess corruption as a negative. In 1967, Nye 
registered an early voice on the subject as a subscriber to the realist (or functionalist) view of corruption. 
This school argues corruption is a net positive for development, acting to facilitate the economy, even if 
informally. In the 1970s and 1980s, the very term corruption underwent a shift in implications, used in the 
context of Marxist research to characterize whole systems of economies and social classes. By contrast, in 
1978, Susan Rose-Ackerman helped pioneer one of the most enduring models of corruption, the rational 
actor model, which frequently approaches corruption as an issue to combat and suggests doing so by raising 
the associated costs of corruption (jail time, fines) for the corrupt actor. See, Anthony Maingot, “The 
Challenge of the Corruption-Violence Connection,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge 
and Change, ed. Ivelaw Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 130-132. 
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Jamaican Defence Force (JDF) launched an all-out assault on the heavily-
defended Tivoli Gardens “Garrison” stronghold controlled by Christopher 
“Dudas” Coke, the alleged overlord of the “Shower Posse” international 
crime syndicate who is wanted to face extradition to the USA on drugs 
and weapons trafficking charges…The JDF fired mortars and then used 
bulldozers to break through heavy barricades which Coke’s supporters had 
erected to block entry to the fortified enclave. As of 6:00 p.m. May 24, 
heavy fighting continued within Tivoli Gardens, and a fire was burning 
out of control in the adjacent Coronation Market. The JDF plans to 
continue operations through the night. Large numbers of women and 
children have fled the area. While casualty figures are not yet available, at 
least six JCF/JDF officers are known to have been killed in recent days, 
and many more wounded; the numbers of gang members and civilians 
killed or wounded are not yet known.477 
 
The cable goes on to detail ensuing gang violence across the city, insufficient hospital 
resources, and flight cancelations through the next morning. In the aftermath of Operation 
Garden Parish, the scene was surreal; “Kingston had become a war zone in the course of 
enforcing a United States extradition request against a single international drug 
trafficker.”478 Tivoli Gardens exemplifies how “crises in governance have generated the 
perfect ecosystems for private power brokers,”479 as well as the unique challenges in 
dismantling them (Coke eluded capture for weeks). “When order is lacking and public 
institutions are rife with patronage and graft,”480 drug lords have the capacity not only to 
govern real political space but also to captivate the genuine admiration and loyalty of 
large swaths of the population. 
 Police and government officials are on the ‘payroll,’ as in Tivoli Gardens, across 
the Caribbean. The result is a capsizing of public confidence and a sustained flow of 
narcotics, weapons, and people throughout the region. Anecdotes on corruption, which 
like all things illicit tell only a fraction of the story, suggest an extensive system of 
criminal infiltration. In 1991, Trinidad and Tobago’s Assistant Commissioner of Police 
Rodwell Murray alleged that a drug trafficking cartel was operating within the police 
department.481 A later report expanded on Trinidad’s intricate system of corruption in 
which competing factions hidden within the police force recruited officers from early in 
their careers. These mafias provided career services including promotions within the 
force, protected members, and opened access to sources of corruption.482 Such 
institutional corruption has only persisted. In 2002, Jamaica registered twenty-seven 
official allegations of police corruption; a 300 percent increase over the previous year.483 
A non-representative sampling of informants in a 2010 IOM study from the Bahamas, 
Jamaica, St Lucia, the Netherland Antilles, and Suriname all believed that local 
immigration officers either facilitated or ignored instances of human trafficking in their 
country.484 In Barbados, a passport scam implicated law enforcement accused of 
facilitating the passage of irregular migrants from Guyana.485 Trinidad and Tobago police 
have been arrested in connection with ransom kidnappings.486 In the summer of 2013, the 
United States withdrew aid from St. Lucian law enforcement after allegations that police 
had participated in extrajudicial killings.487 Ironically, the killings coincided with St. 
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Lucia’s Operation Restore Confidence, an initiative to battle rising local crime rates that 
had been negatively impacting tourism.488 
And it is not just poorly paid beat-cops who are involved in transnational crime. 
In August 2013, the director of Suriname’s counterterrorism unit, Dino Bouterse, was 
arrested in Panama and turned over to the DEA.489 He was accused of narcotics 
trafficking, with an indictment alleging that Bouterse smuggled cocaine in a suitcase on a 
commercial flight across the Caribbean that July.490 Bouterse had previously been 
sentenced to eight years in prison in August 2005 for fencing cocaine, weapons, and 
stolen cars.491 Even more astounding than a country’s counterterrorism chief being 
arrested on multiple occasions for narcotics trafficking, gunrunning, and smuggling, 
Bouterse’s father (himself a convicted drug trafficker) actually became president of 
Suriname in 2010.492 And corruption runs to American shores. In May 2013, the director 
of environmental enforcement in the Department of Planning and Natural Resources of 
the U.S. Virgin Islands was arrested on drug trafficking charges after allegedly using a 
government boat to transport cocaine.493 Then-DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart 
expressed concern over the rise in drug trafficking in the Caribbean and its propensity to 
corrupt law enforcement in American-administered Caribbean territories (the Virgin 
Islands and Puerto Rico).494 
The impact of this corruption on communities is difficult to measure but 
undeniably degrading. Sociologist Anthony Maingot notes of St. Kitts and Nevis, for 
example, that corruption eroded confidence in the government and that basic governance 
and sovereignty suffered as a consequence.495 Corruption acts as an echo chamber, 
amplifying the psychological context of Caribbean security. Perceptions of governmental 
fragility have the potential to become so pervasive that, at one point, Sir Shridath 
Ramphal, former Commonwealth Secretary-General noted without exaggeration, “it only 
takes 12 men in a boat to put some of these governments out of business.”496 Narcotics is 
unlike any other criminal enterprise in its capacity to spread corruption and graft, which 
has profound and often understated impacts throughout domestic politics and 
international relations.497 The interplay between corruption, context, and disorder is no 
more clearly exhibited than in the confusion of identities surrounding so much of the 
region’s crime. In Mexico and the Caribbean, “daylight killings are sometimes carried out 
by men dressed in police uniforms, and it is not always clear, after the fact, whether the 
perpetrators were thugs masquerading as policemen or actual policemen providing paid 
assistance to the thugs.”498 Meanwhile, “on those occasions when the government scores 
a big arrest…police and military officials pose for photos at the valedictory news 
conference brandishing assault weapons, their faces shrouded in ski masks, to shield their 
identities. In the trippy semiotics of the drug war, the cops dress like bandits, and the 
bandits dress like cops.”499 
Obviously, corrupt agents of law enforcement and national security hamper the 
effective action of those organizations. But the implications of corruption reach far 
deeper. Poor or lacking governance, as we explored in Chapter One, invites vigilante, 
criminal, and terrorist groups to fill the ensuing power vacuum. And critically, as the 
Broken Windows theory would suggest, it is not only the inefficiency of corrupt 
authorities that invites competition from non-state actors; even the very perception of 
corruption can breed disorder.500 Vigilantism took root so strongly in the Caribbean 
between the 1980s and the early 2000s that, at one instance, the national security minister 
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for Trinidad and Tobago was compelled to issue a notice on national radio and television 
reminding the population that self-styled self-defense organizations remained illegal.501 
There are also political ramifications for reduced confidence in the government. Public 
disaffection undermines the validity and stability of the democratic process, which puts 
the very authority of the state in jeopardy. 
Finally, not only does corruption degrade perceptions of government, it impacts 
the capacity of the government to defend its own survival.502 In Section 3, we explored 
the debilitating implications for communities of the illegal trade in weapons. When law 
enforcement is complicit in gunrunning, the devastation reaches even deeper, as 
authorities facilitate their own reduced capacity to respond to violence.503 Similarly 
deleterious impacts can be seen in human trafficking. The corruption of border personnel, 
law enforcement, and politicians directly impedes the adequate enforcement of existing 
laws criminalizing human trafficking (however lacking they may be).504 This leaves 
communities vulnerable to greater human trafficking, which as we highlighted in Section 
4 is part of an even wider network of irregular migration. Every tentacle of illicit 
transnational crime inevitably reaches to the heart of Caribbean states through corruption 
and graft. As a result, stamping out corruption has proven to be the single greatest 
obstacle to more effective enforcement in the region. With a hold on the very institutions 
designed to safeguard the people, crime and trafficking suffuse the body politic with 
corrosive ease. 
 
8.0 Conclusions 
 
 Trafficking in the Caribbean is not new. The trade stems from a history spurred 
on by the region’s earliest European inhabitants. With the introduction of Spanish 
restrictions on trade and migration in the early 16th century, the Western Hemisphere was 
ensnared by the great Eurasian tradition of smuggling. Just as today, the implementation 
of government regulations inevitably provided an arbitrage opportunity for individuals 
willing to shoulder the risk, known to Spanish colonialists as piratas (pirates), or what the 
British called the “private trade.”505 For centuries, this trade made use of ample lawless 
territory. Such ungoverned spaces “were out of control, but they were also out of touch, 
having little if any impact on the major concerns of central governments.”506 Out of sight 
and out of mind, the region slowly adapted “what many refer to as a culture of 
smuggling, an ambivalence toward national or international regulations or laws that 
affects the very survival of many of the region’s governments.”507 Over the past century, 
as signaled in Kilcullen’s megatrends from the first chapter, interconnectedness has 
replaced isolation, and this culture of smuggling has burst forth as a genuine threat to 
Caribbean and international security. 
We have noted throughout this chapter that financial and political constraints 
across the Caribbean serve as obstacles to effective regional security apparatuses. At the 
expense of external patronage, typically from the United States, Caribbean security 
initiatives frequently but halfheartedly embody the strategic vision of the funding 
country. This half-heartedness is precipitated by a “discernable divergence between [the] 
multi-dimensional view on security threats predominating in the region and the more 
narrowly focused law enforcement emphasis of the US authorities” seen in the 
compartmentalization of responsibilities across agencies and bureaus.508 This asymmetry 
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strains efforts to build strong partnerships, which, in the words of General Kelly, are 
theoretically “the cornerstone of U.S. Southern Command’s engagement strategy and 
[are] essential for our national security.”509 This dedication to partnership is a key 
element of the Coast Guard’s approach to regional security. Indeed, in light of the 
profoundly transnational character of Caribbean crime, economy, and sociology, the 
Coast Guard and Navy have come to place considerable weight on their reliance on 
international partners.510 
Given the centrality of these partnerships to American capabilities and the 
effective maintenance of Caribbean security—recall that half of successful JIATF-South 
operations would not have taken place without international cooperation—any strategy 
the United States employs in the Caribbean would be markedly more successful if it were 
one of consensus. Yet, unified action has been difficult to effect, and much of the issue is 
institutional. In the United States, dozens of federal agencies participate in counter-
narcotics missions, but “without clear lines of authority [and] the absence of a lead 
agency…the counter-narcotics struggle is in jeopardy of falling between the same 
regional bureaucratic gaps as have other unconventional threats.”511 Further, myriad 
intergovernmental organizations throughout the Basin struggle to command the resources 
and authority necessary to motivate sustained local action. These organizations are 
reflections of the geography that engendered them. The Caribbean Basin is home to more 
than 1,200 islands under the jurisdiction of more than twenty-five countries.512 The 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) represents fifteen states, most of British tutelage, 
while many of the Central American states lining the Basin are represented both in 
Caribbean organizations as well as the more exclusive Central American Integration 
System (SICA).513 The Caribbean is noteworthy for having the greatest concentration of 
defined maritime borders on the planet (though still far from entirely resolved),514 but 
even this accomplishment invites unique bureaucratic hurdles in fighting transnational 
issues. Complicating factors even further is the high concentration of foreign 
dependencies, with local territories under the authority of the Netherlands, France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. With so much institutional fragmentation, “only 
an integrated strategy that synchronizes the various organizational efforts under a 
unifying concept can address these problems.”515 As we explored in Section 3.1, 
Community Policing, of which Broken Windows is a subset theory, is among the few 
security ideologies of consensus in the region. Constructing an American maritime 
security strategy in the language and approach of a community policing framework 
would better enable regional security cooperation by elevating American leadership 
beyond strictly the financial and technical, to the strategic and ideological. And in the 
words of one expert, “law enforcement cannot hope to succeed without adequate strategic 
guidance from political leaders. This fact has been proved over and over throughout the 
history of smuggling in the Caribbean.”516 
 
8.1 Western Hemisphere Strategy 
 
As we explored throughout Chapter One, transnational issues (which predominate 
in the littorals) are a “defining issue of the 21st century.”517 No branch of the American 
armed forces perceives this better than the United States Coast Guard, which has 
dedicated itself to combating transnational crime and irregular migration. The Coast 
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Guard is aided in this pursuit by its decidedly hybridized nature; it is “the only military 
law enforcement organization which is a member of the national intelligence 
community,” and thus “bridges traditional enforcement gaps between military and law 
enforcement organizations.”518 The Coast Guard’s inherent cross-bureaucratic nature 
seemingly frees the organization to conceive of its mission in different (perhaps broader) 
strategic terms than that of other maritime services. This conceptualization was on 
display during the Vietnam War, when the Coast Guard uniquely applied its counter-
smuggling expertise in Operation Market Time, “an intensive multi-year campaign to 
stop the Communist flow of arms and supplies by sea.”519 This institutional flexibility is 
likewise on display on America’s northern border with Canada. Integrated Cross-Border 
Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO) are specialized missions that permit 
certain U.S. Coast Guard and Canadian officers to hold law enforcement authority on 
both sides of the border.520 This is a highly noteworthy act for an American military 
branch, ceding a degree of sovereignty, designed to undercut one of transnational 
trafficking’s greatest advantages (borders).* This conceptualization can also be seen in 
one of the Coast Guard’s newest strategy papers, Western Hemisphere Strategy. Of the 
three primary “priorities” identified by the Coast Guard in this document, the first is 
explicitly intended to address the spread of transnational networks.521 The white paper 
notes these networks present “new threats to maritime safety, security, and efficiency.”522 
The Caribbean Basin, Central America, and Mexico all face the “destabilizing impacts of 
violence, corruption, terrorism, natural disasters, and trafficking in drugs, humans, and 
arms.”523 Most notable is the Coast Guard’s recognition of the ambiguity and flexibility 
of networks. The authors relay, as we have, that organizations that “evolve and mature 
for one illicit purpose have shown an increasing propensity to diversify their nefarious 
activities.”524 They continue, “In the next decade, the links between networks initially 
formed for illicit activities including drug smuggling, human trafficking, or terrorist 
activity will continue to blur.”525 In response, the Coast Guard has migrated towards a 
strategy with numerous similarities to one guided by the Broken Windows theory. 
 The most significant evolution in the Coast Guard’s approach to Caribbean 
security is its emphasis on networks. Recognizing the perennial shortfall of resources 
required to make interdiction a successful deterrence strategy, the USCG’s paper has 
instead turned to dismantling TCOs themselves. This approach moves pointedly away 
from the mid-century police enforcement model rejected by Kelling, Wilson, and Coles. 
That model, as mentioned in Chapter Two, is both resource intensive and of limited 
success in catching criminals in the act (its signature intention). The Coast Guard’s 
updated approach to networks consists of three prongs: understanding and fostering 
network culture, identifying networks, and prosecuting networks.526 Of these, the greatest 
challenge to a hierarchical organization comes in understanding the fundamental 
components of networks and co-opting their most dynamic qualities. Yet, this is precisely 
what Commissioner Bratton executed in New York City. The application of community 
                                                
* The European Union has taken some significant steps that similarly demonstrate the need to combat the 
value of borders for “trans-sovereign” criminal groups. The EU’s European Police Office (EUROPOL) is 
an evolving experiment in this regard, and may offer a model for how a CARIBPOL could structure trans-
sovereign of its own. See, Clifford Griffin, “Regional Law Enforcement Strategies in the Caribbean,” in 
Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change, ed. Ivelaw Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: 
Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 504-505. 
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policing necessitated a better, less centralized understanding of neighborhood needs. This 
bred a federalization of enforcement, offering officers on the streets and their immediate 
superiors greater flexibility to make operational decisions in real time. Much like the 
recommendation of counter-insurgency theorists such as John Nagl and David Kilcullen, 
this disaggregation of command produced responses better suited for local needs and 
better equipped to leverage time-sensitive intelligence.527 In an effort to meet community 
demands, Broken Windows policing produced a network of enforcement in place of a 
strict corporate system. Better collection and timely employment of intelligence, stronger 
community relationships, and stronger institutional effectiveness—all components of the 
Coast Guard’s emphasis on defeating networks528—are proven outcomes of the Broken 
Windows theory as seen in Chapter Two. All of this can directly guide the Coast Guard’s 
efforts to embrace network culture, which it outlines as: “decentralized authority, highly 
adaptable members and practices, valuing competency above rank, perpetual self-
analysis, shared ‘consciousness,’ developing partnerships with non-traditional actors, and 
achieving a national ‘unity of effort.’”529 
In conversation with Vice Admiral Michel at a public conference on the sea 
services in Washington, DC on December 4, 2014, the assistant USCG Commandant for 
operations remarked to the author that no Coast Guard asset should turn a propeller 
without a purpose (for a follow up conversation with Admiral Michel, see Appendix 
B).530 The Admiral was referring not only to the more economically efficient use of 
JIATF-South assets but also to the smarter use of ships and aircraft to defeat networks 
instead of more labor intensive and less effective patrols. Vice Admiral Michel placed 
particular emphasis on the Western Hemisphere Strategy’s pivot to networks, both 
combating them and mimicking their construction. The admiral similarly recognized the 
shifting nature of transnational organized crime, and was receptive to the notion that they 
may better be described as a network of networks instead of one singular organization. 
Admiral Michel recognized the challenge of adapting a bureaucratic military organization 
to better reflect a network; his evident appreciation for the difficult institutional 
transformation this requires is indicative of the USCG’s deep understanding of the 
complexities of hybrid maritime threats. In a subsequent interview, the admiral even 
made explicit reference to the Coast Guard’s aim to produce a “tipping point” on crime in 
the Caribbean, reminiscent of Gladwell and Kelling et al’s assessment of Broken 
Windows influence on crime trends in New York. 
The Coast Guard has even adopted a definition of Transnational Organized Crime 
that better accommodates the fundamental restructuring of criminal networks in the last 
two decades. According to the white paper, “Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is 
defined as criminal activity that is coordinated across national borders, usually involving 
networks of individuals or groups working in multiple countries in an attempt to execute 
illegal business ventures.”531 The underlying sentiment in this definition is an awareness 
of the loose application of the word “organized,” underscored by the depiction of TCOs 
as a collective of networks. Even the more traditional components of the Western 
Hemisphere Strategy highlight an important rhetorical shift, one closer to community 
policing and the Broken Windows theory. The document suggests strengthening 
interdiction capacity by expanding the scope of suspicion beyond narcotics trafficking to 
include any kind of transnational crime.532 This seemingly innocuous recommendation 
would provide the legal and strategic recognition of one of Broken Window’s primary 
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premises: that violent crime is not atomized, not a stream of isolated incidents. In theory, 
Broken Windows expresses this interconnectedness in the process tracing we outlined in 
Chapter Two (broken windows lead to abandoned houses which lead to drug use which 
leads to panhandling which leads to muggings etc). In practice, Broken Windows also 
expresses this interconnectedness by demonstrating that policing quality-of-life crimes 
puts police in contact with wanted felons and knowledgeable informants (e.g. about one 
fare-beating arrest in ten on the subway produced someone wanted for a Class A 
misdemeanor or felony). By focusing on the climate of enforcement instead of specific 
crimes (i.e. narcotics)—which is consistent with the Coast Guard’s newly expressed 
perspective on networks—Broken Windows would suggest that maritime enforcement 
bodies stand a greater chance of impacting Caribbean security. While such 
implementation lags, the inclusion of language symbiotic with a Broken Windows lens 
lends greater credence to the argument that the mechanisms identified in community 
policing are likewise applicable in the maritime domain. 
The document also provides a number of suggestions that could directly impact 
the context of Caribbean security, the most significant element of any Broken Windows 
approach. For example, the strategy recommends expanding the deployment of LEDETS 
(law enforcement detachments) to “non-traditional platforms and/or locations with 
increasing TOC network activity and threats.”533 This initiative would not only increase 
the reach of American enforcement efforts but would place authorities in direct contact 
with local enforcement and communities. In so doing, LEDETS become sounding boards 
for Caribbean communities in much the same way many officers do in neighborhoods 
policed by a community-oriented approach. Gathering intelligence is a positive outcome 
of this contact, but the primary assets are in expressing an honest commitment to improve 
a community and in genuinely responding to local needs. As a result, LEDETS and their 
partners can help restore an element of self-efficacy among Caribbean communities, 
which would magnify their efforts greater than any new cutter or warship could. For this 
same reason, Southern Command’s decision to cancel Civil Affairs deployments in FY13 
under budget pressure should be seen as contrary to the community policing value of 
building local familiarity and credibility.534 Another component of shaping the context of 
Caribbean security is in providing for an effective, “persistent presence” in the Basin.535 
Such a presence, alongside gathering timely intelligence, would similarly signal the 
enduring commitment of the United States (and, critically, its local partners) to the 
mission of bettering life for local communities. To this end, the U.S. Coast Guard, with 
its smaller ships and valued law enforcement reputation, is thought of within the United 
States government as the most sought-after military partner for Caribbean states.536 This 
is so in part because, for many Caribbean states, constabulary and police bodies maintain 
the primary obligation for law enforcement and security policy, with the military serving 
as an auxiliary.537 As such, the Coast Guard is a more relatable institution. Even many of 
the contributions of major Western states come in the form of constabulary or police 
forces, notably Scotland Yard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.538 
Complementing this is the Coast Guard’s investment in “access to international 
littorals,”539 which has the potential to bring the USCG, LEDETS, local partners, and 
local communities into even greater and more productive contact. And while the Navy 
has struggled to deploy goodwill missions in the Caribbean Basin over the last few years, 
the Coast Guard’s partial role as a relief organization has left it well-adapted for 
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humanitarian missions in the hemisphere. After the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the United 
States Coast Guard was the first American agency with assets on hand (including almost 
one thousand Coast Guardsmen and women).540 A Broken Windows perspective on 
maritime security would suggest that the goodwill generated by humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief (HA/DR) is as important to regional security as are conventional 
enforcement operations. Indeed, the infrastructure support provided by HA/DR has the 
capacity to literally fix broken windows, restoring a sense of order in communities hit 
hardest by crime or nature. 
Targeting networks is not a flawless approach. As we have encountered 
throughout this chapter, the underground world of illicit smuggling and trafficking is 
notoriously difficult to understand because of a dearth of available data. Anthony 
Maingot wrote of this void of knowledge, even in the basic relationship between the 
primary syndicates of the time: 
 
Are the three reputed mafias in Trinidad and Tobago…or the Jamaican 
posses, or the Dominican mafias, subordinate to the Cali cartel? Or are 
they autonomous players that act sequentially, segmentally, and local in a 
chain of individual conspiracies running from producer to consumer? 
Because of the secrecy involved, direct empirical evidence is difficult to 
come by. This means that any attempt to illuminate the structure of the 
Caribbean drug business will have to depend on a series of assumptions.541 
 
Perhaps the greatest such assumption the Coast Guard’s new strategy makes is 
that with enough intelligence, these structures can be understood well enough to 
be dismantled. The Broken Windows theory provides central guidance for this 
pitfall as well. The Coast Guard should place even greater emphasis on impacting 
the environment in which all networks operate, instead of investing too deeply in 
identifying and targeting particular organizations or individuals. 
 
8.2 Two Problems 
 
General Kelly summarizes the leviathan we have depicted throughout this case 
study as follows, 
 
Picture an interconnected system of arteries that traverse the entire 
Western Hemisphere, stretching across the Atlantic and Pacific, through 
the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central America. 
Complex, sophisticated networks use this vast system of illicit pathways to 
move tons of drugs, thousands of people, and countless weapons into and 
out of the United States, Europe, and Africa with an efficiency, payload, 
and gross profit any global transportation company would envy. In return, 
billions of dollars flood back into the hands of these criminal enterprises, 
enabling the purchase of military-grade weapons, ammunition, and state-
of-the-art technology to counter law enforcement. This profit also allows 
these groups to buy the support—or silence—of local communities 
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through which these arteries flourish, spreading corruption and fear and 
undermining support for legitimate governments.542 
 
Threats to maritime security in the Caribbean exhibit the ambiguities of the hybrid 
threats discussed in Chapter One. Some non-state actors have even grown so large and 
influential that they are thought to leverage more financial and military weight than some 
regional states.543 The Coast Guard and White House refer to this hybridization directly, 
referencing a new “crime-terror-insurgency nexus” that connects transnational crime to 
political violence across the Basin.544 And while the Coast Guard is cognizant of the 
growing threat to the maritime domain posed by hybridized transnational threats, the 
organization concedes that only now are the deep impacts of illicit trafficking making 
themselves understood.545 As we saw throughout Section 2 on narcotics, the Coast 
Guard’s progressive policy paper has yet to be implemented in practice. Interdiction 
remains the most persistent form of American counter-narcotics in the transit zone. And 
by some metrics, the strategy has had remarkable success. Between efforts in the Pacific 
and Caribbean, not a week passes without reports of a “spectacular” seizure.546 Such an 
approach, however, has not systematically reduced the overall flow of drugs, which 
continues “virtually unabated.”547 
The problem is twofold. First, as we noted throughout this chapter, such an 
approach deemphasizes the flexibility of modern networks, ignoring the seismic changes 
undergone in the structure of transnational crime. Naím presciently wrote in 2006 that the 
Mexican kingpin “[Chapo] Guzman will eventually be arrested or killed…[Yet,] that 
victory too will be transient.”548 Writing this chapter only a year after Chapo’s arrest in 
2014 (he would later dramatically escape, only to be recaptured in early 2016), Naím’s 
prescience would seem prophetic if not for the predictable pattern of ineffective 
enforcement techniques. As Naim notes, 
 
That one high-profile criminal rises to replace another is a fairly easy 
notion to absorb…The diffusion of the drug business into the fiber of local 
and global economic life is much harder to fathom, let alone 
combat…More than any cartel, kingpin, or rebel warlord, it is this 
pervasive global mainstreaming of the business that the fight against drugs 
is up against.549 
 
The nature of the threat has changed, and enforcement bodies have struggled to 
integrate these realities with the strategies they employ. As we noted in Section 3.1, the 
militarization of crime has produced an impulse towards militarizing law enforcement, 
with mixed results at best. With Caribbean police “fully committed with their primary 
law enforcement missions…it is now commonplace to have armies deployed on the 
streets and on the seas alongside the police in support of anti-crime efforts.”550 While the 
added resources of the military can be invaluable, the strategic conceptions common 
among militaries make them ill-equipped to operate as auxiliary law enforcement. 
Turning the region into a “fortress Caribbean” would not only be inimical to tourism but 
to the very survival of local communities (see our conversation on urbicide in Chapter 
One).551 And as General Kelly notes, “given its history, the region is sensitive to any 
appearance of increased militarization.”552 Until such a time as police and the military 
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can effectively combine the best of their strategies and resources, the evolution of the 
structure of criminal groups will continue to vastly outpace that of the enforcement 
strategy designed to combat them. 
Second, the issue is not exclusively a failure in the capacity of law enforcement to 
evolve with dynamic networks, “but a spreading culture of lawlessness” and “no heritage 
of respect for the administration of justice.”553 This cultural ambiguity towards central 
authority and a marred criminal justice system is evident across our case study. It is 
evident in Alfonzo, the Mexican entrepreneur engaging in small-scale trafficking without 
regard for the rise and fall of kingpins. It is evident in the Costa Rican fishermen pressed 
to provide way stations and supplies for transiting traffickers. It is evident in the vast and 
poorly regulated torrent of human traffic whisking victims across borders with impunity. 
It is evident in the smuggling of migrants throughout the Basin, many of whom become 
victims or facilitators of transnational crime in the honest pursuit of a better life. It is 
evident in the free flow of billions of dollars, smuggled, laundered, and invested in drugs, 
guns or campaigns of terror. It is evident in the rise of self-defense militias, fractured 
sovereignty, and the popularity of gang leaders like Christopher Coke. It is evident in the 
proliferation of local violence, tied directly and indirectly to transnational crime. And 
finally, it is evident in the graft and corruption that blocks meaningful progress on 
Caribbean security. This context pervades and defines this case study, yet its significance 
is understood most thoroughly through the lens provided by the Broken Windows theory.  
 
8.3 Context 
 
Cutting between both of these problems is the need to address context rather than 
any one particular crime, criminal, or criminal syndicate. If local Caribbean communities 
provide the ‘arteries’ (in General Kelly’s words) through which these networks flow, then 
Broken Windows can play a prominent role in shaping and constraining the illicit actors 
navigating through these avenues. Throughout this chapter, and throughout the literature 
on Caribbean security, references to context predominate. We began this section with a 
reference to the Caribbean’s long cultural history with the private trade. Historically, over 
the five centuries of Caribbean smuggling, traffickers have time and again sought out 
ungoverned spaces and regions of “tolerant government attitudes” in which to ply their 
craft.554 Academics and politicians alike have seized upon this theme. The former 
Colombian ambassador to the Organization of American, States Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, 
made reference to the corrosive impact of this culture when he noted the region’s 
“tolerance of criminal conduct” and the population’s “growing belief in the invincibility 
of the drug barons.”555 The ambassador also noted that this psychological defeat is 
intertwined with the consequences of a “lack of an effective international anti-drugs 
strategy.”556 In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in 2013, General 
Kelly made similar note of the region’s “corrosive criminal violence,” which is enabled 
in part by “permissive environments for illicit activities.”557 In 1992, the West Indian 
Commission expressed dismay at the appearance of “powerlessness” of regional 
governments in the face of transnational crime.558 James Zackrison, an intelligence 
analyst at the Office of Naval Intelligence, refers to a “culture of smuggling that 
permeates the Caribbean.”559 In Section 2.3, we quoted an Associated Press article that 
used the word “anxiety” to characterize the mood of a small Jamaican fishing village 
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concerned about expanding trafficking.560 Even the United States government references 
perceptual obstacles to security in the region. In the Department of States’ 2014 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the authors cite a “culture of impunity” 
in Guatemala and the need for “culture of lawfulness training” in Mexico, the only two 
instances in the entire report where this wording is employed.561 The INCSR also 
references “frustration” in Jamaica, among both officers and the public, over the 
country’s struggle to meet its criminal justice obligations prosecuting corruption and 
narcotics, which extract “a significant social cost.”562 
 The Broken Windows theory (or the Power of Context), as detailed in Chapter 
Two, offers compelling evidence that environment impacts the decisions we make. In that 
chapter, we noted this impact in New York City, as well as in literature across 
psychology and medicine. Yet, we need not rely exclusively on extrapolating the theory’s 
applicability from criminology and public health. In the weeks after the attacks of 
September 11, narcotics trafficking across the U.S.–Mexico border plummeted by eighty 
percent, not because of any new program, but because of the “perception that security 
had been increased.”563 In the Caribbean, drug smuggling remained constant, but 
authorities registered a similar decline in illegal immigration “because of the same 
perception.”564 There are examples on an even more local level. In November 2000, DEA 
and Colombian counter-drug officers uncovered the first credible evidence of Russian–
Colombian collaboration on the manufacture of narco-subs. Authorities were tipped off 
by villagers in the small town of Facatativa, who became suspicious of Russian 
newcomers who eschewed interaction with locals and remained sequestered in a 
warehouse.565 Police succeeded because locals believed authorities could respond to their 
needs and, more critically, because locals were invested enough in their community to 
identify and report threats. This is an ideal, organic representation of self-efficacy and 
community policing. 
 
8.4 Concluding 
 
The avenues for applying the Broken Windows theory as a framework for 
maritime security in the Basin are extensive. And given the nature of the myriad hybrid 
threats plaguing Caribbean littorals, the application of a criminological theory to 
international security proves a relatively straightforward conceptual leap. Smuggling is a 
crime, after all, and traffickers are criminals. Epidemics of crime in New York City or the 
Caribbean may express themselves through different global implications, but the 
principles of epidemics and environment as expressed by Gladwell, Kelling, Coles, 
Wilson and Bratton endure. Until now, American-led enforcement in the region has taken 
a combative approach to local issues, alienating communities without affecting change on 
a large scale. And yet, society’s role in alleviating Caribbean insecurity is not expressly 
new. Among others, Zackrison reached that conclusion when he remarked that the only 
way to effectively combat smuggling is “when done in concert with society.”566 For 
Zackrison, however, this was strictly hypothetical, noting that “history records no such 
coincidence to prove the hypothesis.”567 On a macro scale, in international relations and 
security studies, that may be true. On a micro scale, though, this is far from theoretical. In 
cities employing varying iterations of community policing across the United States and 
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around the world, authorities have demonstrated that policing with society is as possible 
as policing against it. 
 We began this research process with one question: Can the Broken Windows 
theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provide the lens through 
which to theorize maritime security in the littorals? It soon became apparent, however, 
that answering this primary question required addressing numerous sub-questions. In 
Chapters One and Two respectively, we strove to answer the two most fundamental of 
these sub-questions: Why is a reevaluation of maritime strategy necessary, and what is 
the Broken Windows theory? Having answered these, we finally turned in this third 
chapter to the central theme of our dissertation: How can we use the Broken Windows 
theory as a unifying framework in maritime security strategy? To frame a response, we 
began by meticulously describing the multidimensional nature of Caribbean security. We 
carried this theme throughout the chapter by demonstrating that academics and politicians 
in the region have long since argued for an approach to security that mirrors this reality. 
Significantly, we validated our selection of Broken Windows by underscoring that, 
among the fractured web of competing strategic visions, Caribbean authorities have 
already agreed upon community policing (of which the Broken Windows is a subset 
theory) as the region’s consensus enforcement model. We similarly highlighted the need 
for more constructive enforcement solutions—employing lessons learned on urbicide in 
the first chapter—noting that “security can no longer be limited to traditional military 
operations.”568 The experiences of Caribbean enforcement, and the lessons of the Broken 
Windows theory, both endorse the values of “an integrated approach to ‘the conditions 
which create instabilities in societies,’” or what we have framed as “the need for the 
adoption of a ‘multidimensional approach to hemispheric security.’”569 Finally, we 
identified how context cuts across this multidimensional spectrum, offering a domain in 
which this range of hybrid threats can be combatted under a single rubric. 
We have demonstrated repeatedly how the primary theoretical and practical tenets 
of the Broken Windows theory provide a lens through which to frame 
multidimensionality and complexity, unifying disparate components of maritime security 
in the Caribbean under a common banner and purpose. In so doing, we have reliably 
addressed the central element of our research question, demonstrating that the Broken 
Windows theory indeed provides suitable scaffolding upon which to construct a 
comprehensive theoretical model of maritime security. What remains of our research 
inquiry is one of the most significant components of any theoretical evaluation: 
generalizability. Our remaining two case studies are thus not approached with the same 
comprehensive scope employed in the Caribbean context. Instead, we turn in the 
following two short chapters to conclude our investigation with the job of demonstrating 
the generalizable application of our new construct. 
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Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Hostis humani generis. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Thus far, we have explored what the Broken Windows theory and community 
policing are, what justifies an exploration of maritime security in the littorals, and how 
this converges in the Caribbean context. In so doing we have answered the largest 
component of our research question, demonstrating how the Broken Windows theory 
serves as a framework for a strategy of maritime security. What remains is an evaluation 
of this theory’s generalizability. Without opening our theory to a wider context, we 
demonstrate only that it has proven its merit in the Caribbean Basin. 
As detailed in our section on methodology, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea 
are “most similar” cases, differing on one subcomponent of the causal factor of 
disorder—piracy. In the prior case study, we employed a detailed descriptive approach to 
demonstrate the capability to apply Broken Windows’ social psychological lens on 
disorder to the maritime domain. In so doing, we illustrated that maritime insecurity in 
the Basin can be framed at a multidimensional and contextual level, yielding new insights 
into what security in the littorals means. In the first half of this chapter, we endeavor to 
illustrate, through a brief description of the insecurities plaguing the Gulf of Guinea, the 
similarities these issues share with those in the Caribbean. To better emphasize this 
connection, and to more succinctly facilitate coverage of these crimes, we refer 
extensively to the linkages to multidimensionality and context specificity highlighted at 
length in Chapter Three. We do so in two portions. First, we detail the parallel nature of 
the narcotics trades in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, establishing clear 
relationships both in theory and in practice between the two cases. Next, we detail several 
of the quality-of-life, small-scale crimes endemic to West Africa. This parallels our 
discussion in Chapter Three of the local crimes and context of Caribbean insecurity. By 
illustrating the myriad similarities between these cases—with respect to actors, crimes, 
and linkages—we validate the utility of the cross case comparison to serve as a 
mechanism for extrapolating Broken Windows applicability beyond the Caribbean. 
In the second portion of this illustrative study, we investigate the characteristics of 
piracy, the variant subcomponent of disorder between the two cases. In this investigation, 
we will demonstrate that piracy, despite being absent from our theory-validating 
discussion in Chapter Three, fits comfortably in the lens and language of Broken 
Windows (as laid out in Chapter Two). By incorporating a new issue area into the theory, 
we demonstrate that the theory building conducted in Chapter Three is applicable in a 
more global context (generalizability). Or, as we noted in Chapter Two: by illustrating 
that piracy can be integrated into the same narrative on maritime crime’s 
multidimensional and environmental nature, we demonstrate that a Broken Windows lens 
is capable of adapting to new issues and locales, and thus is not unique in its application 
to the Caribbean. 
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1.1 Regional Overview 
 
The literature is at pains to define the Gulf of Guinea’s exact boundaries. In its 
narrowest application, the Gulf of Guinea is the body of water bounded by the Prime 
Meridian and the Equator (0º0’0”, 0º0’0”), from around Togo to the northern portion of 
Gabon.1, 2 More broadly, the Gulf of Guinea is characterized as emanating from -15º0’0”, 
-15º0’0”, which would expand it as far west as Guinea and as far south as Angola.3 Rear 
Admiral Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo of the Nigerian Navy defines a “wider Gulf of 
Guinea” as the 5,000 nautical miles of coastline from Cape Verde to Angola.4 
Commander Ali Kamal-Deen of the Ghanaian Navy, on the other hand, promotes an 
institutionally guided definition, using the membership of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) as templates.5 This would extend the region as far northwest as Senegal. 
Similar institutionally guided efforts to achieve a definition using just one organization, 
the Gulf of Guinea Commission, in a 2012 report by the International Crisis Group, 
resulted in the need for ad hoc expansions—including Ghana, Togo, and Benin.6 
Freedom Onuoha of Abuja’s National Defence College notes, in reference to this 
inconsistency, that the term is “almost too obtuse to be a gulf” at all.7 Tension among 
these definitions subtlety permeates the literature, and the definition employed frequently 
“varies depending on the issue or interest at stake.”8 In line with our treatment of the 
Caribbean Basin, we do not seek to elevate one definition. Rather, we again recognize 
this geographic ambiguity as an important feature of the theoretical landscape. 
Just as in the Caribbean, where local disorder in Colombia or Haiti can precipitate 
regional discord, so too is the case in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria in particular is a 
linchpin, an economic and demographic powerhouse that for years has struggled to exert 
control over internal conflicts. That Nigeria shares direct sea borders with Benin, 
Cameroon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe9 serves to facilitate the 
‘transnationalization’ of these conflicts. The Niger Delta is also evocative of the risk 
factors from Chapter One. The delta is home to thirty million people, as many as ten 
million of whom are unemployed.10 It lays claim to forty ethnic communities across just 
nine states, epitomizing the complexity and density we have discussed.11 The topography 
is an extreme example of littorals, with a “vast transitional zone between the sea and the 
huge inland delta with its networks of waterways leading to and from the Gulf of 
Guinea.”12 “These waterways serve as arteries for the syndicates” involved in the 
region’s myriad criminal activities.13 More broadly, Nigeria is a study in Kilcullen’s 
megatrends. As of April 2013, the country is the continent’s largest economy14 and, at 
150 million people, represents more than half of the West African population.15 Broader 
still, the region’s “many port cities and capitals are among the most densely populated on 
the continent.”16 And these “dense conurbations along the coast helped to create the 
conditions for an increase in crime.”17 
 While maritime security has long taken a back seat to landward issues 
conventionally associated with threats to state sovereignty,1819 the littorals are fast 
becoming a point of concern for governments undergoing a “paradigm shift” in 
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perception.*20 Unfortunately, systemic underinvestment in maritime domain awareness, 
resulting from the longstanding neglect of maritime issues in favor of a “land-centric” 
security perception, had by then greatly facilitated the use of West African littorals for 
illicit maneuver.21 Angola, with the longest regional coast at 1,600 kilometers has a naval 
strength of one thousand individuals—compared to the air force’s six thousand and the 
army’s one hundred thousand.22 Liberia, “the second-largest flag state in the world,” has 
a coast guard of approximately fifty people and eight boats (all ten feet and under).23 
While security funding at-large may be weak, regional navies and coast guards have 
suffered sustained neglect.24 
The Gulf of Guinea’s rise in oil exportation has furthered focus on its littorals. As 
a major link in the international energy market, the region is attracting ever greater 
attention from abroad (in 2007, Nigeria overtook Saudi Arabia as the third largest 
exporter of crude to the U.S.,25 and in 2013, 15% of American oil was supplied from the 
Gulf).26 United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was born in part due to this 
strategic emergence in Western conception.27 The boon in production has also been a 
windfall for militants, fueling local conflicts through the sale of illegally ‘bunkered’ oil. 
West African production accounts for almost 70% of the African total.28 That crime often 
emanates from Nigeria is in part due to its significant share of production, 47% of the 
regional total.29 Like the Caribbean, the region is at trade crossroads—it is placed at the 
center of trade lines that connect North America and Europe to West, Central and South 
Africa—which makes local insecurity relevant to international actors.30 This geographic 
placement, combined with state weakness, has precipitated the use of the Gulf of Guinea 
as a transshipment point similar to the role of the Caribbean in transnational crime. 
Through recent history, the Gulf has attracted the Russian mafia, South American cartels, 
and Lebanese smugglers, among others.31 
Alongside the rise of violent extremism, maritime insecurity is now recognized as 
a leading threat facing African states.32 In response, rhetoric in the Gulf increasingly 
reflects that which we saw in the Caribbean context; multilateralism and the 
multidimensionality of crime are emerging tropes. In an interview with MilTech, Rear 
Admiral Geoffrey Biekro, then Chief of Naval Staff for the Ghanaian Navy, remarked 
that it was a “commonly shared picture that most of the criminal activities going on in the 
whole region are transnational” and that “the need for multilateral-cooperation cannot be 
over-emphasized.”33 Raymond Gilpin, chair for defense economics at the Africa Center 
for Strategic Studies at NDU, likewise writes that the Gulf’s potential and wealth is being 
“undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and 
vulnerabilities.”34 As in the Caribbean, such multifaceted insecurities include narcotics 
trafficking, weapons trafficking, vigilantism, irregular migration, the specter of terrorism, 
and corrosive corruption. In the section below, we endeavor to illustrate a number of 
these issues and the similarities they bear to the conversation detailed in Chapter Three. 
In so doing, we reaffirm the applicability of the lessons learned in Chapter Three to the 
Gulf of Guinea by underscoring the “most similar” nature of the cross case comparison. 
 
 
                                                
* Vreÿ identifies 2008-2010 as the central years of this reorientation. See, Francois Vreÿ, “African 
Maritime Security: A Time for Good Order at Sea,” Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 2, 
No. 4 (2010): 121. 
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2.0 Narcotics 
 
West Africa has emerged as a significant route in the trafficking of narcotics, 
particularly South American cocaine.* As Mexican cartels grew in influence, as 
trafficking routes came under greater surveillance, and as demand grew in Europe,35 West 
Africa became a “hub” for the trade.36 In 2007, the UN estimated that more than a quarter 
of the cocaine annually consumed in Europe passed through West Africa (at a wholesale 
value of $1.8 billion).37 Between 2005 and 2007, thirty-three tons of cocaine were seized 
en route from West Africa to Europe—previously, annual African seizures across the 
whole continent rarely surpassed one ton—and 2007 seizures were more than sixty times 
those of five years prior.38 The largest such seizures have taken place on the high seas.39 
In 2006, for example, five of the seven largest seizures took place on the water.40 
Some examples include one seizure by a French naval ship of a Togolese tugboat 
laden with two tons of cocaine from Venezuela;41 the 2002 Nigerian seizure of a 
Brazilian ship carrying sixty kilograms of cocaine docked at the Tin Can Island wharf;42 
and a 2003 haul intercepted between Senegal and Spain.43 In 2004, arrests in the 
Ghanaian port of Tema uncovered over 500 kilograms of cocaine.44 In 2006, a ship off of 
the Canary Islands was found carrying almost four tons of cocaine.45 In January 2008, 
more than two tons of cocaine was found by the French Navy onboard the Blue Atlantic 
as it passed the Liberian coast on its way to Nigeria.46 Stephen Ellis of the Free 
University in Amsterdam notes that shipments have been detected across Cape Verde, 
Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Benin.47 
A smaller amount of heroin is also imported by sea, often from Thailand.†48 Lieutenant 
Commander Stephen Anderson, while serving as executive officer of HMS Dauntless, 
referred to this avenue as “Highway 10,” as much of the trafficking from the Caribbean 
east takes place around ten degrees north latitude.49 Though not geographically direct, the 
use of Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea for drug trafficking is similar to Haiti’s use in the 
Caribbean as a trafficking way station.50 
The methods employed are familiar from our Caribbean study, like using 
modified mother ships (freighters or large fishing vessels).51 This has been the case in 
Ghana, which the U.S. Department of State identifies as a transshipment point for cocaine 
as well as Afghan and Pakistani heroin.52 Traffickers unload these laden mother ships 
onto smaller fishing vessels for transfer.53, 54 In response, Ghana formed a Marine Police 
Unit in June 2014 to operate as a de facto coast guard, and the United States has provided 
maritime law enforcement training for the Ghanaian Navy, emphasizing littoral narcotics 
interdiction.55 Once imported, narcotics leave the Gulf in one of two ways. Larger 
shipments are generally sent by sea, landing most often in Spain (which leads Europe in 
cocaine seizures).56 This is one of three predominant sea avenues for bulk importation 
into Europe.57 It is likely that Latin American cartels retain tight control over bulk 
shipments, as they often did when employing nascent Mexican cartels that initially 
                                                
* Some heroin bound from Asia to North America, and a small quantity of African grown marijuana, also 
use this corridor See, Stephen Ellis, “West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” African Affairs, 108/431 
(2009): 172. 
† Heroin is sourced by Nigerian exporters in Thailand buying from sources as diverse as Myanmar and 
Afghanistan. Bulk shipments are sent by air and sea from Southeast Asia back to Nigeria. See, Moisés 
Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2005), 73. 
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provided protection and logistics support without purchasing the drug.58 The 2009 
discovery of precursor chemicals further suggests that cartels may have moved entire 
portions of their operations to West Africa.59, 60 Ellis notes that some prominent 
traffickers from Latin America are suspected to have already moved to the region.61 The 
notion that cartels may be integrating the Gulf of Guinea into a global distribution chain 
lends greater significance to the rise of narco-subs, which can reach the African coast 
from Colombia.62 
The portion of cocaine sold wholesale to Nigerian networks comprises a parallel 
distribution network.63 While the maritime route is used for bulk methods,64 Nigerian 
schemes typically employ drug mules (or “swallowers,” so called for swallowing cocaine 
in condoms) flying out of Lagos into Europe.65 As with Mexican cartels, the expanded 
use of payment in kind by producers will likely broaden the exploitation of mules, as well 
as local narcotics abuse;66 drug usage already seems to correlate to regional 
transshipment patterns.67 As Nigerian travelers face greater scrutiny, traffickers have also 
increasingly turned to Nigeria’s porous borders, including seaports.68 Yet, regardless of 
method, the presence of South American cocaine in Africa marks not only a matter of 
local human security, but for the fight against narcotics in the Caribbean. Proceeds from 
African trafficking will make their way west69 and will be used in part to finance the 
Western drug trade.70 
We can learn more about West African crime using our Caribbean case for 
comparison. For example, preexisting networks in the Gulf of Guinea formed ready-made 
partners for South American traffickers,71 just as local infrastructure in Jamaica or St. 
Kitts and Nevis was co-opted by cartels. One American drug official claimed that 
Nigerian networks were so sophisticated that they were sought after by drug syndicates 
from both Asia and Latin America.72 The fluid dynamic of Caribbean TCOs is also 
reflected in the Gulf, pointedly described as an “adhocracy.”73 Some Nigerian groups, for 
example, employ middlemen who act as insulators between foot soldiers and bosses,74 
ensuring that relationships are often in flux. Another component of Nigerian transnational 
crime is also familiar from Chapter Three, particularly our discussion of Dominican 
traffickers—diasporas. North America and Europe are home to large Nigerian immigrant 
communities. In Chicago, for example, Nigerians were historically heavily documented 
in the wholesale market for heroin.75 In an analysis of U.S. heroin seizures in 1998, the 
majority were connected to Nigerian networks.76 Largely blameless, immigrant 
communities unfortunately acted as a substrate within which traffickers navigate with 
obscurity,77 often manipulating for their own ends the accountability and trust common in 
communal ethnic networks.78 
Narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is also multidimensional. For example, 
militants in the Niger Delta who steal, or illegally bunker, oil from pipelines sell that 
contraband to tankers waiting offshore in exchange for cash, weapons, and also cocaine.79 
As oil travels downstream, it represents one component of a complex regional market in 
which oil, drugs, and weapons serve as surrogates for cash.80 Narcotics may even play a 
role in funding extremism. A trans-Saharan smuggling route has been purported by some 
to provide funding for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).81 This appears to be 
the case in Northern Mali, where AQIM (alongside local militias) operates protection 
schemes against traffickers.82 While Francois Vreÿ of Stellenbosch University in Cape 
Town categorizes the volume of drugs entering from the sea as “alarming,” he is quick to 
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note that it is these multidimensional connections that are the most “disturbing” element 
of the trade, “dovetailing with criminal statecraft, terrorist groups and oil theft 
syndicates.”83 As in the Caribbean, drugs have a long relationship with power and 
warlordism in West Africa.*84 Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor both did little to dissuade 
the use of Liberia as a staging ground for trafficking.85 Former Togolese president 
Gnassingbé Eyadema stands accused of complicity in narcotics trafficking.86 In 1998, a 
former Nigerian senator was arrested in New York on charges of heroin trafficking.87 In 
2005, American authorities arrested a Ghanaian MP carrying over one hundred pounds of 
heroin.88 
As in Chapter Three, “criminal statecraft at times typifies governance” in the Gulf 
of Guinea.89 This is no more visible than in the case of Guinea-Bissau, which poses an 
interesting parallel to many Caribbean states. Like them, Guinea-Bissau is “off of most 
people’s radar screens…poor, weak, and yet not so unstable as to attract attention.”90 It 
has, consequently, been subsumed by narcotics. As with Caribbean states, the value of 
transshipped cocaine in Guinea-Bissau likely exceeds the country’s entire GDP ($304 
million in 2006, or about six tons of cocaine at wholesale value).91 The government’s 
annual budget is matched by the wholesale value of just two and a half tons of cocaine.92 
In 2007, the heads of the United Nations Peace Missions gathered in West Africa 
expressed their concerns that Guinea-Bissau posed a threat to regional stability.93 Here, as 
in neighboring Guinea, Latin American dealers exercise some of their tightest control 
over the African–European route.94 As Andre Le Sage of NDU’s Institute for National 
Strategic Studies notes, the country’s narcotics problem earned it the distinction as the 
continent’s first “narco-state.”95 On one day in 2009, both the president and a senior 
military official were killed in “tit-for-tat” assassinations linked to the trade.96 Ellis relays 
the assessment of a Nigerian drug enforcement official, who alleged that Guinea-Bissau’s 
military has provided storage space for outward-bound cocaine.97 At least one (possibly 
two) FARC affiliates were arrested in the country in 2007, an obvious sign of the 
expanding connectedness of hybrid threats.98 FARC officials have been reported in 
Accra, Conakry and Monrovia as well as other major cities in the region.99 
Narcotics trafficking is not new to the Gulf of Guinea.† It is only over the last 
fifteen years, however, that bulk shipments have been consistently recorded entering 
from South America.100 As a consequence, a number of international actors recognize the 
narcotics trafficking threat. In November 2007, West African UN Peace Missions 
expressed “the crucial importance of addressing drug trafficking and organised crime.” 
The European Union’s fact sheet on a strategy for the Gulf of Guinea makes direct 
reference to narcotics’ billion-dollar industry.101 Members of the Economic Community 
of West African States expressed, during a 2013 summit, the significance of cooperating 
on counter-narcotics.102 The United States, through the newly established Africa 
                                                
* Drugs have been used not only to enrich warlords and as goods to barter for weapons, but also as a means 
of controlling pressganged militiamen. As Audra Grant, of the RAND Corporation, notes, drug use by 
combatants in Sierra Leone and Liberia was likely a contributing factor to the duration of the conflicts in 
those countries. See, Audra Grant, “Smuggling and Trafficking in Africa,” in Transnational Threats: 
Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley Thachuk (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), 119. 
† Stephen Ellis succinctly summarizes the modern history of West Africa’s involvement in the trade in an 
article in African Affairs. See, Stephen Ellis, “West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” African Affairs, 
108/431 (2009). 
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Command (AFRICOM, activated in 2008)* lends increasing maritime law enforcement 
training in the region, including littoral interdiction training.103 The United States Coast 
Guard, in testament to the hybrid nature of Gulf of Guinea security, has participated in 
AFRICOM training, principally through the African Maritime Law Enforcement 
Partnership.104 The West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI), launched by 
the U.S. in 2011, aims particularly to address drug trafficking in the region.105 The U.S. 
has also provided vessels for littoral operations, including two ships donated in May 2012 
to Nigeria’s marine police.106 Many of these ships are former Coast Guard vessels. This 
was the case with NNS Thunder, the former USCG Cutter Chase, re-launched by the 
Nigerian Navy in 2011.107108 
While the West African trade in narcotics may not be the region’s most pressing 
transnational issue,109 the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report identifies 
West Africa as a region of “growing concern.”110 Consequently, West African authorities 
have less counter-narcotics experience and fewer anti-trafficking resources than their 
Caribbean counterparts. Yet, to dismiss West African narcotics trafficking as less than a 
“salient” threat111 is to disregard our exploration of Broken Windows’ two critical 
lessons: multidimensionality and context. Geoffrey Till, using language reminiscent of 
Broken Windows, speaks to this dynamism: 
 
Disorder at sea only makes things worse ashore. The success of 
transnational crime such as drug smuggling elevates the power of the kind 
of people who challenge civilized states…it undermines their prosperity, 
security and ability to connect with other countries. Countries that fail for 
such reasons tend, moreover, to become security concerns for others.112 
 
Barack Obama similarly warned against the regional “destabilizing effects of increasing 
drug trafficking in West Africa.”113 Like a vacant lot leading to loitering, fear, 
community abandonment and crime, maritime disorder is contagious. Thus, while the 
region may face more prominent threats, this should not diminish the significance of the 
Gulf’s emergence as a “major narco-trafficking hub.”114 And just as in the Caribbean, this 
trade lends itself to analysis through the Broken Windows theory. 
On June 27, 2007, fishermen from the Senegalese village of M’bour noticed a 
strange boat, which they reported to the local Gendarmerie, who found it laden with 
bricks of cocaine.115 As with the Colombian villagers from Chapter Three, who reported 
suspicious foreigners whom police found to be building a narco-submarine, this incident 
reflects just how critical police–community partnerships are, even in transnational crimes. 
Moreover, the converse is equally true; “in a vicious cycle, citizen cooperation declines 
with each police failure, further undermining the ability of officials to do their jobs.”116 
The very rhetoric used to describe West African narcotics trafficking is reminiscent of the 
importance of perception and context we saw in Chapter Three. Ellis, for example, notes 
that smuggling is “widely tolerated” and that “tolerance” from government officials 
                                                
* Until this time, responsibility for Africa was divided between European, Central and Pacific Commands. 
Lauren Ploch profiles the new command for CRS. See, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren 
Ploch, CRS Report RL34003 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 
October 2, 2009). 
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encourages criminality.117 Ellis also makes reference to the significance of perception, 
noting that the expansion of narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is a partial result 
of the “exceptionally favourable political context offered by ineffective policing” and 
“governments that have a reputation for venality.”118 Speaking of Ghana, the Department 
of State comments on the degrading impact of public perception and “rumors” of 
government complicity in trafficking.119 Of Nigeria, the Department of State notes that 
the “perception of high levels of corruption and impunity encourages narcotic 
trafficking.”120 According to a former head of the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency (NDLEA), some of the agents charged with combatting narcotics trafficking are 
even more invested in the trade than traffickers themselves.121 Corruption, spurred on by 
enormous profits, entrenches criminal interests while “deepening fear and mistrust,” 
characteristics seen in Chapter Two to be so destructive for communities.122 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, whose attention to the 
perception of corruption is evocative of Broken Windows, ranks Nigeria 144th out of the 
survey’s 175 countries.123 
Colombian economist Francisco Thoumi affirms that illicit trades require “weak 
social and state controls on individual behavior, that is, a society where government laws 
are easily evaded and social norms tolerate such evasion.”124 The parallels between drug 
trafficking in the Caribbean and Gulf of Guinea suggest that this norm setting, such a 
critical element of Broken Windows, is equally relevant in the West African context. 
Combatting transnational crime in Africa will undoubtedly require fundamental 
investments in capacity building and situational awareness—even basic office supplies.125 
Just as in the Caribbean, mere strategizing cannot overcome the limits of poor, weak 
states without enough fuel to power their police cars or enough ships to patrol their 
coasts.126 And yet, as we saw in Chapter Three, by placing narcotics trafficking within 
the framework of a wider transnational flow, we can demonstrate the applicability of the 
Broken Windows theory’s core principles—multidimensionality and context specificity. 
 
3.0 Life and Crime 
 
 As in the Caribbean Basin, local crimes in the Gulf of Guinea are interwoven with 
national and transnational themes. This can be seen in an array of issues, from illegal 
fishing, to smuggling, to oil theft. These crimes are interrelated, often using the littorals 
as a shared domain for transferring illicit commodities. The resultant security crisis has 
bred the proliferation of vigilantes and militias, which present yet more obstacles with 
similarities to our discussions on the relationship between perception and vigilantism 
found in Chapter Three. In this section, we highlight several such issues in brief. In so 
doing, we illustrate the context in which security and disorder are framed in the 
Caribbean, and demonstrate further the multidimensionality of local crimes, just as in 
Chapter Three. 
 
3.1 IUU 
 
In coastal communities, human security includes the ability to fish for sustenance 
and profit. Fish account for more than half of all protein consumed by those in the Gulf of 
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Guinea,*127 the poorest forty percent of whom depend critically on this supply.128 Illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing challenges this dependence. A 2013 report by 
the International Labour Organization concluded that West Africa is “particularly 
vulnerable to illegal fishing,” and that more than a third of catches were illegal in the 
time studied.129 Rear Admiral Osinowo regards these waters as the most abused on the 
planet.130 The European Union reinforces such a claim, relaying a World Bank estimate 
assessing the annual damage to coastal economies at $350 million.131 Ships engaging in 
IUU fishing off West Africa have also been documented as perpetrators of other crimes, 
including forced labor.132 European and Asian trawlers in West African waters have 
become increasingly predominant, and trafficking victims have been detected on lakes in 
Ghana.133 IUU fishing and related toxic dumping pose serious risks to the socioeconomic 
health of coastal communities (environmental degradation is a push factor for 
migration).134 As of 2014, more than one-and-a-half million tons of petroleum had spilled 
in the Niger Delta, making it one of the most oil-drenched places on earth (and an 
obvious correlate to the physical Broken Windows of Chapter Two).135 Moreover, as 
noted in commentaries on Somali piracy,136 the loss of traditional fishing grounds can 
increase the likelihood of piracy.137 And while some IUU fishing is the product of local 
fishermen, organized crime is also a contributor.138 In recognition of IUU fishing’s 
relationship to crime and piracy, Chatham House notes that it may even be “far more 
important in West Africa than piracy,” the most publicized regional maritime issue.†139 
 
3.2 Forgeries and Smuggling 
 
The Gulf is rife with forgeries and contraband smuggling. In Lagos, one survey of 
pharmacies found that eighty percent of merchandise was counterfeit.140 The UNODC 
estimates the annual value of fake and low-quality anti-malarial medications at over $400 
million.141 Cigarette smuggling from the Gulf of Guinea to Europe and North America 
approaches low-end estimates on the region’s cocaine trade.142 Guns too are a problem, 
which circulate with relative impunity. By some accounts, Africa houses twenty percent 
(100 million) of the world’s stock of illegal small arms and light weapons (SALW).143 
Audra Grant, a RAND political scientist and former State Department analyst, writes that 
the trade in SALW is particularly worrisome in West Africa, where she estimates seven 
million firearms are in circulation.144 The region has also emerged as a producer of craft 
firearms. Ghana boasts more than two thousand manufacturers selling pistols for as little 
as six dollars.145 The smuggling and production of SALW, as from Angola into Nigeria, 
makes regional insurgencies “almost intractable.”146 Liberia similarly funneled weapons 
to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, as did Burkina Faso and the 
Ivory Coast. Togo was likewise a staging ground for SALW transshipping to the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).147 Blood diamonds, themselves a 
smuggled commodity, have been used routinely to finance weapons procurement.148 The 
                                                
* In Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe, for example, fish comprises roughly sixty 
percent of protein consumption. See, Raymond Gilpin, “Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of 
Guinea,” Strategic Insights 6, No. 1 (January 2007): 2, (https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/11174). 
† In line with our assessment, the report also goes on to call for a widening of perspective on maritime 
security issues, to include the illicit trade in people, guns and contraband. See, Chatham House, Maritime 
Security in the Gulf of Guinea (London: Chatham House, March, 2013), 16. 
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diamond trade from Sierra Leone has even been accused of enriching al-Qaeda, though 
the evidence is disputed.149150151 Grant relays an estimate that Al-Qaeda earned $15 
million in the trade.152 Doug Farah, reporting for the Washington Post, records that the 
organization, after its assets were frozen by the U.S. in 1999, leveraged connections in 
Liberia to shelter millions of dollars in diamonds in Sierra Leone.153 The diamond trade, 
bound up as it is in gunrunning, commodity smuggling and money laundering, is 
representative of yet another multidimensional and “difficult to control” transnational 
trade.154 Commodity smuggling is, consequently, “deeply tied to African civil wars” and 
insecurity.155 Even more so, they have turned parts of the region into “a ‘duty free’ port 
for organized crime.”156 
 
3.3 Illegal Oil Bunkering 
 
One of the most predominant crimes in the Niger Delta is illegal oil bunkering, or 
theft from pipelines, in part made possible by the availability of small arms.157 In 2013, 
AFP reported daily losses of 150,000 barrels to the theft, representing seven percent of 
Nigerian production.158 One analysis of media reports estimated annual losses in Nigeria 
at $12 billion, twenty percent of GDP.159 Oil theft bears a connection to political 
violence. According to Patrick Dele Cole, a former Nigerian ambassador, illegal 
bunkering began “because of the political need to raise a lot of money during the 
elections. The whole idea of selling oil illegally was sponsored and maintained by our 
political leaders.”160 As Vreÿ notes, oil theft is bound up in an intense competition for 
resources for which political actors compete for access against other criminal 
organizations.161 Control of territory, whether by criminal syndicates or militias, is 
required to tap and guard ‘wellheads.’162 If local neighborhoods and police cannot be 
avoided, they may be bribed163 in much the way narcotics traffickers co-opt communities. 
The Gulf of Guinea acts as the downstream distribution hub for this petroleum, where 
tankers offshore receive deliveries of oil from smaller barges.164 Here too the political-
criminal dynamic is on display. One pirate tanker, the African Pride, intercepted by the 
Nigerian Navy was allowed to offload more than 10,000 barrels of crude to a different 
pirate tanker while under guard.165 Two rear admirals eventually lost their jobs in the 
scandal, but the incident highlights the complicity of political (government, naval, and 
business) actors in the crime.166 
 
3.4 Vigilantism 
 
Self-defense groups, militias, and terrorist organizations, as chronicled in Chapter 
One, often rise to fill the void left by governments. The Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND) is one such example. It is an outgrowth of political 
grievances, notably the inadequate distribution of revenue from locally drilled oil and the 
resulting pollution. Forty percent of Nigeria’s GDP, over eighty percent of federal 
revenues, and virtually all export earnings come from such oil, while little investment 
makes its way back.167 The group is also criminal, though, perpetrating crimes with the 
veneer of a political agenda. MEND has since earned the distinction of “one of the most 
active of militant groups involved in maritime crimes.”168 That MEND can use 
community issues as a basis for the “intense criminality [that] dominates its practical 
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existence and activities”169 is tribute to the myriad applications of this research. In 
particular, it speaks to the relationship between context and action explored in Chapter 
Two, the former informed (perhaps even driven) by the latter. 
MEND has targeted the petroleum industry as a symbol of federal overreach, 
kidnapping workers and tapping and destroying pipelines.170 This also includes attacks on 
offshore oil platforms171 such as one in 2008 on the Bonga, a floating production, storage, 
and off-loading unit (FPSO), which helped force an agreement between MEND and the 
government in 2009.172 That MEND’s leadership benefited from this amnesty 
disproportionately than the rank-and-file, that the organization’s leaders have disputed 
influence, and that MEND’s activities were often capital-driven in nature have all 
complicated that agreement. MEND’s structure is characterized by a familiar 
amorphousness and it is suspected that the group is “highly fractious, with several 
autonomous branches operating in its name.”173 Martin Murphy, of Dalhousie 
University’s Center for Foreign Policy Studies, writes that MEND was “never a formally 
organized, hierarchical body but a loose coalition of armed militias, many of them 
motivated by local grievances.”174 What leadership did exist involved the interplay of 
both “insurgents and criminals in a way that made it difficult…to draw any clear 
distinction between the two.”175 Plunder frequently replaces politics as an operating 
principle.176 As such, and as explored, even in instances of political settlement, 
“insecurity and criminality tend to linger.”177 
Vigilantism thrives throughout the region.* In Onitsham, southeastern Nigeria, a 
businessman refers to one such group’s (the Bakassi Boys) relentless pursuit of armed 
robbers as “the only thing that makes us sleep with full eyes closed.”178 Perception plays 
a vital role in the creation and support of such organizations. When communities become 
so wary of authorities that they “opt to avoid direct contact with officials,” they are 
forced to “seek security and welfare in nonstatutory arrangements.”179 While efforts to 
modernize Africa’s militaries have increased professionalism, “the continent’s police 
forces are considered a front line of corruption and human rights abuse.”180 It was in part 
this “popular perception that the federal state [had] failed as a security guarantor” that 
made the emergence of the Bakassi Boys possible.181 Criminal gangs across Nigeria’s 
Rivers state, often sponsored by local politicians, operate with “near-total impunity.”182 
Such politically sanctioned gangs helped spawn the earliest leaders of MEND, as well as 
the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilante 
(NDV).183 And as we have seen, the belief that law enforcement is ineffectual can be 
enough to threaten such fundamentals as the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
 
3.5 Money Laundering 
 
Money laundering and corruption are interwoven throughout transnational crime. 
Nigeria, in part for its role as a gateway for foreign investment in West Africa, is listed 
                                                
* Threats to sovereignty do not only come from informal actors. Africa has also proliferated a major 
industry of security contractors. In Cameroon, vigilantes serve lower income communities while nearly two 
hundred official private security firms serve the country’s wealthy. A similar phenomenon was recorded in 
Nigeria, where a growth in private security paralleled the expansion of organizations such as the Vigilante 
Groups of Nigeria, which in one Nigerian city served more than four thousand households (for a fee). See, 
Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2005), 61. 
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by the United States as a country of primary concern for money laundering.184 Angola, 
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Sierra Leone are also noted of concern, while 
Cameroon, Congo (Republic of), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Sao Tome and 
Principe and Togo are among those monitored by the Department of State.185 Elements of 
West African money laundering are familiar to our Caribbean case, including bulk cash 
smuggling,186 some of which likely takes place using maritime routes given the 
proliferation of maritime illicit conveyances. Money laundering is also bound up in the 
smuggling of commodities from West Africa—we have already noted the trade in blood 
diamonds. Ivory too is a major trafficked commodity through Cameroon, Nigeria, Angola 
and Côte d’Ivoire.187 Like narcotics and blood diamonds, ivory and other poached 
products are occasionally used as cash surrogates to purchase weapons.188 The open 
borders and trafficking infrastructure that supports these and other laundering 
transactions are open to exploitation by all transnational criminals, including terrorist 
organizations, which have repeatedly used Africa as a “safe haven.”189 
 
3.6 Irregular Migration* 
 
Human trafficking and smuggling is bound up, as we saw in Chapter Three, in a 
wider transnational web of actors, routes, and crimes. And like much illicit activity in the 
Gulf of Guinea, it is no surprise that irregular migration in West Africa predominates on 
the sea.190 Human trafficking in West Africa has “exacerbated the criminal element in 
maritime trade” and is “closely related to piracy and robbery as all revolve around the 
acquisition of weapons and illegal monetary transactions.”191 In this regard, it is truly 
multidimensional, and only by placing irregular migration in a broader context can we 
hope to understand its role in maritime insecurity. 
The push and pull factors leading to irregular migration, and the risk factors of 
human trafficking and exploitation (all explored in Chapter Three), find echoes in the 
Gulf of Guinea. As in the Caribbean, a great deal of trafficking is sub-regional, and most 
West African countries reported that trafficking victims were found sub-regionally.192 
Major flows include “from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo to the 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. In Togo, major flows are from 
Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria.”193 Le Sage identifies major human trafficking and 
smuggling flows emanating from Nigeria, Ghana and Benin in particular.194 Globally, 
West African victims are transported on international flows and comprise a sizeable 
portion of those detected in Europe.195 In West and Central Europe, fourteen percent of 
detected victims (around 3,000 individuals)196 came from West Africa during the 
reporting period, found in at least twenty countries across the continent.197 Only around 
one percent of all victims detected in West and Central Europe originate from elsewhere 
in sub-Saharan Africa.198 Nigerians are particularly victimized. They were detected in 
sixteen West and Central European countries, where the UN estimates they make up 
eleven percent of victims.199 Individuals from Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone have also been detected throughout Europe.200 The UN estimates that revenue 
from transfer fees for smuggling from West Africa to Europe totals $300 million 
                                                
* See the UN Trafficking in Persons Report for detailed country-specific information. United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (New York: UNODC, December 
2012). 
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annually.201 The flow also operates in reverse, with victims trafficked into West Africa. 
Filipino victims have been reported in Côte d’Ivoire, and Chinese victims have been 
detected in Ghana.202 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) calculates the number of forced 
laborers in Africa at 3.7 million (eighteen percent of the global total) and the annual 
profit from this labor at just over thirteen billion dollars (higher than in Latin America 
and the Caribbean).203 Africa trails only Central and Southeastern Europe in the 
prevalence of exploited laborers, according to the ILO.204 The UN similarly notes that 
Africa recorded a higher rate of victims trafficked for forced labor than other regions.205 
This is true of children as well. In Côte d’Ivoire, more than twenty five percent of 
children participate in the economy, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation.206 Lake 
Volta, in Ghana, is a magnet for children exploited in the fishing industry.207 Trafficking 
victims are also disproportionately children; Africa’s share of child trafficking is greater 
than the world average;208 more than sixty percent of detected victims in the region are 
children.209 In Côte d’Ivoire, the United Nations office noted only cases of trafficking in 
children.210 In Nigeria, minors account for half of victims, while Ghana and Sierra Leone 
report that a majority of trafficking victims are children.211 
Of the estimated 3.7 million African victims of exploitation, approximately 
800,000 are engaged in forced sexual exploitation, 2.5 million in forced labor, and 
400,000 in state-imposed forced labor.212 The UN estimates that just fewer than fifty 
percent of victims in Africa and the Middle East were trafficked for forced labor and just 
over one third for sexual exploitation. The remaining victims were trafficked for crimes 
such as use as child soldiers or in ritual practice.213 In all categories, that is nearly double 
the figures in the Caribbean and Latin America.214 Annual profits for sexual exploitation 
in Africa are approximately $8.9 billion, $300 million for domestic work, and $3.9 billion 
for non-domestic labor ($13.1 billion total).215 We noted extensively in Chapter Three the 
community and public health ramifications of irregular migration streams. This was on 
acute display in August 2014, when the Liberian Coast Guard helped enforce an 
unpopular quarantine of Liberia’s West Point neighborhood. The region, “a sprawling 
slum with tens of thousands of people,” much of which is “made up of shanties separated 
by alleys wide enough for only one person,” was cordoned off in an effort to stop the 
spread of Ebola.216 The move, a manifestation of the global fears of infectious 
contagions, was also representative of the need to address issues of human movement in 
partnership with communities, not in opposition to them. And while Ebola dominated 
headlines in the summer of 2014, parts of Africa continue to be ravaged by a range of 
infectious diseases. HIV/AIDS, for example, is still the number one cause of death on the 
continent,*217 and human trafficking has been linked to its spread.218 We also noted, 
above and in Chapter Three, the impact of environmental degradation on irregular 
migration. In West Africa, illegal logging, appropriation of forestland, and unregulated 
charcoal making all present threats to local ecologies that precipitate migration.219 
                                                
* The Naval Health Research Center in San Diego administers the DOD’s HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, 
which is intended to help reduce the infection rate of members of Africa’s armed forces, some of which 
report rates as high as 60%. See, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Africa 
Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch, CRS 
Report RL34003 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, October 2, 2009), 
17. 
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As with narcotics trafficking, human trafficking is not West Africa’s most visible 
security threat. Of the top twenty migration corridors identified by the International 
Organization for Migration, only one African route makes the list, from Burkina Faso 
seaward to Cote d’Ivoire.220 On the Department of State’s ranked index for trafficking in 
persons, most Gulf of Guinea countries are listed as Tier Two.221 Only one (Angola) is 
listed as a Tier Two Watch List state and one (Equatorial Guinea) joins the short list of 
Tier Three non-compliant states.222 Nevertheless, as we underscored in Chapter Three, 
crimes, criminals, and the vectors through which they operate are interconnected. Until a 
theoretical framework is presented that coherently places irregular migration within the 
wider context of West African littoral insecurity, combatting the trade in people will 
remain ad hoc and underemphasized. 
 
3.7 Corruption and State Weakness 
 
Corruption in West Africa is widely documented. Its most relevant element for 
our study, however, is the social psychological component, as expressed in Chapter 
Three. In an article on piracy, Major Eero Tepp of the Estonian Army writes that a 
“permissive political environment” is one of the noteworthy consequences of 
corruption.223 This permissiveness creates an atmosphere conducive to disorder and 
whereby corrupt officials lend protection to allied criminal elements.224225 The result, as 
in the Caribbean, is the questionable legitimacy of political or security establishments. 
For example, despite the overt criminality of Niger Delta militants, Murphy considers it 
undeniable that the perception of the oil industry “supporting a corrupt political class” 
helped groups like MEND substantiate their actions.226 This political-criminal nexus led 
Murphy to scrutinize the solution to maritime insecurity, noting that “the attempt to brand 
it as solely criminal and impose law-based solutions in the absence of a shared 
appreciation of what criminal means can lead to a sense of frustration.”227 Such problems 
cannot be tackled without a shift in how security apparatuses conceptualize criminality. 
Corruption is also related to state weakness, which we noted has greatly 
contributed to the growth of crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Many states in the region score 
in the bottom ten percent of both rule of law and political stability rankings.228 Even in 
Nigeria, West Africa’s largest country by demography and economy, sustained “failure to 
fund and train coast guards, navies and police has created a situation where the readiness 
of the Nigerian Navy (NN) is low, the coast guard ineffective and the vast network of 
river transportation routes is poorly policed.”229 Though the largest naval force in the 
region, at around 18,000 people, the Nigerian Navy’s capacity is so degraded that, in 
2012, Tepp considered it doubtful any vessel larger than a small patrol boat was 
serviceable.230 Here, pirates and criminals are often more seaworthy than the navies set to 
combat them.231 That ineffectual security sectors also operate in a “climate of impunity,” 
employing torture and intimidation, further weakens their effectiveness while generating 
an attitude of fear and resentment.232 As we saw with narcotics, the resulting political 
space afforded by weak or permissive states acts as a surrogate for the “physical 
sanctuary of coves, creeks, and swamps” where malicious maritime actors have 
historically settled.233 
Finally, as with vigilantism, state weakness is also manifested in the growth of 
private maritime security companies (PMSCs). Some companies have begun employing 
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armed guards to shepherd ships through dangerous waters, though this has proven a 
controversial move,234 and the record of embarked security is mixed.235 Some fear it will 
result in escalation with pirates and criminals, and others note a number of legal 
questions regarding the presence of armed personnel onboard a ship flagged to one state 
in the territorial waters of another.236 Yet, state weakness and corruption has often meant 
that distress calls from ship operators in West Africa go unanswered “eight times out of 
ten.”237 It is then no surprise that the continued use of PMSCs remains likely, especially 
because the presence of patrol boats (even non-navy contractor vessels) seems to aid in 
deterrence.238 After oil, private security is the largest sector in the Nigerian economy.239 
As Major Tepp notes, “private navies are on the rise,”240 and their relation to and 
influence over weak states is still a matter of debate. While the presence of PMSCs may 
signal a growing willingness among the able to pay for added security, at a broader level 
their predominance may only reinforce the perception that states in West Africa do not 
retain the capacity to project power in the littorals. 
 
4.0 Similarities Summary 
 
The Gulf of Guinea exhibits the same basic traits—multidimensional threats and 
references to perception and context in its discourse—that make the Caribbean so 
amenable to an application of the Broken Windows theory. Speaking to 
multidimensionality, Le Sage writes that “Africa’s irregular threats are not isolated 
phenomena,” which facilitates a “vicious circle of insecurity.”241 We know from Chapter 
Three that trafficking infrastructure is easily co-opted. Likewise in the Gulf of Guinea, 
where crime, insurgency, and corruption “provide both criminals and terrorists with ready 
networks for weapons proliferation, illicit finance, and illegal movement of men and 
material.”242 Speaking to context, we have seen that local violence, fed by transnational 
flows, permeates the environment in which so many live. West Africans “are beset by all 
forms of criminal violence on a day-to-day basis, including robberies, assaults, 
carjackings, kidnappings, and sexual violence, with little recourse.”243 Poor healthcare, 
squalid living conditions, and schools in disrepair are literal broken windows, 
precipitating “disillusionment and frustration,” which we know from Chapter Two to be 
so corrosive.244 In such an environment, “resentment would be at its height…leading to 
restiveness, conflict, and crime.”245 All of this is familiar, and suggests that the precepts 
of the Broken Windows theory are as applicable in the Gulf of Guinea as we showed 
them to be in the Western Hemisphere. Yet, this particular “malignant environment” has 
produced one feature unlike what we saw in the Caribbean—rampant piracy.246 
Demonstrating how this can be integrated into a Broken Windows framework is critical 
for demonstrating the theory’s generalizability. 
 
5.0 Critical Point of Departure—Piracy 
 
Piracy was the first act criminalized under international law—hostis humani 
generis, enemies of all mankind247—and its cross-jurisdictional nature helped develop the 
notion of the high seas as the common heritage of humanity.248 Yet, piracy today in the 
Gulf of Guinea is not that of Hollywood lore, and contemporary definitions prove 
insufficient in addressing it. The most widely used definition of piracy is set out in 
Muddy Waters: 
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory 
  163 
Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 
international benchmark for maritime law. According to the convention, piracy is an 
action that can only take place on the high seas, beyond the territorial sea maximum of 
twelve nautical miles (nmi) from the baseline.249 The high seas include the contiguous 
zone (the next twelve nmi), the exclusive economic zones (up to 200 nmi from the 
baseline), and the remainder of international waters beyond. Piratical acts that take place 
within the territorial sea or internal waters are de jure not piracy but merely armed 
robbery at sea.250 Lisa Otto, of the University of Johannesburg, notes that, while 
UNCLOS’ intent was to preserve coastal state sovereignty, the resulting arbitrary 
distinction between piracy and robbery where such actions frequently take place between 
the territorial and high seas hampers enforcement efforts.251 In the case of Somali piracy, 
this debate has been largely sidestepped. Somalia’s status as a failed state, and the great 
distance from the coast at which Somali pirates operate, negate many of these legal 
issues.* In the Gulf of Guinea, however, armed robbery is prevalent in territorial waters—
pirates in Nigeria operate from a web of thousands of inland creeks and stream252—and 
so the dogmatic delineation in legal language has become a pronounced hindrance. 
A range of definitions has been proposed to correct the artificial distinction when 
acts of violence occur along the divide of the territorial sea. The International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) emphasizes intent over geography, folding robbery at sea and piracy 
together.253 The IMB’s definition, favored by Onuoha over that of UNCLOS’, defines 
piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to 
commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in 
the furtherance of that act.”254 This reflects the wider Gulf of Guinea scholarship, which 
avoids geographically conditional definitions.255 Even the United Nations Security 
Council’s choice of rhetoric includes robbery at sea as de facto piracy.256 While this may 
help ensure that counter-piracy efforts avoid UNCLOS’ self-imposed strictures, Otto 
notes that existing legal constructs remain significant institutional barriers.257 Otto 
concludes that a more dynamic construction is imperative in order for piracy to be 
considered “holistically rather than in individual parts specific to the distance from the 
coast at which the crime takes place.”258 Here, we adhere to the above functional 
definitions, recognizing that for all practical accounts, the threats, actors, and motivations 
behind piracy and robbery at sea are “largely the same despite the legal distinction.”259 
Formulating a more realistic definition of piracy also includes an understanding of 
the nexus between piracy and political violence. In 2008 and 2009, militants from the 
Niger Delta mounted cross-border attacks into the Bakassi peninsula (governed by 
Cameroon), as well as Malabo (the capital of Equatorial Guinea) in 2009.260 Political 
unrest in the Bakassi peninsula in particular may be an influence,261 with the Bakassi 
Freedom Fighters linked to some attacks.262 Of Nigerian pirates, Dirk Steffen, director of 
maritime security at Risk Intelligence, notes that they are “the same youths who face both 
oppression and extortion by corrupt security forces in the Niger Delta.”263 The 
interconnectedness of piracy, criminality, and politics leads Vreÿ to identify a “pirate-
insurgent-criminality threat.”264 He notes that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is often a 
                                                
* Somali Piracy has ballooned outwards, now reaching as far as 1,300 nm off the coast (more than half way 
to India). In Nigeria, on the other hand, piracy is predominant within the twelve nautical miles of the 
territorial sea and its near environs. See, Lisa Otto, “Westward Ho! The Evolution of Maritime Piracy in 
Nigeria,” Portuguese Journal of Social Science 13, No. 3 (2014): 322. 
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display of a “political-criminal link,” just as with oil bunking ashore.265 And just as 
political unrest serves as justification for theft on land, pirates masquerading as 
insurgents feed predation at sea.266 
Perhaps the surest sign of the relationship between piracy and politics is the 
hypothesis that pirate attacks increase around elections. The managing director of Risk 
Intelligence, the director of Chatham House’s Africa program, and the International 
Maritime Bureau have all advanced this theory.267 This trend appears to be supported by 
piracy patterns (though 2011 is an outlier), including an increase in attacks leading up to 
the 2015 elections.268 This brings important questions to the fore about piracy’s role as a 
“campaign finance mechanism,”269 which have not yet been thoroughly understood. As 
Tepp notes, “piracy has always been tied to the prevailing political situation,” though he 
stops short of addressing piracy as overtly political.270 Otto goes still farther. She 
questions whether UNCLOS’ apolitical categorization of piracy accurately captures the 
motivations of some Gulf of Guinea actors.271 
This examination of the relationship between piracy and politics bears directly on 
the hybrid nature of crimes in the littorals. The difficulty in constructing a theory of 
maritime security is born in part out of the tension between the criminal patina of actors 
operating in littorals, who possess the capacity (and sometimes the will) to project or 
influence political power. Police, in our case studies, infrequently have the capabilities 
necessary to combat threats in the maritime sphere. Yet, leveraging military tactics or 
materiel is not an easy solution. As we explored in Chapter One, with our conversation 
on urbicide, militaries have a tendency to ignore the communal nature of security, 
resulting sometimes in disastrous circumstances. We reinforced this in Chapter Three 
with our conversation on fortress Caribbean and the standoff in Kingston, Jamaica to 
arrest Christopher Coke. The solution we presented was melding criminology and 
military strategy in an effort to bring the theory of community policing in line with the 
might often imprecisely leveraged by navies or coast guards. By identifying the 
complicated hybrid nature of Gulf of Guinea piracy, we validate the notion that piracy is 
similarly amenable to framing in a Broken Windows context. 
 
5.1 The Statistics 
 
Nigeria had a “serious piracy problem” a decade before widespread Somali piracy 
burst to the fore.272 In the early 2000s, Nigeria registered more acts of piracy than did 
East Africa.273 And Gulf of Guinea piracy appears to be enduring. In 2012, it again 
overtook Somalia in number of attacks.274 According to figures from Kamal-Deen, 
attacks nearly tripled between 2005 and 2007, and swelled yet again between 2010 and 
2013 after a short decline (2008-2009).275 During the heyday of the Niger Delta 
insurgency, until the 2009 settlement, incidents were often worst off of Warri, Port 
Harcourt and Calabar.276 The spike in pirate activity following the lull precipitated by the 
2009 accord between Nigeria and MEND277 demonstrates that piracy persists, even in the 
face of political settlement, as an increasingly popular option for financial gain. In the 
aftermath of this agreement, insurgents have not so much joined forces with pirates as 
simply become pirates themselves.278 Recall, in Chapter Three, we detailed the 
relationship between terrorists and transnational crime—particularly the potential for one 
to migrate to the latter. We noted that the skillset required to operate as a terrorist are 
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often exportable to the less ideologically motivated elements of international crime, 
creating linkages and potential nodes between terror and transnational crime. 
Moreover, as Le Sage notes, piracy may be ‘contagious,’ producing a copycat 
effect elsewhere.279 While the progression from pirates’ political motivations to financial 
motivations (above) represents a multidimensional element of West African piracy, this 
contagion serves as a fundamental example of the impact of context. Near Lagos, for 
example, piracy increased commensurate with spikes in the Delta, with attacks taking 
place well within range of shore.280 Acts of piracy also migrated upstream in the Delta, 
where waterways such as the Port Harcourt–Nembe axis and the Calabar River became 
hotspots for robbery.281 Today, Nigeria remains the epicenter of West African piracy. In 
2013, according to the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre, of the 
approximately 230 incidents they noted worldwide, thirty took place off Nigeria 
alone.*282 Nigerian waters have seen the greatest number of incidents directed against 
offshore oilrigs anywhere in the world.283This has profound consequences for the cost of 
shipping in the region, as well as the billions lost to regional countries (estimated up to $2 
billion annually).284 Further, numbers for West African piracy are likely underreported to 
a greater degree than elsewhere, perhaps by as much as half,285 giving greater 
significance to these figures. That piracy breeds more piracy, in part merely by inspiring 
copycats, is indicative of the crime’s viral quality—and it was an epidemiological 
representation of crime that Broken Windows produced in Chapter Two, even down to 
the theory’s adoption in public health. This feedback is likewise expressed in Philip 
Gosse’s piracy cycle, which outlines a familiar evolution of maritime piracy, from small 
scale, opportunistic attacks to larger and more organized operations.286 
Piracy’s contagion is on display across the Gulf of Guinea. While piracy emanates 
primarily from Nigeria, it is quickly becoming a regional issue. This is difficult to 
measure in part because states likely underreport acts of piracy.287 Nevertheless, we can 
at least discern trends. Attacks on oil tankers, for example, have been registered 
throughout the “Ghana-to-Angola and Nigeria-to-Côte d’Ivoire axes.”288 In the summer 
of 2013, a Maltese ship was hijacked off of Gabon, the first such incident in its waters.289 
Piracy from Guinea appears to have spilled into Sierra Leone, which Kamal-Deen regards 
as a “portent of organized criminal activity.”290 Equatorial Guinea reported its first major 
attack in February 2009, which was particularly telling.291 In what was first thought to be 
an attempted coup, approximately fifty armed and poorly informed assailants launched a 
raid on the presidential palace in Malabo; they later admitted they thought it was a bank 
or in possession of large sums of money.292 Some of this piracy outside of Nigerian 
waters is born of the balloon effect.293 As Nigeria made gains countering piracy in the 
late 2000s, Benin went from zero reported attacks in 2009 and one in 2010, to more than 
twenty in 2011.294 Greater enforcement off of Benin (with Nigerian help) was then 
followed by a rise in attacks in Togo (and Nigeria once again).295296 Piracy has also 
ballooned outward into the high seas, where the number of incidents has continued to 
grow since 2005.297 
Piracy is not evenly distributed in the Gulf. Between 2012 and 2014, Togolese 
and Nigerian piracy accounted for three quarters of incidents in West Africa.298 Angola 
only reported its first major hijacking in February 2014.299 Piracy off of Cameroon and 
                                                
* By Contrast, thirteen incidents were recorded off the coast of Somalia. See, European Union, Fact Sheet: 
EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (Brussels: EU, March 17, 2014), 2. 
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Equatorial Guinea has declined since its height in 2009.300 Moreover, incidents off of 
many countries often entail petty theft in ships located very close to shore.301 
Nevertheless, trends in 2013 and 2014 showed piracy continuing to grow and spread 
southward.302 The secretary general of the ECCAS acknowledged that maritime 
insecurity stretches the length of the Gulf of Guinea, from Côte d’Ivoire down to 
Angola.303 Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone have become of increasing concern, and 
Guinea has established itself as a secondary enclave of piracy entirely.304 Steffen relays 
that the Gulf of Guinea has averaged, in recent years, between eighty and 100 attacks 
annually.305 The definitional disagreements we discussed above, as well as obstacles to 
full data collection, make reliable statistics difficult to gather.306 Still, the trends are clear. 
As the IMB concludes, the Gulf of Guinea is one of the most insecure waterways in the 
world.307 
 
5.2 The Tactics 
 
The word piracy often evokes images of Johnny Depp (or Errol Flynn) 
swashbuckling in Tortuga, or Captain Phillips held hostage for days. In West Africa, 
however, piracy takes a much different form. The International Crisis Group identifies 
three types of maritime criminality there: “the spread of political gangster-ism from the 
Niger Delta to the Bakassi peninsula; seaborne raids; and increasingly sophisticated acts 
of piracy.”308 The latter two can also be described as opportunistic and organized piracy. 
According to Tepp, opportunistic piracy is “not as much a way of life as a crime of 
opportunity,”309 lending the issue particularly well towards an evaluation through a 
Broken Windows perspective. If crime is opportunistic, that means it is rooted 
fundamentally in the perceptions of those who perpetrate the acts. And, as we detailed in 
Chapter Two, if perceptions can be altered, so can actions. Moreover, Kamal-Deen 
categorizes most Gulf of Guinea piracy leading up to 2005 as opportunistic,310 when 
robberies were mostly “subsidiary activities.”311 He notes that this label is not a 
commentary on capabilities, but rather about the centrality of piracy for an 
organization.312 Such robberies, stealing easily portable cargo and equipment, can net 
between ten and fifteen thousand dollars in one attack, grossing as much as $1.3 million 
annually.313 Coordinated attacks, such as those choreographed against oil tankers, can net 
nearly triple that figure.314 In such attacks as many as thirty men in up to five speedboats 
converge on a target at speeds of sixty knots.*315 This is a surgical strike requiring 
operational intelligence, unlike the prowling technique often employed in Somalia.316 
Groups including MEND, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, and the Niger Delta 
Vigilante have been identified with this type of attack.317 Oil theft also includes the 
involvement of organizations from as far as Eastern Europe or Asia.318 This connection to 
transnational crime can be seen in the hijacking of the Duzgit Venture, during which 
pirates were “in cahoots with other actors about four thousand kilometers away from the 
point of hijack.”319 In an attempt to meet, “they sailed the commandeered ship across the 
coastal waters of five states.”320 Yet, as we detailed in Chapter Three, even organized 
                                                
* Speedboats, which can often outrun naval craft, were already in use by littoral insurgents and were easily 
repurposed for piracy. See, Ali Kamal-Dee, “The Anatomy of the Gulf of Guinea Piracy,” Naval War 
College Review 68, No. 1 (Winter 2015): 104. 
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crime fits into the Broken Windows’ theoretical lens. At the most granular level, 
transnational crime does not exist in a vacuum—real crime happens in real communities. 
Organized operations trace their origins to the 1970s, as the oil industry took hold, 
bringing with it an upsurge in shipping for construction materials (the “cement 
armada”).321 Then, piracy was centered on Lagos.322 As the petroleum industry migrated 
southeast, stirring feelings of disenfranchisement, piracy followed suit.323 And note, once 
again, that something so seemingly intangible as sentiments of discontent, when framed 
through Broken Windows, takes on greater significance in the context of broader 
maritime insecurity. This antecedent to contemporary piracy exhibited a number of 
characteristics that have proven durable. Robbery, for one, was no longer the only 
apparent motive. Sabotage (and, to a lesser extent, kidnap and ransom)324 became 
prominent, and it had become evident that piracy was increasingly part of a complex set 
of criminal, political, and tribal concerns.325 Violence also becomes a motif at this 
stage.326 Nigerian pirates are accused of being more violent than their Somali 
counterparts,327,328,329 usually for tactical reasons. The former aim to facilitate an efficient 
robbery while the latter employ kidnap for ransom and thus need live victims.330 The use 
of violence to ensure complicity may also be a result of a lack of safe havens from which 
Nigerian pirates can conduct ransom negotiations.*331 This violence is also important 
because successful boardings are more common in the Gulf of Guinea than elsewhere in 
Africa,332 which is also noteworthy for the high rate of successful attacks.333 The use of 
automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades is not uncommon in such attacks.334 
As Broken Windows would predict, these attacks have an impact on local 
communities. In particular, piracy has impacted West African fishing more than any other 
local sector, according to Tepp.335 Between 2003 and 2008, Nigeria documented nearly 
300 pirate attacks on fishing boats.336 Fishing vessels are also targeted for hijackings. 
Pirates use stolen trawlers’ expanded ranges to operate as mother ships with which to 
stage attacks on oil tankers farther to sea,337 as well as for use as a ruse to approach oil 
tankers.338 Recall, above, we discussed the importance of local fishing to the livelihood of 
regional communities. Moreover, recall the vignette in Chapter Three on fisherman Oneal 
Burke, from the Jamaican hamlet of Forum. Burke’s community, and those like them, are 
bellwethers of security. By engaging with such populations, as community policing 
recommends, authorities are afforded the opportunity to identify the problems most often 
first detected by communities themselves. It should be no surprise, therefore, that 
counter-piracy operations frequently see benefits in the fight against IUU fishing as 
well.339 This is an explicit endorsement of the multidimensional nature of security in the 
littorals. 
That piracy and terrorism may become linked, therefore, is also not inconceivable, 
particularly given our understanding of the multidimensionality of crime. Pirates 
maintain capabilities that many terrorists would envy. Though such a relationship 
remains a matter of speculation,340 an attack on a pipeline in February 2012 sparked 
concerns that Boko Haram might begin to target petroleum infrastructure, including 
maritime targets.341 Similar concerns, with some more supporting evidence, in Chapter 
Three suggest such crime-terror partnerships are possible. Fluid criminal dynamics and 
                                                
* While this violence is widely cited, Steffen disputes its treatment as dogma and dives into such claims in 
greater detail. See, Dirk Steffen, “Challenging the Myths of Pirate Violence,” Marine Link, September 2, 
2014, http://www.marinelink.com/news/challenging-violence376188.aspx. 
Chapter Four: Piracy and Perception in the Gulf of Guinea 
 168 
the potential for TCOs to co-opt existing infrastructure make the terror-piracy nexus 
worth monitoring.342, 343 Aside from acts of piracy committed in the maritime space, 
terrorists may also adapt the infrastructure of piracy for use entering and exiting Africa in 
obscurity, like the Caribbean could be used as a staging ground for acts elsewhere.344 As 
we explored in Chapter Three, the capabilities inherent in human smuggling, narcotics 
trafficking or, as seen here, piracy, overlap. As we also saw in Chapter Three, as well as 
in our conversation with Captain Morris (see appendix), these linkages are not simply 
theoretical. While every link may not be of equal strength or validity, the 
multidimensionality of maritime crime is a fundamental component of framing littoral 
security. As we saw above, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea threaten good order at sea 
alongside poachers, narcotics traffickers, and other criminals and insurgents.345 Piracy is, 
therefore, not an isolated phenomenon. It is one node in a dynamic web of interrelated 
issues.  
 
6.0 Broken Windows 
 
6.1 Enforcement Environment 
 
In Chapter Three, we detailed that insecurity in Caribbean littorals, seen through 
two of Broken Windows’ central tenets (multidimensionality and context specificity), 
evinced the relevance of applying a criminological lens to maritime security. We also 
identified that the enforcement environment in the Caribbean added yet more incentive to 
apply community policing methods in littorals. Heavy-handed tactics employed by 
hybridized military and law enforcement units often alienate the neighborhoods they 
were meant to protect. Moreover, the predominance of small actors, each unable to 
independently address maritime insecurity, necessitates a consensus theory of security to 
ensure unity of effort. Community policing, for its focus on community problem-solving 
and its popularity among regional practitioners, presented itself as a ready solution. The 
Gulf of Guinea faces similar obstacles in the enforcement environment. 
First, like the Caribbean, West Africa is highly sensitive to perceptions of 
militarization of the region, particularly with respect to American military involvement. 
In part for this reason, the United States has not maintained dedicated counter-piracy 
assets in the Gulf of Guinea,346 and programs like the Africa Partnership Station (APS) 
have been slow to put down roots.347 This reluctance towards militarization is also part of 
the reason for AFRICOM’s limited continental footprint (it is based in Stuttgart, 
Germany). Liberia is in the minority, offering to host an African headquarters for the 
command.348 After the announcement of the creation of AFRICOM, most West African 
military heads issued a statement expressing reservations about the command.349 And 
after Nigerian president Umaru Yar’Adua hinted optimism about the command in a 2007 
visit to Washington, domestic backlash prompted the foreign minister to walk those 
comments back.350 In 2008, Ghana’s president expressed relief after a meeting with 
George Bush that the U.S. was not planning barracks on African soil.351 There are, of 
course, other reasons for nations, particularly those with colonial pasts, to fear the 
presence of foreign military installations on their soil. Yet, just as the fear of urbicide and 
‘fortress Caribbean’—both rooted in the perceptive domain—played a role in framing 
security in Chapter Three, so too does it in West Africa. In an evaluation for Congress of 
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the Africa Command, the Congressional Research Service noted concerns over the 
potential “militarization of development and diplomacy,” with some fearing the 
Department of State and USAID would play junior roles to the larger DoD.352 And this is 
not solely an issue of American intervention. As in the Jamaican example of Tivoli 
Gardens, West African states have also ‘militarized’ their responses to criminality. As 
Chatham House notes, some countries have created Special Forces units specifically to 
perform police functions.353 
Second, as in the Caribbean, there is a proliferation of interested regional actors 
with competing incentives, complicating shared security framing. West African 
organizations have created a veritable alphabet soup of counter-piracy players—ECCAS, 
ECOWAS, MOWCA, GGC and more.354 In 2008, the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) produced its Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security (ISMS), 
which aimed to construct a “common regional framework” for action.355 The Yaounde 
Code of Conduct, signed in June 2013, represents an effort to coordinate counter-piracy 
efforts by dividing the Gulf into alphabetized areas of responsibility.356 The Maritime 
Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), in partnership with the IMO, seeks 
to facilitate an integrated coastal force, though progress has been sluggish.357358 
MOWCA’s membership—it is represented through transport ministers who wield limited 
influence—and the bureaucratic threat coast guards pose to navies have contributed to 
this lethargy.359 A similar effort put forth by the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Gulf of 
Guinea Guard Force, has also stalled.360 The most successful example of cooperation in 
recent years comes from a joint cross-border patrol undertaken by Nigeria and Benin in 
late 2011.361 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea also attracts the attention of international actors. 
UNODC and the International Maritime Organization have both facilitated regional 
maritime security training,362 and the United Nations Security Council has passed 
resolutions calling for greater focus on Gulf of Guinea piracy.363 In January 2013, the EU 
introduced its Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) program.364 In 
the spring of 2014, the PLAN visited Cameroon and allegedly participated in counter-
piracy drills.365 France has bolstered partnerships with Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville.366 NATO has indicated an interest in a greater presence 
in the Gulf.367 Even INTERPOL is involved, providing investigative support, 
underscoring the hybridized nature of littoral security and the potential role of 
criminology.368 
To provide aid without sparking sensitivities, the United States offers support 
primarily through partnerships and capacity building. Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM’s 
priorities are not depicted as combat-oriented.369 Responsibilities in both regions include 
the issues fundamental to perceptions and the contextual domain as seen throughout the 
preceding chapters: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-narcotics, and 
maritime interdiction operations.370 As we discussed in Chapter One, these constabulary 
operations require “a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities,” given how 
they differ in scope and substance with what a navy ‘typically’ does.371 
Africa Command’s naval element has also attempted to “breathe life” into 
regional agreements, emphasizing joint exercises like Obangame and Saharan Express.372 
The Africa Partnership Station and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership 
(AMLEP) programs are particularly aimed at maritime security. These programs draw 
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still greater parallels to Chapter Three and the hybrid nature of maritime security. APS, 
for example, began in 2007 with the deployment of HSV-2 Swift and USS Fort 
McHenry.373 These ships operate primarily as “floating schoolhouses” to partner with 
local maritime forces.374 And given the overlap with constabulary responsibilities, the 
U.S. Coast Guard is a partner in APS.*375 
Gulf of Guinea states have also begun unilaterally investing in maritime security. 
In December 2013, Nigeria installed surveillance posts along its coast in a creative effort 
to dissuade piracy.376 In early 2014, Côte d’Ivoire publicized its intent to expand its navy 
by forty ships.377 In June 2014, Equatorial Guinea debuted a “jury-rigged frigate to lead 
its emerging naval force,” while Gabon chose to purchase two offshore patrol vessels 
during a naval exhibition that year.378 In 2012, the Ghanaian navy greatly expanded its 
capacity through the acquisition of two German and four Chinese ships.379 The rate of 
growth signals the newfound prominence of maritime security and the need for a strategy 
to guide investment. Yet, it is in multilateralism that the need for a coherent strategy is 
most apparent. Cooperation will be the theme of West African counter-piracy, since 
regional national authorities lack the resources to address the problem and international 
forces lack the legal authority to act independently.380, 381 As foreign actors grow ever 
invested in counter-piracy, and as regional states invest greater sums in capabilities and 
organizations, the need to arrive at a consensus strategy of maritime security—one that 
does not lose sight of the local context and inhabitants—is compelling. 
West Africa’s panoply of security concerns is leading to greater engagement on 
the part of Europe, NATO, the United States, and China, not to mention all of the 
regional littoral states. And yet, maritime security cannot be achieved simply by 
detaching more ships to the Gulf of Guinea.382 As the International Crisis Group notes, 
the only way to successfully address an issue such as piracy is to see it “not just as a 
security problem but as a form of transnational organised crime.”383 Consequently, navies 
in such hotspots are only likely to take on even greater constabulary responsibilities in the 
future.384 Moreover, as in the Caribbean, West African transnational criminal 
organizations diversify into as many product streams as possible.385 Not only do 
landward criminal groups engage in the trafficking of people, narcotics, commodities, 
and weapons, they are also directly related to pirates plaguing coastal waters.386 Scholars 
and practitioners who observe the region are in agreement that, despite the public (and 
academic) fascination with piracy, “it is but one aspect of a wider problem of maritime 
disorder.”387 So, why should counter-piracy efforts exist in a void if piracy does not? 
A senior official at INTERPOL, Yaron Gottlieb, speaks of the “‘glocalization’ of 
anti-piracy efforts.”†388 He argues, “as criminals take global ideas and implement them at 
a local level, addressing the problem requires global solutions that are tailored to local 
environments and conditions.”389 This is precisely the impetus for the theoretical 
framework put forth in this dissertation. The decision to investigate a community policing 
construct is also increasingly relevant. While piracy’s impact on global shipping and oil 
prices may garner the interest of Western powers, maritime insecurity is particularly 
                                                
* AMLEP, meanwhile, is similar to the law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) operating in the 
Caribbean. In this partnership, embarked USCG teams operate alongside host nation law enforcement, 
often on American ships, to provide law enforcement training and support. See, Chatham House, Maritime 
Security in the Gulf of Guinea (London: Chatham House, March, 2013), 32. 
† Glocalization reflects the intersection of local phenomena with globally sourced solutions. 
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important for the havoc it wreaks on local communities. In fact, in West Africa, all of the 
themes of the previous three chapters converge—multidimensionality, context, 
Kilcullen’s megatrends,* hybrid threats, the need for cooperation, and the shortfalls of 
evaluating maritime security without reconciling its political and criminal components. 
We have demonstrated throughout this dissertation that any maritime security 
proposal will need to embrace communities in order to bring lasting impact. We have 
even seen this in limited practices, as in Chapter Three when locals in Colombia 
uncovered a narco-sub operation simply through communal vigilance and collaboration 
with police. In West Africa, the International Crisis Group similarly advocates engaging 
with artisanal fishermen, who know their coastal neighbors and could provide 
intelligence and partnership to maritime authorities.390 This offers one such step towards 
incorporating a community policing component to West African littorals, and 
demonstrates yet again that the Broken Windows theory provides scaffolding compatible 
with many isolated recommendations in maritime security. Any counter-piracy proposal 
will also need to address piracy’s multidimensionality. As with transnational crime in the 
Caribbean, we have seen piracy to be dynamic. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi, then governor 
of Nigeria’s Rivers State, notes, “an attacker may one day kidnap on oil worker in order 
to buy a flashy car; the next day he may join a raid by a militant group and, on the third 
day, hijack a rig to generate cash for his chief or to get jobs, a new hospital or generator 
for his village.”391 This fluidity runs counter to the usual counter-piracy, counter-
insurgency, counter-narcotics divides. By improving perceptions and environments—in 
other words, quality of life—the Broken Windows theory tackles transnational crime by 
overcoming sophistical barriers and addressing the reality Governor Amaechi describes. 
 
6.2 Discourse 
 
Perceptions and attitudes play a crucial role in Gulf of Guinea piracy. As in the 
Caribbean, a careful review of the literature reveals frequent allusions to the role of 
context in maritime security. Otto, for example, notes how a “political culture” of 
corruption has precipitated “an enabling environment for pirates.”392 Otto also references 
“the rise of a culture of violence,”393 which may inform the character of West African 
piracy. Otto proposes that the primary difference between Somali and Nigerian piracy is 
that the former’s state weakness turned into state failure, whereas Nigerian weakness has 
manifested in “a state in which violence is the norm.”394 The International Crisis Group 
refers to a palpable “criminal culture” in the region.395 This language of norm setting 
invites a deeper analysis of the discourse on piracy. 
Murphy notes that some communities, including in West Africa, are “more likely 
to resort to piracy because of cultural reasons,” born of a maritime heritage.396 While 
Tepp is skeptical of this reasoning, asserting that “Nigeria does not have a true culture of 
piracy,” he nevertheless agrees that “the crime [now] enjoys social acceptance amongst 
riverine communities of the Niger Delta.”397 This support comes in part because of the 
                                                
* Vrëy, for example, writes of the threats that daily batter the “densely populated littoral states” of the Gulf 
of Guinea. See, Francois Vreÿ, “Bad Order at Sea: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea,” African 
Security Review 18, No. 3 (September, 2009): 28. 
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feelings of financial and political marginalization discussed above.*398 Of the seven 
factors Murphy identifies as contributors to piracy, he includes the role of “conflict and 
disorder,” “permissive political environments,” and “cultural acceptability,”399 all 
contextual and perceptual characteristics with obvious relation to our discussion of 
Broken Windows in Chapter Two. In Nigeria, Murphy continues, “resentment” plays an 
instigating role in maritime crimes.400 Harkening back to our conversation above on the 
contagion of piracy, Murphy contends it can also turn endemic, with its “corrupting 
influence” becoming self-perpetuating.401 Many states even lack “the culture to protect 
maritime matters,” which is “weakly developed” in deference to security threats on 
land.402 
Murphy argues that “piracy is a business and can be analyzed as a rational 
economic activity.”403 That is a valid lens, and has been applied for decades in 
criminology as well. Yet, as we have illustrated, crime understood purely on the rational 
actor model fails to emphasize important elements—namely, multidimensionality and 
environmental impact. As the Broken Windows theory highlights, and as the discourse on 
West African piracy supports, disorder breeds disorder. Failure to address insecurity at 
the ‘softer,’ communal end of the spectrum only increases the cost of intervening at the 
more violent end. 
Proposed solutions to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are equally evocative of 
Broken Windows. Rear Admiral Osinowo explicitly includes failure to implement 
community policing methods as among the major limitations to better addressing 
maritime insecurity.404 The European Union similarly identifies aiding “vulnerable 
communities” as among its primary values in the construction of a Gulf of Guinea 
strategy.405 René-Eric Dagorn of Sciences-Po Paris likewise writes that counter-piracy 
should involve not only state building, but “society building” as well.406 The sentiment 
underpinning each of these assertions is that crime cannot be disassociated from 
communities. 
Journalist Stephen Starr, writing for West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Center, 
speaks directly to the relevance of this dissertation and the comments above. Starr evokes 
the utility of a theory that joins criminology and maritime security, expressing that the 
“line between piracy and conventional criminality is becoming increasingly blurred in 
Nigeria, resulting in the ‘cross-pollination’ of the country’s naval and police forces.”407 
Starr is referencing not only the hybridization of security threats, but the hybridization of 
responses to those threats (as seen in Chapters One and Three), which we have argued 
would benefit from greater framing and theorizing. Moreover, as we noted in Chapter 
One, while this “cross-pollination” is increasingly a reality in practice, there has been 
little collaborative follow through among the academic disciplines that comment on these 
issues (Kilcullen and Murphy are among the few who have). This dissertation is an 
attempt to address that vacuum of cross-pollination. 
 
 
 
                                                
* Of course, such approval does not come without reservations, as some contend that the level of violence 
employed by pirates is “felt to be intimidating even by the Niger Delta population.” See, Dirk Steffen, 
“Challenging the Myths of Pirate Violence,” Marine Link, September 2, 2014, 
http://www.marinelink.com/news/challenging-violence376188.aspx. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, we began by illustrating that the Caribbean and the Gulf of 
Guinea were “most similar” cases. We identified major similarities between the narcotics 
industry in both regions, and detailed the myriad ‘quality-of-life’ crimes that affect the 
lives of many living on West Africa’s coast, just as in the Caribbean Basin. We 
demonstrated, through this approach, that maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea 
reflected the core components seen in Chapter Three—multidimensionality and the 
importance of context. As a consequence, we validated the applicability of this cross case 
comparison as a means of extrapolating Broken Windows relevancy outside of the 
Caribbean (its generalizability). 
In the second half of this illustrative study, we evaluated the crime of piracy, the 
variant subcomponent between the two cases. In this analysis, we underscored that 
piracy, despite not being present in Chapter Three’s theory-validating analysis, fits 
comfortably in the framing provided by the Broken Windows theory. By incorporating 
this variance into our discussion, we depicted that Chapter Three’s proof of concept 
demonstration is applicable in a more global context and to a diversity of maritime 
threats. By highlighting that a variant issue, piracy, can be incorporated into the framing 
of maritime insecurity’s multidimensional and environmental components, we 
demonstrated that Broken Windows is capable of serving as a theoretical lens adaptable 
to new issues, not singular in its application to the Caribbean. 
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Chapter Five: Evolving Security Conceptions in the Straits 
 
“Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice” Fifteenth century saying,1 
attributed to Duarte Barbosa. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
In Chapter Three, we employed the Caribbean as a primary case study in which we 
illustrated the feasibility of applying the Broken Windows theory as a lens for framing maritime 
security. To do so, we traced in detail the lifecycle of transnational crime in the Caribbean Basin, 
from major international trends to the local insecurities that accompany them. Next, in Chapter 
Four, we turned towards our first illustrative case study, the Gulf of Guinea, the primary burden 
of which was to demonstrate the applicability of our Caribbean conclusions to a more global 
framework. To emphasize the generalizability of our findings, we employed a narrative structure 
similar to Chapter Three, in which we sketched in parallel many of the same crimes and attitudes 
that lent themselves to our framework in the Caribbean. Finally, we strengthened our argument 
for generalizability by highlighting an element, piracy, far more prominent in the Gulf of Guinea 
literature than in the Caribbean. This demonstrated that the theory was capable of framing a new 
issue through the same lens we constructed in Chapter Three. In this second illustrative case 
study, we disengage from the parallel structural approach used in the last two chapters. In this 
concluding study, we turn towards a conversation on a region that is widely considered to have 
met its maritime insecurity head on, along the way developing some of the most mature literature 
in maritime security research. By demonstrating the relevance of a Broken Windows lens even 
here, we lend yet still greater credibility to the argument for generalizability. 
This third case study, the second of our illustrative cases, represents a “deviant” case from that of 
the Gulf of Guinea. In this case, we turn to evaluate a region that has responded forcefully to the 
threat of piracy—the divergent subcomponent of maritime disorder highlighted in the second 
half of Chapter Four. Unlike in the Gulf of Guinea or Caribbean Basin, the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore are not bordered by a proliferation of weak states (only one, Indonesia). Here, 
only three states ring the region of study, two of which maintain strong or moderate capacity for 
local power projection. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate in this chapter that, despite dedicated 
efforts to address and suppress piracy (the dependent variable between cases two and three), 
issues in framing and theorizing have led to obstacles in practice. Moreover, we will demonstrate 
that the literature on maritime security in Southeast Asia, some of the most established on the 
subject, has begun to echo sentiments of a Broken Windows lens as theorists wrestle with the 
durability of piracy. Thus, while Chapter Four provides proof of generalizability through the 
inclusion of another variant of disorder (piracy), this chapter reinforces the argument for 
generalizability by analyzing longstanding counter-piracy efforts and demonstrating the value of 
Broken Windows even in this context. 
 
2.0 Overview 
 
A strait is a narrow stretch of water connecting two larger bodies—in this case, two very 
narrow stretches of water, connecting some of the most vital shipping routes in the world. 
Collectively, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore constitute the longest and most used 
waterways in international shipping.2 The Strait of Malacca runs approximately six hundred 
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nautical miles, from the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea.3 More specifically, the 
International Hydrographic Organization places the Malacca Strait “between the west coast of 
Thailand and Malaysia in the northeast, and the coast of Sumatra in the southwest.”4 At its 
narrowest, the six hundred mile long Strait of Malacca is only one and a half miles wide, situated 
between Peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra.5 The Singapore Strait, which bridges the Strait of 
Malacca with the South China Sea, is even narrower at points, winnowing down to 1.2 miles 
across,6 never more than fifteen miles wide, as it winds between peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Indonesia’s Riau Islands.7 These narrow lanes serve as arteries for the global economy. By 
tonnage, more than half of the world’s shipping traffic passes through the Straits of Malacca, 
Sunda and Lombok annually.8 And according to Japan’s Ministry of Land Infrastructure and 
Transport,9 regional maritime traffic could exceed 100,000 ships by 2020.10 
This traffic carries much more than just goods bound for market in the west. These 
shipping lanes have deep strategic significance to China, Japan, South Korea and other rapidly 
industrializing states in need of Arabian oil and natural gas.* And it is not only commercial 
vessels that rely on the maritime highways of Southeast Asia. American warships likewise 
employ this causeway to the Middle East, transiting from operations in the Persian Gulf and 
Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.11 With the advent of the pivot to Asia, and a post-9/11 
emphasis on radical Islamic groups, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have drawn still 
greater attention from American naval planners. The Bush administration, for example, launched 
three maritime security initiatives during the 2000s—the Container Security Initiative (CSI),† the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)12—
each with an eye towards Southeast Asia.13 
As we also noted in Chapter One, Southeast Asia’s population is heavily clustered in the 
littorals. Two-thirds of Southeast Asian residents live in, or are reliant on, the maritime 
sphere14—perhaps as many as 40% living within 60 miles of the coast.‡15 These waterways 
connect three of the most populous states in the world: China, India, and Indonesia.16 As we 
intimated in Chapter One, climate change presents real concerns for such coastally concentrated 
populations. The combination of coastal congestion and global climate change precipitates real 
concerns,17 not only of human security but also of regional instability through disruptions to 
traditional livelihoods and irregular migration. Already Southeast Asia is, according to some, the 
“most disaster affected area in the world,” prompting the establishment of a regional 
coordination center for disaster relief in Singapore, and increasing focus on HA/DR by local 
armed forces.18 
Unlike in our previous case studies, however, the area of the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore is dominated geographically by few (only three) littoral states—though other nations 
																																								 																				
* Upwards of 80% of the oil and gas imports of China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea pass through the Strait of 
Malacca. See, Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: 
Responses to the U.S. Proposal,” International Law Studies 83, (2009): 98. Half of the world’s oil passes through 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. See, Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders 
Not Welcome?” Naval War College Review 61, No. 1 (Winter 2008): 87. Two thirds of the world’s natural gas 
shipments also pass through the Malacca Strait annually, as well as 25% of global trade. See, Gal Luft and Anne 
Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Policy 83, No 6 (November-December 2004): 67. 
† Whose companion piece is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). 
‡ Exact estimates range. Rosenberg writes that more than half a billion people live within 100 miles of the 
overlapping South China Sea, through which more than half of global shipping passes annually (by tonnage). David 
Rosenberg, “The Maritime Borderlands: Terrorism, Piracy, Pollution, and Poaching in the South China Sea,” in The 
Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization, ed. James Clad, Sean McDonald, and 
Bruce Vaughn (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 107-108. 
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along adjacent sea routes and critical user states serve to augment the ranks of interested parties. 
Yet, even without this cadre of interested parties, the three littoral states alone—Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia—are widely diverse in wealth, size, and governance. Justin Hastings of 
the Georgia Institute of Technology notes the extent of this diversity: “Singapore, one of the 
wealthiest countries (with one of the highest levels of state capacity) in the world, is connected to 
Malaysia, a middle power, by two bridges, and is within sight of Indonesia, one of the globe’s 
weaker (but non-failed) states.”19 
Singapore is a city-state. The country’s position at the southern extremity of the Strait of 
Malacca has helped it develop as a focal point for global shipping, both as a hub for oil refining20 
and as one of the two busiest container ports in the world.*21 More than 100,000 ships visit 
Singapore annually, averaging out to a vessel entering the Singapore Strait every four minutes.22 
And while Singapore dominates financially, Malaysia and Indonesia dominate geographically. 
Two non-contiguous halves principally form Malaysia, one on the peninsula north of Singapore, 
the other on the island of Borneo, which it shares with Indonesia (and Brunei). Indonesia is far 
more fractious by comparison. It is an archipelagic state composed of 17,000 islands23 spread 
across three million square kilometers of territorial and archipelagic waters, in addition to 
another three million square kilometer EEZ.24 Beyond Indonesia’s 39 legally recognized ports, 
the country’s archipelagic nature has bred thousands of illegal ports, called “jalan tikus 
[alternative routes],” according to Brigadier General Dedy Fauzi Elhakim of Indonesian counter-
narcotics.25 The gradations in capacity and priorities among the three littoral states, and 
neighbors including the Philippines and Thailand, make for a compelling environment in which 
to test our Broken Windows best practices. 
In another distinction from our previous case studies, Southeast Asia is wracked by more 
obvious great-power conflicts than is visible in the Caribbean or West Africa. These tensions 
promulgate a variety of significant threat scenarios of which naval planners must be cognizant, 
as noted by Sam Bateman, professor at the University of Wollongong’s Australian National 
Centre for Ocean Resources and Security. One of these major threats includes the potential for 
sovereignty skirmishes.26 The conditions that make such skirmishes possible, born of regional 
territorial disputes to which we will return, serve as obstacles to greater intraregional maritime 
cooperation. Mutual hostilities reign, particularly with respect to Singapore’s perceived, 
contradictory character as both an apparent Western and Chinese outpost. Such skirmishes could 
even precipitate what Bateman labels “catastrophic threats,” such as a conflict between ASEAN 
states and China, perhaps over the disputed Spratly islands, around which the Straits would serve 
as the primary trans-oceanic chokepoint.27 Yet, as Bateman also notes, the probability of an 
incident occurring decreases as its lethality increases, meaning that the most endemic threats—
namely, the small scale, ‘quality of life’ crimes we have discussed at length—are not the ones 
about which strategists think most.28 Bateman identifies many of the same low level issues as we 
described in the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Guinea, including pollution, piracy and robbery 
at sea, trafficking in goods and people, IUU fishing, and climate change.29 
Just as in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, narcotics trafficking and, consequently, 
money laundering, are endemic. More than sixty percent of global opium is cultivated across 
South and Southeast Asia, presenting real threats to good order at sea.30 Two-thirds of illicit 
poppy is cultivated in the Golden Triangle region adjacent to these busy waterways, in Burma, 
																																								 																				
* In fact, five of the 25 busiest container ports in the world are in Southeast Asia. Ahmad Amri, “Piracy in Southeast 
Asia: An Overview of International and Regional Efforts,” Cornell International Law Journal Online 1, (2014): 
128. 
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Thailand and Laos, drawing comparisons between Southeast Asia and the Caribbean.31 There is 
similarly a tradition of moving drugs through maritime conveyance, either from Burma through 
seaports to Singapore and Malaysia or farther east departing from Thai coasts.32 From Singapore 
and Malaysia, narcotics have been shipped to destinations as far as Australia and New Zealand.33 
Amphetamines also built momentum in the late 1990s and early 2000s, moving between the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, where the use of such drugs reached “epidemic 
proportions.”34 The impact of this trade is the same the world over. As seen in Chapters Three 
and Four, “the networks and illicit markets supporting traffickers undermine the rule of law and 
weaken public institutions. They perpetuate corruption and contribute to geopolitical tensions 
throughout the region.”35 
Similarly, IUU fishing, as in the Gulf of Guinea, threatens the livelihood of regional 
subsistence fishermen, some of whom are catching just 15 percent of what they did a half-
century ago.36 An estimate by the Indonesian government placed annual losses to IUU fishing at 
$4 billion, much higher than the estimated cost of regional piracy.37 For this reason, the current 
Indonesian government has expanded a policy of sinking captured illegal trawlers.38 Clashes 
among law enforcement, illegal fishers, and other fishing groups are frequent, occasionally 
violent, and run the risk of escalating tensions stoked by disputed maritime boundaries.39,40 The 
region is in fact replete with unresolved border disputes, including: “the northern Malacca Straits 
where there is no EEZ boundary between Malaysia and Indonesia, [and] the eastern approaches 
to the Singapore Straits where sovereignty over key features is divided between Malaysia and 
Singapore.”41 Indonesia and Malaysia took a dispute over two islands near Borneo to the 
International Court of Justice, which, in 2002, ruled in Malaysia’s favor.42 China, with the Nine 
Dash Line map through which the nation lays claim to a substantial portion of the South China 
Sea, is a party to a great number of border disputes throughout the region.* Consequentially, 
“virtually all shipping” transiting the Malacca and Sunda Straits must pass the Spratly Islands43 
and some of the most contentiously disputed real estate in the world. 
Like narcotics and IUU fishing, irregular migration and human trafficking are also 
abundantly present in the region. Extensive international coverage of the plight of stranded 
Rohingya Muslims, abandoned by their traffickers at sea in 2015, brought global attention to an 
issue of longstanding in the region.44 Migrants take various routes, many beginning on foot 
passing between Bangladesh, Burma and Thailand on through the latter’s land border with 
Malaysia,45 though maritime routes persist. Indonesia and Malaysia in particular serve as 
gateways for the smuggling and trafficking of people from as far afield as Afghanistan and Iraq 
into Australia, in everything from fishing boats to container ships.46 Lieutenant Commander John 
Bradford (USN) notes that criminality has pervasive effects on a population, including a 
proliferation of disease and communal violence,47 factors that precipitate migration flows. 
Bateman, moreover, notes that greater poverty and climate change could provoke still greater 
human migration, much as we discussed in Chapters One, Three, and Four.48 And, as usual, 
corruption plays a critical role in greasing the wheels for the myriad maritime crimes committed 
in Southeast Asian waters, from “fees” paid by illegal fishermen to Indonesian naval personnel, 
to the involvement of some of the same personnel in human trafficking.49 None of these issues 
can be resolved simply or in isolation. 
																																								 																				
* The ICJ is also currently hearing a territorial dispute case between the Philippines and China. 
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Finally, as in the Gulf of Guinea, the maritime crime for which Southeast Asia is most 
commonly associated is piracy.* The region’s geography plays a large role in the growth of this 
predation. Chokepoints like the narrower segments of the Straits force vessels to sharply reduce 
their speeds, making for easier targets.50 High ship volumes (70,000 a year in 2011), combined 
with natural hazards such as shallow reefs and numerous small islands, further force ships to 
reduce speed when entering the Straits.51 The narrowness of the waterways leaves slower ships 
vulnerable to attack from land-based pirates, an important tactical distinction from Somali 
piracy.52 This geography was so forgiving for maritime criminals that, by 2000, the IMB 
declared the Strait of Malacca the world’s piracy hub.53 Meanwhile, Lloyd’s, the insurance giant, 
labeled the region a de facto war zone in response to rising concerns over the nexus between 
piracy and terrorism (to which we will speak below).54 As in the Caribbean and the Gulf of 
Guinea, criminals manipulate borders and geography while engaging in “state capacity 
arbitrage,” leveraging the weaknesses of neighboring countries against one another (i.e. stealing 
goods in an unsecured Malaysian port and laundering the proceeds through Singapore’s modern 
financial infrastructure)55 and evading pursuit by crossing maritime borders.56,5758 
As the 1990s came to a close, Southeast Asia boasted the highest piracy rates in the 
world—and they were only on the rise.59 From 1997 to 2002, attacks increased from 22 to 164.60 
Moreover, as pirates became wealthier and more organized, the sophistication of attacks grew 
from hit-and-runs to hijackings and kidnappings.61 The shipping community was quick to 
respond, establishing in 1992 the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre 
(PRC) in Kuala Lumpur.62† The international community lagged only slightly in comparison, 
taking an interest in the latter half of the decade, according to the Joint Services Command and 
Staff College’s Catherine Zara Raymond.63 According to Raymond, piracy in the region built 
momentum as coastal communities responded to the Asian financial crisis.64 Several high-profile 
attacks from 1997 through the end of the decade may have also encouraged shippers to report 
attempted attacks, causing reports to rise from virtually zero to 75 in the span of only a few 
years65 (though likely still underreported). As we will see in the coming sections, the regional 
response to piracy, its initial success, and its long-term struggles offer a clear strategic case for 
the inclusion of Broken Windows principles as a lens for maritime security planning in the 
region. 
 
3.0 Piracy 
 
For two decades, more than half of piracy reported worldwide has taken place in and 
around the South China Sea,66 clustered around Malaysia, Singapore and, predominantly, 
																																								 																				
* As in the case of Gulf of Guinea scholarship, much of the literature on Southeast Asian piracy recognizes the 
limitations of UNCLOS’ definition of piracy (Tammy Sittnick, “State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the 
Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to Secure the Strait,” Pacific Rim 
Law and Policy Journal 14, No. 3 (2005): 756) and instead defines piracy and armed robbery collectively, in line 
with the definition of the IMB. See, (Adam Young and Mark Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, No. 2 (August 2003): 270; Ralf Emmers, 
“ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 16, No. 3 (2003): 7; 
Neil Renwick and Jason Abbott, “Piratical Violence and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” Security Dialogue 
30, No. 2 (June 1999): 183. 
† Piracy imposes a number of costs on shipping. Beyond the value of goods stolen and rising insurance premiums, 
the need for tankers to sail at higher speeds to avoid being targeted could add almost $90,000 a day per ship in added 
fuel consumption costs. See, Ted Kemp, “Crime on the High Seas: The World’s Most Pirated Waters,” CNBC, 
September 15, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/15/worlds-most-pirated-waters.html. 
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Indonesia.67 According to the Nottingham Trent University’s Renwick and Abbot, between 1991 
and 1997, 328 of Southeast Asia’s 579 reported attacks took place in Indonesian waters alone.68 
Notwithstanding Indonesia’s heavy footprint, piracy by its nature remains an international 
problem around the straits. For Singapore, whose financial health depends on the free flow of 
goods through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, piracy has been a driving priority from the 
earliest signs of trouble, prompting investment in coastal surveillance and patrols from the 
1990s.69 Malaysia soon followed suit, as did Indonesia under pressure from the other two littoral 
states,70 and counter-piracy became akin to a regional specialty. While initially promising, these 
individual state efforts and nascent bilateral initiatives proved insubstantial in the face of 
mounting attacks, and the three states fell behind the crushing growth of piracy in the straits.71 
As the international community took notice as the millennium came to a close, counter-piracy in 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore entered a phase of investment and scrutiny that would 
prove fruitful, if perhaps unsustainable. 
 
3.1 Response 
 
A number of diverse parties helped drive the littoral states towards an investment in 
maritime security. First, the growing impact of piracy on international shipping brought the IMB, 
IMO, shipping companies and insurance companies to the table. Second, following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the United States took a greater interest in securing the straits from 
terrorism, an interest heightened by rumors circulating that pirates were hijacking ships in the 
straits in order to learn how to navigate (seen in the guise of the 9/11 hijackers attending flight 
school).72 When, in June 2005, the insurance giant Lloyd’s’ Joint War Committee listed the 
Strait of Malacca as a war risk zone,73 raising the cost of shipment for producers and user states 
alike, it became financially imperative for Singapore, and to a lesser extent Malaysia and 
Indonesia, to respond emphatically to the piracy epidemic. 
The regional response was robust and international at the highest reaches of government. 
As early as 2003, the members of the tenth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) addressed the threat 
of piracy at a ministerial level through a declaration of cooperation on maritime security.74 In 
2004, the littoral states initiated Trilateral Coordinated Patrols under the operational name 
MALSINDO to better organize their independent surveillance activities.*75 These patrols 
produced no immediate impact on piracy rates,7677 though they signaled a willingness on the part 
of regional states to act collectively on maritime security. One year later, the littoral states 
introduced joint air patrols under the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) program.78 In 2006, the two programs 
were merged into the Malacca Straits Patrols.798081 Also in 2006, the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was 
announced in Singapore.82 The agreement is another noteworthy example of successful 
multilateralism in the region—ReCAAP was the world’s first intergovernmental organization 
devoted to counter-piracy83—and was established to provide better reporting on maritime crime 
and best practices.84 
The importance of the free and financially expedient flow of goods through the straits 
weighs not only on the littoral states, but on user states as well. One of the largest user states is 
Japan, which has been an enthusiastic contributor to stabilization efforts. Since the 1990s, the 
maritime authorities of Southeast Asian nations have been invited to Japan to train with the 
																																								 																				
* Thailand became a partner of MALSINDO in 2008. See, Sheldon Simon, “Safety and Security in the Malacca 
Straits: The Limits of Collaboration,” Asian Security 7, No. 1 (2011): 35. 
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Japanese Coast Guard (JCG).85 Japan’s Coast Guard makes frequent visits across the region, 
offering instruction and collaboration, in addition to the country’s founding role in ReCAAP.86 
With Japanese help, Jakarta instituted a coast guard to augment and synthesize the disparate 
enforcement responsibilities of its nine agencies and the local jurisdictions that organizationally 
maintained authority over maritime enforcement.87 Indonesia, it should be noted, has made 
strides to unify this structure, creating Navy Control Command Centers and establishing 
regencies along international borders in an attempt to address piracy’s perceived root causes, like 
poverty.*88 Indonesia’s Ministry of Home Affairs, meanwhile, has initiated similar “dissuasion 
programs,”89 whose name itself implies an implicit understanding of the importance of 
perception in maritime crime. Malaysia has also attempted to centralize its maritime components 
under a unifying coast guard,90 the Malaysian Maritime Law Enforcement Agency (MMEA), 
which reorganized five agencies under one roof in spring 2005.91 Also in 2005, Malaysia invited 
the JCG to train personnel in this newly formed coast guard.†92 The Japanese non-profit Nippon 
Foundation donated training vessels to Malaysia in 2006.93 That same year, the Japanese 
government announced it would donate several patrol boats to Indonesia.94 Malaysia has also 
been investing in capacity and surveillance independently. In 2000, the nation stood up a 
counter-piracy task force within the Royal Malaysian Marines and trained dozens of officers in a 
special “marine police tactical unit.”95 In 2003, it acquired new patrol vessels and invested in 
radar stations to more effectively monitor traffic along the Malacca Strait.96 In 2006, Malaysia 
announced it would acquire up to fifteen new police vessels to aid in its goal of twenty-four hour 
surveillance of the Strait,97 while the country’s navy acquired an auxiliary vessel to support 
maritime security operations as recently as January 2016.98  
The United States has also played a role in response, often through capacity building 
facilitated by the Global Train and Equip Program,99 and funding lent to the South East Asian 
Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT).100 Through the installation of coastal 
radars, ship transfers, and multinational exercises, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have delivered 
further millions in aid and training to the three littoral states.101102 The Cooperation and 
Readiness Afloat (CARAT) program is one such example, through which the United States’ 
maritime services annually exercise alongside the three littoral states as well as Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Brunei.103 SEACAT, Southeast Asian Cooperation Against Terrorism, is yet 
another U.S.-led multination maritime exercise in the region, begun in 2002.104 The U.S. has also 
donated materiel, including fifteen patrol boats to the Indonesian Marine Police in 2008.105 In 
2011, a retired Coast Guard cutter, USCGC Hamilton, became the Philippine Navy’s flagship.106 
Port visits have increased over the last decade as emphasis on the region has grown, with USN 
visits to Malaysia nearly tripling from 2006 to 2010, and a large naval delegation (including the 
CNO and the aircraft carrier USS George Washington) attending Indonesia’s independence 
celebrations in 2009.107 Also in 2009, the United States Navy established “formal, recurring 
talks” with Japan, South Korea and Australia, all prominent user states, initiated high-level talks 
with Singapore, and expanded exchanges between fleet and combatant commanders and their 
regional counterparts, to build personal and institutional relationships across services.108 Yet 
																																								 																				
* In maritime security, as in criminology, the focus often remains fixed on ‘root causes.’ While these are doubtless 
important to address, recall that a value of Broken Windows in New York was its ability to impact crime rates even 
while long-running root causes eluded quick solutions. 
† Singapore, by contrast, has historically maintained a highly structured approach to maritime security, with a 
Maritime and Port Authority, a Police Coast Guard, and a Navy; a Maritime Security Task Force coordinates their 
collective maritime efforts. See, Yun Yun Teo, “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, No. 6 (2007): 543. 
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another program, the Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative (MLE), builds more directly on the 
constabulary nature of maritime insecurity in the region, providing resources to help regional 
states combat human trafficking, narcotics and weapons smuggling, IUU fishing, and 
environmental crimes.109 Even intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations have lent a 
hand. In addition to the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre, the International Maritime Organization 
has inaugurated programs including the Marine Electronic Highway Project to enhance safe 
passage of the waterways.110 Other international organizations involved in maritime security in 
Southeast Asia include ASEAN (including ARF and the ASEAN Security Community), APEC, 
the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,111 and the World Bank.112 
Despite figures suggesting a decline in piracy as a consequence of so much investment, 
not everyone interpreted the data as a blanket success. Sheldon Simon, of the Arizona State 
University, wondered in 2011 whether piracy had disappeared in the Straits or “simply relocated 
to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to the strait,” like the balloon 
phenomenon would suggest.113 Bradford similarly notes that piracy rates did not decline 
uniformly, and that rates increased near Sabah, driving Malaysian piracy rates up threefold at the 
same time they were declining more broadly.114 Simon notes surges in 2008 in the Riau 
Archipelago south of Singapore, as well as in the region of the northern Malacca Strait, between 
Sumatra and Malaysia’s west coast.115 Piracy suppression in the Malacca Strait may have driven 
piracy eastward to the Singapore Strait and deeper into Indonesian waters,116 but it has had 
impacts farther afield as well. Raymond notes that while the international community was 
focused on reducing piracy incidents in the Strait of Malacca, insecurity grew in other waters 
connecting Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, including the Sulu and Celebes seas.117 
These seas create a “triborder sea area” linking the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, a critical 
junction made a haven by transnational criminals.118 
Nevertheless, by conventional acceptance, piracy was on the wane by the mid-2000s. 
Figures peaked at 165 attacks in 2004, according to the IMB-PRC, and declined in 2005 (108), 
2006 (83), and 2007 (70) across Southeast Asia.119 More specifically, figures within the straits 
declined from 38 reported in 2004 to 10 in 2007.120 Something, it seemed, was working. The 
literature, however, is inconclusive regarding what particular initiatives were most responsible 
for this overall decline in piracy rates. This is a critical point. Despite apparent downward trends 
in piracy rates, the literature remains largely unable to identify specific actions or programs 
responsible for the decline. Lieutenant Commander John Bradford (USN) notes, for example, 
that four years after the initiation of trilateral surface patrols among the littoral states, it remained 
unclear if such actions shared any relationship with declines in incident rates.121 ‘Probably,’ 
‘may have,’ and ‘most likely’ are often the closest analyses come to linking the decline in 
reported incidents through the mid-2000s to the myriad initiatives underway at the time.122 There 
are even a few competing explanations on the piracy decline that discount state action entirely. 
Perhaps the most common dissenting theory is that the 2004 tsunami that ravaged the region 
played a role in the reduction in piracy, though this is perhaps undercut by the reality that rates 
fell in regions untouched by the disaster as well.123124125 Raymond posits a theory that the 
devastation wrought by the tsunami on piracy-prone Aceh, an Indonesian province long plagued 
by a separatist insurgency and hit hard by the surge, may have contributed to ending the conflict 
and, by extension, piracy in the broader region.126 The contagious and multidimensional nature 
of piracy depicted in the previous chapter, and the tipping point argument explored in Chapter 
Two, would certainly lend credence to an argument that a reduction in piracy in a particular 
hotspot could radiate effects outward. Such unique hypotheses aside, however, the general 
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consensus has been that a combination of the efforts noted above had a collective impact on the 
issue of piracy.127 And they may have—for a time. 
 
3.2 Resurgence 
 
As Simon notes, “there is an important distinction between piracy deterrence and 
suppression—currently effective in the strait—and alleviation of the underlying causes of 
maritime crime.”128 Until maritime insecurity is addressed in a broader context, states can only 
hope to cope with piracy. By dint of the frequent focus on a single threat vector, the counter-
piracy suppression initiatives employed in Southeast Asia generally failed to target the 
“architectures of intertwined security relationships” that make transnational crime so resilient, 
and to which we have dedicated so much space in this dissertation.129 Lessons learned from our 
application of Broken Windows suggest that this narrow lens ignores the driving effect of the 
environment on decision-making and disorder. The rise in regional piracy rates in recent years 
suggests that piracy suppression is no longer adequate in the face of wider maritime insecurity. 
Indeed, after an interlude of rampant growth off of the Horn of Africa, piracy prevalence has, 
since the early part of this decade, drifted across the Indian Ocean back to the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore where the issue has thus far proven endemic—despite laudable efforts.130 
Despite decades of investment, the IMB continues to issue piracy warnings for mariners 
transiting near Indonesia,* the Malacca Strait, and the Singapore Strait.131 And while rates have 
stayed low in some places, they have climbed in others, as near Malaysia’s Tanjung Piai cape 
and Indonesia’s Bintan Island, adjacent to Singapore.132 Overall, reports of piracy in the region 
tripled between 2009 and 2014, and once again half of the world’s reported piracy takes place off 
the coasts of the three littoral states.133 Of the six countries that represent three quarters of the 
world’s reported piracy incidents, only Nigeria is outside of the Indian Ocean, with Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia comprising more than half of the attacks counted among those six 
nations.134 Of the thirty-six “serious attacks” listed in the IMB’s 2014 report (the most recent at 
the time of writing), twenty took place in Southeast Asia,† and almost half occurred near the 
three littoral states alone.135 Worldwide, of the ports that reported three or more incidents in 
2014, half belonged to the littoral states (five in Indonesia, one in Malaysia, and one in the 
Singapore Straits), constituting two-thirds of incidents reported in those anchorages.136 Similarly, 
of the 204 actual reported attacks in 2014, nearly two thirds took place in the straits or waters 
adjacent to the littoral states.137 According to ReCAAP, 2014 was among the most dangerous 
years in nearly a decade, something the IMB-PRC corroborates.138 Early data for 2015 shows 
these trends have continued, as Southeast Asia—particularly the Straits—struggles with a nearly 
twenty percent increase in reported piracy.139 
 
																																								 																				
* Indonesia is in a class all its own with respect to piracy rates. 100 vessels were reported attacked in Indonesian 
waters in 2014, the most recent reporting year as of writing. Almost all of these attacks were incidents of attempted 
or successful armed robbery within the archipelago. The Indonesian Marine Police have succeeded in driving down 
armed robbery rates in about a dozen designated safe harbors, though hundreds of anchorages remain vulnerable. 
See, ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January-
31 December 2014 (London: ICC IMB, January, 2015), 29, 32 
† Vietnam in particular exhibited a worrying trend in 2014. See, ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January-31 December 2014 (London: ICC IMB, January, 
2015), 29. 
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Piracy rates have ebbed higher since a trough in the mid-2000s and, between 2008 and 
2012, Southeast Asia was still the second most pirate-prone region in the world;140 only the Horn 
of Africa ranked higher.141 Year-on-year trends paint an even less optimistic picture. Incidents in 
Indonesian waters are up 150% compared to 2010; incidents in Malaysia are up by one-third 
from that same year; and reported incidents in the Singapore Strait have more than doubled in 
that same time.142 While overall incident rates (attempted and successful) have declined globally 
over recent years, the number of successful attacks has jumped, due predominantly to incidents 
in Southeast Asian waters.143144 And Indonesia is not alone as a target among littoral states; 
Malaysia witnessed some of the largest year-on-year increases in incident reports in 2014.145 
Most of these attacks, some targeting small oil tankers,146 are far more reminiscent of the small-
scale attacks described in the Gulf of Guinea, than the more sensational Somali model.*147148 As 
one news report remarked: “if Somali pirates act like muggers, attacking isolated targets out of 
sight of the authorities, south Asia’s [sic] pirates act more like pick-pockets, using the crowd 
itself as cover.”149 Crowded waterways conceal criminals, like they did for the terrorists coming 
ashore in Mumbai in 2008, the scene with which we opened this dissertation.150 This cover is 
part of the environment within which maritime disorder persists, and cannot be disassociated 
																																								 																				
* Bryan Abell, former USMC Intelligence and Six Maritime’s director of operations for West Africa lists several 
other similarities between the Gulf of Guinea and continued piracy in Southeast Asia, including the presence of 
political angst. See, Miha Hribernik, “Southeast Asia’s Piracy Headache,” Diplomat, February 15, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/southeast-asias-piracy-headache/. 
Figure 1 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships Report for the Period 1 January-31 December 2014 (London: ICC IMB, January, 
2015), 6. 
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from our understanding of security in the littorals. Similarly, as ReCAAP’s Assistant Director 
Lee Yin Hui notes, more than half of the incidents reported in the most recent reporting period 
were petty thefts, opportunistic in nature.151152 These are the very types of crimes to which the 
Broken Windows theory is most relevant. Recall, in Chapter Four, that we linked opportunistic 
piracy with the ‘quality-of-life’ crimes outlined in Chapter Two. 
 
3.3 Obstacles to Collective Effort 
 
Even a weak state, with help, can garner investment to meet a specific threat in a specific 
location for a defined duration, as was the case in 2005 and 2006 when the littoral states were 
induced to action by Lloyd’s war risk zone designation.153 Indonesia, for example, initiated 
Operation Gurita in 2005, deploying at least 20 ships to piracy prone waters.154 Such surges are 
often unsustainable, however. In 2005, almost a decade into the piracy spike in the region, 
perhaps as little as 25155 to 30 percent of Indonesia’s naval vessels were seaworthy,156 and the 
country maintained as few as one or two functional aircraft for maritime surveillance.157 
Indonesia’s defense minister put operational estimates higher, but at a still dispiriting sixty 
percent.158 Even at full operational levels, the Indonesian fleet is less than half the size necessary 
to patrol its waters, according to then naval Chief of Staff Admiral Slamet Soebijanto.159,160 As 
noted by Noel Choong, former head of the Piracy Reporting Centre, Indonesia’s investments 
matter; “a lot lies with Indonesia and with how long they will sustain their patrols, which do cost 
millions.”161 Indonesia’s “anemic maritime budget,” which was funded at only a third of the 
requested amount as recently as 2009, makes it impossible for Jakarta to maintain situational 
awareness over its 17,000 islands.162 Low pay and poor morale, a direct consequence of resource 
shortfalls, have even led some analysts to suspect elements of the Indonesian Navy and maritime 
police of complicity in local crimes.163 Some peripheral states are no less well off. In late 2014, 
the Philippine Navy announced plans to modernize a fleet that, until now, has been marked 
predominantly by “museum pieces.”164 To compensate, authorities have asked local fisherman to 
report crimes they see in their coastal and maritime communities,165 inadvertently instituting the 
central element of any good Broken Windows, community policing approach. As we saw in 
Chapters Three and Four, this community engagement can have an impact. In the former, locals 
in Colombia detected and disrupted a narco-sub production ring in partnership with local 
authorities. In the latter, fishermen from a Senegalese village reported a suspicious vessel to the 
local Gendarmerie, who found it packed with cocaine. 
Yet, there is more to the shortfalls of maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore than resource constraints. A range of issues, including sovereignty sensitivities and 
issue prioritization, serve as obstacles to the collective framing and action necessary to make the 
midcentury policing model (enforcement and interdiction) effective in the maritime space. As we 
mentioned above, territorial claims in Southeast Asia bracket any conversation on regional 
security frameworks. Sovereignty concerns are a recurring refrain in the literature and are of 
particular importance for Malaysia and Indonesia.166 This emphasis on territorial integrity is an 
outgrowth of the non-contiguous, archipelagic and maritime nature of these two states, whose 
wealth and influence are directly related to the extent of their dominion over adjacent waterways. 
Due to such sovereignty concerns, Indonesia and Malaysia have been slow to engage in 
multilateral pacts beyond the three littoral states. They are not, for example, signatories to the 
SUA Convention, nor are they party to ReCAAP.167,168 Even Indonesia, most in need of capacity 
building aid, has drawn a red line around the presence of foreign militaries.169 
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When, in 1999, Japan’s Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed a regional coast guard 
initiative, ASEAN states responded tepidly,170 and China with outright opposition.171* While 
some of this tepidity is a result of Japan’s wartime legacy in East Asia, modern politics plays a 
role as well. China, for example, viewed the Japanese initiative as an avenue through which to 
expand regional influence.172 Indonesia and Malaysia went so far as to agree to participate in 
exercises, but balked at the prospect of armed vessels in their territorial waters.173 An inadequate 
appreciation for the depths of sovereignty considerations was also a factor in the defeat of an 
earlier Japanese proposal in 1996.174 As a result of these defeats, Major Victor Huang (Republic 
of Singapore Navy) concludes that, “in general, attempts by extraregional powers to exert 
leadership are likely to trigger unfavorable reactions from rivals.”175 
American initiatives are viewed no less suspiciously by the littoral states. In March 2004, 
misreported (and misinterpreted)176 remarks by Admiral Thomas Fargo, who was quoted as 
suggesting the presence of American sailors in the straits under the Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative (RMSI), prompted quick rebuke.† Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 
quipped, “I think we can look after our own area.”177 One Malaysian maritime security 
commentator considered the perceived American attempt to send troops to the region under 
RMSI as a Singaporean ploy intended to thwart the modernizing Malaysian military.178 Another 
expert, B.A. Hamzah, former director general of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), 
wondered if RMSI disguised an American effort to seek out new enemies in the region, “using 
the Straits of Malacca as a pretext” or concealing a “hidden agenda.”179 Retired Malaysian Navy 
Captain and MIMA research fellow Mat Taib Yasin enumerated several elements of the RMSI 
program that rankled regional officials, including familiar references to sovereignty and political 
spillover, as well as doubts of American sincerity and intentions.180 The overt regional hostility 
to RMSI’s perceived intentions demonstrates this tendency towards “ambivalence or outright 
rejection” of most frameworks introduced by extraregional powers.181 Any successful vision for 
maritime security in the region must negotiate the need to balance external funding with a 
perspective on security that recognizes territorial concerns. 
Bateman makes a similar argument, writing that “a fixation on resolving sovereignty 
claims reinforces distrust and inhibits cooperation, whereas cooperative actions on ‘softer’ issues 
should be seen as CBMs [confidence building measures] helping build trust.”182 Just as we have 
argued throughout this dissertation, Bateman concurs that “the region desperately needs a more 
cooperative mindset,” one that moves away from a zero-sum concept of maritime security.183 
Without conceptualizing a theory of maritime security that allows the region to move beyond 
sovereignty clashes and build cooperation, the myriad quality-of-life crimes that prey on lives 
and livelihoods in the region will continue to proliferate.184 This was precisely at issue in the 
regional response to RMSI. According to some reports, the Indonesian administration understood 
that Admiral Fargo’s comments were misquoted, but nevertheless opposed the program because 
																																								 																				
* Japan’s Ocean Peacekeeping proposal was diluted to meet regional sovereignty sensibilities and reconstituted in 
2002 as ReCAAP, which entered force in September 2006. See, Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in 
Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” Naval War College Review 61, No. 1 (Winter 2008): 98. Malaysia, home 
to the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center, has objected to the establishment of ReCAAP’s Information Sharing Center 
in Singapore as an unnecessary redundancy. See, Sheldon Simon, “Safety and Security in the Malacca Straits: The 
Limits of Collaboration,” Asian Security 7, No. 1 (2011): 37-38. 
† U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce was later forced to issue a clarification, stating that the news reports 
were inaccurate. See, Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal,” International Law Studies 83, (2009): 104. 
Muddy Waters: 
Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory 
	 201 
it was “perceived as overly militaristic,” thereby failing to circumvent the conventional political 
model used by many in the region to interpret security issues.185 
And, as we saw in our discussions of both the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, 
attempting to coordinate a vast array of governments and intergovernmental organizations 
invested in maritime security is in itself a daunting challenge.186 On June 14, 2014, for example, 
the tanker Ai Maru sent a distress signal to the IMB-PRC. Six ships from four agencies 
belonging to three countries were dispatched to respond to the call, and the pirates still evaded 
capture.187 The mere presence of international coordination does not pre-ordain its success. It 
should come as no surprise, therefore, that those international agreements that have entered force 
have often been viewed as “uncoordinated and incomplete.”188 ReCAAP, for all its 
accomplishments, remains “incapable of having a large impact,” according to University of 
Wollongong’s Ahmad Amri.189 Amri is even less optimistic about the impact of ASEAN’s 
forums, calling them “merely talk shops.”190 Critics have also seen the cooperative sea and air 
patrols discussed above as “more show than substance.”191 That as many as seventy air sorties a 
week are estimated as necessary to effectively monitor the waterways, while EiS generally 
executed only eight,192193 lends further justification to this criticism—and the inadequacies of the 
midcentury policing-inspired interdiction model in the littorals. 
Most importantly, however, the littoral states failed to maintain a parallel level of effort 
in the fight against piracy because piracy is simply not a priority for all parties. Malaysia, for 
example, whose Maritime Enforcement Agency maintains a respectable seventy patrol ships, 
regards illegal fishing and tourism development as higher priorities than piracy, according to 
both Simon and Major Huang.194195 Meanwhile, Indonesia, whose goods principally traverse 
alternative straits (Lombok and Makassar), does not face the same financial incentives that 
motivate Singapore’s interest in piracy suppression.*196,197 Moreover, Jakarta maintains a long 
list of nautical issues, including maritime territorial disputes, concerns over smuggling and IUU 
fishing,198199 not to mention landward sovereignty,200 all of which rank higher in the interest of 
the state than counter-piracy. Both Malaysia and Indonesia regard human trafficking as a major 
issue as well.201 Singapore, by contrast, is far more concerned with hazards to the free flow of 
traffic through its adjacent straits, a symptom of its heavy dependence on the shipping 
industry.202 Even user states have conflicting priorities and perceptions. The United States, as we 
will see, has been predominantly concerned with the threat of terrorism, Japan with piracy, and 
Australia with overall capacity building (given its role as a destination for smuggled products 
and people).203 That the range of maritime crimes represented in these seemingly divergent 
interests is interconnected, as we have seen, at the contextual domain, is diminished in a strategic 
lexicon pitted against individual threats. These barriers to collective action—resource allocation, 
concerns over sovereignty, and mismatched threat perceptions—are illustrative of the pitfalls of 
strategies that do not consider the broader context of maritime insecurity. 
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore represent a unique case in our study. For a time, 
efforts predicated on traditional notions of threat framing seemed to be making a real impact. 
Indeed, they likely were, despite a lack of reliable corroboration in the literature (as noted 
above). Yet, what makes this case all the more powerful, is that even promising counter-piracy 
efforts do not offer the theoretical frameworks that are critical to sustaining “resolve and 
resources” over the long run—two pillars that Bradford identifies as Achilles Heels of Southeast 
																																								 																				
* Singaporean flagged or managed ships were among the most victimized in the world in 2014. See, ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January-31 
December 2014 (London: ICC IMB, January, 2015), 16, 18. 
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Asian counter-piracy.204 Bradford argues that, should the littoral states manage to succeed in 
maintaining momentum and resource investment in counter-piracy, this success can be parlayed 
into a mechanism to drive cooperation on a wider degree of maritime insecurities in the 
region.205 As we have argued throughout these pages, however, buy-in can also be elicited by 
appealing to a strategic conception that addresses all of the insecurities that matter to the littoral 
states at the outset, placing an emphasis on context over a given threat. A strategy such as this, 
which by its law enforcement heritage may be able to avoid the type of regimes that “[set] off 
power rivalries and sovereignty concerns” common in the region, can make real inroads in 
Southeast Asia.206 
Obstacles to effective piracy reduction in the Straits, in the face of a midcentury policing-
like model of interdiction and disruption, provide strong evidence that greater security could be 
achieved through an alternative strategic perspective. Yet, this is not the only argument 
supporting the value of a Broken Windows application in the littorals. The literature on 
Southeast Asian maritime security is itself representative of the utility of the Broken Windows 
lens, as the themes outlined in this dissertation begin to emerge organically. While the literature 
lacks the framing and language of the Broken Windows theory provided here, a manifest 
gravitation towards a multidimensional and contextual understanding of maritime security in the 
discourse is indicative of the theory’s relevance even in this advanced literature. 
 
4.0 Evolution to Broken Windows 
 
While we may disagree with Bradford’s conclusion, his argument is nevertheless 
revealing. Bradford’s explicit linkage of piracy with terrorism, smuggling, and migration is 
implicit acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of maritime crime.207 So too are 
references in the literature to linkages among instability, corruption, poverty, and transnational 
crimes an acknowledgment of the need for a more holistic interpretation of what maritime 
security means.208 As terrorism gained ground as a popular field of study, it inadvertently served 
as a vehicle by which the literature on Southeast Asian maritime security became exposed to a 
more multidimensional perspective on security—a key component of the Broken Windows 
theory as identified in practice in Chapter Two. This evolution was precipitated in part by the 
shortcomings of the midcentury model as applied to piracy, which was resource intensive yet 
unable to interdict criminals in the act. In this section we trace that transition in an effort to 
highlight the linkages between the piracy literature and our Broken Windows lens. 
 
4.1 From Piracy to Terror 
 
No article on maritime security in the straits is complete without reference to terrorism—
often right in the title. The relationship between 9/11 and the maritime security literature is 
profound and difficult to overstate. Raymond, for example, writes simply: “one year after piracy 
incidents peaked in the Malacca Strait, al-Qa’ida launched its attack on the Twin Towers in New 
York.”209 Raymond was of course not arguing any correlation; rather that 9/11 demonstrated that 
conveyances (i.e. planes and, by extension, ships) were now seen as vessels for terror attacks.210 
Nevertheless, the acute juxtaposition is illustrative—and common. As we noted above, the 
literature draws frequent parallels between the flight school training of the 9/11 hijackers and 
concerns over similar activities in the straits.211 Reports of ship hijackings are often portrayed as 
potential “dry runs” in which terrorists gain operational knowledge for later use—perhaps 
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ramming an explosives-laden ship into a port212—though some experts have disputed these 
conclusions.213, 214 One example portrayed in this light is the March 2003 hijacking of the 
chemical tanker Dewi Madrim, which, after being commandeered, was steered through the 
Malacca Strait for an hour before the assailants fled with a trove of technical documents.*215 Gal 
Luft and Anne Korin, of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, even relay reports that 
al-Qaeda owns dozens of “phantom ships,” hijacked and repainted vessels.216 Young and 
Valencia posit a more exact figure—fifteen ships—and regard their existence a “widely 
disseminated, and largely accepted, fact.”217 
The list of scenarios involving merchant shipping disasters is extensive. Bateman, for 
example, sketches a number of theoretical catastrophic attacks, including exploding liquid 
natural gas (LNG) tankers, ferry bombings, and cruise liner attacks.218 Such acts of terrorism 
would have particularly adverse economic consequences for Singapore given the nation’s 
reliance on an extensive, advanced coastal infrastructure, itself an attractive target.219 Should a 
tanker be sunk in a narrow portion of the straits, such as the Phillips Channel in the Singapore 
Strait, the cost in loss of business alone to Singaporean ports could amount to hundreds of 
millions of dollars annualized.220 Regardless of the sensational nature of some of these scenarios, 
their underlying premises remain true. Given the preponderance of local extremist movements in 
Southeast Asia, there remain concerns over a crosspollination between piracy and terrorism.221 
Several organizations in the region, including the Free Aceh Movement, the Abu Sayyaf Group, 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
have employed maritime tactics or engaged in piracy.222 
Similar to the use of narcotics trafficking in funding terror in Latin America, and the use 
of piracy in West Africa to fund hybrid political-criminal organizations, piracy in Southeast Asia 
has also been suspected as a source of funding for extremism. Senia Febrica, a researcher at 
Universitas Indonesia, notes that terrorist organizations (including the Abu Sayyaf Group and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front) have been indicted for attacks in the adjacent Sulu Sea designed 
to provide their organizations with funding.223 Febrica also notes that sea passages between 
Indonesia and the Philippines have been used as conduits for terrorist movement, including the 
passage of individuals from Malaysia destined for training camps in the Philippines.224 Luft and 
Korin relay that international efforts on countering terrorist financing have pushed terror 
organizations towards alternative funding streams like piracy,225 and that this is particularly 
evident in the Strait of Malacca.226 As Aditi Chatterjee, of New Delhi’s National Maritime 
Foundation, notes, “the rampant trafficking of illegal drugs and smuggling of arms in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar and Thailand provides nourishment to insurgency and 
terrorism” as far afield as India, sustained by fishing boats crisscrossing the Andaman Sea.227 
The movement of narcotics, as we have seen, also precipitates the involvement of criminal 
syndicates, most prominently Japanese yakuza, Chinese triads, and Vietnamese gangs.228 As Luft 
and Korin note, pirates also often have relationships with the transnational criminal organizations 
operating in Southeast Asian waters.229 
The focus on terror is not, however, merely academic. While incidents of maritime 
terrorism have been scarce in the waters around the South China Sea, they are not unheard of,230 
often coming in the form of ferry bombings. In 2000, the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix 
was bombed, allegedly by the MILF, killing approximately forty people.231 In 2001, the 
Indonesian ferry Kalifornia was attacked, killing ten passengers.232 In one of the most frequently 
																																								 																				
* As noted by Peter Lehr in discussion with the author, the ship’s master later confirmed it was just a ‘run-of-the-
mill’ pirate attack. 
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cited examples in the literature, the 2004 attack on Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, resulted in the 
most lives ever lost to an act of maritime terror; more than 100 people died.233234235236 Abu 
Sayyaf claimed responsibility for that bombing.237 All told, between 2000 and 2004, attacks on 
ferries in the region killed approximately 300 people.238 
States, too, have exhibited real concern over the issue. Singapore’s former defense 
minister Teo Chee Hean has “consistently maintained” that maritime terrorism poses a real threat 
to the region.239 Malaysia, which has previously downplayed the threat of terrorism, also now 
warns of the threat in the region and has referred to it as a “real and possible” threat.240 
Indonesia, which has similarly demurred from linking piracy and terrorism in the past, has also 
in recent years been drawing connections between the two.241 Indonesian officials have relayed 
intelligence that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has considered attacks on shipping passing through the 
straits.242 Videotapes recovered from JI have included footage of MMEA patrols, and JI militants 
have received training in maritime tactics.243 Only months after September 11, authorities 
uncovered a Jemaah Islamiyah plot to attack American naval ships docked at Singapore’s Changi 
Naval Base.244245 Captured al-Qaeda member Omar al-Faruq has also reportedly acknowledged 
attempting to plan scuba attacks against American ships in the Indonesia port of Surabaya.246 In 
2010, all three littoral states issued warnings of potential maritime attacks within the straits.247 
More recently, there has even been concern that sympathizers from Southeast Asia may be using 
sea routes to travel to and from the Islamic State,248 prompting an investigation by the Indonesian 
Navy (they could find no evidence to support such claims).249 
This attention to terrorism was also a major factor in the United States’ interest in 
regional maritime security, as noted earlier. In the months after 9/11, the United States 
collaborated with the Indian Navy to help protect American-flagged ships transiting the northern 
portion of the Strait of Malacca.250 In 2004, the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asia, Matthew Daley, told an audience at the Dialogue on Security in Asia that “Asia’s 
waters are prime targets for Al-Qaeda and other terrorists,” and that the threat “is not to be 
underestimated.”251 During Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Indonesia in 2006, she 
discussed with her counterparts terrorism’s interface with the security of the straits, and an 
American-Indonesian joint exercise on maritime counterterrorism took place shortly after Rice’s 
departure.252 American concerns over the safety of the straits became so critical so quickly that, 
by only 2002, the region had already earned the moniker “the second front” in counterterrorism 
by some observers.253 The United States’ focus on maritime terror has in part made it easier to 
partner with littoral states,254 which have themselves come to see terrorism both as a regional 
problem and an avenue for American aid.255 
As Young and Valencia rightfully address, the post-9/11 “conflation” of piracy and 
terrorism appeared ubiquitous256 and was undoubtedly overstated. Nevertheless, the 
commingling of terrorism and piracy in the Southeast Asian literature inadvertently marks an 
important theoretical step in conceptualizing maritime security in the straits. The predominance 
of terrorism in the approaches of policymakers and academics encourages progress towards 
multidimensionality, blending two previously bifurcated policy spheres into a single threat 
picture. Within this framing, piracy and terror are still often regarded as “distinct crimes,”257 
largely treated as separate issues.258 Still, as a consequence of their juxtaposition, piracy and 
terror come to be presented in the same context, manipulating the same vulnerabilities.259 While 
the motivations driving piracy and terror remain split when evaluated from this perspective—the 
former economic, the latter political260—the actions of both organizations are seen to overlap, as 
are the environments in which they thrive.261 
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4.2 Terror, Transnationalism, and Multidimensionality 
 
Concurrent with this shift in emphasis towards terrorism and terror financing, in both the 
academic literature and international attention, was an expanding focus on other transnational 
crimes in the straits. In some cases, these crimes were seen in similarly narrow lenses as piracy 
and terrorism, as isolated threats. Drug trafficking, for example, which came into greater focus as 
a critical issue for many states as consumption rose,262 was often discussed in isolation. Yet, the 
blending of terrorism, piracy, and transnational crime in the literature also bred an increasingly 
multidimensional view of maritime security. This shift was facilitated by the global nature of Al-
Qaeda’s attacks in the early 2000s, which precipitated a vision of terrorism as thoroughly 
internationalized. Thus, while piracy was typically regarded as a matter for the littoral states to 
address among themselves, the integration of terrorism into the maritime threat landscape 
enabled regional states to more broadly consider non-territorial non-conventional threats.263 
Febrica, for example, relays the common concern that irregular migration across porous maritime 
borders may be used to facilitate the easy movement of terrorists in the larger migrant flow.264 
Moreover, as Bradford notes, transnational criminal activity, particularly the movement of 
weapons and people, has a real impact on the capacity of non-state actors to engage in political 
violence.265 Luft and Korin posit that the maritime domain has even become a key operational 
realm for terrorists, and that attacks at sea might represent more than merely attempts at financial 
gain.266 Young and Valencia term this “political piracy,” something which bares similarities to 
the hybridized maritime violence we explored in Chapter Four.267 Yann-huei Song of Taiwan’s 
Academic Sinica notes that the United States “sensed increasing synergy between transnational 
threats like terrorism, illicit drugs, trafficking in humans, [and] piracy.”268 Nazery Khalid, of the 
Maritime Institute of Malaysia, represents the evolution in the literature well; “the threats facing 
the Straits are multidimensional. Although in recent years the international media has given 
extensive coverage to piracy and sea robbery, there are many other threats facing this key artery 
of world trade.”269 These conclusions are not revolutionary, but they demonstrate a progression 
towards a wider understanding of the maritime security domain. Now, it is axiomatic that the 
threats of maritime security in the straits are “complex, asymmetrical, multidimensional and 
transnational.”270 
As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, it is a logical conceptual step from imagining 
terrorists and other transnational actors operating alongside one another, to the fusion of actor 
and infrastructures. Chatterjee comes to this same conclusion, noting that “it is plausible that 
pirates and terrorists could collaborate” with one another, one gaining financially, the other 
logistically.271 This leads to what Donna Nincic of the California Maritime Academy considers 
to be “the most significant threat” in the maritime domain, “the emerging ‘web of criminality’ 
with pirates, terrorists, and ordinary criminals working in an ad hoc manner.”272 Nincic refers to 
this expansion of piracy into a range of other maritime crimes as “diversion,” or diversification, 
something we discussed at length in our previous chapters, and something that is evocative of the 
multidimensional element of Broken Windows.273 A report from a maritime news service 
similarly suggests that Southeast Asian piracy groups are highly international in nature, with 
Indonesian foot soldiers and Malaysian and Singaporean bosses, and often engage in a wide 
variety of illegal maritime activities.274 As we explored in Chapters Three and Four, maritime 
criminals are more dynamic than the atomized state response suggests. As Bateman remarks, 
smuggling networks in Southeast Asia are not only “highly dynamic,” but the same gangs may 
be involved in smuggling one day and piracy the next.275 Chatterjee writes of human traffickers 
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that they are likewise connected to transnational networks engaging in the trade of narcotics, 
guns, money, and counterfeit products.276 Captain Richard Phillips, of the famed MV Maersk 
Alabama, notes that pirates operating in Southeast Asian waters are part of a larger criminal 
infrastructure.277 Raymond, too, notes the significance not only of deterring pirates at sea, but 
tackling the broader network of criminality that sustains them.278 What connects these crimes, 
beyond the people and networks involved, is the context in which they take place. 
The inclusion of transnational crimes in the literature drastically alters the perception of 
the success of midcentury-style counter-piracy initiatives. As E.L. Dabova, of Saint Petersburg 
State University, notes, “while the actual number of piracy cases may be perceived as dropping, 
the total number of maritime crimes in the Strait of Malacca has actually increased.”279 Weighing 
heavily on this rise is the role of human smuggling and trafficking. Dabova estimates that a boat 
of between 50 and 100 migrants could net traffickers as much as $30,000, while products from 
stolen motorcycles to timber all yield lucrative sums.280 The transportation of hazardous waste, 
one of the most obvious visible symptoms of disorder, is among of the fastest growing crimes in 
the region.281 Like the decentralized criminal syndicates we have discussed so much, these 
trafficking groups are often small in size, between five and ten people.282 This nodal view of 
crime is seized upon by the Broken Windows theory’s community-oriented perspective, and is 
missed by a midcentury model focused on interdiction, or the ‘beheading’ model used against 
more corporately structured criminal organizations. As a consequence of the growing awareness 
of the multidimensional, contagious nature of littoral insecurity, issues that were once 
predominantly the concerns of one or two littoral states are now gaining traction internationally. 
Even less prominent crimes, like the smuggling of cigarettes, counterfeit medication, and even 
sand,283 are receiving “substantial attention.”284 The impact of these crimes may, individually, be 
small. Yet, as Nincic argues, collectively they are “even more problematic because [they are] all 
part of the increasingly overlapping ‘web of criminality’ connected through the global maritime 
domain.”285 Just as Kelling and Wilson argued in 1982, so too does Khalid; disorder compounds 
and, if unattended, could have profound implications for the security of littoral states.286 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations are also increasingly a 
part of the conversation. As Huang notes, the United States’ role in humanitarian relief in the 
aftermath of the 2004 tsunami built operational capacity and political goodwill.287 Lieutenant 
Commander Bradford similarly notes that HA/DR operations performed in times of peace are 
integral to building the trust necessary for effective naval cooperation in times of crisis.288 
Moreover, as Broken Windows would suggest, by aiding in recovery efforts and physically 
cleaning up after a natural disaster, non-military actions can directly improve an environment, 
and thus regional stability. The United States has embraced this premise in Southeast Asia. Since 
2006, the U.S. has partnered with other Indo-Pacific nations in the Pacific Partnership initiative, 
providing humanitarian assistance across the region.289 In 2010, the hospital ship USNS Mercy 
participated in the Sail Banda exercise alongside medical ships from Indonesia and Singapore.290 
As the author Robert Kaplan expresses, such deployments are likely to become increasingly 
common. Echoing sentiments from our exploration of population growth, climate change, and 
natural disasters in Chapter One, Kaplan writes, given “population growth in climatically and 
seismically fragile zones…placing more human beings in danger’s way than at almost any other 
time in history, one deployment will quickly follow another.”291 
Even the Littoral Combat Ship, that much maligned vessel from Chapter One, has made 
an appearance in the straits. The U.S. Navy intends to station four LCS in Singapore by 2018, 
first announced by Secretary Gates at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue.292 Their presence, 
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according to the Commodore of LCS Squadron One, Captain Randy Garner, offers “an amazing 
return on the shipbuilding dollar.”293 The ship’s smaller nature allows it to better perform 
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) in concert with the smaller ships of adjacent navies and 
coast guards.294 In a similar vein, Scott Cheney-Peters, of the State Department’s maritime 
security desk, notes that the “white hulls” of the U.S. Coast Guard are better suited yet for the 
constabulary and criminal challenges faced by littoral states.295 And despite being short on 
assets, the Coast Guard does send vessels through the region to participate in joint exercises, as 
in 2012 when USCGC Waesche participated in that year’s CARAT operation.296 Cheney-Peters 
likewise notes, as we did in the Caribbean context, that LEDETs (law enforcement detachments) 
provide a unique solution for augmenting Coast Guard and law enforcement assets in the Straits 
of Malacca and Singapore, and that they “have a strong case to represent U.S. support” in the 
region,297 underscoring further the hybrid dimension of maritime security needs. 
The special role of the Coast Guard in this sphere should not be understated. As Bateman 
notes, regional states are often concerned that the American interest in maritime security and 
counterterrorism “has placed too much emphasis on the military dimension” of current 
strategy.298 Just as academics and practitioners in the Caribbean were concerned with a ‘fortress 
Caribbean’ approach to security, leading to the hostility and urbicide we explored in Chapters 
One and Three, so too are practitioners and politicians in Southeast Asia concerned over a 
‘fortress Malacca.’ The use of LEDETs in the Caribbean,299 as well as the Basin’s strides in 
developing a cooperative theory of maritime security,300 are even explicitly held up as models for 
adoption in the straits. Through such a perspective, regional states can “build operational trust by 
disconnecting forms of maritime cooperation on the ‘softer’ issues from the military and political 
issues that underpin strategic distrust” throughout Southeast Asia.301 As a consequence, “this will 
mean a better framework for maritime cooperation in the region and ‘demilitarizing’” the way in 
which regional states approach maritime security.302 
This transition—from piracy, to terrorism, to transnational crime, to a multidimensional 
perspective on security—inevitably begs the question: how do states reconcile the criminal 
dimension of these issues with the resources necessary to combat them? That tension has been at 
the core of this dissertation, and is present at times in the literature on Southeast Asian maritime 
security.303 As Young and Valencia note, it is not the traditional responsibility of militaries to 
provide police functions.304 While navies are often tasked to address such problems because they 
possess the needed hardware, they often lack the arrest authority and knowledge base necessary 
to police effectively. Yet, the hybrid nature of crimes like piracy, terrorism, and trafficking in 
people, weapons, and goods, are not easily lent to conventional policing authorities.305 As far 
back as 1999, Alan Dupont, then Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Australian 
National University, wrote of narcotics trafficking in Asia: while the matter has been 
“traditionally regarded as principally a matter for law enforcement agencies,” this is 
“demonstrably no longer the case.”306 
There is, similarly, an impulse to emphasize root causes, often with the assumption that 
short term mitigation is unlikely to make a significant difference. Young and Valencia are 
emblematic of this argument, advocating for a strategy of maritime security that stresses 
addressing root causes, rather than their symptoms (something we saw earlier in the chapter, and 
across Chapter Two).307 And undoubtedly, states should focus on governance, poverty 
alleviation, and human rights. Yet, as our investigation of the Broken Windows theory has 
shown, the symptoms matter as well. By tackling symptoms, we influence perceptions, which 
impact how people behave. As the implementation of Broken Windows in New York suggests, 
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even without solving ‘root causes,’ maritime forces, “acting in a law enforcement capacity, can 
still have a significant effect.”308 
Still, perhaps the greatest endorsement of the need for an alternative way of looking at 
maritime threats in Southeast Asia comes from the limits of the dominant, midcentury policing-
style strategy expounded over the years. The littoral states responded robustly to the rise of 
piracy in the region, and have sustained a focus on maritime insecurity to varying degrees for 
more than twenty years. Yet, after a period of temporary piracy decline, renewed incident rates, 
and concerns over resources and matched level of effort, there is yet a more fundamental 
question about Southeast Asian maritime strategy. Are any of the lessons learned in the region, 
after two decades of counter-piracy operations, applicable elsewhere? Does the existing theory in 
the region pass the generalizability test we have striven to apply to our own? Simon, directing his 
evaluation towards the Gulf of Aden, answers emphatically no: “any isomorphism seems 
remote” because of mismatches in geography, sociology and governance309 (all variant 
components of this ‘deviant’ study). That after so many years the practice of maritime security in 
Southeast Asia may not have produced generalizable applications suggests the need for 
continued theorizing, an exercise this dissertation has attempted to accomplish. 
On piracy studies in particular, some authors have even echoed some of the core 
sentiments of the Broken Windows theory. Nincic, for example, suggests that the disorder 
brought along by piracy breeds greater disorder.310 Her depiction is reminiscent of that which we 
presented in Chapter Two, of a broken window’s cascading impact on a local community. She 
writes, “left unchecked, piracy tends to transition through levels of increasing complexity and 
violence. When it first appears, piracy tends to be little more than petty crime; left unchecked, it 
will tend to become more organized, moving from ‘mom and pop’ operations to sophisticated 
criminal gangs.”311 There is even reference to the contagious nature of piracy,312 something we 
noted in our Gulf of Guinea study, akin to the vision of crime and disorder expressed by Kelling, 
Coles and Wilson. Chatterjee even makes reference to the impact of context, identifying the 
region’s “permissive environment” as a contributing factor to the proliferation of maritime 
crime.313 References to the “synergetic” impact of transnational crimes314315 can likewise be read 
as references to the compounding nature of disorder as understood in the lexicon of Broken 
Windows. Robert Kaplan summarizes, “piracy is the maritime ripple effect of land-based 
anarchy.”316 Broken Windows substitutes the word disorder for anarchy, but the principle 
remains. As one saying from the fifteenth century quips, “whoever is lord of Malacca has his 
hand on the throat of Venice.”317 A feature of this dissertation, of the lessons gleaned from the 
Broken Windows theory, and a point of convergence within the literature on Southeast Asia, is 
that “more safety and security in one of the world’s busiest waterways constitutes a positive sum 
outcome” for everyone,318 as resonant today as ever, it would seem. 
The literature on Southeast Asian maritime security is among the most mature on the 
subject in the world. The growth of the piracy epidemic in the 1990s, and the intensity with 
which the global community demanded action, have spurred an ongoing interest in maritime 
security research from Singapore to Australia. There is perhaps no greater endorsement of the 
potential usefulness of the Broken Windows theory than the growing prominence of our two 
main themes—multidimensionality and context-specificity—in this body of work. As Chatterjee 
relays, “there is a growing need to expand the traditional notion of security to address non-
traditional threats, and thereby adopt a more comprehensive approach to security…Apart from 
being non-military in nature, these challenges are also transnational.”319 Dabova likewise writes 
of the need to “develop a complex concept of non-traditional threat to maritime security” 
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because current frameworks on security face “conceptual and institutional weakness.”320 The 
scholarship on Southeast Asian maritime security suggests simultaneously that there is an 
ongoing need to place maritime security strategy in a greater theoretical context, and that the 
critical themes we have distilled from the Broken Windows theory meld with the lessons 
emerging in this robust literature. Thus, in demonstrating the applicability, and viability, of a 
Broken Windows-inspired strategy in a region with a long relationship with maritime insecurity, 
and piracy in particular, we underscore again the generalizability of this research. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 
Across every region, “policymakers have a hard time conceptualizing non-traditional, 
transnational and human security issues, which do not respect national boundaries and which 
transcend institutional and policy stovepipes.”321 In response, Donna Nincic summarizes the 
need for this research best: “the global maritime community should focus less on stopping a 
particular form of maritime crime, be it piracy, terrorism, or trafficking, and more about creating 
holistic measures to counter an increasing ‘web’ of maritime criminality.”322 The Broken 
Windows theory, through an emphasis on multidimensionality and context, cuts across these 
stovepipes to present a holistic view of maritime security. Such a perspective presents more than 
just another way of looking at threats. As argued by Richard Bitzinger, of Singapore’s 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, “above all you need a common threat perception” to 
engender genuine cooperation and impact in the maritime domain.323 A theory of maritime 
security, such as one predicated on the lens and lessons of the Broken Windows theory as 
explored in this dissertation, provides one such avenue for redefining a shared threat perception. 
In this illustrative case study, we diverged from the parallel, most similar model 
employed in the cross case comparison between the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea. In this 
‘deviant’ case, we assessed a region that has directly addressed the variant subcomponent 
highlighted in Chapter Four (piracy). Also unlike in our previous cases, the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore are dominated by only a few states, some with real capacity for action in the 
maritime space. Nevertheless, in this chapter we underscored that despite concerted regional 
efforts to respond to piracy, the issue remains nearly endemic. Through an assessment of piracy’s 
resurgent presence in Southeast Asia, we highlighted in clear relief the continued need for 
theorizing about maritime security. This was further reinforced in our survey of the literature on 
Southeast Asian maritime security, which struggled to attribute piracy’s initial decline to specific 
polices, and has remained dynamic as new issue areas are incorporated into the discipline. This 
body of work, through an infusion of terrorism research into the maritime sphere, has come to 
echo elements of the Broken Windows theory we laid out in Chapter Two—multidimensionality 
and context. By identifying a region with longstanding investment and investigation into 
counter-piracy, and even in this context demonstrating the potential contribution of the 
community policing model in contrast to techniques similar to interdiction or institutional 
decapitation, this chapter reinforces the argument for generalizability of a Broken Windows lens 
beyond the Caribbean Basin and West Africa. 
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Conclusion 
 
1.0 Criticisms 
 
The Broken Windows theory is not without its flaws, and neither is its legacy. In 
recent years, the theory has become used as shorthand for an increasingly adversarial 
relationship between police and minority communities. In New York City, controversial 
stop-and-frisk policies have served to aggravate racial tensions, which burst to the fore in 
late 2014 after a series of unarmed black men were killed in police custody across the 
United States (including Eric Garner on Staten Island). While perhaps inspired by Broken 
Windows’ emphasis on addressing quality-of-life crimes, stop-and-frisk is—as our 
investigation in Chapter Two should suggest—anathema to the broader aims of 
community policing. Moreover, despite the colloquial use of the term Broken Windows, 
a household phrase in New York since Rudolph Giuliani held office, stop-and-frisk was 
implemented not under Commissioner Bratton, but a successor. 
The discrepancy between the vernacular use of Broken Windows today, and its 
representation in the academic literature, has been reiterated by some in the 
criminological community,1 including the theory’s creator, George Kelling.2 
Nevertheless, even if only in the pop lexicon, Broken Windows has been cast as a 
coconspirator in a growing movement to overhaul American policing. And, in part, police 
departments own this responsibility. Instead of elevating Broken Windows’ emphasis on 
people and perceptions, police across the country invested deeper in zero-tolerance 
policies, missing the corrosive degradation in relations that should have been the bedrock 
of community policing. In so doing, even as crime in cities like New York remain at 
record lows, police constructed an environment in which the enforcement of law was 
perceived by the community to be unequal. The very lessons in this dissertation, which 
suggested an aversion to militarizing police and fortress mentalities, were lost on some of 
the police forces that first pioneered community policing.  
While an important conversation, however, the ongoing debate over Broken 
Windows’ successor does not negate the value of the lens this theory lent to our 
investigation of maritime security. In this dissertation, we exported the theory’s most 
fundamental and transformative conclusions, as understood by our evaluation in Chapter 
Two—that crime is multidimensional, and that environment matters. Or, as Kelling 
writes in his recent defense of the theory, “that small things matter in a community and, if 
nothing is done about them, they can lead to worse things.”3 It was this fundamental 
mixture that propelled the Broken Windows theory to popularity, especially in New 
York, and these core principles are those that we sought to apply to the littorals. That 
citations, searches, and arrests have historically been skewed against minority 
communities may be more expressive of a broken system than a broken theory. To this 
very point, the language of Broken Windows, that which directed our understanding to 
the importance of perception and context, only underscores the consequences of festering 
mistrust between law enforcement and communities of color. 
There are, to be sure, more enduring criticisms of this research. Time and 
financial constraints made regional field research infeasible, but would have undoubtedly 
offered a still more nuanced understanding of the interplay between perceptions, 
environment, and security. Without the capacity to implement real-world tests, our 
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argument is forced to stand on thought experiments, however copious. The very focus on 
theory creates competing incentives, most obviously the hope to explain a complicated 
phenomenon while being as parsimonious as possible to ensure the development of a 
useful model. Perhaps most of all, reaching between disciplines invariably sparks 
controversy over exportability. Each of these critiques is mitigated by the research design 
and the progression in which we advanced our argument. 
 
2.0 Summation 
 
We opened this dissertation with an illustration of a world far outside the minds of 
many naval strategists, but one well within the lived experience of millions of people 
around the world. Dense slums. Congested waterways. Contested spaces. These 
conditions predominate in the lives of a rapidly growing percentage of the global 
population. Maritime security embodies the hybrid threat. And because such threats are 
so often manifested in criminality, those responsible for addressing insecurity in the 
littorals would, we suspected, be well served by an understanding of criminology. The 
Broken Windows theory was particularly fitting for this task. Just as it revolutionized a 
midcentury policing model built on fighting and interdicting crime, so too did Broken 
Windows offer a similarly intriguing redefinition of security in the littorals. It was this 
reality that inspired the kernel of our research question: How does this maritime space 
relate to the functions of navies today? 
This core question grew in complexity and specificity until we arrived at our main 
point of inquiry, as laid out in the Introduction: Can the Broken Windows theory, a 
criminological construct of social disorganization, provide the lens through which to 
theorize maritime security in the littorals? To answer that question, however, required a 
better understanding of two underlying issues. First, why should we care? What was so 
wrong with existing theories, or so different about the world today, that made an 
investigation like this relevant? Second, what is the Broken Windows theory? Without 
understanding the fundamentals of this theory, we would be unable to test its lens against 
the realm of maritime security. Answering each of these two sub-questions satisfactorily 
was the objective of our first and second chapters, respectively. 
First, what in the strategic literature made this research relevant to begin with? 
We addressed that in two complementary sections. First, we elucidated the threat forecast 
from which we were operating. This forecast illustrated the major trends shaping the 
future of the littoral space over the coming decades, including Kilcullens four 
megatrends: population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness. This 
analysis told us not only where to expect future tensions to arise (in the littorals), but 
hinted at the cause of these hotspots (transnational issues of human security). It was in 
this conversation that we were introduced to the idea of feral cities, urbacide, and hybrid 
threats, upon which we relied over the course of the subsequent case studies. These 
themes legitimized an investigation on maritime security by asserting the inevitable role 
coastal zones will play (indeed, already are playing) in global stability. 
In the second portion of Chapter One, we turned towards an analysis of the post-
9/11 strategic literature to understand the space for this course of research. It was here 
that the strategic gap in discussing the maritime sphere was underscored. U.S. maritime 
and strategic documents were shown to address maritime security in broad strokes, 
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leaving unanswered fundamental questions about what maritime security means. 
Strategic documents from NATO, the European Union, and the African Union similarly 
offered little guidance on broader theoretical concerns. Maritime security strategies most 
often read like laundry lists of activities that did not belong in more conventional naval 
operations, and were consistently framed around specific threat-vectors (i.e. counter-
piracy or counter-narcotics). A more detailed look at one particular strategy, A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21), underscored further the 
dichotomy between language on maritime strategy and the platforms and programs being 
funded by the Department of Defense. What emerged was a strategic space without much 
theory; a domain to which analysts widely referred but that appeared to lack a coherent 
framing. Combined, these two avenues of investigation—threat forecasting and strategic 
literature review—underscored why this research was relevant, answering the second of 
our two initial sub-questions. 
Still, the second of our initial sub-questions remained—what is the Broken 
Windows theory? And, significantly, how would we set about answering the researcher 
question? In Chapter Two, we therefore began with an exploration of the theory at large, 
ascertaining some of the central tenets of Broken Windows. To gain a deeper familiarity 
with the theory and its literature, we turned to an illustration of its use in the New York 
City subway. In so doing, we introduced not only a common case study in Broken 
Windows scholarship, but depicted the theory in the conditions of a natural experiment. 
This was the first major step in demonstrating the exportability of a criminological theory 
beyond the urban space and into a maritime one. That extrapolation was then reinforced 
in our discussion of Broken Windows in the greater New York City environment, 
wherein we further underscored the broader social implications of Broken Windows 
outside of a rigid, urban application. To validate this conclusion, we turned the 
conversation towards Broken Windows’ use across disciplines, particularly in the realms 
of public health and psychology. Through this investigation, we confirmed what we had 
postulated, that the Broken Windows theory speaks to broader psychological and 
sociological states—ones that lend themselves to applications beyond those its initial 
authors had hypothesized. Whether fighting crime in New York, venereal diseases on the 
streets of Louisiana, or pirates off the Gulf of Guinea, Broken Windows’ central 
components appeared to be reasonable lenses for understanding the actions and 
conditions of communities around us. Across this discussion, we identified two 
components in particular, which we have carried throughout this dissertation—
multidimensionality and context specificity. In the subway, in New York City, among 
seminary students and middle schoolers, these two elements played an ongoing role in 
our understanding of disorder. And while debate remains surrounding the particular 
pathways of cause and influence in the criminological literature, of those two elements 
we could be certain. So we closed Chapter Two, acknowledging the ongoing 
conversation within the theory, while underscoring the validity of adopting Broken 
Windows’ central tenets as a foundation for understanding insecurity globally. 
Having addressed the underlying sub-questions raised of our main research 
inquiry, we turned in Chapter Three to the heart of that question. How can the Broken 
Windows theory provide a lens through which to theorize maritime security in the 
littorals? In response, our Caribbean Basin case explored in granular detail the life, 
crimes, and transnational flows of actors across the region in an effort to highlight the 
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two Broken Windows themes in Chapter Two: that context influences action, and that 
such actions are not isolated. Through a look at narcotics trafficking, local violence, 
irregular migration, terrorism, corruption and more, in Chapter Three we repeatedly 
illustrated the utility of this lens. Maritime insecurity across the Basin was shown to be 
heavily multidimensional, with social cues shaping not only crime in the Caribbean, but 
the recommendations for enforcement models as well. Local murders interplay with the 
transnational flow of drugs. Crimes committed within a community compound to create a 
chain of criminality extending across continents. People moving irregularly in search of 
better lives obscure deeper illicit trafficking flows. The transnational distribution of 
money throughout the Caribbean lubricates crime while corroding faith in political 
institutions. Terrorists are allegedly granted access to fundraising and resources through 
infrastructure established by criminal organizations. Local contexts—crime, poverty, 
corruption—contribute to how Caribbean authorities conceptualize security, while 
multidimensional actors frustrate enforcement efforts centered on interdiction or single 
threats. 
The relevance of this Broken Windows approach was reinforced by our 
exploration of local perspectives on transnational crimes, which illustrated that academics 
in the Basin have long viewed security as multidimensional. We even saw that Caribbean 
law enforcement has already embraced community policing’s precepts in region-wide 
trainings and seminars, validating further the feasibility of appropriating the Broken 
Windows theory as a lens for framing maritime crime. Perception permeated this 
conversation, providing a new lexicon for discussing littoral security and allowing us to 
identify subtle themes across the literature. In so doing, we presented the environment as 
a domain in and of itself, a contested space of ideas, behaviors, and physical signals that 
inform the actions of those living within the Basin. Consequently, Chapter Three served 
as proof of concept for the exportation of Broken Windows’ primary lenses to the 
maritime space. 
Can the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social 
disorganization, provide the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the 
littorals? Up to the end of Chapter Three, we had explained what the theory was, why it 
mattered, and that it did, in fact, provide an interesting perspective through which to 
evaluate maritime security in the Caribbean Basin. What remained was the capacity to 
generalize this applicability, to demonstrate that the theory applied in more than one 
(albeit robust) case study. So we entered into the first of our two illustrative case 
studies—Chapter Four, the Gulf of Guinea. In this study, we leveraged the extensive 
relationships and vocabulary established in the Caribbean Basin to identify 
commonalities between the two regions. By illustrating the similarities between the 
Caribbean and West African trade in narcotics, as well as the myriad quality-of-life 
crimes endemic to both regions, we underscored the most similar nature of the cross case 
comparison. Throughout this demonstration of the analogous nature of Caribbean and 
West African maritime insecurity, we noted the value (and relative ease) of applying 
Broken Windows’ lens in a new region. 
Yet, this was only half of the effort. In the second portion of Chapter Four, we 
identified one variant subcomponent of maritime disorder between the two cases—the 
heavy presence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Our intention was to demonstrate that 
this new issue, unaddressed in the Caribbean case upon which the first half of Chapter 
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Four so heavily rested, can also be analyzed through the lens provided by the Broken 
Windows theory. By doing so, we added additional support to the generalizability of our 
Broken Windows lens by moving beyond the strict reliance on the groundwork laid out in 
our primary (Caribbean) case. As we noted at the start of this dissertation—by illustrating 
that piracy can be integrated into the same narrative on maritime crime’s 
multidimensional and environmental nature, we demonstrate that a Broken Windows lens 
is capable of adapting to new issues and locales, and thus is not unique in its application 
to the Caribbean. 
Finally, to solidify our argument for generalizability, we turned in our second 
illustrative case study, Chapter Five (the Straits of Malacca and Singapore), to present a 
deviant case from those prior. Unlike the preceding cases, Chapter Five’s core actors 
revolved around only three littoral states—two of which maintained capacity for at least 
moderate maritime operations. Moreover, around the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 
piracy (the variant subcomponent of Chapter Four) was an issue of relatively 
longstanding study and state action. Moreover, in this region, the flagship issue of 
maritime security, piracy, was even successfully suppressed for a time. Notwithstanding 
so much attention and investment, we demonstrated in Chapter Five that piracy in 
Southeast Asia lent itself to an analysis through a Broken Windows lens. The evolution 
of the literature on the region, which has begun to echo the multidimensional and 
environmental themes discussed here, was further evidence that theorizing a wider 
conception of maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was both 
possible and necessary. Our Gulf of Guinea case offered justification for the inclusion of 
another threat type (piracy) into the framework we established in Chapter Three. Our 
final body chapter built on that incorporation. In it, we demonstrated further that, even in 
a region long accustomed to discussing and responding to piracy, a Broken Windows lens 
provided a new and interesting perspective. 
 
3.0 Findings and Consequences 
 
This research speaks most directly to two distinct audiences. First, the 
multidisciplinary nature of this dissertation serves a bridging role for a variety of streams 
of literature—from security studies, to naval research, to criminology. While it is 
impossible to address sufficiently every debate upon which this research touches, we 
endeavored throughout to highlight linkages across disciplines (see Chapter Two in 
particular). Second, it has clear overtones for naval strategists and policymakers. As 
discussed at length in Chapter One, littoral security will likely play a dominant role in the 
21st century, regardless of policymakers’ disinterest in the grey spaces of order 
maintenance. For both audiences, this research fills a void in the emerging field of 
Maritime Security, which is noticeably absent of strategic frameworks. Hopefully, such a 
framework (as well as the unique research model used in its development) will prove 
useful for both communities, academics and policymakers alike. To help in that process, 
it would be instructive to identify some of the most significant conclusions this research 
has for each audience. 
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3.1 Multidisciplinary Researchers 
 
Briefly, it is instructive to reiterate many of the debates upon which this research 
touched, and hopefully informs. To begin, this dissertation helped bring the study of 
maritime security into greater contact with an expanding literature on transnational 
threats. Chapter Five served as an archetypical example of the evolving role transnational 
issues play in the way we understand maritime insecurity. There, we detailed how a focus 
on piracy in Southeast Asia merged after 9/11 with an interest in terrorism, and 
eventually a wide variety of non-state threats, yielding over time a multidimensional 
understanding of the complex world of illicit international flows. Since September 11, 
there has been a concerted effort by some to bring the transnational world into greater 
relief (see, in particular, Naím or Thachuk). And yet, this body of work often remains 
isolated from wider security studies literature, particularly maritime security, which is 
itself already an outlier for many security studies programs. The point, made in practice 
throughout this dissertation, however, is that any one portion of security or maritime 
research is incomplete without an accompanying transnational component. It is among 
our greatest hopes that this research helps facilitate an awakening of transnational 
maritime considerations in the academic and strategic consciousness. 
Of course, any consideration of non-state threats leads implicitly towards a 
conversation on the role of navies in peacetime, a theme found throughout this 
dissertation and yet another ongoing debate in policy and academic circles. Beginning in 
Chapter One, we identified the very concept of peacetime versus wartime operations to 
be an outdated way of understanding non-state conflict. From the ‘savage wars of peace’ 
to the demands of stability and development operations, we underscored at the outset that 
the conventional paradigm of war and peace loses some relevance in a transnational 
framework. Significantly, we noted that even the United States maritime services have 
begun to express an understanding of this evolution in their 2007 capstone document 
(CS21). In the context of maritime security, the maritime services hint in CS21 at a drift 
away from the war and peace dichotomy towards an appreciation of order maintenance 
and conflict prevention. Still, as we concluded, the Navy has yet to metaphorically ‘put 
its money where its mouth is’ when tackling maritime security—with respect to both 
monetary and intellectual investments. The debate over ambiguous security postures 
(peace or war) continued to surface across this dissertation. In Chapter Two, we 
connected the role of police in keeping the peace (itself a contentious debate) to the 
evolving conception of a less binary perspective on war and peace. In our empirical 
chapters we also touched on themes—such as urbicide and the conflicting demands of 
using military equipment and personnel to counter criminal actors—with obvious 
implications for the debate on peacetime military operations.* For nearly two decades the 
United States and the world have struggled to understand how a seemingly endless war 
on terrorism fits—legally, ethically, and strategically—into a world order built around a 
black and white understanding of conflict. This dissertation does not resolve that debate, 
but it is clearly contoured by it. 
Finally, in a narrower maritime lens, the Navy’s peacetime responsibilities are 
equally relevant for an area in which there should be significantly more debate—what 
                                                
* Chapter Five in particular spoke directly to the role of peacetime humanitarian assistance in fixing literal 
broken windows. 
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does good order at sea mean, strategically? Till, as noted in Chapter Two, regards the 
phrase ‘Maritime Security’ largely as a rebranding of the more conventional ‘good order 
at sea.’ Yet, no matter the language we use, it remains clear that promoting good order is 
a particularly sparse arena of strategic debate in the naval world. It makes sense that a 
theory of order maintenance (i.e. the Broken Windows theory) would provide a 
foundation upon which to lend greater conceptual depth to such a longstanding but poorly 
framed notion as maritime good order. In that guise, this dissertation serves as a potential 
launching point for further theoretical work on good order at sea. Perhaps in so doing, we 
can even come to a better understanding about just how ‘good order at sea’ and 
‘Maritime Security’ actually relate to one another. 
 
3.2 Naval Strategists 
 
Understanding, now, how the Broken Windows theory helps navies think about 
littoral spaces and the insecurities that inhabit them—what does this mean for U.S. 
strategy in practice? To answer that question, we need to revisit the fundamentals of 
Broken Windows as expressed in Chapter Two. Community policing is, by nature, a 
problem-oriented approach. Its central tenets are, therefore, not as overtly prescriptive as 
perhaps Mahan’s conclusion to control sea and trade. Instead, in every city, in every 
precinct, even on every block, Broken Windows arms police with the means to identify 
problems in conjunction with community-members and understand how enforcement 
decisions shape communal self-efficacy. Thus, we have avoided making too many 
specific operational recommendations. Still, while the findings we reach here are not as 
prescriptive as other strategic frameworks may be, they are nevertheless consequential for 
how the U.S. Navy should perceive its role operating in crowded littorals. Some practical 
strategic guidance is detailed below. 
First, navies need to understand and adapt to the dichotomous demands of military 
objectives on one hand, and law enforcement (or peacetime) objectives on the other. 
While pursuing the latter may require military technical capabilities, given the advancing 
sophistication of non-state threats, these two objectives require patently different ways of 
interacting with communities (think of the consequences of the Tivoli Garden raid in 
Jamaica, for example). The U.S. Navy should continue to invest in diverging strategies to 
meet these divergent objectives, embracing the groundwork laid by A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’s (CS21) hint towards two complementary but 
distinct spheres of strategy. 
Second, the U.S. Navy cooperates extensively with local authorities across the world. 
A Broken Windows inspired approach would require, however, that policymakers place 
local partners at the focal point of littoral strategies. Just as police, in community oriented 
models, let neighborhoods help set the enforcement agenda to meet their fears and 
concerns, so too does a navy operating in littoral spaces need to be seen as working in 
line with local social objectives. In many cases, those local (and national) objectives vary 
significantly from American strategic considerations. Consider, for example, the 
diverging security priorities even of the three littoral states in the Straits of Malacca case, 
detailed in Chapter Five. This should consequently inform the third consideration—
remember multidimensionality. 
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Even if communities or nations have different first order concerns than those of the 
United States Navy, the multidimensional nature of littoral crime sketched throughout 
this dissertation reinforces the notion that nothing is in fact isolated. Combatting illegal 
fishing may precipitate declines in piracy, or combatting human trafficking may reduce 
the spread of public health concerns. The point for the U.S. Navy is that focusing on 
placing local communities in the driver’s seat and building communal self-efficacy—no 
matter the individual points of concern—helps breed greater stability across a spectrum 
of issues. In other words, navies and coast guards should emphasize the positive 
mobilization of maritime communities in pursuit of their own security. Partnership is not 
zero-sum, and pursuing a local agenda helps ensure long-term buy-in from local 
authorities and the people they will rely on to help keep communities safe. 
Finally, do not neglect context and perceptions. Missions on the softer end of the 
operational spectrum “are not ancillary to the broader strategic landscape, but pivotal in 
its construction.”4 Unlike in blue waters, in the littorals the Navy will routinely find itself 
operating with and around maritime communities. Without a clear understanding of how 
enforcement at the communal level shapes broader disorder, the Navy (and Coast Guard) 
will inevitably fail to achieve long-term strategic success. In planning deployments in the 
littorals, the Navy should prioritize understanding, and positively impacting, local 
perceptions. This is, ultimately, at the root of any community policing objective—the 
endeavor to help communities feel as if they have a stake in their neighborhoods. That 
objective is as consequential to maritime security as it is to urban crime control. 
As Chris Trelawny, a Royal Navy reservist and IMO staffer, writes, “there does 
seem to be an almost existential crisis around the question of what navies are for. 
Politically, there does not seem to be much evidence of grand strategic thought and 
planning—many states are hampered by governance ‘by accountant.’”5 And while, as we 
saw in Chapter One, “the need for navies to maintain the deterrent capability of their 
high-end war-fighting skills remains critical” in the eyes of Western (predominantly 
American) strategists,6 the first half of the 21st century presents a threat forecast replete 
with hybrid threats that do not conform to convention. As we have explored, there is a 
growing body of work that underscores that navies would be well served to help states in 
troubled regions develop constabulary, “coastguard functions” to address the disorder of 
that emerging dynamic.7 This dissertation is a manifestation of that sentiment, taking 
conclusions such as Trelawny’s—and those of Kilcullen and Nagl, who reference 
explicitly an ideological and strategic exchange with law enforcement—to a logical 
extension. The tides are shifting, and the littorals are re-emerging. Conceptualizing 
muddy waters, and the opaque world of crime and war they harbor, is paramount. 
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Appendix A 
 
Captain Mark Morris, US Navy (Ret) 
Interview in Falls Church, VA, 10 AM on January 22, 2015 
 
United States Coast Guard 
Presently Vice Admiral, USCG Vice Commandant 
Formerly, Deputy Commandant for Operations, 
Director of Joint Interagency Task Force—South 
[End of informal discussion excluded] 
Josh: But if I can just start because your, I guess your last posting was as Chief of the Naval 
Mission in Bogota? 
Morris: From 2006 to 2010 I was Chief of the U.S. Naval Mission in Bogota, Colombia. That’s 
the security assistant side. Within our embassies we typically have the attachés who do their 
attaché job, and then we have the security assistance folks which advise host nation militaries, 
divide funding for things, and in Colombia of course it’s one of our largest in the world, certainly 
the largest in the Western hemisphere. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: But so my job was administering the various types of funding support, the Colombian 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, advising them, channeling all of our support whether it’s 
things like improving their radars, using our security assistance money to buy weapons, 
ammunition. Whatever they needed, as long as it’s within our law and wasn’t prohibited by 
Congress we would provide, but our goal was, you know, improve their counter-narcotics. 
Josh: Okay, so would you say counter-narcotics was the preeminent focus for the naval mission 
there? Is that… 
Morris: Oh yes. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: The whole U.S. Embassy, the number one focus was counter-narcotics. The number two 
focus was helping the Colombians with their insurgency. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: The Colombians had that reversed. 
Josh: Right. 
Morris: Their number one focus was counterinsurgency and then counter-narcotics. 
Josh: Okay, and I’ll come back to that stuff because I find those conflicting interests interesting, 
and also obviously overlap between, you know, the insurgency and narcotics in and of itself. But 
before we get to that, I’m just interested also in the structure of the relationship that you had as 
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the Chief of Mission with working with JIATF-South and SOUTHCOM. What was sort of like 
the structure of the relationship there? 
Morris: Okay, the U.S. military group was headed by an Army Colonel, and under him was the 
Naval Mission, the Air Mission. So my boss was the Army Colonel there in Bogota. His, he 
directly reported to Commander of U.S. Southern Command. So his boss was, my evaluation 
was written by the Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: So, what we did was, our relation with JIATF-South was quite good, and we, a lot of 
times, facilitated information flow between JIATF-South and the Colombian Navy. Although 
they had a liaison officer in Key West. So, it was a flow of both ways of information. Also, when 
JIATF-South visited I was his host, or any of his people visited I hosted them, made 
arrangements for all their travel within Colombia, the meetings and things like that. Of course 
the other components are, JIATF-South is just one component of Southern Command. There’s 
also Naval Forces South, Marine Corps Forces South, which for me were supporting the U.S. 
effort. They’re the ones when I needed Navy people, Navy support, I talked to NAVSO, when I 
needed Marine Corps support I talked to MarFor. The way I got Coast Guard support was talking 
either District 7 or 11, which they’re the ones that own the forces.  
Josh: Okay so you don’t go through JIATF-South for that. 
Morris: I would go through JIATF-South too because it was always a Coast Guard guy even 
though it’s not a Coast Guard command. But also I had good relations with the Director of 
International Affairs at Coast Guard Headquarters. So, I tried to keep as many people in the loop 
as possible what we were doing, you know, hey here’s the effort, and you know what I needed, 
what support I needed whether it was a training team, whether it was... Let me give you an 
example. Colombia, like Mexico, is changing over their law legal system from the traditional 
Hispanic accusatorial system to more of a common law adversarial system, and, which 
empowers the judges more, so the judges have a say now in which evidence is accepted, which 
evidence is not accepted, and under common law, there has to be a chain of custody, I guess 
there didn’t have to be a chain of custody before. So the Colombians had a, the Colombian Navy 
had several cases thrown out when their Coast Guard officers did not have proper chain of 
custody under the new system so they came to me and said, how to do it. So I brought in Coast 
Guard Training teams as well as DEA people to help train the Colombian Navy in terms of, hey 
how do you do this thing called “chain of custody.” 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: The other thing is that SOUTHCOM, the money appropriated by Congress to help the 
Colombians came in a couple of different forms. If it was the foreign military financing, the State 
Department money, even though we administered it, we still had to get a buy in from 
SOUTHCOM. 
Josh: We as in the Navy Mission or as in the Embassy? 
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Morris: Well, okay all of it. I mean when you think about it, the Naval Mission, I had to give 
approval, but them someone within the Embassy, the Ambassador had to approve it. If it didn’t 
get approved by the Ambassador, it didn’t go. 
Josh: It didn’t go. 
Morris: So then someone at SOUTHCOM would have to approve it and then finally, since it is 
State Department money, someone at the State Department would have to approve it. So, there 
was other money, counter drug money, that I didn’t have to get anyone else’s approval for. I just 
say okay, I want to buy this, this and this. Now, at the end of the day the Ambassador would say 
yes or no. There’s other type of money, like where we had to approve Colombian facilities, 
engineering money. It was U.S. money, it didn’t have to go through SOUTHCOM, but there was 
someone else in the embassy, head of the Narcotics Affairs section, for some reason there had 
been some memorandum of understanding that the head of Narcotics Affairs section would 
approve spending for that. 
Josh: And that person is State, or? 
Morris: State Department. 
Josh: Okay, from like INL? 
Morris: Yes, they report to INL. They might not necessarily be from INL, they may have been 
from another thing but they have detailed work for INL in Colombia.  
Josh: Did you find that, was that system complicated in a good way or was it so overcomplicated 
that it could take so long to get funding or programs approved that by the time they were 
executed, they were a little past their due date? That’s kind of a leading question, but it just 
sounds like a very complicated system. 
Morris: It is a very complicated system. It dates to the Cold War. The idea was we wanted to be 
slow in providing assistance so that there’s no rapid change in the balance of power in the region. 
In fact, one of the things when you do either an arms sale or a foreign military financing, which 
is our money, you had to comment in the cable that was written, typically the mil group 
originated it but then it had to go throughout the rest of the Embassy. You had to have a 
paragraph that commented on the effect on regional stability. So you know, if all of a sudden 
you’ve sold a hundred tanks to someone whose neighbors has no tanks and there’s no threat to 
this country, why would they need tanks, what’s the reason? It’s not internal defense, it’s 
aggression. 
Josh: It’s aggression. 
Morris: But the idea was, and there’s other things too, for example if you wanted to have like a 
high tech item and it had to go through a different process, it was difficult. I’ll give you an 
example. Before I arrived there, Congress did an earmark and I believe it was in the FY04 
budget, that said that this money, specific money of FMF was being set aside so that the 
Colombian air force could have a Medevac system. And by the time I left in 2010, we’re still 
negotiating over what we want. We’ve got some aircraft in country, some Bell Helicopters but 
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they also want Blackhawks and then they want Grand Caravans, air ambulances, and there’s a 
piece of some type of rare metal in a Grand Caravan that requires someone else. Oh it’s crazy 
trying to get through the approval process. So the approval process is slow and even Secretary 
Gates said he wanted to streamline it, Secretary Hagel, Panetta, all said hey, we want to 
streamline this system, but [unclear]... 
Josh: Okay. So it’s hard to extract it from that. And it sounds that you had a good working 
relationship, obviously with the Coast Guard. It also sounds like a lot of your responsibilities 
overlap a little bit more with the Coast Guard’s, not just jurisdiction but interest a little bit more 
than the DOD and the Navy interest. I guess what I’m asking is how does the Navy characterize 
the maritime issue in the Caribbean? Because my impression is that that characterization, or the 
interest level, is substantially different than that of the Coast Guard, because they’re different 
organizations, their objectives are different. Did you feel like that was the case? Either that there 
wasn’t the level of interest or? 
Morris: I certainly can’t comment on how the whole Navy thinks. Let me give you this 
observation. When I arrived in Colombia, I had great support from the Coast Guard. I had very 
little support from U.S. Naval Forces South. 
Josh: Financial support or just overall? 
Morris: Just overall support. They had no financial interest in me at all, so they held none of my 
money. My money, was either I held and spent or SOUTHCOM held it and we spent it and said 
hey, here’s where it’s going to go. But getting things like training teams down from the Navy, 
you know getting NAVSO to buy off on that was often difficult. When Admiral Stavridis came 
in, he said Colombia’s the number one priority. And even then I had trouble with NAVSO 
agreeing with it, they said we don’t agree with that. Then when Admiral Kernan became both the 
Commander of Naval Forces South and the new Fourth Fleet, that all changed. I got great 
support from them in terms of training teams, in terms of things like intelligence, bringing 
intelligence training teams down to help train Colombian Naval Intelligence, things like that. 
That sort of waned once Admiral Kernan left. So the Navy’s focus in the Caribbean has not 
necessarily been… but let me say the working relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard’s 
great. The Navy controls frigates, they have Coast Guard boarding teams on it. We have 
agreements, bilateral agreements that a lot of the Caribbean basin nations. So not only can U.S. 
Coast Guard boarding teams ride our ships, other nation’s boarding teams can ride our ships too. 
So the relationship, I didn’t get as much support. Now there were a couple other parts of the 
Navy that I got great support from. Colombia has two Diesel-Electric Submarines. There’s a 
program where we bring the Latin American Diesel-Electric Submarines up to the United States 
to exercise with our battle groups because we don’t have any Diesel-Electric Submarines and all 
of our potential enemies do. So a nuclear sub can’t act as a, you can pretend but you can’t act so 
we would get the South American nations to send their submarines. We had more support from 
the Colombians so I would get lots of ports from the Submarine Force when they said, okay the 
Colombians need a visit, they need this and that, I got it. The other one was, the Office of Naval 
Research has a global outreach program. They finally realized the gringos don’t necessarily have 
all the greatest ideas in the world. There’s a lot of ideas coming out of a lot of places, so there’s 
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actually an ONR office in Santiago, in the Embassy in Santiago, and I get visits from those guys 
2-3 times a year coming to talk to the Colombian Navy, their R&D folks, their shipyard, things 
like that to exchange ideas. 
Josh: Less on the maritime security front and more on your classic naval issues… 
Morris: But, when I needed a Coast Guard guy, I got it. 
Josh: Right. 
Morris: No matter what. The epicenter of the drug trade is Buenaventura, Colombia. My whole 
four and a half years there I never had a U.S. Navy admiral visit Buenaventura. Lots would go to 
Cartagena but never to Buenaventura. And as far as the Colombians remembered, they can never 
ever remember a U.S. Navy admiral visiting Buenaventura. Coast Guard guys, four or five visits 
to Buenaventura, Coast Guard Admirals, easily they would, yes let’s go, let’s go. And there’s a 
lot of times when training teams would want to come down and we’d want to do a meeting with 
the Colombians, we want to use Cartagena and I sort of realized it’s just military tourism. Well 
you know, 10 years ago Cartagena would be a great place to hold that meeting but now 
everything shifted to the Pacific. I want you to hold the meeting, the training in Buenaventura, 
and about a week later it’s like, ah we don’t want to go there. 
Josh: And so, I mean I guess what that subtly gets to is that, obviously the Navy has different 
interests in, let’s just say different perspectives on what it considers most significant, what it 
considers its responsibility and what the Coast Guard considers its responsibility. As a Naval 
Officer yourself… 
Morris: Well, let me back up, let me explain something. One of the reasons that, and one of the 
guys at JIATF-South explained this to me, one of the directors of JIATF-South I don’t recall 
which one, was saying post-Cold War, assets were not a problem. They could send ships and 
aircraft, both Navy and Coast Guard out on pure patrol and it wasn’t a problem, and they in fact 
they ignored a lot of the bilateral working arrangements, a lot of working with other countries. 
Josh: Because they didn’t have to. 
Morris: They didn’t have to, they didn’t have to. And so as the fleet draws down post-Cold War 
and assets become more and more rare and the ability to do pure patrol disappears, you’ve got to 
launch aircraft only on missions that are verified intelligence, or sending ships out to patrol 
known drug lanes rather than just patrol in general. And so one of the things the Navy did do was 
really good at help building bilateral relations, especially with Colombia. So while maybe I 
didn’t receive as much support from NAVSO as I wanted to, I got great support out of 
Washington, especially the CNO’s office, and so got lots of visits from the CNO. 
Josh: Because it sounds like there was an appreciation for the role that Colombia should play, 
which you centered in, and less of an appreciation of how hard assets can be detailed there I 
guess because they felt that they were needed elsewhere at this point. 
Morris: Yeah. 
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Josh: You know the fleet is shrinking and the Caribbean just isn’t a priority in that regard. Okay, 
and this goes more I guess towards your education and experience as a Navy officer, and as a 
captain in the US Navy, did you feel like, or how did those experiences, your coming up and 
educating as a US Navy officer prepare you for a lot more of the unconventional components of 
security in the Caribbean, your dealing in your position with counter-narcotics, and you were 
saying before [before start of recording] the issue with wildlife traffic. And I can’t imagine that 
features prominently in something, the courses that you take. 
Morris: No none of it. In fact, going to Colombia was an eye opening experience. I’ll give you, 
this is a true story that when I arrived in Colombia, there were still a lot of go-fast boats leaving 
the Caribbean coast not far from Cartagena. We had started pushing them out from Cartagena 
towards the Guajira and [Uraba] but there were still quite a few, they were being stopped and 
captured by either US Navy with Coast Guard boarding teams, US Coast Guard, Colombians. 
And at the time, they weren’t smart enough to throw their Sat phones and GPS’s overboard, so 
we were capturing the GPS. Well I realized, if you captured the GPS, you know where they left 
the coast. So I made a comment to the head of DEA in Cartagena one day, says okay I’m going 
to get the Colombian Marines to do a landing right where they left the beach and we’ll find the 
caleta, the big cash of cocaine. And he goes no, I mean I thought I was giving him a heart attack, 
he says no, no, no, no, no. I said, why not? He says, because we’ve given the Colombians 
landing craft, we’ve trained their Marines, they have either the second or third largest Marine 
Corps in the world depending on how you count the numbers, it’s either the South Koreans or the 
Colombians are number two or three. They’ve adopted a whole bunch of US Marine Corp 
programs whole cloth, so they are amazing marines. One of the classes we do ongoing is called 
lasso landing attack and subsequent operations, mainly for a riverine force but it also applies for 
amphibians, so they had landing craft, they had all this stuff so we could send the Marines 
ashore. So the idea of doing that, and the DEA guy said, look if you ask the Colombians to do it, 
they’ll do it, but please don’t. I’m like, well, why not? Don’t we want to capture the cocaine, and 
the DEA guy goes, no we don’t want to capture the cocaine. I’m like, hold it, I thought you guys 
were the Drug Enforcement Agency. He says, we want to capture the people, and we don’t really 
care about the guys who load the boat or guard the caleta, because they’re nobodies. They’re 
replaceable. What we want is we want the head of the DTO, the Drug Trafficking Organization, 
and we want the guy who keeps the books, which is either his brother or first cousin. And so they 
told me a story, they said in the early 2000s, a small boat near Cartagena was captured with like 
120 kilos. Which is nothing in Colombia, doesn’t even make the news in Colombia. In New 
York City, 2 kilos makes the front page news, Los Angeles, but in Colombia 100 or 120 kilos, 
because the average go-fast carries between 1000 and 2000 kilos. The fishing boats, when they 
were using fishing boats could carry between 6 and 10 thousand kilos. The semi-submersibles 
carry between 4 and 8 thousand kilos. So 120 kilos in Colombia is not much. He said, what we 
did is, we got a conviction on the guy in the boat, and we started talking to him, he told us what 
he knew. So we arrested this guy, who did he talk to?  And over a patience of like 7 years, they 
built up this case and they finally took down the head of the Drug Trafficking Organization and 
seized $200 million of property in South Florida and $200 million of property in Colombia. He 
said, if you send the Marines ashore, they’ll destroy evidence. He says, we’re not about arresting 
the little guys, we’re about collecting evidence to take down the head of the organization and 
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seize all his assets. That’s how we hurt them. So if you think about that, the military method is 
sending the marines. You know, capture the whatever. 
Josh: Take the beachhead. 
Morris: Take the beachhead. And had I asked the Colombians to do it, they would have done it. 
They would have figured out a way to do it because they would’ve seen that as, hey they’ve 
given us all this money, they’ve given us landing craft, they’ve done all this stuff, they want us 
to use them now, they would’ve done it. They would’ve certainly captured a hole in the ground 
with a whole bunch of cocaine, they probably would’ve captured one or two guys and some 
AK47s and that’s it, they would’ve destroyed all the evidence. So if you think about it, that’s a 
whole different attitude from a military guy, which is you know, kill, seek out and destroy and 
kill the enemy. It’s capture evidence. Use that evidence to go higher and higher and higher up 
their chain of command, so there’s really nothing that I could have done that could’ve trained me 
for that. I never did an exchange tour with the Coast Guard, I’ve done a lot of work with the 
Coast Guard before that, but never, you know anything like that, so it’s just a whole different 
attitude than the military ones. So I was not very well prepared. The thing that I knew is, also an 
economics background, so I’m like okay, when you seize $200 worth of property in South 
Florida and $200 million in Colombia, that hurts. That makes sense, that’s taking the profit out 
of them. 
Josh: Alright, we were talking before about sort of the structure of the Colombian Navy, how 
they don’t have a distinct Coast Guard but it’s one of the multiple elements of the Colombian 
Navy. This is kind of a two-part question, I guess the first part is, in character or in strategic 
perspective, does the Colombian Navy operate in a different way than the US Navy? And I 
assume the answer, obviously the US Navy is global in perspective and so global in strategy. 
Would you characterize the Colombian Navy, which includes that Coast Guard Component, 
more in terms of I guess constabulary nature, that they’re far more interested with maybe even 
law enforcement in a way that more resembles the US Coast Guard or do they have more of that 
I guess conceptualization of the world that’s similar to the US Navy? 
Morris: That’s a very good question and it requires a two-part answer. It’s one of those, do you 
speak Spanish? 
Josh: Not a lot. 
Morris: In Colombia there’s a lot of questions answered si pero no, yes but no. Or si como no, 
yes however no. They do perceive external threats. They have an ongoing maritime dispute with 
Nicaragua and it has to do with the islands in the Caribbean that the Colombians have and then 
the treaty that drew the line that the Nicaraguans have been challenging in more recent court 
decision, international court decision that said, well no we’re going to give some of those waters 
to Nicaraguans. They also perceive that Venezuela is a threat. A lot of times privately the 
Colombian admirals would say their worst case scenario is a worsening economic situation in 
Venezuela, would become much like Argentina in 1982 where the Argentinians, bad economics, 
things that need an external enemy to turn away from the internal problems so they invade the 
Falklands. So in the Colombian mind, they do worry about Venezuelan… So their attitude is 
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they need frigates and submarines as a deterrence, as a deterrence. They also, and the 
Colombians have written about this for decades, about responsibility in world affairs. They had a 
war with Peru in the ‘30s down in the Amazon and they submitted to international arbitration and 
said we’ll accept whatever. They felt so strongly about being part of the UN when the UN called 
for troops to go to Korea, the Colombians sent a battalion of troops in 3 ships to fight in Korea. 
When, if you remember the Suez Crisis of 1956 after the Israelis, the British and French invade 
the Suez, which had been nationalized by Nasser, Colombia, one of the Scandinavian countries 
and an Asian country sent peacekeepers. Then when the Camp David Accords come along, 
having needing someone who had troops with experience in the Sinai, the Colombians are still 
part of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force. So the Colombians have this attitude that as a member of 
the world community, there’s a responsibility, so they realize we need to have a certain amount 
of forces to help them. So they do see that, hey there’s this problem. They made a commitment 
to one of our CNO’s that they want to work towards deploying one of their frigates with one of 
our battle groups of some type.  
Josh: Outside the fourth fleet or? 
Morris: Yeah outside the fourth fleet, yeah. So they’re our best friend, they want to participate in 
stuff with us. They would express that they want to be up to NATO standards. They would even 
say, you know, maybe NATO membership is not out of the realm of possibility, they actually 
have observer status at NATO now. So that’s it. On the other hand, the problem in Colombia’s so 
bad that the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard is a big constabulary force. For 
example, while the Colombian police, national police, have jurisdiction over all the land, the 
Colombian Navy has jurisdiction over all the navigable waters and 500 meters on either side. 
Josh: Oh wow. 
Morris: And they get to say what’s navigable. At one point the police came to me and said they 
wanted to buy some boats so that they could patrol the non-navigable rivers and the Navy came 
to me and said… 
Josh: There are none? 
Morris: No, no. At the time there was 18,000 kilometers of rivers, and all the briefings would say 
12,000 kilometers navigable so the army said, well we’re responsible for the other 6,000. And 
over the next few months, all the briefings changed. Colombia has 18,000 kilometers of 
navigable rivers, because the Colombian Navy looked at the law and the Navy gets to define 
what’s navigable, not the police. So, so yeah. There’s also a land jurisdiction on the Pacific Coast 
in 20 kilometers and the department, the northern parts of three departments around Cartagena, is 
the Navy’s responsibility for security. So you see marine’s patrolling the streets with the national 
police and in some places there’s only marines patrolling the streets. So, yes they do see this 
responsibility to protect Colombian sovereignty, they do perceive that there’s outside threats. 
They do think that some of the internal actors are talking to some of the external actors, so that 
weighs heavily on their mind. But there’s also this, you know, hey what is out part in this 
internal war? And it’s the rivers, the Pacific Coast and the area around Cartagena. And there’s 
another area that they’re responsibly for, it’s called the [Montes de Morenas], it’s south of 
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Cartagena and it is some of the richest agricultural land in the world. You drive through it, you 
think you’re in Kentucky, Tennessee, the Shenandoah Valley type of Virginia, these giant farms 
or ranches and so it’s just this huge rich agricultural land. It was never a drug producing area, but 
it was areas to get from the interior where the drugs are produced out to the coast so the FARC 
moved in, started extorting farmers so Uribe, President Uribe sends in a marine rifle brigade to 
pacify the area and kill the FARC, and they did. And so, we kept asking to withdraw their 
brigade, turn them into a riverine brigade, President Uribe kept saying no. So they do see the big 
national security picture, but they also see this internal threat that they’re responsible for a great 
deal of. 
Josh: Okay. Well that kind of leads into, and we were talking about this before, before I turned 
on the mic, but this sort of, not conflicting but maybe competing interests between US maritime 
forces and the Colombian forces, which you were saying that in the United States the narcotics 
issue is sort of perceived as number one and the Colombian insurgency issue is perceived as 
number two, whereas in Colombia that’s flipped. Maybe if you would just talk a little bit more 
about how, if at all, that impacted your relationship with the Colombian officials, particularly 
your relationship with the Navy that, did you feel like you were working at cross purposes ever 
because you had those mildly conflicting priorities or was it just something managed because 
both of them got attended to? 
Morris: The Colombian Navy saw the relationship between the insurgency and the drugs, so they 
felt their role was to stamp out the drugs as much as possible as a way to choke the insurgency’s 
funding. I ended up writing a paper, a point paper in circulating around the ministry defense and 
them trying to get the Colombians to build up their Navy as a way of the defeating the FARC, 
using some examples of the US submarine force attacking Japan but the main example was the 
North versus the South during the American Civil War. The South was agriculture society based 
on an export of one particular product trying to fund their war effort. The FARC is growing one 
particular product, although they make money from extortion and kidnapping, the vast majority 
of the money… 
Josh: They were really only exporting one major product. 
Morris: …is cocaine, to some extent heroin, but heroin and cocaine. And so you build up the 
Navy, you choke off their trade and they go out of business. The Navy always bought into that. 
Josh: The Colombian Navy. 
Morris: The Colombian Navy. Of course the army didn’t, because the Colombian Army in the 
last, you know hundred years or so that there’s been a Colombian commando general the joint 
command and everything and a commando general, their equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs with one exception like five years ago for one year, it’s always been army, was a Navy 
guy for one year and the army hated that. And the army is dominant and the national police are 
dominant, so they on average get 45 percent each of the budget, and it’s a struggle each year. 
One is going to get 46 and one 44 and then the Navy and the Air Force share the remainder of 
the defense budget which is… 
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Josh: Wow. Pretty minimal. 
Morris: Five or Six percent. So where I think the struggle was not within the quantity because the 
army’s dominant and so, at one point in the late nineties is the FARC is been given the despeje 
the demilitarized zone, they build up their forces to 20,000 uniformed and then somewhere 
between 40 and 60,000 militia. And they basically have a ring around Bogota. They imagined 
themselves riding into Bogota, much as Castro rode into Havana being given keys to the armory, 
all the armories and then they take over. And I think that there was a lot of people here in 
Washington that thought that was going to happen, that the Colombian government was about to 
fail and we were going to end up with a narco-state not only a two-hour flight from Miami. We 
had already approved, and remember it started under President Clinton, in the last years of 
President Clinton this thing called “Plan Colombia.” Plan Colombia was a Colombian idea that 
said hey help us, we need the resources to attack this narcotics fight. And at the time our law and 
our policy prohibited the State Department from helping the Colombian military and the Defense 
Department from helping the Colombian police because the police were fighting narcotics and 
the army was fighting the insurgency. Okay so at some point in ’99, 2000 we see the assessment 
from the joint chiefs is that the government in Colombia is going to fail. So they see all this 
money that we have already approved by Congress and with the approval of Congress, they say 
okay, we’re going to focus on the survival of the Colombian government first. So that meant 
mainly providing the Colombian army with mobility, rotary wing mobility, lots of helicopters, 
both through State Department buying and operating helicopters in Colombia and the US DoD 
using FMS to buy and start shipping down the, both of them have your advantages and 
disadvantages. The disadvantage of the FMS system is it’s slow. The big advantage of the FMS 
system is that we believe in a thing called, gosh I forget the term for that, but basically it’s a 
whole solution. We don’t just give you helicopters. 
Josh: Right. 
Morris: We give you training for pilots, training for mechanics, oh yeah. You gotta buy all the 
special tools you need. You’ve gotta set up all the special shops you need. You’ve gotta train all 
those people so that a year after you have that helicopter, it’s still operating and not a piece of 
junk on the ground because all you did was buy the helicopter. We believe in the whole solution 
and that takes time. I mean if taking and airplane mechanic and turning him into a Black Hawk 
Helicopter mechanic is done but… 
Josh: It’s a complicated process. 
Morris: It takes time. It takes a lot of US people advising them year after, how to maintain 
maintenance records. You know, if you’ve got helicopters that are flying near the coast, how do 
you inspect for corrosion, how do you get the salt off of them. All those sort of things that you 
just don’t think about, but it’s part of the whole package approach. So that’s a slow process. So, 
we also built up what we called mobile brigades within the Colombian Army and riverine 
brigades within the Colombian Marine Corps. They were mobile, not like a US or European 
mobilized brigade, which means motorized, they were mobile in the sense that they were not 
constitutionally tied to a piece of territory like some of their divisions, where their divisions were 
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constitutionally tied to a piece of territory and if there was no problem in that area, that 
department, you couldn’t pick that division up or move it. So we created about twenty mobile 
brigades as well as two or three riverine brigades that could go anywhere in the country. They 
were very, a lot of guys carrying weapons, not too many administrative people, so the logistics 
administrative support came from the regional divisions, but these guys could go anywhere in 
Colombia and fight. Later on while I’m there, the tension is a lot less between the US and the 
Colombians, we just agreed to disagree. And then the Colombians were going to focus on what 
they thought was the biggest threat and then we would try to prod them to do a lot more counter-
narcotics work. So that was working with the police, that was NAS and that was us working with 
the Colombian Navy and we had certain money, earmarked specifically for riverines specifically 
for Coast Guard that couldn’t be touched, that the US army couldn’t pick up and move and say, 
oh we need this for rotor wing stuff. Because if you look at the funding for Plan Colombia, even 
once Uribe is in office for a couple years and there’s no longer a threat to the Colombian 
government, the vast majority of Plan Colombia money went to Colombian Army rotary wing 
aviation. Tens and tens and tens of millions of dollars and the Colombian Army, while they had a 
counter-narcotics brigade, that was not their focus. The Colombian Navy from 2006 to 2010 
went from seizing 68,000 kilos to 98,000 kilos a year and the Colombian National Police was 
always in their, Colombian National Police, Colombian Marines destroying hundreds and 
hundreds of labs a year and while the Colombian Army did that, their numbers are in the 
hundreds of kilos, not in the tens of thousands of kilos. Their number of labs are in the dozens, 
not in the hundreds. 
Josh: What was the priority there? 
Morris: Fighting the FARC. 
Josh: Was it just directly engaging with… 
Morris: Going after the FARC in that area that used to be the demilitarized zone, which is their 
heartland. Pushing them further and further back, establishing civil control in cities and 
departments and municipalities and then keep moving forward, keep moving forward. 
Josh: Okay. This kind of blends right into another… 
Morris: So the tension is that the US Army wants to continue to support and continue to pour 
more and more money into rotary wing aviation and I wanted money to build patrol boats. I 
wanted money, now I didn’t have to worry about the riverine money because that was between 
five and ten million dollars a year to support Colombian riverine, and that money could not be 
touched, no group could not say ‘oh, I want to give that to the air force, I want to give that to the 
army.’ It was… 
Josh: Earmarked for that. 
Morris: Earmarked specifically for the riverine forces. And then occasionally I’d have money for 
some other stuff that was earmarked, but it was all going to the counter-narcotics fight by the 
Colombian Navy. So but, I would say, okay I want to build patrol boats. You guys, and so in a 
book that was a great book about the history of the US military relationship between Colombia 
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and the United States from the beginning up until about 1960, I read that the support for 
Colombian army rotary wing aviation started under Eisenhower. And so I would ask in meetings, 
okay so we’ve got to protect our investment, we’ve got to protect, we’ve got to finish building 
this special shop to do maintenance on these engines, these turbines because we’ve got to protect 
our engines. Okay well how much longer do we protect our investment? Well what do you 
mean? I said, well we have been supporting Colombian army rotary wing aviation since 
Eisenhower, when does it end? 
Josh: When does it stop? 
Morris: When does it stop? And they just look at me and say, what do you mean? We gave them 
24 helicopters, all sorts of stuff in the last few months of the Eisenhower administration, training, 
all sorts of stuff like that. When does it end? Is fifty, you know fifty years is enough? Or do you 
need sixty years? And the army would, they kept pushing back because they kept wanting 
support, they wanted to go from just individual helicopter units to an aviation battalion, to an 
aviation brigade. And they had full buy in from the US army mission to do that. And so, there, I 
think a lot of the internal struggle was within the mil group, within the mil group in trying to 
convince people. In fact, one officer, you know I kept talking to him in one briefing about, and I 
think it was Congressional delegation, about how Plan Colombia was counter-narcotics, and this 
guy pulled me aside and said, hey Lieutenant Colonel, Army Lieutenant Colonel, he said, hey sir 
you just don’t understand. I said, what do you mean? He said, Plan Colombia was never about 
counter-narcotics, it was about supporting Colombian army rotary wing aviation. And he’s right, 
that’s where the money went. Another example, we did a program called Air Bridge Denial. We 
brought in Cessna Citations with radar and communications gear. We built up Colombian air 
force ground based radars so that they could reassert sovereignty over their airspace. And they 
had airborne use of force. They never had to shoot down an aircraft. I think, I think one time they 
had to fire warning shots, but basically anytime they’d encounter an aircraft in their airspace that 
was unregistered or didn’t have a flight plan, they could force it down and arrest the guys. And 
so basically the drug flights disappear from over Colombia, yet, and the best I can, over the 
number of years that program from whenever it started until 2010, we spent probably between 80 
million and a hundred million dollars for that program. And yet, JIATF-South will tell you that 
on average, on average, narcotics flights are only five percent of the traffic. Maybe there’s one or 
two years where it may have gotten up to ten percent, but on average the narcotics trafficking, 
only five percent is done by air, 95 percent is done by sea. And yet there was never a 
corresponding Sea Bridge Denial Program where we poured tens of millions of dollars into coast 
radars and maritime surveillance aircraft and things like that. We didn’t do it. It was, you know, 
support… 
Josh: Because there’s this legacy I guess of that, of this rotary wing investment for some reason. 
Morris: And then so, and then to help the air force out. But also I think part of it was, there was 
this concept within the American public, you’ve got all these drug flights coming into the States. 
You know, there weren’t that many and they don’t care that much. 
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Josh: Right. But for some reason they captured the imagination and that’s what people were 
talking about. I want to bleed in, I’ve just got a couple more questions, I don’t know what your 
time frame is but… 
Morris: I’m supposed to go to lunch over in Fairfax at about 12:30, but let me see… Perfect, yes 
so I have to be over at Fairfax City at 12:30. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: Or thereabouts. 
Josh: I mean I’ve only a couple more, like formal more questions I have written out. So as we’re 
talking about terrorism or insurgency, you know depending on your specific definitions of the 
term, are a big issue in Colombia. But in a lot of the literature that I read, the relationship 
between narcotics trafficking and terrorist financing, or human smuggling and terrorism, the 
relationships between terrorism and a lot of the other illicit trades in the Caribbean and in 
Colombia are spoken about in theoretical terms, but there seems to be very little hard evidence or 
forensic evidence that’s put forward in a lot of the literature about the relationship between 
terrorism and broader illicit trades. And I was wondering if maybe you could speak broadly to 
what sort of direct relationship, of course the FARC is obviously known to be funded through 
narcotics trafficking, but of any other or more diverse relationships between terrorism and illicit 
trafficking or human trafficking, or you know things of that nature in the Caribbean? 
Morris: Well certainly the FARC and the ELN are involved in cocaine trafficking, and then the 
terrorism, I was, right after I arrived in Bogota was about four blocks away from a hundred kilo 
car bomb that targeted their National War College and then there were a lot of smaller bombs in 
Bogota throughout my time there. Typically, we certainly think a hundred kilo car bomb was 
designed to kill people but I think it only killed one person. But there was supposed to be 
something going on nearby that ended up being canceled at the last minute for some reason. And, 
but there was a lot of other smaller bombs, typically they were extortion. The idea was you 
know, hey, you pay us money and your business stays safe. And the FARC is involved in a lot of 
kidnapping and extortion, those are other sources of revenue for them. But also, a lot of the 
paramilitary groups that didn’t demobilize through the government program, they just sort of 
disappeared and stopped doing paramilitary work, basically became organized crime elements. 
So there’s still a lot of kidnapping and extortion through that. In fact, my wife is in Bogota right 
now, her mom’s got cancer so she’s down with her. And she just, you know, how much things, I 
mean I’ve mentioned it several times but hey, we can move to Bogota. And she’s like no I don’t 
want to do that, because the crime is… 
Josh: Still rampant. 
Morris: Yeah, has gone up, in fact. 
Josh: Oh really? 
Morris: Now, it’s not murders, but it’s just a lot of street crime and stuff like that. The 
millionaires ride where they kidnap you and take you around every ATM machine until midnight 
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New York time and then start again until your credit/debit card won’t give out any more then 
they just they either dump you off on the streets somewhere. Sometimes they dump you off 
where they picked you up. So as long as you don’t resist, you know, you’re okay but a lot of 
that’s organized crime. Now, I think the FARC was into a lot of other types of things too. If you 
believe the newspaper stories about the computer files captured from Raul Reyes, the guy that 
was killed in the bombing raid in Ecuador, one mile into Ecuador, they were looking to do false 
carbon credits, they were looking to sell some nuclear material, which was later captured in 
Colombia. It was all like medical waste that couldn’t have been used for anything but they didn’t 
know that. They thought it was… 
Josh: Right, they thought it was real. 
Morris: Well, I mean it was real nuclear materials, but it was so depleted that it had no, it 
couldn’t have been used for anything but they didn’t know that it couldn’t be used for anything. 
They knew it was real nuclear materials. So there’s money laundering schemes, all sorts of other 
stuff. Counterfeiting is big in Colombia too. In fact, the Secret Service has an office within the 
US Embassy in Bogota mainly for counterfeiting. The Colombians counterfeiters, some of them 
which are organize crime, some them which may be involved in, with the terrorist groups, are 
sets that they still engrave plates. They’re not using digital stuff to do anything. They’re actually 
still engraving plates. 
Josh: Does that make better forgeries or? 
Morris: According to Ambassador Bill Wood, yeah. He was the Ambassador when I got there. 
He said that when the banks, the national bank of Iraq fails after the invasion, the organized 
crime moves in, takes all the money, Denari or whatever the Iraqis had, Denari, and they bleach 
it, and then they ship the paper to Colombia because that, the Iraqi money was the closest paper 
to American money. 
Josh: Interesting. Well that, so well that obviously points to pretty extensive international 
connections. Are there, I mean I’ve read about, you know, relationships between, you know, 
Russian organized crime and narcotics traffickers and between even the Provisional IRA and 
maybe the FARC. Are there… 
Morris: Yes, there were three members of the Provisional IRA that were involved in training the 
FARC on improvised mortars, they were convicted in Colombian Court. They were appealed, let 
out on bail and they’ve never, they skipped the country and never been back. Colombians still 
want them; I don’t know if they’re back in the Republic of Ireland, the Republic of Ireland 
doesn’t extradite to South America. Whatever, yeah. There’s also possibilities of money 
laundering for Hamas. There is a small in the Guajira Peninsula. Are you familiar with that? 
Josh: Yeah. That sort of juts out into the Caribbean. 
Morris: Lots of Lebanese, Colombians of Lebanese or Syrians. 
Josh: Okay so fundraising for Hezbollah, it would probably be that. 
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Morris: Fundraising and then maybe some money laundering, but certainly not as much as in 
Venezuela. 
Josh: Right 
Morris: Or Trinidad. 
Josh: In the Tri Boarder. I know there’s a Muslim population in Trinidad, is that… I’m always 
sort of, I try and air on the side of skeptical that I see in a lot of papers that, you know, they’ll 
link the location of a Muslim community to some sort of extremist sympathies. Is there any sort 
of real evidence that anything like that or do people just cite that like it’s a potential because of 
the community there? 
Morris: It’s a potential. You know, the money laundering may be really just sending money back 
to families. Because when the civil war erupted in Lebanon, the Colombians actually sent an 
aircraft to pick up Colombian-Lebanese citizens and bring them back, or whatever. 
Josh: And I guess it’s hard to know in sort of that flow of remittances and the flow of people. It’s 
hard to know. 
Morris: And I don’t think it’s that big. It’s certainly not like the Tri Boarders  
Josh: Right, it’s more extensive. 
Morris: I mean the Colombians never really had much of anybody immigrating. I mean, the 
numbers are very, very small. I mean, not like Argentina where you had waves of European 
Jews, waves of Germans, waves of Italian, waves of Welsh, waves of Irish. 
Josh: Yeah, the Welsh ended up in like Patagonia right? 
Morris: Patagonia, yeah, yeah. In fact, I met a guy in Colombia on one of the humanitarian 
missions who’d been on, he was a retired British officer, he’d been on, in the Falklands War, and 
his unit never went ashore until after the Argentinians surrendered. He was responsible for 
rounding up all of the Argentinian prisoners. He’s taking down the names, like every fifth names 
of Welsh. Yeah it was all in Patagonia. The Spanish wouldn’t go to Patagonia but the Welsh 
would. So, yeah, so the Colombians never… there’s only a handful of non-Spanish surnames 
there. Like there’s one guy that I met who is Mario Eastman, and there’s some Eastman’s in my 
family, I was like wow. And one of the senators was Klovkosky and, but the numbers are so 
small. It’s not like, like you know some of the Cabinet in Venezuela or Syrian distraction or 
something like that. The numbers are very small. What we were worried about is the interchange 
of technology between illegal groups, illegally armed groups. Colombia has, the Colombians call 
them anti-personnel mines, and what we would call IEDs. More mine incidences than any 
country in the world for civilians. Thousands of people that are walking around on one leg 
because the FARC uses mines to protect their camps, to protect their labs, to protect coca fields 
and things like that. So, you know, were there increases of technology transfer, triggering 
devices and stuff like that? 
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Josh: Is that, were you concerned about that being direct between the groups, some sort of 
interaction or just by being proximity to one another that there’s a technology transfer? 
Morris: No, we were talking internationally. You know, what type of triggering devices were the 
Middle Eastern terrorists using that maybe the FARC could pick up on, and through the internet, 
through the dark side of the internet. The other thing that we were worried about is both the 
semisubmersible and the submersible technology. In one of the semisubmersibles captured off 
Central America, there were two Colombians, a Sri Lankan, and someone from some other 
country. What the hell is a Sri Lankan doing on a semisubmersible? Later on, someone sent me 
some pictures of some semisubmersibles in my e-mail that had just gone out, that I finally 
realized, they weren’t Colombian semisubmersibles. They were Tamil Tiger semisubmersibles. 
Was there in interchanged of technology before the Tamil Tigers, don’t know. But if you look at 
the pictures, holy moly. Now they were using them for, well the Tamil’s were using them for 
suicide attacks as all as trafficking arms, bringing arms from the mainland into Sri Lanka. So 
certainly, I mean that was one of the nice things about working in Colombia, even though 
technically the FARC was an atheist group, a lot of good Catholics that were not willing to 
commit suicide. So, like the British would tell me, with the IRA, the one thing that they would 
do is if you can cut off the escape route, if you cut off the escape routes, they wouldn’t do 
whatever they were going to do because then it becomes a suicide mission and good Catholics 
don’t commit suicide. And so even atheist Catholic FARC members don’t commit suicide. There 
was a couple of cases where there was some suicide attacks that basically it was people who 
were duped into it. Club Nogales Bombing, I don’t know if you’re familiar with that. Club 
Nogales was a very high end social club on one of the main streets in Colombia, right across the 
street from the house of the Spanish Ambassador. And in 2002, it was car bombed. It was like 
sixty people killed, there were a couple of quinceañera’s going on, the fifteenth birthday party 
celebration, and things like that. The people were, the car was loaded up with explosives and 
people drove it in. The handlers told them, okay, we want you to get away and then we’ll trigger 
it remotely. 
Josh: Oh okay. 
Morris: And or set the timer, whatever. They set the timer, you’ll have time to get away don’t 
worry about it. And they detonated it remotely and killed the guys driving in, so… And then 
occasionally they’d put a backpack on a kid and tell him to walk into a police station and stuff 
like that. They’re using kids so young that really don’t even know what they’re doing. The other 
one’s a burro, on a donkey. 
Josh: Really? 
Morris: Putting bombs on donkeys. 
Josh: Just let them walk. 
Morris: Walk into the main square, they detonate them. 
Josh: Wow. 
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Morris: So, they seem to do about one a year of those. So, yes. There’s this increasing worry 
about the interconnection between these people. Is there a direct connection? I don’t know. 
There’s always stories about, with the counterfeiters, if they could counterfeit, if they could 
counterfeit US currency, could they counterfeit a US passport? And who from the Mideast would 
want a US passport? 
Josh: Right. I mean that’s one of the connections… 
Morris: The Colombians don’t need to have… 
Josh: Right. 
Morris: Yeah, because so many Colombians have Visas to get here anyway, they don’t need to 
have a false US passport. But now with the Venezuelans giving away to the Iranians… 
Josh: These investor Visa programs in the Caribbean also. 
Morris: Yeah, so we were worried about that. We were worried about the transfer of technology 
from maritime trafficking. That was a big concern. And then once I, so the question we would 
always ask though is, and look at some of the stories that, about the semisubmersible captured. 
The nationality of the crews. Now, if there, if you have, we always thought it was more than a 
thousand kilos. If you have about more than a thousand kilos of cocaine in a boat, there’s an 
owner’s representative onboard because he wants to make sure it gets to the destination, it gets to 
whoever. Now, the FARC, the ELN, the paramilitaries, they could fight each other in one area 
but they’ll do a handshake deal to move drugs, pool their risk. The cocaine brick is stamped with 
an ownership mark, so that does a couple things. Who owns it, but also some of them have a 
reputation for better quality too so you know hey, this is the Cadillac version. 
Josh: Right, the good stuff. 
Morris: Yeah, this is the good stuff. So when they capture it, they would make, and you’d see all 
sorts of marks in a load. You’d see FARC marks from this front, that front, ELN marks, you’d 
see paramilitary groups, other bandas criminales, the criminal bands that aren’t paramilitary, or 
former paramilitary. And so, so while they, we’d fight and kill each other, they would also do 
business together. So, if you’ve got these people that are ideologically opposed to doing business 
with each other, who else would they do business with? Is it farfetched that they would build a 
semisubmersible that could leave the coast of Colombia with ten tons of something undetected, 
and so the question we’d always ask is, what could it enter a US port with undetected, ten tons of 
something. Ten thousand kilos is a lot, a you could do lot of things with ten thousand kilos and if 
you only make it five thousand, and then the rest is fuel, that increases your range even more. I 
mean, five tons of fuel is, that’s a lot. 
Josh: I’ve heard some of these, some of those semisubmersibles or fully submersibles can reach 
the coast of Africa. That some of them are that technically competent at this point. 
Morris: I don’t know about technically competent, that’s probably not… 
Josh: A little too generous. 
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Morris: Yeah, that’s a little too generous, if you’ve ever been on one there’s nothing technical 
about it, they’re rudimentary at best. But, yeah you’re right, they do have the range. One that 
was, I mean semisubmersibles and even the submarines have mainly been a Pacific Coast 
phenomenon, but, one of the ones captured in 2009 was caught on the Guajira, twin engine, twin 
screws, twin rudders, quite a wide beam and large gas tanks. Do you go from the Guajira to 
Puerto Rico or Hispanola? Or do you go east? I don’t know. I think most of the drug trafficking 
going in Africa is done by fishing boats. And fishing boats that are no longer fishing, they’re 
outfitted to carry six to eight tons, six to ten tons the cocaine. They travel in groups, there’s one 
guy that’s the decoy, there’s one guy that’s got extra fuel, there’s one guy that is, you know, 
watching. And so when the Coast Guard comes in, you’ve got six boats traveling in a group, 
which one do you stop? 
Josh: Right, who do you follow? 
Morris: You’ve only got assets to stop one at a time and you can’t force them all to stop so you 
know, you stop one, the decoy, the rest of them keep going, they’ve already changed course, 
they’ve refueled, the guys got the coast they split off. But yeah no, not technology, that’s 
rudimentary. But, but they’re building them for a purpose and they build them… There’s, as far 
as I know there’s been no, although no, there was a semisubmersible that was caught off Spain, 
right? Or Portugal a couple years ago. 
Josh: Was there? 
Morris: Yeah, but I don’t know that there was evidence that it came from South America or if it 
was coming up from North Africa or West Africa, yeah. Mostly, and then using old cargo planes 
because now that you have some countries in there that don’t mind whatever a cargo plan 
landing, coming from Venezuela. Venezuela is the, it’s all going through Venezuela, going to 
West Africa. 
Josh: Okay. So the African trade coast for Venezuela just because there’s… 
Morris: The West African trade, there’s stuff that goes down through the Amazon, down to 
Brazil and Argentina, it goes to Southern Africa across there. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: So, if you’re in the ‘80s and ‘90s and you’re Brazil and Argentina, cocaine is not a 
problem for you because, and from even in, yeah, in the ‘80s and ‘90s it’s not your problem. And 
in fact, you’re getting quite wealthy over it not being a problem because the drug trafficking 
groups pay for services in cash. About 2002, and we only found this out in retrospect about four 
to five years after it happened, the drug trafficking groups made a business decision no longer to 
pay in cash, they pay in kind for services. So, what was not previously a Brazilian or Argentinian 
problem has become a big problem for them because they’ve now created... 
Josh: Right, they’ve created local markets. 
Morris: Local markets to sell the in kind that you’ve got. And in fact, outside of the United 
States, Brazil was the number two consumer of cocaine and right now they’re number one 
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consumer of crack cocaine. We don’t really have a crack problem; I guess all our crack addicts 
all died. We don’t have much of a crack problem anymore. There is a huge crack problem in 
Brazil, and they have become the number two consumer of cocaine after the United States. 
Josh: That’s interesting. 
Morris: But it wasn’t their problem in the ‘80s and ‘90s. Now it’s their… 
Josh: Right, now it’s become their problem. 
Morris: Yeah. 
Josh: Alright, then moving on. So a lot of, sort of the crux of my research is a little bit more 
strategically oriented and one of the things that I’ve come across is that it seems that the ideas 
that environment or attitude, not environment as in climate but as in context, have a significant 
impact on enforcement outcomes and in the course of that research, I’ve read a lot of 
descriptions, many of whom were former Ambassadors or, you know, Chief of Missions, Naval 
Officers, who describe the Caribbean as wrestling with a culture of permissiveness, or even a 
culture of smuggling. And this is sort of a multi part, but is that a description that you’re familiar 
with, do you find it accurate and if so, how have you dealt with getting things done in a climate 
that’s frequently described as incredibly permissive for transnational crime? 
Morris: I’ve never heard that term applied to the Caribbean, I did hear it applied to the Pacific 
Coast of Colombia. The history of the Pacific Coast of Colombia is that the Spanish brought in 
more African slaves in the New World than the English did. Most, if they didn’t go to the 
Caribbean Islands, if they came in to South America, they almost all came in through Cartagena. 
And originally they were to work the mines near, between Cali and Medellin. A lot of those 
slaves escape, go over the Andes, the last ridge of the Andes, the western ridge of the Andes, and 
set up, live on the Pacific Coast and they support themselves through contraband. An example is 
that, according to this book I was telling you about the history of the US/Colombian military 
relation, it’s estimated that one sixth of the platinum that reached Nazi Germany came from 
Colombia. It was illegally mined, given to German agents, smuggled south to Argentina, put on 
neutral Spanish ships, and then, you need platinum to make all sorts of high specialty steels. And 
it’s estimated that as little as one sixth, and maybe more, of Nazi’s needs for platinum came from 
that. So there’s this, so just an example, but they’ve been engaged in contrabanding for hundreds 
of years and in the Pacific Coast, on the Pacific Coast of Colombia. And contraband, just the 
cocaine, is just a contraband of choice today. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: If the cocaine were to disappear, they would find another. And in fact, since the, in 
recent times it’s basically with the price of gold and platinum so high, and some new finds of 
new discoveries on the Pacific Coast, it’s illegal mining again, it’s huge in Colombia. So, so I’ve 
heard that describe. So, and then that breeds corruption. On Transparency International’s index 
of countries, Colombia is actually fairly good, and better than most Latin American countries, 
and the Colombians say when you take out the Pacific Coast of Colombia, Colombia is actually 
pretty good. Now, they’re not like Finland, you know but they, you know the Colombians would 
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say that except for the Pacific Coast of Colombia, the rest of Colombia on the corruption index 
would probably be fairly European, fairly European. But it’s this corruption on the Pacific Coast 
that does that, and so I don’t know about the Caribbean. My limited experience in the Caribbean 
is with the Colombian islands in the Caribbean, and there, while there is, there is no drug 
production on those islands, what there is, is support for the drug trafficking trade. For example, 
a go-fast boat that leaves from the Caribbean coast needs to be refueled, and so the fuel comes 
out of San Andreas, that’s the Colombian island. So the Pacific Coast, the Colombians would say 
and admit is very corrupt. So part of the US efforts were trying to reduce that corruption by a lot 
of different things, but mainly by some sort of way of providing alternative means of earning a 
living. Whether it’s sustainable logging, because they have some amazing exotic woods out there 
that you could use for veneers, for furniture that actually would be more valuable than cocaine, 
developing plantations of African palm that could be converted to biodiesel, plus whatever else 
you use African palm products for, things like that. Coca, excuse me, cacao, Colombia is also 
known for cacao. Coffee, although you need a little bit higher elevation. So part of, but just, you 
know, trying to work with vetted units and holding local officials accountable, getting the main 
government in Bogota to hold local officials accountable for limiting corruption. One of the 
things that they would do, of course, is if the, Colombia’s divided into departments and 
departments are divided into municipalities, typically governors of departments and alcalde, the 
mayor of the municipality are elected officials. However, if they’re removed from office for 
corruption, then the president appoints someone to fill the rest of the term. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: And so, you know, getting Uribe to act was not very hard. He was happy to do that, 
happy to exercise that power. In fact, I worked with one of the men who’s later a Vice Minister 
of Defense, that was one of the governor, he was the governor of Antioquia for a while, 
appointed by Uribe to replace a governor who had been removed for… 
Josh: Some sort of corruption. 
Morris: Corruption connection, yeah. The Colombians are very good, they went back and 
anybody that had connections with the paramilitaries, they got rid of them, including in one fell 
swoop of like sixty members of Congress. So they were very good, just a lot of corruption to find 
especially on the Pacific Coast. 
Josh: Okay. 
Morris: Not so much on the Caribbean Coast, although you know, certainly it’s there, but the 
Pacific Coast, it’s because not only you have all the drugs flowing out, but everything that’s 
needed to make the drugs comes in. So little that’s available in Colombia has got to be brought 
in, and that’s why Buenaventura is so violent. The drug trafficking organizations, all the different 
illegally run groups are fighting for control over different neighborhoods of Buenaventura 
because you control the territory. You also get the workers which can serve as boat crews and 
they work in the ports and stuff like that, so that’s why things are so bad in Buenaventura. So 
much corruption there being brought in, so having to fight the corruption. Yeah. 
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Josh: Alright, okay. And then I just kind of, now that we’re kind of at the end we’ll loop back to 
what we were talking about before we officially got started, on that relationship between 
multiple transnational crimes. And maybe if I could just get you to relay again what you were 
talking about with organizing that environmental conference. 
Morris: Sure. The head of the economics section of the US Embassy came to me with an idea to 
organize an economics, excuse me, environmental law enforcement conference. He knew about 
tapping into DOD environmental money to do that. He wrote up the paper, I approved it, we sent 
it out, SOUTHCOM, they approved it, and we got DoD environmental money to do a DoD 
sponsored environmental law enforcement conference with the Colombian Coast Guard, some of 
their environmental authorities and some of their national police. The first year was, I believe 
was 2009, we held it in Cali, brought in these people from the Pacific Coast and then, a couple 
days in Cali, and then the rest of the time in Cartagena, the Caribbean coast. Then next year we 
just did it in Cartagena, brought everybody to Cartagena. It turned out to be much more 
productive. But, part of the group in addition to Coast Guard, US Coast Guard people involved 
in environmental law, including environmental law enforcement, brought in people from the US 
Fisheries and Wildlife Service or the marine fisheries, and they were, some of them were 
actually federal law enforcement agents that worked for those agencies. When we held the 
meeting in Cartagena, of course I invited the DEA to participate and the head of DEA came over 
and started talking to his fellow law enforcement officers and soon they realized they were 
talking about some of the same people. So, what the DEA didn’t realize, but these other people 
did, is, and now the DEA realizes, is that the same people involved in narco-trafficking are also 
involved in other types of trafficking, whether it’s illegal fish and game, it’s illegal human 
trafficking, arms and explosives, money laundering, it’s, whatever route they use is the same 
route by water and it’s the same people. One week they’ll transfer drugs, the next week they’ll 
bring in bales of laundered money or money that needs to be laundered. There’s a lot more of 
that after post 9/11 with all the restrictions moving money around electronically. So we actually 
saw increases of seizures of cash, bulk cash being brought back into Colombia. Illegal conk and 
lobster, you know, caught in Colombian waters and then bound for restaurants in the United 
States. And so, what we saw is, because the Colombian Coast Guard now knew of this, now 
knew more of the US laws and environmental protections and things like that. We even saw a 
few arrests by the Colombians and extraditions over international waters turned over to the 
United States, if it’s in international waters, not really an extradition. And then, so the guy 
instead of getting twenty years for drug trafficking, he gets two years for illegal wildlife. But 
still, that’s two years that he’s not moving drugs, not moving arms and explosives back into 
Colombia, not laundering money. It’s two years that the guy is off the street, and so helping the 
Colombians do that. A couple of things that would benefit that is some US environmental groups 
actually bought some patrol boats for the Colombian Navy. There’s an island that the 
Colombians have out in the Pacific called Malpelo, it’s a breeding ground for Hammerhead 
Sharks, and so the US environmental groups bought a boat for the Colombian Navy just to patrol 
out there. So it goes out, patrols 21 days, comes back, seven days in port, 21 days, seven days in 
port, and so it actually reduces the amount of time that the bad guys are out doing that because 
it’s the same people. The big thing there was shark finning, where the captured the shark, cut of 
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the fins, dumped the shark back in the water and then keep the fins. Other things, but it’s the 
same people. 
Josh: Right. 
Morris: And it’s all about the money, you know, whatever money they can get. Making money 
moving drugs, making money moving people. There’s one case in one particular week, may even 
be in the same day, the Colombian’s Navy captured a boat from the Caribbean and in the Pacific, 
because Colombia has both a Pacific and a Caribbean Coast, with illegal immigrants. The one in 
the Pacific Coast had illegal immigrants from China, or Asia I should say, I don’t necessarily 
know that they were Chinese, and then the one in the Caribbean had African illegal immigrants, 
all with the goal of getting into the United States, but captured.  But the boats arrived by the 
same people they had seen transferring drugs before. 
Josh: Those are, those are really the types of stories that I’m very much interested in because that 
sort of stuff, not just I think in law enforcement but in the academic portion of it too, they’re very 
atomized. The approaches are, one person is writing on narcotics trafficking and one person is 
writing on, you know, human trafficking or regular migration and there’s very little of that flow 
where they get together and realize, oh, you know… 
Morris: We’re talking about the same people. 
Josh: We’re talking about the same people, they’re using the same boats, same routes, same 
infrastructure. 
Morris: Well it’s, it’s, the Colombians started telling us in the ‘80s that the FARC was involved 
in the drug trade, that the FARC was involved in drug trading and we didn’t believe it. I 
remember, shortly after arriving in Colombia, attending a seminar where the head of the 
Colombian military brought in every general and admiral. It was a big meeting in Cartagena and 
they talked about strategy and stuff like that and one general said, we started telling the gringos 
in the ‘80s, we started telling the gringos in the ‘80s that the FARC was involved in the drug 
trade, and they didn’t believe us. It’s only post 9/11 when President Bush signed the special 
authorities that allowed, showed the connection between narcotics and terrorism, narcotics and 
the insurgency in Colombia and allowed the DoD to go more after the drug traffickers, the State 
Department to go help more against the insurgency. And but before that it was divided, you 
know, one part of the Embassy worked with the police on the drug guys and another part worked 
on, but I mean overlap has always been the Naval Mission because of the Coast Guard functions 
of the Colombian, and Coast Guard and customs functions of the Colombian Navy. 
Josh: Well I mean, this has been really fantastic. 
Morris: Okay, I hope it’s helpful. 
Josh: No absolutely, I mean this is, this is really the sort of information that lends a little bit 
more… 
Morris: But you’re absolutely right, there’s very little academic writing. There’s a lot of 
journalists. There’s a guy that writes for the Los Angeles Times, he spends a lot of time in 
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Colombia. Really good reporting and stuff like that, but again, is it sourced like an academic 
paper? No, but in a lot of cases, his name’s Chris. I’m not remembering his last name. There’s an 
independent writer out of, he’s an American but he lives in Lima? Lima or Santiago. He’s got 
like eight kids so he has to write a lot to support them. And so he did an article on the narco-subs 
and he interviewed me and took pictures of them, used some of my pictures of them, things like 
that. And I think in the US it was published in like Maxim or British Maxim, stuff like that. And 
then in Colombia, it was their version of Maxim, I think it’s called Don Juan or… anyway. So 
even then, you know, you’ve got a good article but you look at the magazine it’s punished in, 
like can I really cite that in an academic paper? Because that’s a lad’s magazine. 
Josh: Yeah, it’s something you’re flipping through at the barber shop, but. Yeah, and that’s, it’s 
interesting that it’s not really something that the academic establishment has latched onto, even 
at places like… 
Morris: One of the guys you could look up is a guy, Roman Ortiz. 
Josh: Roman Ortiz. 
Morris: He used to be a member, work in a place called [Foundations Ideas y la Paz], Foundation 
for Ideas and Peace. 
Josh: Is that just, Indepaz, is that? 
Morris: Yeah. 
Josh: Yeah, yeah okay. 
Morris: He doesn’t work there anymore. He did work for a, are you on LinkedIn? Are we hooked 
up on LinkedIn? 
Josh: I’m on it but I don’t think I’ve… 
Morris: Okay, I’ll see if I can introduce you through linked in. But he does a lot of security 
studies. He has his PhD from a University in Spain, and he’s actually Spanish but he lives now in 
Colombia, does a lot of research. He’s got some papers he’s written. He’s written, done research 
for SOUTHCOM, he’s done research for some other people from the Colombian Ministry of 
Defense. So he’s got some stuff that’s published. And there are a few others. One guy that I 
really like but he’s been off the radar screen for the last two and a half years is, I can’t think of 
his name now. But he was the founder of the [Foundations Idea y la Paz], he’s one of the 
negotiators in Havana so he hasn’t been writing anything at all either. And he didn’t write 
anything when he was Vice Minister of Defense because, he was Vice Minister of Defense. He 
was real critical of the government so Uribe said, okay, come join, so. 
Josh: Good move on his part. 
Morris: Yeah. 
Josh: Alright well, again I appreciate the time. 
Morris: Cool. 
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Michel: Looks like you’ve got a good topic to work on. 
Josh: Appreciate it. 
Michel: Yeah, there’s a lot of work to be done in this area, and very timely, obviously I can see 
why you’re interested in the Coast Guard. 
Josh: So, yeah well one of the things that got me really interested in this is the fact that you see 
sort of the subheading naval maritime security popping up a lot in the national security 
documents a lot lately, but it’s still a very atomized approach. There is counter-terrorism, there’s 
counter-narcotics, you know, there’s, you know, counter-human trafficking, all those things. But 
they’re not linked in the documents in any sort of coherent strategic language, so a lot of my 
research just looks at, can we build a theoretical framework that makes those relevant to one 
another, which theoretically should help over all, you know, unified government effort in 
countering them. 
Michel: Yeah, we can talk for a long, long time about what you just said there because it really, 
what you talked about, you know the different types of threats that exist in the maritime 
environment go all the way from symmetric threats like nation state upon nation state, which is 
still out there, and that’s why we have a Navy and those type of things. But then you have all 
different types of asymmetric or non-homeland defense type scenarios, so all the way from 
terrorists down to recreational boaters who become intoxicated and sort of everything in 
between. 
Josh: Right, so my interest is sort of right in that middle spot, the area that I think often gets lost 
in the gray space that it’s sometimes it’s perceived as a homeland issue, sometimes it’s, you 
know, it’s perceived as nobody’s issue, so. 
Michel: I can give you a bunch of different scenarios, and the interesting thing about it Josh is, 
and the reason I think it’s so compelling in the maritime is the jurisdictional lines are different 
than they are on land and the availability of resources to respond to an incident are different than 
on land. If you just go to downtown D.C., there’s probably an agency that takes care of 
everything from, you know, parking tickets to speeding to car fires to anything, there’s going to 
be somebody there who can respond to that particular thing so the agencies arguably don’t have 
to work as well together. But when you’re out on the water, you may not, first of all the 
platforms to be able to get there may or may not exist, and when they do, they may be, you 
know, full on combatant all the way down to police vessels or good Samaritan or something else 
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because of what happens on water. And the jurisdictional lines are very different than they are 
landside, so it’s a different and unique problem as I’m sure you’re aware of. 
Josh: It’s good that you started off that way because, sort of, I’ve got sort of a loose list of 
questions and I kind of wanted to start on the broader end. Oh thank you. 
Michel: They needed to move there to give you the [unclear, closing blinds]… 
Josh: But because I’m interested at looking at it more at that 30,000-foot level and getting the 
broader strategic overview, one of the things that interests me the most in the Coast Guard’s 
approach is the fact that it is a member of the armed forces, it is a member of the intelligence 
community, it is a federal law enforcement agency and I’d like to know, in what way if any, that 
impacts you in the Coast Guard’s prospective on strategy and strategy development. 
Michel: Well, we were talking about pocketing all those different threats. The beauty of the 
Coast Guard is the Coast Guard can address almost all of those, I mean if we’re there we have 
the authorities to do everything from, you know, basic law enforcement, worker search and 
rescue or environmental response, all the way up to, you know, symmetric work in the Coast 
Guard and every single symmetric conflict that this nation has had, you know, all the way from 
Persian Gulf, Vietnam, World War II all the way back to Civil War. I mean if you read some of 
our history, if you’re aware it’s a Revenue Cutter Service ship that actually fired the first shot in 
the Civil War, most people don’t know. But we participated in all the different battles so the 
beauty of having the Coast Guard is it gives you that flexibility across the span of threats that 
exist there, and I would say in that regard, at least in the Federal Government it’s unique, I mean 
there’s no other member in the armed services who’s also a law enforcement agency, a 
regulatory agency, a humanitarian agency and an environmental agency, and all the things that 
come with it and I think it is the master stroke of this government to create a domain-based 
organization rather than, like here when you’re talking landside, there’s one who does parking 
tickets, there’s one who does car fires, there’s one who does EMT and stuff. I would argue, 
because of the scarcity of resources in the maritime, and the primary responsibility for 
jurisdiction being federal rather than state and local, through time the creation of a domain-based 
organization that has the authorities, capabilities, competencies and partnership to respond to 
respond to that entire range is ultimately where we need to go, but it’s extremely difficult to 
achieve in the Federal Government and I’ll give you an example. So, you know, we deal in some 
of the offshore areas, one of DHS’s Department of Homeland Security’s is down on the 
southwest border. You look on down at the southwest border, any particular spot of land down 
there has multiple jurisdictions, not only to have the multiple people who can respond to you, 
whether it’s local, state, tribal, you know, EMT, DEA, DoD under certain circumstances, I mean 
everybody’s just completely overlapping jurisdictions and you can argue efficiency or otherwise, 
but the Coast Guard’s uniquely efficient in that it has all those, that entire toolkit, and can 
perform basically as a whole of government within and of itself. Not that we have every single 
piece of it, we’ve got almost all of it and I think a domain-based organization like that, if you can 
do that, there’s no place else that government’s replicated, not even in the aviation side which 
arguably always grew up under federal tutelage, but if you think about it FAA which is in the 
Department of Transportation, has the safety kind or portfolio, but TSA… 
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Josh: Has the security. 
Michel: Has the security portfolio. It isn’t like that in the maritime. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: And you can go back and consider the reasons why and why you would develop a 
domain-based organization, there’s a lot of good reasons for doing it. I think the maritime makes 
it easier to develop one of those kind of organizations, again because of the scarcity of resources 
and the clarity of jurisdictional lines, it lends itself to an efficient federal solution covering the 
entire piece. I mean I don’t know if you’re even aware that back in our history when Alaska was 
still a territory, Coast Guard officers basically acted as federal judges, and you can read back in 
Coast Guard history like the Revenue Cutter Bear which was essentially the federal law in the 
territory of Alaska. Again because of the scarcity of resources, the remoteness of the location, the 
Coast Guard even picked up those duties of actually being the federal court that floated around 
and took care of, you know, disputes between the native populations and, that’s just another 
aspect of why it’s different and why it’s efficient to do that, that type of organization. 
Josh: Right, well and then, that sort of brings me to the next part where maybe we muddy the 
waters a little bit because there are certain areas in which the jurisdiction is obviously maritime 
but seems to overlap in responsibility with the U.S. Navy. 
Michel: Okay. 
Josh: And, you know, I’m talking predominately in the Caribbean which is what my first major 
case study is looking at, and so you’ve got the, you know, Southern Command, you’ve got the 
Fourth Fleet, you’ve also got JIATF-South which you were the director of, which is always 
directed by a Coast Guard admiral, and the Navy obviously… 
Michel: Not always. And it’s… 
Josh: Oh it’s not? 
Michel: Yeah, this is interesting. It’s original founding was a Coast Guard Vice Admiral who 
stood up the commandand then the next three admirals after that were Navy admirals. 
Josh: Oh they were Navy. Okay, well that almost brings the point a little bit. 
Michel: Since then, since I think 1994, they’ve all been Coast Guard admirals. 
Josh: Okay, okay but I didn’t know that that wasn’t an official… 
Michel: No, no it could be any, it could be any… 
Josh: Armed… 
Michel: Yeah, I mean it’s a DoD, it’s a joint DoD command. 
Josh: Right. 
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Michel: So it could be anybody. As a matter of fact, the deputies have been switching back and 
forth between the Air Force and the Navy. 
Josh: Okay. 
Michel: But there’s, that’s one of the beauties of the Coast Guard, when we’re operating under 
title ten authority like that, I’m purple just like all those other DOD guys. That’s not a Coast 
Guard. 
Josh: Okay, well that… 
Michel: Just by practice, I mean that’s been… 
Josh: Okay, well that kind of brings the point down a little fuller I think because you do have 
that, that melding there of responsibilities or at least a melding of leadership, but the Navy 
obviously approaches its mission with a different historical perspective, you know a different 
strategic legacy. And in your position as Director of JIATF-South, did you experience any sort 
of, not conflicting but competing interests or competing perspectives with the Navy? 
Michel: No, no, no, no. It’s interesting we should talk about the Coast Guard and the Navy 
relationships, and they go all the way back. If you’re not aware, the Navy during the 
Revolutionary War was actually stood down at the end of the Revolutionary War, there was no 
Navy... 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: … after the end of the Revolutionary War, and then Alexander Hamilton championed 
the founding of the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790 to basically prevent smugglers. So we would 
be the federal law outside the ports to prevent smuggling of goods and the collection of tariffs, 
which were absolutely essential to the nation. And at that time, we were the country’s only 
maritime force at all, there was no other force. It wasn’t until the Barbary pirates came along that 
we felt like we had to have a Navy. And the Navy was reestablished I think it’s 1798, you can go 
back and look at these, don’t quote me on that but it was basically to confront Barbary pirates 
overseas. Interesting, were the pirates a law enforcement or were they a national security 
mission? We could talk about that for a while, that’s one of those tweeners kind of like terrorists, 
you know, are they law enforcement or national security, could kind of go either way on it. But 
it’s interesting, and you see Captain Bainbridge, who was one of the heroes at taking down the 
Barbary pirates. If you’re not aware, the Bainbridge was the one that rescued Captain Phillips. 
USS Bainbridge was the one that rescued Captain Phillips, so it all ties together… 
Josh: It’s interesting. 
Michel: You know, Muslim origin pirates, and you can go back in the history, it’s all interesting 
there, but the Navy has, just like all Navies, it’s primary mission is to defend the nation. Coast 
Guard has a defense role as well; we do the exact same role they do, but they’re built for, now 
high end symmetric warfare. I mean, they’re constructed that way. When you look at their fleet 
of ships, when you look at the way they train their sailors, they’re all about, you know, the fight. 
And I’m talking really the full on symmetric fight, whether it’s with Russia or China or Japan or 
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whoever, whoever, and they build their fleet that way. Their fleet also is flexible enough to 
undertake some of the other missions that they undertake, like piracy, anti-piracy is one of them. 
Humanitarian relief and you regularly see, like after the big tsunami over in… 
Josh: Yeah, the typhoon, yeah… 
Michel: Indonesia, that was all supported. You know, that was combat designed equipment but 
you can kind of use it for other things. And one of the other things that they use it for is the 
detection and monitoring mission which if you’re not aware, the Department of Defense, not the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense under 10-USC124 have the 
statutory lead for the detection monitoring of illicit trafficking that moves throughout the western 
hemisphere. 
Josh: Okay. 
Michel: Were you aware of that? 
Josh: I’m not sure. 
Michel: Because I think that… 
Josh: Does that come into conflict with posse comitatus. It sounds very. 
Michel: Let me explain this to you so, let me pull this apart for you. So go back to the history, 
the Coast Guard’s always done anti-smuggling work, I mean that’s where we were founded in 
1790, that’s our forte. In the 70s when, you know, drug trafficking became a big thing, it’s really 
not just drug trafficking like growing marijuana like here in the United States, it’s transnational 
drug trafficking which has its own flavor because it reaches across boundaries, it’s gotten to such 
magnitude it actually threatens nation states. So you remember back in the days, Pablo Escobar, I 
mean he almost brought the government in Colombia, almost became a narco-state. And one 
could argue that some of the counties in Central America right now, this is national security, an 
existential national security threat for them, it’s not just organized crime. TCO’s if you read the 
President’s strategy are really kind of another one of those tweeners that you can pbin them as 
criminals but they’re not just, well that’s the old lady’s purses. 
Josh: That’s the central focus of my dissertation is looking at them as hybrid threats, as those in 
between sort of where do they fall, how do you combat them? 
Michel: Yeah, and we could talk about that so, you know just take your scenic consistent threat 
here of threats that range all the way from, you know, very low end threats that a criminal justice 
system, a regular criminal justice system is responsive to all the way up to sort of nation-state 
threats, and we know how to deal with those kind of smoking hole in the water. And then we’ve 
got all these things in between, so you’ve got organized crime which is a higher level magnitude, 
and treated by the law here, I’m talking domestic RICO and stuff like that, conspiracies, all those 
types of crimes, that crime plus and they get treated a little bit differently. Then you’ve got 
transnational organized crime to read the President’s strategy, it basically says, yes these are 
criminals, yes we’re going to treat them as criminals, i.e. use force rules for criminals, our end 
game is to try them in a court of law, etcetera etcetera. When they become of such magnitude 
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that they actually start becoming a national security threat, we’re going to treat them in a 
different way, it doesn’t answer exactly how we’re going to do that, but that’s the same thing. 
Pirates are another example; pirates, if you look under the law, they’re hostis humanis generis, 
the enemies of all mankind and they have universal jurisdiction. Any state can grab pirates on the 
water and try them in a court of law and that’s, the law of the sea. So they’re universal criminals, 
but even our Navy, posse comitatus doesn’t apply to Navy actions against pirates because it’s not 
considered a law enforcement action. I mean you could look at the statutes and stuff and how 
you pull that apart but they’re different. It’s just like why we built a Navy to go fight Barbary 
pirates, why didn’t we give it to the law enforcement agency to go do it, because these were 
national security threats or deemed to be national security threats, so where do you bin those 
things it becomes very important because, let’s take TCO’s for example. If you bin in 
transnational criminal organization as criminals, then what’s your end game? Your end game is 
to gather evidence in a lawful manner and to try them in a court of law based on evidence and 
you put them in jail. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: And you’re only allowed to use law enforcement use of force rules, so if you’re 
smuggling cocaine in an airplane, guess what we probably can’t shoot you down. If you bim 
those as a national security threat, what’s your end game? Smoking hole in the water. You know, 
that’s your end game. Same with terrorists, I mean we debate this in the country right now, are 
those guys down in Guantanamo Bay, should they be tried in the military tribunals as unlawful 
combatants or should they be criminals and tried in the criminal justice system? Get the right to 
remain silent, get a lawyer and all other stuff. I mean you can, even the Attorney General of the 
United States I don’t think completely agrees with how it is, those tweener things because if you 
bin them as criminals, there’s things that come along with it. If you bin them as national security 
issues, then there’s a whole different rule set and typically a whole different end game that 
comes along with it. So that thread that we’re talking about, you know if becomes very clear on 
the low end. You know, common criminals, you deal with them in the criminal justice system. 
As a matter of fact, most of them are domestic common criminals, like you know guys, like I 
said stealing purses down here, we know how to deal with those. But, and we know how to deal 
with the Chinese Navy. But these in between ones. 
Josh: In between ones, right. 
Michel: And this becomes important from a maritime perspective. I’ll give you an example, so 
you tell me what the answer to this one is. There’s a offshore oil structure down in the Gulf of 
Mexico that produces, you know, a mixture of natural gas and hydrocarbons and it’s important to 
the nation’s economy and if it were destroyed, it would create not only economic impact but 
potentially kill a bunch of people, and also create a huge oil spill, like Deep-water Horizon so it 
could be a really very serious issue. Okay, you have murky intelligence, you know, like typical. I 
mean if I’ve told you that these people were this or that, it becomes an easy problem solved  but 
that’s not what you get down there. So you have some murky intelligence, maybe there were a 
couple tax overseas on offshore infrastructure and stuff like that, and you have some murky 
intelligence telling people to be on the alert in the Gulf of Mexico for potential attacks by, say 
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small boats, and you end up with a small boat out there, let’s say a fishing boat that could be a 
fishing boat, it could also be something else and it’s not answering on the radio and it’s 
approaching one of these offshore platforms, what is it and what do you do about it? 
Josh: Yeah, well those are those enduring, they have those questions and you know those 
checkpoints, you know between Israel and the West Bank. The questions of whether a car or an 
ambulance is, yeah. 
Michel: Well let me, I heard one of the most coaching comments so if you can get your arms 
around this, it was made by, I think it was made by the Israeli Defense Minister and he had one 
of our DHS people was talking to him and saying, you know we’ve got these homeland security 
related issues here where we’ve got terrorists in our country, and you know like the Boston 
Bomber and stuff like that and you know how we’re going to try them in courts and stuff like 
that. And the Israeli guy said, every one of those scenarios that we deal with that’s exact like you 
do, for us it’s not a homeland security issue, it’s a homeland defense issue. Because we don’t 
have the luxury of treating these as homeland security issues because we’re in a sort of an 
existential fight, there’s no time, space and distance to treat those things that way and if you can 
get your arm around that, it changes the equation. So you got that, let’s say you got that terrorist 
guy and he’s doing something and the guy’s a stripper or whatever, I mean your end game there 
is probably a smoking hole in the ground. They’re not criminals, they’re, but you know, the 
Boston Bomber? Was there ever any indication that we could just sort of create a smoking hole 
in the ground with that guy? No, I think we came to the conclusion, or at least we have that this 
guy’s a criminal. We’re going to use our criminal justice system to get this guy even though he 
blew up people with a bomb. I mean, you do the same thing in Israel and you’d just be a smoking 
hole in the ground. So it’s once again that… 
Josh: Right, finding where the line is somewhere. 
Michel: It’s very important how you bin these things, at least the way the law’s currently 
constructed, because if you bin them down criminal, you get a certain use of force rules, you got 
a certain end game that drives a bunch of things, you know collections evidence, non-exposure 
of intelligence products to the, that’s another one. On the criminal side of the house, if you’re 
using a highly sensitive intelligence product to develop your probable cause… 
Josh: Yeah you’ve got to make it public. 
Michel: Or you don’t try the case. 
Josh: Right. Well I guess this goes back to that advantage. 
Michel: On the smoking hole in the ground, so much of your intelligence apparatus is exposed to 
that end game, absolutely nothing except, you know whatever they can draw from the fact that 
there’s a smoking hole in the ground. 
Josh: And I guess it does come back to the advantage that the Coast Guard has which is that you 
get to operate wherever that line is drawn because you have both ends, whereas there are 
agencies that may have competing interests on billing it on one side or the other because… 
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Michel: Not only competing interests but competing platforms and competing [trainings], like 
that scenario I talked about where you’ve got maybe a boat there, you’re not sure exactly what’s 
going on with the situation. Could be legitimate, it might not be legitimate, you know the 
consequences are pretty great, you put a Coast Guard unit on there, you can go both ways. The 
Coast Guard unit can create that smoking hole in the water. The Coast Guard can always grab 
these people… 
Josh: Catalog the evidence. 
Michel: And the way that we’re trained is we know how to actually stop boats in a non-deadly 
force manner. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: So we, our guys are trained to shoot at the engines and rudders, we have certain 
procedures we go through to do that, we could do that day and night. As a matter of fact, we do 
that with vessels from helicopters day and night, we have a long track record of being able to 
deliver ordinance fire in a non-deadly force manner, which means in accordance with the law 
enforcement use of force rules. You get a Navy platform out there… 
Josh: Yeah, they’re not even quite so, so deliberately at an engine. 
Michel: They’re not trained to do that type of work, they’re not trained to, and they don’t have 
the authorities either, I mean we can go on posse comitatus for a while but you know, the typical 
general rule is DoD can’t do law enforcement. I mean, there are exceptions to that, piracy is one 
of them. 
Josh: Piracy is one. 
Michel: I mean, yeah like those pirates who were taken down with Captain Phillips, that was, 
that guy they caught was caught by Navy guys and he was arrested and brought before a court of 
law because he was a pirate. He’s one of those tweeners. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: But, you know. Your question about how we operate in the Caribbean, there’s a lot in 
what I was just saying there, but how it’s operated in the Caribbean, the Department of Defense 
has a statutory lead for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking events. 
Josh: Okay. 
Michel: They’ve got the lead, it isn’t D.H.S and there’s a good reason for that because they’ve 
got the most sophisticated radar systems, intelligence systems, platforms to be able to do this 
work. I mean, some of the stuff that they’re dealing with down there, like the semi submersible’s 
vessels, you know what I’m talking about there? 
Josh: Yeah. 
Michel: Law enforcement agencies don’t have acoustic detection gear and the DEA has no 
frigates, and neither does the FBI have any ships and they’ve got to rely on other people to do 
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that work. So even as we speak right now there are U.S. Navy ships down there working for 
JIATF-South, they carry Coast Guard law enforcement detachments onboard. Were you aware? 
Josh: Yep, the LEDETs, right? 
Michel: Yep, the LEDETS and what ends up happening is, let’s say they find one of these semi 
submersibles out there, they will actually shift tactical control to the Coast Guard so that that 
Navy ship actually becomes a Coast Guard ship with the authority to do it. You know they 
actually raise the Coast Guard flag, Coast Guard ensign goes up on that Navy ship and that Navy 
ship essentially becomes a Coast Guard ship and we can use the Navy small boat to take our 
Coast Guard boarding team to the work, and we can even bring Navy guys to assist us if we need 
to. 
Josh: And that sort of gets in a little bit deeper into the weeds of some of the strategy that I’m 
looking into because it does seem like that gives just a little bit more of an opportunity for 
expanding minimal resources, that if you can detach a couple of Coast Guard guys on, not just 
American naval ships but I know that they’re on British, French ships, Dutch ships, so… 
Michel: Yeah, that sharing of resources that becomes, it’s not only sharing of resources but the 
melding of authorities’ capabilities, competencies and partnerships between the maritime 
partners that allows each to be more effective than they were on… 
Josh: Well I think that’s something that’s also unique to the Coast Guard, just from my reading 
and my experience, there seems to be a comfort with the ambiguities of sovereignty that are 
required in the maritime domain that I think are a little bit more uncomfortable for the U.S. Navy 
to deal with. I know that there’s an authority sharing program between the Coast Guard and the 
Canadian authorities, which essentially allows Coast Guardsmen but also Canadian enforcement 
officers to operate on both sides of the border. 
Michel: Yeah, that’s the ICM LEO inter boarder maritime law enforcement whatever, that’s a 
very unusual one. That takes it on steroids because that involves cross deputization of officials; 
there’s nothing else like that that I’m aware of but it’s very interesting so I took a snapshot 
picture of two Canadian RCMP guys on a Coast Guard boat with some Coast Guard guys and I 
asked, I was given presentation of the audience, I said, what do you guys see before you here 
right now? And they said, well we see these two Canadian RCMP guys and Coast Guard guys on 
this Coast Guard boat, and I said, yep that’s what you see, but if you see this south of the U.S/ 
Canadian border, you’re actually looking at two Coast Guard members on a Coast Guard boat, 
but also two cross deputized, essentially U.S. Marshals. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: They’re RCMP guys but they’ve been deputized as U.S. Marshals… 
Josh: As federal agents, yeah. 
Michel: And they’re federal agents. If I took this picture north of the border, you’re looking at 
two Canadian RCMP guys and two Canadian deputized RCMP guys riding with them having 
also to be U.S. Coast Guard members. That type of inter-border cooperation, first of all doesn’t 
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exist anywhere else on the planet except between the U.S. and Canada and there are good 
reasons for that, probably, you know two of the closest partners that exist but long histories 
working together and our judicial systems match up pretty well. But, yeah that’s on steroids and I 
would argue they tried to replicate it on land, they even tried to do like air, air… 
Josh: Doesn’t work as well? 
Michel: Yeah, it’s just because maritime is different and there’s a long history of cooperation, 
and again you’ve got to have the scarcity of the assets, and in that particular one you don’t want 
the, you’ll have to stop at the border and do a hand off or something like that so it arises out of 
necessity, so that’s it on steroids because that actually is on sovereign territory, you know that’s 
sovereign territory. When you’re out on international waters things become a little bit easier for 
those cooperative things. I don’t know if you know this but U.S. also does with People’s 
Republic of China, People’s Republic of China ship riders on Coast Guard ships and they do the 
high seas drift network… 
Josh: Okay. 
Michel: Out on the Pacific, because it’s in both our countries’ interest to be able to do that, that 
type of work and the assets are so scarce and so expensive… 
Josh: Right, because you have to just cooperate. 
Michel: yeah, you have to cooperate on that stuff. 
Josh: So if you don’t mind, I’d like to sort of shift gears and zero in a little bit more on the 
Western Hemisphere strategy and so as you’ve noted and General Kelly’s noted that about three 
quarters of high confidence trafficking events usually go unmolested. The scale of that shortfall 
suggests to me that this is more than just an issue of scarce resources or to put it another way that 
it can’t be resolved with a simple influx of resource, that the deficiency is too extreme so… 
Michel: I wouldn’t make that… 
Josh: Do you disagree with that? 
Michel: Yeah, I wouldn’t make that conclusion, the point being that having been director of 
JIATF-South there are more intelligence cases than there are platforms to actually respond to. 
Josh: Right, but so my, so I guess my first question is, do you foresee a circumstance in which 
JIATF-South and the Coast Guard receive enough funding to bridge that gap? 
Michel: Well, if you go, you can search in the open source but the Commandant’s publically 
gone out and said that the Coast Guard is going to put more ships into the Western Hemisphere 
transit zones specifically to address that problem and he said we’re going to accept some risk in 
some of the other areas that we’re working on, fisheries work and some of the other things. So 
he’s already gone out and announced it and he wants to try to change that strategic equation 
down there for Central America and Mexico and the different countries that are impacted by this 
stuff so, and it’s hard, it’s, my opinion is you probably can’t ever get a hundred percent of it, you 
know you’ve got a sophisticated adversaries doing that but if you could get it at a more 
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significant portion of what’s going on there, you stand a chance of actually changing the strategic 
calculus. And if you go on and look at the national targets, we’ll just take cocaine, the national 
target for cocaine is forty percent removable rate. They didn’t pull that number out of the air. I 
don’t know if you can actually get the study but there’s a very thick study and it basically comes 
down to the conclusion that, as a business model if you’re able to take forty percent of the bad 
guy’s product, it fundamentally shifts the way they’ve got to do business in order to remain 
profitable. 
Josh: So you’re looking for a tipping point. 
Michel: Yeah, looking for a tipping point, exactly right. And the removal rate, I think at its 
highest was maybe in the upper twenties or low thirty percent. They’ve never gotten up to the 
forty percent; we’d like to see if we can actually get up there and test that theory and see whether 
we can actually change the equation. I mean we’ve been on a very good track on cocaine 
reduction anyway and when you look at the ships that are out there, there’s less ships but they’re 
a lot more effective than they used to be primarily because intelligence driven operations and a 
more sophisticated way of doing business than we have in the past. So I guess I take a little bit 
of, I don’t agree with your, the foundation of your theory there. At its heart it really is a resource 
problem, it’s not just ships. Ships can be made more effective by things like maritime patrol 
aircraft or any way to better fill in the space in the battle space down there, whether it’s 
unmanned aerial systems or satellites of other different intelligence techniques, and so on and so 
forth. That problem set is amendable to being pushed around and we pushed it around before 
when I first started they used to come directly into Florida and we pushed them out of there and 
then they came into the Bahamas and we pushed them out of there, came through the Caribbean 
and we pushed them out of there. Now they’re in Central America and hopefully we’ll be able to 
turn the screws on these guys again on the cocaine trade in particular. The other drug trades have 
their own rhythm to them, we can talk about that but the Commandant’s gone out publically if 
you see the remarks that he, he just made some remarks over at CSIS. 
Josh: Yes. 
Michel: He talked about increasing the ship presence down there, specifically to get at that 
problem set that’s identified there which really is a shortfall in boarding platform. Again, if we 
treated this as a national security threat, we’d probably shut this down very quickly but you 
know, you’d be creating smoking holes in the water, what you’d be doing. You know, the go-fast 
boat operating without lights at night with the bales on board, I mean I’m talking mixed in with, 
I’m talking fully illegitimate semi submersibles. You know, if you were treating them as a 
national security threat where your end game is just a smoking hole in the water, I think you’d 
probably shut it down fairly quickly but now you have to get a boarding team out there. I mean, 
you don’t have this smoking hole in the water, you’ve got to collect evidence, you’ve got to use 
non deadly force rules to stop it and so on and so forth, and that requires boarding teams and 
people to be there. 
Josh: Right, okay. And now, so I see that element but I also, I sort of detected in the Western 
Hemisphere strategy that there is also the recognition that there are certain upgrades, or let’s say 
Appendix B 
	 266 
emphases that need to be placed in a different element of Coast Guard strategy in the Western 
Hemisphere which seems to be coupled alongside that change in resource allocation and I know 
that, and I think when I met you at the conference in, at the Newseum, you’d emphasized this 
idea of network cultures and so that struck me but it struck me for a number of reasons not least 
of which because in a lot of the literature on transnational organized crime and cartels now, 
there’s the idea that those terms are a little mid of a misnomer, that they’re not corporately 
structured in the sense that they were in the 1980s and when you made reference to, you know to 
Escobar that now they’re much more, they’re franchised, they’re fluid, they’re networks of 
networks and.. 
Michel: Yep, I agree with all that. 
Josh: And so the definition of transnational criminal organizations in the Western Hemisphere 
strategy leaves that probably helpfully ambiguous, but I was wondering if you could comment 
maybe about how the Coast Guard’s perception of what networks are have changed over time, 
over the last several decades. 
Michel: Yeah, well I mean they morph all the time. I mean in this particular threat that we’re 
talking about with cocaine, so back in the battle days you had Pablo Escobar, he was the man, he 
basically had the entire thing so he was at the top of the organization and his, well the peasants 
always grew the coca but his guys would buy the leaf from the peasants, his guys would do the 
processing, his guys would transport it to the fishing vessel or to the airplane or wherever it was 
going. His guys would meet the airplane and the fishing vessel wherever it was going. His guys 
would take that product and they cut it and do whatever, and his guys were selling it on the 
streets of New York, I mean it was a fully integrated, you know on the lines of Exon. So Exon is 
an integrated oil, you know it drills the oil, it processes the oil, it even sells it at the pump you 
know to the user, that’s an integrated system and that’s how Pablo Escobar had the whole thing. 
Keeping strategy, you know you had the Cali Cartel you had the Medellin Cartel you know these 
big ones that were the big integrated oils and they’ve taking those all apart and they don’t exist 
anymore so what you end up with, you end up with fragmented organizations so if you’re 
familiar with like the oil industry works, you’ve got upstream, midstream, downstream, 
downstream refiners and then you’ve got retailers. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: And that’s kind of the way that, what has happened now is they’ve become specialized 
so you have organizations that just do transport, you have organizations that just by the coca leaf, 
you’ve got organizations that just do the processing of the coca leaf, they’ve got organizations 
that will meet it in Central America and they’ll take it for, you know between Honduras and 
Guatemala but once it ends up in Mexico they’ll give it to somebody else, they take it up on the 
border, much less you know the guy who sells it on the street in Chicago. Each one is very 
fragmented and specialized but the point being that each one of those organizations because 
they’re transnational criminal organizations, maybe not all of them one may be just be in Mexico 
or whatever but in its entirety, it operates as a system. So I guess the best way to describe it is, it 
is a unity of effort amongst a number of different networks that all communicate, they’ve got to 
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have the basic things that make a network function so you know a transportation organization 
has to have conveyances, it has to have a certain amount of capital, it has to communicate, it may 
have to corrupt somebody, it may have to, you know have a security side that whacks the 
competitors or whatever. I mean those basic traits of a functioning organization, some may be 
hierarchical and some may be distributed, depends on the way that they are. I will tell you that 
this, the important part about the combatting networks, there’s a number of important pieces, one 
is, it’s my belief and it’s Admiral [unclear] belief that it takes a network to most efficiently 
combat a network. And my Coast Guard organization I can most definitely tell you is a 
hierarchical organization, it goes, like in the Pablo Escobar model, it goes from the Commandant 
all the way down to the non [unclear] who’s doing the boarding, you know it’s a hierarchical 
organization, it’s really not organized in a distributed network fashion like a flatter organization. 
But a number of those organizations down range are just like that. I mean they don’t have a 
corporate headquarters, they’re all over town and they’re very fluid too. You know, and they’re 
kind of changing alliances and different types of things, but very nimble so you know we figure 
out a technique to get at them, they just write a check or they corrupt an official or they kill a 
competitor or whatever bad guys do in a very nimble fashion. Whether we can ever replicate 
that? I don’t know, but we’ve got some people who are trying a lot of new things in a more 
nimble manner. So that’s on our side of the house. On the network side of the house, this is what 
I would say about the difference in the mentality of a network, and I’ll take it from extremes. So 
when I first started in this organization thirty years ago dealing with drug traffickers, we would 
drive around in a box in between Cuba and Mexico in a place called the Yucatan Pass which we 
knew was a trafficking area, we knew they were there, didn’t know really anything else but they 
would drive, we would have a box and we would fly our helicopter and we would go around 
looking for people and we would find them and we would find bad guys on, you know with bales 
out on deck and we’d arrest them and we’d take them into Key West, we’d all get our pictures 
taken in front of the dope and we went away and we went back next time we went looking in the 
box for people, that’s what we did. We never apprehended that every encounter that we had out 
there was an encounter with the node of a network. Never thought of it that way, it was just an 
individual interdiction, we took it down. You know DEA had their kingpin strategy which you 
can say is kind of network focused, it really wasn’t, it was kind of going after the top guys in the 
pyramid. But if you treat that event as a contact with the node of the network and you treat that 
as a learning opportunity to expose the logistics, conveyance, communication, modus operandi, 
the human capital piece of that enterprise and you use that, all that to be able to identify other 
nodes in the network, that’s a higher level thinking about the problem set, a higher level of 
thinking than we’d done in the past, and the ability to recognize that and more importantly the 
ability to exploit that and counter with the node is where we want to get at. And then when we, if 
you’re able to start identifying the network, you’re able to also potentially predict, or better 
predict future operation of that network, so a future event. So if you’ve got, if you can exploit 
that network node, it may tell you not only about sort of what happened there and help you build 
a case or whatever your end-game is going to be on it, but if you get really go at it, you can 
predict what that network will do. If you understand how a network operates and functions, its 
MO, they become, every network has a certain level of predictability, and even bad guys have a 
certain level of predictability because they just can’t go out and sort of hire somebody that they 
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trust or someone smart enough to build a semi-submersible, or someone who’s smart enough to 
navigate one of these things. I mean there’s a certain cadre of people that they’re going to work 
with and when they do that and there are humans involved in that type of a system and they use 
certain communication methods or fund transfer methods or, you know transportation routes, 
they become predictable and so if you can use that encounter to the network to build that 
knowledge level and then become predictability, that feeds on itself and that’s what the 
Commandant’s talking about, getting at those networks. And also, that’s facilitated by your own 
appreciation of network type activity and your own appreciation... 
Josh: Right 
Michel: So that, it’s a higher level of functioning. Same thing with the securing border’s piece, 
when you look at that in the strategy, that’s not just about a line in the sand. That’s actually about 
treating those whole threat streams holistically, and interdicting that particular threat stream at 
the optimum point whether it’s here, whether it’s on foreign soil, whether it’s on land, whether 
it’s at somebody else’s border or our border. We’ve never done that, never done that before, but 
there’s certain organizations in the U.S. that are not designed to look any further than our border 
with another country. Is that the best place to interdict a threat stream? Maybe, maybe not. If a 
threat stream can be interdicted like cocaine can be interdicted on the water down range, in the 
you know a thousand kilo quantity before it even gets on the land, number one it’s closer to the 
head of the snake the evidence that you’re getting there, that encounter with the network is 
probably closer to the heart of the network than it is further downstream. Plus you keep it out of 
Central America with all the problems there, and on our U.S. southern border, the average 
cocaine siege is somewhere between four and seven keys. And you stand the greatest chance of 
actually interfering with legitimate commerce if you’ve got to search every flipping car for four 
to seven kilos. So, where’s your best investment? Or against cocaine threat stream, you know do 
you want to aerial eradication in Colombia, you know actually trying to… 
Josh: Source control, right. 
Michel: …or other things. The treatment of those threat streams holistically, whether it’s 
methamphetamine precursors, illegal migrants or firearms, bulk cash, you name your thing, 
where on those, where on that continuum in the threat stream is it best to invest national effort. 
Josh: Well it’s very, to me it’s very relevant that you include those other functions because what 
I’m finding is that sort of the right hand doesn’t always talk to the left hand but the reality is that 
there aren’t always such things as narcotics traffickers as there are traffickers. On Monday 
they’re trafficking cocaine and on Tuesday they’re trafficking guns and on Thursday it’s people. 
And so, is that also an element, is there recognition now that there’s a focus on this, on nodes of 
networks? Is there an integration of the idea that we’re not just looking at one form or one 
product being trafficked? 
Michel: Yes, now it’s because the traffickers have gone that way, you know. Take the guys in 
Mexico, I mean lots of times you’ll have illegal migrants mixed, you know and they’ll be 
carrying a thing of dope for you know, somebody else, yeah. I mean there, well and that’s what I 
mean about nimbleness and flexibility but, take it from a U.S. government perspective, okay 
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you’ve got a migrant, illegal migrant is carrying dope, what, let’s say you catch him in southern 
Arizona. Who’s got responsibility for that and how do we deal with that in the whole of 
government solution? Is it DEA? DEA only has, is a single focus. They only do drugs, they don’t 
do illegal migrants. That’s not in their charter, that’s not what they do. FBI does the entire 
panoply, you know, border patrol, they’ve got bits and pieces, they do all that, you know, state, 
local, tribal, you know. I don’t know, it’s, the answer to your question is as they morph, we want 
to morph with them. And we’re sort of, I don’t want to say that we’re traffic or crime ambivalent 
because we’re not, because the government is segmented. The Coast Guard can do all of it if it’s 
out on the water, Coast Guard can do all of it and it doesn’t make any difference to us, I mean 
whether they’re migrants or whatever. When you get on the land side, you do have jurisdictional 
issues, I mean ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, only typically does certain things. 
DEA only does certain things, FBI, and they all, they have overlapping jurisdictions, much less 
you add in state’s locals, that’s a whole...  
Josh: Well it seems, it appears to me that Caribbean authorities, Caribbean academics, Caribbean 
politicians, all sort of emphasize the multidimensionality of crime in the region so and it sounds 
like that, while that’s not mirrored in the structure of most federal agencies in the United States, 
you’re saying that it is a big element or a comfort factor in the Coast Guard. 
Michel: Yeah, well I mean again you’ve got a large domain based organization, we can deal with 
all of those things. That’s why on the water it’s lots of times easier to create whole of 
government solutions on the water just because you have to. I mean it’s the same thing, if DEA 
had a fleet of frigates who could go down there and bust their own dopers, they might very well 
do that but right now they don’t have any ships. So if they want to, and the beauty of it is let’s 
say you’ve got a trafficker or something you want to get, do you want to get him in Colombia, 
you know where you might or might not have access to him or he might or might not get 
prosecuted? I mean Colombia’s a pretty good partner but, put it in Honduras, you know, do you 
want to take the guy down in Honduras land side, or do you want to wait until he goes on a go 
fast boat, you get him on international waters and guess what? That guy could end up in a U.S. 
court. If you want that type of end game, and DEA lots of times wants that type of end game, 
guess what, they’ve got to come to somebody who’s got a boat who can actually do that work, or 
not only that but somebody who’s got a sensor network who can pick up that boat and can 
communicate with somebody and get out there and the only people who typically have that is 
you know navies or coast guards so they’ve got to come to us in order to use those scarce 
resources. 
Josh: I’ve just got one more question if you’ve got time for that, or… 
Michel: Sure. 
Josh: So, and this one I think might be a little bit more difficult to react to and, the idea is that in 
my dissertation I explore at length the idea that context and attitude environmentally have a big 
impact on enforcement outcomes. I’m using the theoretical framework of the Broken Windows 
Theory which is a subset of community policing which looks very heavily at how people are, 
people interact with their environments and in the course of a lot of that research, I’ve come 
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across a number of individuals, politicians, former American Ambassadors, who describe the 
Caribbean as wrestling with a culture of permissiveness with respect to crime, or even a culture 
of smuggling and this is sort of a tri-part question, but it all comes down to, is that a description 
that’s even familiar to you? Is it accurate? And if you would consider that accurate, how is that 
something that the Coast Guard addresses in its operations there? 
Michel: Yeah, I think, well, you know I’ve dealt with the Caribbean countries. Whatever I’m 
going to say here is just a broad brushstroke, I mean, this is not meant to any particular 
government and stuff but a lot of those countries are small. I mean, they’re small countries, their 
government institutions are, they’re small and can easily be overwhelmed by someone dropping 
a big load of dope or a big load of cash or, you know a big load of killing in a relatively small 
community. I mean, a lot of the islands down there are, they’re not well equipped to deal with, 
you know, violent transnational criminal organizations who can parachute in there and do what 
bad guys do, and a lot of what bad guys do is, you know, plomo o plata, either play or we’ll kill 
you and we’ll kill your family and one of those type of things, and they’re not well equipped to 
deal with that. So I think that they’re vulnerable to those type or organizations, that’s been 
demonstrated over time and if you look back when a lot of the stuff came through the Caribbean, 
a large number of corruption cases. You know, look at Pindling in the Bahamas for example, and 
the Bahamas has been kind of the smugglers haven for a long, long time and there is a, within 
certain parts of the population, there is a culture of permissiveness to smuggling type activity. I 
mean, if you look in the Bahamas, and that’s not meant, the Bahamas is actually one of our best 
partners in the world. Bahama’s defense forces and those guys, they’re committed to the fight 
and they’re a really good government partner, but there are elements, just like in our society. I 
mean there are elements in our society that are smugglers. I mean, if you look when those loads 
used to come directly into Florida, it wasn’t just Colombian guys, you know parachuting stuff 
into Florida, there were a bunch of Floridians down there who were deeply, deeply involved in 
this business. So when the temptation’s there, yeah people take advantage of those situations and 
the Caribbean is showing itself to be vulnerable to these type of organizations, but it’s not just 
the Caribbean. Take a look at Central America right now. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: Those are, and those are much bigger countries. I mean Honduras I think has about 8 
million people, Guatemala’s I don’t know 6 million, Mexico, a huge country. Mexico is a very 
serious country, I mean that is one of the largest countries here in the Western Hemisphere, one 
of the closest allies to the United States and they’re in a very serious fight with these 
transnational criminal organizations. I mean, very serious and that shows you the power of those. 
You can imagine if those got unleashed on anybody in the Caribbean, and even just a tiny 
fraction of what goes on in Mexico got unleashed in the Caribbean, it would be a serious 
situation, so. I don’t know about your Broken Window Theory because I don’t view the 
Caribbean as, really any of those islands as broken windows. I mean they’re… 
Josh: Not that the islands are broken windows, it’s more an application of that the Broken 
Windows Theory brings the idea that you’re combatting context, that the domain that you’re 
operating on is different that, so for example police officers don’t operate in terms of counter-
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murder, counter-robbery, you know. They, what Broken Windows is, it cuts through that and 
creates a new domain on which to operate and that domain is the context or the environment in 
which these activities are happening. The environment that might induce or enable somebody to, 
you know, to operate as a smuggler or traffickers, not that the government’s a broken but… 
Michel: Yeah. I would say that historically, the Caribbean has had problems with smugglers and 
they had a problem with pirates too. I mean, they had pirates and smugglers because of the 
geography of the area, because of the government institutions there, because the islands 
themselves are just very small and susceptible to, you know, organizations throwing their weight 
around in those locations so, yeah I mean the Caribbean’s vulnerable. I’ve testified on that the 
Caribbean’s vulnerable and we particularly need to watch it here because it’s all part of our 
strategy. So you know right now we’re focusing on Central America because that’s where most 
of the bad guys are and that’s where the Commandant wants to get at most of the instability, 
we’ve got to watch there because history has shown that there’s a little bit of, well there is a 
balloon effect so you push in on one area we don’t want to make sure that if we get it out, you 
know if it moves, one of the places it may move is out to the Caribbean and you’ve seen some 
testimony on that. I haven’t seen any, you know, cosmic or seismic shifts in trafficking but you 
know, we watch that extremely carefully because the bad guys, like I said are networks and 
they’ll adapt and change things. I, I’m really concerned about what’s going on in Central 
America and so is the Commandant just because the homicide rates are there, the governments 
are there, we’ve sort of seen this movie before when the TCO’s become so imbedded in there 
that they actually become an existential threat to the nation state and I would argue, you know 
Honduras, Guatemala, Belize to a certain degree, El Salvador’s its own kind of world with the 
maras and stuff like that but those countries are in a very serious fight, Mexico is too, and you 
know. Whatever we can keep out of Central America and Mexico is less fuel to the fire so that’s 
what the Commandant wants to get at. So I think an answer to your, about the Western 
Hemisphere strategy, all three of those lines of effort are higher level thinking than we of an 
organization have ever done before. Seems interesting as a Coast Guardsmen who’s been in this 
that when I started off thirty years ago I thought we were smart, I mean I really thought we were 
smart. I thought we were doing everything possible to get at this, at the threat stream that existed 
at the time but we’re a lot smarter now. And my guess is, you know ten years from now they’ll 
be another guy sitting in this chair who you’ll hear say, yeah ten years ago they thought they 
were smart, you know. But your government gets better and better and your thesis about whole 
of government solutions, you know thirty years ago we weren’t even talking about stuff like that, 
we were just talking about the Coast Guard getting its business done on whatever. 
Josh: Right. 
Michel: And maybe somebody at a higher level was but I wasn’t, but now we actually have 
organizations like JIATF-South, we have in the Southern Border Approaches campaign plan, are 
you watching that? 
Josh: Yeah. 
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Michel: Actually going to have JTF’s headed up by homeland security members where the 
department will act as a department. I don’t know if you’re familiar with that, you should 
probably Google that because that’s another higher order of DHS operating as DHS. So prior to 
Southern Border Approaches, down on the southwest border, the secretary could go to ICE, 
secretary could go to CBP, secretary could go to the Coast Guard but there was not sort of who 
you could go to in the department. The Southern Border Approaches campaign plan stands up 
three joint task forces: JTF-East which is mostly maritime focused led by the Coast Guard, JTF-
West, southwest border plus the water areas around the southwest border led by CBP and then 
JTF-Investigations led by ICE, and each one of those will have deputies from the other two 
components. So secretary on the southwest border, the secretary has one guy you can go to. And 
so if you’ve got Rio Grande valley’s got a surge operation, you can surge across that entire 
border, never had that capability, not just CBP, CBP, ICE Coast Guard, TSA, FEMA, and 
hopefully those will act as concentrating points for other interagency partners like FBI, DEA, 
state and local, and then if you can really get amped up, bring in the international partners- 
Mexico, Colombia, you know whoever you want to do and create JIATF’s. So the secretary’s got 
that, they’re mirror images of JIATF-South. JIATF-South is detection monitoring only. They 
don’t do any law enforcement in JIATF-South, they facilitate it but they don’t do it. The JTF’s 
will have the law enforcement authorities that go with that. So you can see everybody’s taking 
the game up to a higher level, so it’s all about whole of government and getting the government 
to work well together. And what you’re seeing, in my opinion, is an evolution over time. We’ve 
had a government that’s been responsive to problem sets for 200 something years, you know to 
varying degrees of effectiveness but the technology, sophistication of adversaries, expectations 
of the public, tight budget strings that don’t allow for just boutique stove pipe 
solutions, all of government is driving towards these whole of government solutions where you 
actually share those authorities, competencies, capabilities and partnerships. Sharing sounds easy 
but you’ve got to get communication, it’s the culture, the legal stuff, all that stuff that, it’s a lot 
harder to do than you would think so. But I think you’re hitting on the right thread by attacking 
maritime because in my opinion it’s some of the most sophisticated and effective methods of 
creating whole of government solutions have grown up in the maritime for the reasons that I 
described. So your paper, I think is right on. 
Josh: I appreciate it, and this has been a really interesting conversation and I’d sort of like your 
permission to, maybe I’ll, when I type up the transcript to produce a maybe a more consolidated, 
edited version and include sort of a consolidated transcript as an appendix. 
Michel: Yeah sure. 
Josh: And I can run that past somebody here if you’d like an advance but… 
Michel: That’s fine, I mean whatever I said there is just generic, generic stuff and any things that 
I said regarding any particular countries, you know hopefully I told you those are just kind of 
examples or whatever. 
Josh: Okay, well again I, this was really interesting, I appreciate you taking the time to chat with 
me about it. 
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Appendix C 
 
Dr. Thomas Mahnken 
Interview at Hopkins, SAIS DC, 1 PM on June 24, 2014 
 
The Johns Hopkins University, U.S. Naval War College 
2006-09 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning 
Primary author of the 2008 National Defense Strategy 
Contributing author to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
 
Josh: So, mind if I jump right into it?  
 
Mahnken: Sure 
 
Josh: Okay, so I was listening to a podcast from the New America Foundation a couple of 
days ago and they had Former Assistant Secretary for Operational Energy Plans and 
Programs Sharon Burke on, and she was talking about how people speak of the Pentagon 
as if it has artificial intelligence, that the building wants this or that, or doesn’t want this 
or that. Then you’ve got scholars like John Nagl and John Shy who similarly speak of the 
Pentagon’s institutional memory, and how that institutional memory sort of shapes 
certain preferences. My first question off the bat is, do you believe that such an 
institutional memory exists, does the building have a brain, so to speak? 
 
Mahnken: No. Look, I think if you want, whether you want to think about institution 
memory, or if you want to think about culture, strategic culture, you really need to think 
about it on a number of different levels. So I would say, you know, starting at the top 
there is sort of, there is a national strategic culture, which is the way Americans think 
about the use of force and think about national security. Then there is you know what 
I’ve called a military strategic culture, which is kind of basically equivalent to the ‘fill in 
the blank’ way of war, whether you want to say the American way of war, you know, 
apply it to Britain, the British way of war, which are kind of enduring strategic 
preferences about the use of force and the way we as a country use force. And then below 
that I think you need to think about individual services and their organizational cultures 
and even within services different communities within those services and their strategic 
cultures as well. So yeah I don’t think you could say, yeah I don’t think, you know, the 
Department of Defense is a unitary actor. 
 
Josh: Right, so individual units might have certain institutional preferences but essentially 
the Pentagon is too large of an institution to really have its own distinct culture? 
 
Mahnken: Yeah. So I mean my book on Technology and the American way of war is 
really a book about service strategic culture and how that shaped the, you know, the 
weapons that we bought and the weapons that we didn’t buy. So yeah, I think thinking 
about it in terms of services, because services are still, you know, are still the—nobody 
joins the U.S. Military, they join the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps because 
of aspects of those organizations that, you know, they see reflected in them or that they 
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would like to see reflected in them, and it’s still the services that are primarily responsible 
for organizing, training and equipping the U.S. Military. 
 
 
Josh: Okay, and then, moving more towards projection over let’s say the next three 
decades, where would you yourself identify the most significant threats over that, I guess, 
medium-range limit? Particularly with an interest in, are you classifying those threats by 
country, geography, demography, non-state actors, what’s your vision of what the threat 
environment looks like over the medium-range? 
 
Mahnken: Okay well those are two different questions, so which is the question? Is the 
question the most significant threats? 
 
Josh: Yes. 
 
Mahnken: Okay, well I think the most [emphasized] significant threat over the next two 
to three decades is the rise of China and the, you know, its implications for the balance, 
the global balance of power. I would say, you know, also significant, you know, regional 
rogues such as North Korea, such as Iran, increasingly equipped with nuclear weapons, 
because of their ability to cause damage. And I also think, you know, violent jihadist 
organizations also will continue to be a pretty considerable threat. 
 
Josh: Okay 
 
Mahnken: But again so I’m thinking of significance in terms of ability to, you know, to 
cause damage to the United States and to disrupt the international system. 
 
Josh: Okay, that actually answers one of my other questions which is, is that risk 
particularly to the global system or the United States and you’re saying essentially both. 
Would you say the two are intertwined? 
 
Mahnken: Yeah of course. 
 
Josh: Okay 
 
Mahnken: Because the United States has played a central role in preserving the 
international system and we have also been beneficiaries of a stable international system. 
 
Josh: Okay. Moving right along, David Kilcullen argues that urban third world littorals 
(as I was telling you) [refers to pre-interview discussion] present one of the most likely 
theaters for conflict in the future. How significantly would you rank those regions as 
threats? Would you categorize them also as threats more towards the global system or 
more towards the United States directly? 
 
Mahnken: Well look I mean I think, I think what he’s talking about is, you know, is the 
confluence of several, you know, several trends, so demographic trends—both in terms of 
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age structures in developing countries but also demographic trends in terms of 
urbanization—you could also extend that to talk about, you know, trends in climate, and 
things like that. So, you know, that is a concern. Now whether, you know, how much of 
that is a global concern I think is very much open to question. You know, Karachi today 
is a pretty, pretty nasty place, it’s particularly nasty if you’re a Pakistani, so I can 
certainly see circumstances where, you know, threats could emerge from those trends, I 
could see circumstances in which those might [said with emphasis] threaten the United 
States, but I, you know, I would say that’s not a certainty. I could see sima—I could also 
see circumstances where the U.S. Military would be called upon to operate in that type of 
an environment, whether in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, or some sort of 
intervention. I mean I think all of those are possible. Those are all policy choices though. 
 
Josh: Okay, so—you’re not viewing those as threats that will impose themselves on the 
United States, policy choices meaning that’s something that we either choose to get 
involved in or choose not to get involved in. 
 
Mahnken: Right, yeah. 
 
Josh: And kind of, that cuts right to this question, which is, are these types of threats the 
responsibility of the Department of Defense to respond to? 
 
Mahnken: I think, you know the, the Department of—the services have traditionally 
thought about humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as lesser-included capabilities. 
In other words, if you, if you buy capabilities (you mentioned the Navy earlier), so the 
Navy by and large does not organize, train and equip itself for humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief. The, however, the capability and the capacity that the Navy acquires 
gives it a substantial ability to perform those missions. And I think that’s right. I think 
there certainly are some, maybe some specialized capabilities you might want to invest 
in, but by and large if you buy a world class navy, it is a world class navy that’s capable 
of getting there rapidly with lot’s of humanitarian assistance and, you know, disaster 
relief capabilities. If you take a look at say the aftermath of the Japanese tsunami, who 
were the first responders? Well they were forward deployed naval forces, conventional 
naval forces, deployed in Japan. And they brought with them immense capacity to do 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 
 
Josh: Okay, well and considering that these are policy choices, is there, I guess a strategic 
plan in place, I guess at higher levels at the Pentagon, for how the United States (again 
I’m mostly interested in the Navy but generally speaking the services at large) engage 
with, I guess what are being ca—hybrid threats, criminal insurgencies, these groups that 
operate in these coastal littorals? 
 
Mahnken: Well, okay so, so, a couple of different pieces to it. I would say the Defense 
Department, certainly since 2006, since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the, you 
know, Defense Department’s force planning construct, so the construct that’s used to 
portray the demand for DOD capabilities, beginning in 2006 explicitly considered 
peacetime demand for DOD capabilities, and that includes dealing with, you know, 
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irregular warfare, it includes humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. It also includes a lot 
of other things like noncombatant evacuation operations, presence, all sorts of other 
things. So I would say that, that when the Defense Department looks at what capabilities 
it needs, for the last eight years that demand signal has included these types of, these 
types of things. And so yes while each humanitarian assistance mission is a policy choice, 
you can look back historically and say, you know—look historically we’ve, disaster relief 
is probably a better, better example. X number of times a year, or once every X number 
of years we’ve done this so we need to program in the capacity to do that. 
 
Josh: I think that’s, that’s Kilcullen’s argument is its—I think, what he’s essentially, I 
think, trying to say is it’s, it’s not quite the policy, the independent policy choice that it’s 
often advertised to be, that these things, no one really likes to get engaged with these sort 
of long term stability operations or short term, you know, low intensity conflicts but they 
do thrust themselves upon the United States, you know, like you said, once a generation 
or every ten years or so, so. Moving, I guess, towards the hardware element of this, on the 
acquisition side, the, it looks as if the Navy is continuously defending its choice in the 
Littoral Combat Ship against an ever-widening body of critics, I think now including the 
Secretary of Defense. I was wondering, first, if you could articulate the ship’s mission. Is 
that something that, sort of, has been made readily apparent in the policy community? 
 
Mahnken: No, look I think the rationale. First off I don’t think it’s a great investment, so, 
but I think the rationale, I mean the real rationale, is you, you know, that the Navy needs 
more hulls, and they need more hulls than you can afford if you’re building only 
destroyers and cruisers and aircraft carriers and attack submarines. You need more hulls 
to be able to project presence, and you need more hulls to do things like minesweeping, 
help with anti-submarine warfare, a whole bunch of things. 
 
Josh: Okay, so your argument, from that perspective, the choice to move towards the 
Littoral Combat Ship doesn’t signal so much an interest in the littorals as an interest in a 
cheaper alternative to more expensive destroyers and? 
 
Mahnken: The Navy for generations, for you know really, actually navies, always have a 
high/low mix, right? And in the past, for the, the previous generation of the U.S. Navy, 
the low part of the low mix was frigates, was Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. Those 
are gone, and the, I will say the functional replacement is the Littoral Combat Ship. 
Again we can argue about how good or how bad a replacement it is as a particular ship… 
 
Josh: Right, right 
 
Mahnken: But that’s, but in a way that’s, you know, that’s a level of analysis that’s below 
what I think you’re asking me. No, the purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship is to provide 
the low end to allow for a high/low mix and therefore to allow a larger navy. 
 
Josh: Okay 
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Mahnken: If you were only, you know, if you were only procuring destroyers, say 
destroyers and cruisers, you’d have a much smaller navy. 
 
Josh: Right, okay. So from the— 
 
Mahnken: And, sorry, and one could have very good arguments as about, as to what that 
low end should look like. Should it be Littoral Combat Ships, should it be a new design 
frigate, should it be, you know, a frigate purchase with a design that somebody else has 
come up with? I don’t know that anybody argues that we don’t need to have a low end in 
naval force structure. 
 
Josh: Right, well, it just seems as if the ship itself has garnered a lot of critical attention 
 
Mahnken: Absolutely 
 
Josh: And I was wondering, is that criticism because of the Navy’s failure to articulate a 
specific mission for it, does it, is there a deeper objection to moving the navies into the 
brown waters to a larger extent, or is it honestly just a badly designed ship? Why its 
garnering so much criticism. 
 
Mahnken: Well, I think it is definitely true that the Navy has not fully articulated the, you 
know, the strategic rationale for its force structure. Whether it’s a badly designed ship or 
not, in a way it’s kind of too early to tell. What I would say is traditionally, you know, 
new, new classes of ships always have a breaking in period, they always have a teething 
period, they always have, you know, they always have problems. The good thing about a 
good design is kind of work through those problems, it winds up being a huge success, 
and people forget that they talk about these things. In the case of the Littoral Combat 
Ship, I think part of the question is, well part of it has to do with the philosophy of the 
design, which is this notion that it was going to be a modular design. And I think in 
practice that’s just never worked out with naval combatants. In other words you, or, 
rather you build in modularity at the, at the design phase, you don’t really have it in 
operationally. So, there certainly are designs, you know the MEKO-class frigates are 
probably the best examples, where they’re modular in terms of their design, you can 
order one and say “hey I want one that does x,y, and z,” and it’ll be built with those 
modules included. With the Littoral Combat Ship the notion, or the conceit was, that 
you’d have this ship and then you could swap out modules. 
 
Josh: Okay 
 
Mahnken: In practice that just doesn’t happen. And then the problem with the Littoral 
Combat Ship has been that, part of the reason, and part of the reason it doesn’t happen is, 
those modules get, you know, aren’t funded. And so now you have a truck, but nothing 
for the truck to carry. 
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Josh: Okay. And I’ve seen also, it’s been at least advertised partially as also a sealift 
issue, that you might have a ship where it needs to be but you don’t have the modules that 
you need to put there. I don’t know how legitimate a criticism that is— 
 
Mahnken: Yeah that’s true too but you first actually have to purchase the modules, have 
them operational, which we’re not even at that stage. 
 
Josh: Right, okay. Very interesting. This next question kind of just gets right to the crux 
of what I’m talking about, which is: with the growing cost of modern fleets like you’re 
talking about, and this redistribution of resources we’re seeing very heavily towards the 
Asia-Pacific, and I think we can— 
 
Mahnken: Okay but when you say “redistribution heavily towards the Asia-Pacific,” the 
U.S. Navy today has about 55 percent of its major surface combatants in the Pacific 
 
Josh: Right. 
 
Mahnken: And the goal is to get to 60 percent. 
 
Josh: Right. Okay, fair heavily, is a normative— 
 
Mahnken: Already a majority of U.S. naval assets are in the Pacific 
 
Josh: Right, right 
 
Mahnken: You’re talking about 5 percent more. 
 
Josh: You’re talking about five percent more ships, you are also talking about a 
substantial intellectual investment at, you know, the Naval War College which I think is 
where you are also affiliated, at the Naval Postgraduate School, so there is, I think 
generally speaking, there is a political orientation with the Pivot to Asia so, but yes at a 
hardware level five percent we can argue how significant or not. But I think that’s also a 
growing percentage of a shrinking pot. 
 
Mahnken: Absolutely. 
 
Josh: So with all of that in mind, how, or will, that affect the Navy’s capacity to operate 
globally, how will that impact the Navy’s commitments elsewhere? 
 
Mahnken: Look I think, I think, the United States has no, we are a global power, we’re 
not a regional power, so the, and the part of the U.S. armed forces that is most flexible is 
the Navy. So the Navy will, you know, be present, will operate globally. That having 
been said, you know I think it’s been recognized by multiple administrations, certainly 
going back to the 2001 QDR, that Asia’s strategic weight is growing, and so that needs to 
be taken, taken account of. 
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Josh: Okay, and then continuing to how the actually planning process works, particularly 
of late (these are two questions, we can parse them out). But one is, sow does the threat 
of sequestration influence strategic planning, if it does at all? And then, the other side is, 
how does, I think most commentators would say that we’re seeing far more heightened 
political partisanship, particularly in the budget process than historically is normal, and 
how (if at all) does that influence the planning process as well? 
 
Mahnken: So on the partisanship issue I guess it depends on what your, you know, what 
your historical lens is. I mean more partisanship than in the recent past? Maybe. More 
partisanship than other points of American history? Well that’s debatable. We haven’t 
had members of Congress beating each other up with canes or dueling with pistols, both 
of which have happened in our history, so you know. But look I would say that sea power 
I think is one, is one issue where there is a lot of bipartisanship, and also the Asia-Pacific 
is another area where there is a lot of bipartisanship. So, you go to the people’s chamber 
of Congress, you go to the House, which was designed by the founders to be closer to the 
voter and more closely represent voter, you know, voter preferences, and you see the, you 
see the Asia-Pacific caucus co-chaired by Congressmen Forbes and Congresswoman 
Hanabusa. You see a whole sea power, you know, coalition, that’s quite bipartisan. So I 
would say, the general point I would take, that there certainly is a lot of, a lot of 
discontent, sequestration is terrible because it really, the way it’s implemented actually 
disproportionately hurts successful acquisition programs because it salami slices, you 
know, ten percent out of every program, and so it winds up really again hurting programs 
like the Virginia attack submarine that are actually very good acquisition programs. So 
that’s bad. 
 
Josh: Is it, sorry, is it disproportionate just because they’re successful programs? Or… 
 
Mahnken: Yeah, well a successful program runs on time and on budget or under budget, 
and so it’s a successful program, you’ve demonstrated that you can deliver on time and 
on budget, and now you go take ten percent away from it. Whereas, you know, if it’s a 
program that’s in trouble, that’s behind, it’s already in trouble, so you go from, you 
know, being on pace to acquire two Virginia attack submarines a year, at a sustainable 
rate, and then you take ten percent out every year and it’s like, well what’s ten percent off 
of two? It’s not 1.8, it’s one or one and a half, and so whereas if you have a program 
again that’s behind, that’s over, yeah there, it’s hurt but it’s already a program that’s, you 
know, that’s not performing. So all that was a preface to saying that all that’s bad, but I 
think there is certainly more bipartisanship comparatively on issues of sea power and 
Asia-Pacific. 
 
Josh: Okay. I’ve certainly noted that there’s strong bipartisanship, especially on the Asia-
Pacific issue. That seems to be, sort of, the one strategic issue that everybody can get 
behind. Okay, I’ve only just got a couple more questions for you. 
 
Mahnken: And, you know, Congressman Forbes represents a district in Virginia, so on 
the Atlantic coast, it’s not, Congresswoman Hanabusa it’s a little bit easier to understand 
coming from Hawaii, but still so that’s a good example I think. 
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Josh: Right, okay great. This kind of gets us back to that issue of Kilcullen’s thesis with 
the question: how do, if at all, do strategists traditionally look at indicators like 
demography or urban concentration when they’re guiding, let’s say, broader national 
strategy? 
 
Mahnken: That’s the topic for a whole long conversation but certainly, I mean, when I 
was in the Pentagon, and it continued after me, the answer was you know we looked at 
long-term trends a lot, and there was actually a project called “Trends and Shocks” which 
was, which looked at a whole series of trends, including demography, including climate, 
including governance, science and technology, and looked at how they may play out over 
years, and also looked at potential shocks–discontinuities including, you know, a natural 
disaster in a littoral urban area, including all sorts of things like that. And, again since 
sort of 2006/2007 that’s been incorporated into U.S. defense planning. If you read the 
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review section on the strategic environment carefully I think 
what you’ll see is the evidence of just that sort of thinking. There’s a couple paragraphs 
that really talk about trends and shocks their implications for defense planning. 
 
Josh: This question is kind of out of left field, but in your experience both in academia 
and in policy have you witnessed any significant interdisciplinary exchanges between 
criminology and defense? A lot of the stuff that I read, I sort of hear people say, “there 
should, we should see what we can learn from, you know, law enforcement” but there 
seems to be very little in the way of actual engagement, at least as far as the literature 
I’ve seen. 
 
Mahnken: I think that’s true but of course you know the thing is most policymakers don’t 
think in terms of disciplines or talk in terms of disciplines, I mean that tends to happen in 
the academia much more than in policymaking circles. So, you know, to the extent that 
that expertise is brought in it’s not brought in in terms of criminology its brought in by 
the various fields of expertise, various experts, various communities, so that’s kind of a 
hard one to answer. 
 
Josh: Okay. But, the law enforcement community, would you say it has a reasonable 
involvement in defense planning or? 
 
Mahnken: Well, defense planning, I mean that’s. Well I don’t know that anybody other 
than defense planners have a reasonable input into defense planning. I mean, but our law 
enforcement, you know. Look so, so again back to 2006, you know again the 2006 QDR I 
think was instrumental in talking about building partner capacity, and, and it was 
actually, when we talked about building partner capacity it was mainly building the 
capacity of foreign countries to meet national security threats. The other half of it which, 
until it was, well, the other half of it was about building capacity within the United States. 
And, and so that would include law enforcement. And the point there was, because in so 
many ways DOD was the 800 pound guerilla, DOD was tasked with doing all sorts of 
things that really aren’t central to Title Ten U.S. code which defines the mission of the 
Defense Department. And so the notion was, was very much you need to build up the 
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capacity of other parts of the national security community to handle things, including law 
enforcement. I think that was certainly the case, also, not just in general, but if you look 
at in Iraq and in Afghanistan, as two examples, building both domestic law enforcement 
capacity and using that to combat irregular threats, and also building law enforcement 
capacity in partner states, was key. Now we’re, you know, we’re hindered by the 
structure of law enforcement agencies in the United States, which is, again, it’s a product 
of our government, our constitutional system. We don’t have a federal police force. It’s 
why countries like Italy, countries like Australia actually have very valuable roles to play, 
because there is the Carabinieri, and there is the Australian Federal Police. For the U.S., I 
mean there’s FBI, but the FBI is not a federal police force. And so we are disadvantaged 
when we the United States, say, you know, are working with the Afghan government 
trying to build their law enforcement capability, because we don’t… Unless it’s the 
Military Police as part of the Army, or Navy Criminal Investigative Service, we really 
don’t do that. 
 
Josh: Right, okay very interesting. This is just generally a question of philosophy because 
this is something I—St Andrews is a very theory and constructivist heavy university, you 
probably had some interesting talks while you were there, and I just wanted to know 
because you’ve had successful careers, sort of, melding and moving between academia 
and policy, what do you think the role of academia is in advising or shaping policy? 
 
Mahnken: Look I think, I think ideas matter, I think they matter both directly and 
indirectly, and I think they matter most indirectly, meaning by kind of setting up debates, 
getting ideas out there, they affect the context within which decisions are made. I think 
it’s much rarer that, you know, a particular book or article has a real, has a real influence 
in and of itself. It’s in part because policymakers are by and large very bright people 
already, they know quite a lot, but they’re also very busy people and they kind of operate 
in this hermetically sealed environment, and so it’s very difficult for outsiders to 
influence policymaking. I would go so far as to say it’s not even a good objective. I don’t 
do my scholarship to affect policymakers, if it does that’s wonderful but I do it, you know 
for, to affect academic discussions. 
 
Josh: Okay, very good. And then my last question is, is there anybody that you would 
recommend that I talk to that you think generally speaking this would be interesting for? 
 
Mahnken: Have you, who have you talked to in the Pentagon? 
 
Josh: I just got to DC, so this is my, my first meeting. 
 
Mahnken: Okay. Yeah, I mean I would talk to people, you know, you might want to talk 
to Mara Karlin, she’s the deputy in the strategy shop in OSD policy, she’s also a former 
student of mine. So, she might be able to give you a good read on those things. Yeah, 
she’d be a good person to talk to. 
 
Josh: Okay, great. Thank you very much for taking the time, I appreciate it. 
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Appendix D 
 
The Response to Transnational Threats in the Caribbean 
 
The Response to Narcotics Trafficking 
 
Because of the dominance of the littoral Western Caribbean route for drugs 
smuggling, the most concerted law enforcement efforts of late have been directed in this 
region. Operation MARTILLO, the primary international anti-drug effort organized out 
of U.S. Southern Command,* “seeks to deny the use of the Central American littorals by 
TCOs [Transnational Criminal Organizations]…while maximizing the drug interdiction 
efforts of our interagency partners in the principal geographic corridor through which the 
bulk of illicit drugs moves towards the United States.”1 These littorals became 
increasingly popular smuggling routes after a series of record enforcement years in the 
mid-2000s drove traffickers out of the high seas, where coast guards and navies have the 
advantage.2 As Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Zukunft notes, traffickers have “very 
few allies at sea, and that’s where we do have the upper hand.”3 By increasing 
enforcement in the littorals, Operation MARTILLO hopes that the balloon effect will 
actually work to their advantage, forcing smugglers back into vulnerable deep water.4 
Yet, interdiction-based enforcement efforts have been increasingly inefficient. After the 
Cold War, abundant U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets made blanket patrols feasible (see 
Appendix A conversation with Captain Mark Morris (Ret.), Chief of U.S. Naval Mission 
in Colombia). As resources decline, the same principle can no longer be supported by the 
available resources.  Operation MARTILLO typifies this evolving mismatch between the 
scale of the problem and the scale of American investment in a ‘solution.’ 
Operation MARTILLO is credited, in fiscal year 2013, with disrupting 132,191 
kilograms of cocaine, 42,232 pounds of marijuana, $3.5 million in bulk cash shipments 
(proceeds from drug sales), and 107 vessels and craft.5 In its first two and a half years, 
MARTILLO disrupted a total of 272 metric tons of cocaine, seized $10.7 million in bulk 
cash, and seized 198 vessels and aircraft.6 JIATF-South, which coordinates MARTILLO 
under Southern Command, even reported declines in illicit maritime activity in Western 
Caribbean littorals of forty-three percent.7 There is no broader evidence, however, that 
this has precipitated a decline in overall traffic. Even JIATF-South hints that the declines 
it measures may not translate to overall dips in the drug market but are seen as successes 
if they drive the trade out of the littorals.8 It is likely that decreased traffic in go-fast boats 
in the littorals is mostly an indication of the increased use of alternative means and 
routes. This resilience of the narcotics industry is an astonishing feat given JIATF-South 
estimates it disrupted almost $2.6 billion (wholesale) in cocaine trafficking in 20139 (and 
an estimated $3 billion denied to TCOs in 2012).10 And as the ceaseless back-and-forth 
continues, Southern Command is now concerned that its success in closing more direct 
routes to Honduras will propel traffickers even deeper into congested and camouflaged 
                                                
* The U.S. military has been consistently involved in counter-drug operations since the 1980s, when the 
Pentagon contributed intelligence assets like Joint Task Force-4 in Key West. See, James Zackrison, 
“Smuggling and the Caribbean: Tainting Paradise Throughought History,” in Transnational Threats: 
Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, ed. Kimberley Thachuk (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), 185. 
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littorals.11 Without a massive increase in available resources, which is unlikely, this 
balloon effect will continue to dictate ambiguous enforcement outcomes. Limited assets, 
deployed in limited locations, will inevitably create enforcement gaps elsewhere.12 
Despite this effort, what is perhaps most notable about MARTILLO is the relative 
paucity of the Pentagon’s investment in it and similar operations. In March 2014, 
SOUTHCOM’s commander told Congress (speaking of drug trafficking), “I simply sit 
and watch it go by.”13 Sequestration-induced cuts have made particularly deep incisions 
in Southern Command’s capacity, which already sees itself as “an economy of force 
Combatant Command”14 (read: low priority).* General Kelly continues, “because of 
service cuts, I don’t expect to get any immediate relief, in terms of assets, to work with in 
this region of the world.”15 Southern Command perceives itself “as the lowest priority 
Geographic Combatant Command” and expects to receive “little, if any, ‘trickle down’ of 
restored funding.”16 Southern Command has seen a further draw down in capacity due to 
the declining availability of U.S. Navy frigates as well as the expected decommissioning 
of the Coast Guard’s High Endurance Cutters.17 In 2013, the forced furlough of 572 
SOUTHCOM civilian employees had a “significant impact” on counter-drug operations, 
and despite a reprieve through fiscal year 2015, Kelly fears the instability will spur a 
talent drain in civilians looking for more stable employment.18 Kelly testified that the 
forces under his command failed to capture an astounding eighty percent of estimated 
Caribbean-trafficked narcotics.19 In his assessment, SOUTHCOM receives about five 
percent of the resources necessary to pursue this mission.20 Southern Command appears 
to feel so neglected that General Kelly felt compelled to dissuade against a total 
disengagement from the region, as “some might argue.”21 In an effort to offset cuts in 
resources, Southern Command relies “heavily on the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and 
Border Protection, which now provide the bulk of the ships and aircraft available.”22 
Even in its primary area of responsibility, however, the Coast Guard receives a fraction of 
the budget and resources compared to what the Navy has the potential to wield. 
Sequestration has further imposed budget tensions and threats of downsized assets for the 
USCG.23 Admiral Michel said in 2012 that his Task Force was “unable to target 74 
percent of high confidence events”24 because of resource scarcity. Even of the remaining 
twenty-six percent, interdictions were frequently hampered by an inadequate distribution 
of sensors to provide necessary domain awareness.25 Yet, such financial constraints are 
not strictly an expression of frugality. To put this resource deficiency to scale, in 2013 the 
Coast Guard “expended over 2,900 cutter days, 900 Airborne Use of Force capable 
helicopters days, and 8,000 surveillance aircraft hours on counterdrug patrols.”†26 It 
cannot be more apparent that, even under normal budgetary circumstances, the maritime 
enforcement bodies responsible for interdiction in the Caribbean will, at no point in the 
foreseeable future, command the expansive resources necessary to once again combat 
                                                
* See Appendix A for an extended conversation on the relationship the U.S. Navy has with its operators in 
the region. 
† By contrast, in that same year, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) provided a total 
of “six frigates, [one] High Speed Vessel (HSV) SWIFT, four fixed-wing Maritime Patrol aircraft and two 
Scientific Development Squadron ONE detachments” for MARTILLO. See, General John Kelly, “Posture 
Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern 
Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 
February 26, 2014), 36-37. 
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narcotics trafficking in a conventional, midcentury law enforcement manner (interdiction-
oriented blanket patrols). The task is simply Sisyphean. 
Despite the enormity of this task, a number of progressive programs can be 
discerned amid the range of partnerships and law enforcement missions in which 
Southern Command participates. U.S. Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH), 
for example, employs Joint Riverine Training Teams (JRTT) comprised of Marine Corps 
and Naval personnel to train local littoral and riverine police, coast guard, and navy units 
in best practices for interoperating between land and sea.27 Operation UNIFIED 
RESOLVE, launched in September 2012, promotes interagency Puerto Rican interdiction 
efforts across JIATF-South, Coast Guard District Seven, Customs and Border Protection, 
and others.28 Towards the end of 2013, SOUTHCOM launched a collaborative Counter-
Threat Finance Branch with the Department of the Treasury to map and combat illicit 
networks through financial means.29 In many respects, these SOUTHCOM operations are 
a model for ‘whole of government’ efforts. In fact, U.S. Southern Command headquarters 
contains thirty-four representatives from fifteen distinct federal agencies on its staff.30 
The commander of Southern Command maintains that the “maturity, strategic leadership, 
and tactical collaboration between JIATFS, the USCG, and CBP have greatly enhanced 
the effectiveness of countering illicit trafficking (CIT) operations in the Northeastern 
Caribbean.”31 The Coast Guard’s comfort with constabulary responsibilities and close 
collaboration with the Navy demonstrates both the value and the feasibility of 
incorporating such missions as sub-fields naval strategy (indeed, as it is already being 
done on this small scale). 
International collaborations also play a significant role in Caribbean operations, 
both as a means of partnership and capacity building, but also in an effort to leverage 
limited resources. Southern Command reports that, of the nearly 150 interdictions 
supported by JIATF-South in FY2013, one half would have failed without some degree 
of international support.32 In 2012, Admiral Michel told Congress that international 
partners were active participants in eighty-three percent of disruptions the preceding year, 
acting as a “force multiplier.”33 Alongside the aid of local Caribbean enforcement agents 
(typically small coast guards, police, and occasional naval forces), larger international 
players also assist in counterdrug efforts. Some of the most significant of these partners 
include those with regional dependencies, territories, and associated states such as the 
United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, as well as important hemispheric actors 
such as Canada.34 This extensive partnership provides an answer to one of the most 
frequent comments faced in researching this dissertation: the limit of Posse Comitatus, 
the regulation forbidding the U.S. armed forces from acting in a law enforcement 
capacity. The international experience of Southern Command has directly and efficiently 
addressed this by embarking Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) 
onboard naval ships. The Coast Guard operates in both a military and law enforcement 
capacity, and thus is exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. In 2013, 
the U.S. Coast Guard deployed LEDETs onboard U.S. Navy ships, as well as British, 
Dutch, and Canadian ships (seventeen in total).35 RFA Wave Knight, for example, an 
auxiliary ship in the British fleet, supported multiple interdictions with the aid of one 
such team, even hosting a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter for over half of the ship’s 471-day 
deployment, the first time ever a tactical Coast Guard helicopter squadron has deployed 
on a non-U.S. ship.36 During its time in the Caribbean, the Wave Knight (part of Atlantic 
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Patrol Tasking North) housed eleven American law enforcement personnel,37 an 
embarkation that dramatically widened the impact of limited American resources. In the 
span of only two months in early 2014, RFA Wave Knight made or facilitated at least 
three interdictions, one seizing drugs worth up to £300 million.38  Each mission 
incorporated the participation of the U.S. Coast Guard.  
A related arrangement that addresses some of the legal points of performing 
maritime security operations in the littorals are the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLATs) common throughout the Caribbean. Similar arrangements date as far back as 
1926, when the British government allowed the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict ships in the 
Bahamas suspected of smuggling alcohol into the United States.39 Interdiction 
arrangements have since continued to play an important role in the Caribbean. Today, 
MLATs facilitate the exchange of information and coordinate international law 
enforcement efforts throughout the basin. The United States maintains such agreements 
with, among others in Latin America, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Bermuda, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
(which covers Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Maarten), Panama, 
St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
United Kingdom (which covers Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, 
Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos), and Venezuela.40 At the time of writing, another such 
treaty had been negotiated with Colombia but had yet to enter force. Such international 
counter-drug cooperation is widespread in the Caribbean. In the summer of 2013, Interpol 
coordinated an operation in the region netting $822 million in seized drugs and 142 
arrests.41 Europol, the EU police agency, was a partner in the operation that included 
thirty-four countries and territories, most of them Caribbean.42 Notably, the operation 
also included participation by Western constabulary forces, including the French Coast 
Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.43 The United States has invested heavily 
in such partnerships. Southern Command has provided millions of dollars in counter-
narcotics training and equipment in recent years, most notably delivering forty-two 
interceptor boats to regional navies and coast guards.44 In 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard 
facilitated two Multilateral Maritime Counterdrug Summits in partnership with the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI, a thirteen nation collective) and other South 
and Central American states.45 In yet another multinational effort, the maritime forces 
deployed Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT) to an expanding number of 
Caribbean maritime forces to offer logistical and mechanical training.46 In these and 
similar programs, Southern Command (with considerable Coast Guard leadership) has 
exhibited an important inclination towards creative problem solving that suggests it may 
be among the most strategically flexible of any unified combatant command.* 
 
The Response to Irregular Migration 
 
Responding to the implications of mass human movement in the Caribbean Basin 
is a monumental challenge. As human trafficking continues to grow faster than any illicit 
trade, as human smuggling continues to transport people and diseases across borders, and 
as the networks that perpetrate these deeds expand in scope and ‘product,’ irregular 
migration in the Caribbean is an issue of security concern. Yet, the obstacles to any 
                                                
* We speak to the implications of this international orientation and strategic flexibility in Section 8. 
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strategy aimed at this task are manifold. First, there are the economic disincentives to 
greater enforcement. As the Caribbean attempts to further regional integration, barriers to 
human trafficking and irregular migration will continuously come in conflict with efforts 
like CARICOM’s Single Market and Economy (CSME) initiative.47 While Schengen 
Zone-inspired freedom of movement is far from a reality in the Caribbean, many in the 
region aspire to such a community “without barriers.”48 Economic incentives favor the 
open exchange of goods and people, and U.S. direct investment in Latin America at large 
exceeds one trillion dollars (second only to U.S. investment in Europe).49 Of the twenty 
states with which the U.S. government has signed free-trade agreements (FTAs), “more 
than half are in the Western Hemisphere.”50 Furthermore, the industry that drives the 
demand for so much cheap labor across the Basin, tourism, is in its own right the source 
of the largest movement of people in the Caribbean (more than twenty million visitors 
annually).51 On top of tourism, the constant flux of domestic migration flows, particularly 
in Guyana and Jamaica, add to an ever-dynamic movement of people.52 This extensive 
domestic migration makes it all the more difficult to detect victims of trafficking, as well 
as irregular migrants.53 The most obvious obstacle, however, is access to resources. 
If counter-narcotics operators believe they receive a fraction of the resources they 
require, anti-human trafficking and human smuggling operations receive even less. 
According to the Congressional Research Service, American funded, anti-human 
trafficking-specific initiatives in Latin America totaled less than eight-and-a-half million 
dollars in fiscal year 2011.54 More than sixty percent of those funds went to one country 
(Haiti).55 This American anti-TIP funding for Latin America represents about ten percent 
of the U.S. total.56 The increases in migration flows exhibited in the first half of this 
decade “would place additional burdens on already overstretched U.S. Coast Guard” and 
Caribbean assets.57 What action has been taken is done in the same vein as narcotics 
interdiction. But that enforcement must come as part of a broader strategy, which 
recognizes that trafficking is not an isolated act. We highlighted above the interplay 
between human and narcotics trafficking. The multidimensional nature of human 
trafficking often means that victims are also implicated in local crime (prostitution or 
theft, for example). Treating human trafficking with a midcentury criminal model 
perspective frequently misidentifies victims as criminals or illegal migrants.58 The theme 
of the 2014 Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report, with its emphasis on 
victims’ rights, is intended to provide a set of principles to realign policing with this 
nuanced perspective on counter-TIP. UNODC also funds numerous projects that seek to 
develop local law enforcement’s capacity to respond to the unique challenges of human 
trafficking.59 
Engagement on issues of human rights and human dignity is a sensible 
cornerstone for a strategy guided by Broken Windows. As the theory illustrates, a 
population’s psychological well-being is instrumental in building communal security and 
interrupting individual criminal actions. Southern Command is acutely aware of this 
need, as well as the difficulty in building and sustaining goodwill. SOUTHCOM 
Commander Kelly testified to Congress, “our persistent human rights engagement also 
helps encourage defense cooperation, trust, and confidence, which cannot be surged when 
a crisis hits, and cannot be achieved through episodic deployments or chance contacts.”60 
Southern Command prides itself on this commitment to human security: “Everything we 
do at U.S. Southern Command begins and ends with human rights…A lot of people talk 
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about human rights, but the U.S. military does human rights. We live it. We teach it. We 
enforce it.”61 Yet, budget cuts have targeted the very missions necessary to maintain 
human security and human rights. In 2013, General Kelly told Congress that 
sequestration would “likely result in the cancelation of this year’s deployment of the 
USNS Comfort to the region.”62 And goodwill is a competitive commodity in the 
Caribbean. Failure to deploy hospital ships to needy communities comes in “stark 
contrast to China’s recent efforts,”63 noted in Chapter One, and contributes to the 
disintegration of public health.* Local competition is also stiff. Cuba, with which the 
United States has had an inimical relationship until détente in late 2014, sends nearly 
30,000 medical professionals (mostly to Venezuela) every year; the U.S., by contrast, 
sends approximately 700 to the entire Basin.64 Thus, instead of offering the “next 
generation of global citizens direct experience with the positive impact of American 
values and ideals,”65 Southern Command’s resources for humanitarian assistance are 
shrinking. And while Broken Windows reminds us that it is important that someone cares 
for a community, the proliferation of non-state actors seen in Chapter One reminds us 
that who cares for a community is just as important. 
 None of that is to say United States authorities have not devised 
innovative programs to address the issues explored in this section, particularly in 
the Caribbean Basin. Many such programs are aimed at alleviating administrative 
constraints in creative ways. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
inaugurated the Operations Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on 
Safety and Security (OASISS, anything for an acronym) in 2005.66 The program 
enables American law enforcement to hand over those Mexican traffickers and 
smugglers who cannot be charged in the United States to Mexican officials for 
prosecution.67 In its first six years, 2,617 cases went through the OASISS 
program, though CRS was unable to unearth figures on eventual prosecution 
rates.68 The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights and Criminal Division has 
performed extensive training and provided technical assistance on human 
trafficking for foreign law enforcement.69 The U.S. has also provided assistance in 
helping Caribbean and Latin American countries establish laws for combatting 
trafficking. As we noted, human trafficking is still less risky (with respect to 
potential penalties) than narcotics trafficking in most of the world, and the issue is 
a relatively new on the world stage (the United Nations treaty on trafficking in 
persons went into force only in 2003). To help build the basic legislative 
infrastructure necessary to adequately combat issues of human trafficking and 
migration, the United States’ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, 
Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) has provided assistance to several Latin 
American countries to help draft local TIP laws.70 The Caribbean Border Security 
Initiative (CBSI), co-managed by the Department of State and USAID, spread 
over $200 million across the Caribbean to combat multiple facets of transnational 
                                                
* The PLAN has conducted several goodwill visits to the region, and the Chinese government has begun 
pursuing greater investments in the region, including a prospective $40 billion for an alternative canal in 
Nicaragua and $3 billion in infrastructure projects across the Caribbean. See, General John Kelly, “Posture 
Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern 
Command” (testimony, before the 113th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 
March 20, 2013), 11. 
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crime, including human trafficking.*71 And much as in the case of narcotics, 
international organizations have played a role in anti-TIP as well. By 2012, the 
Organization of American States had trained more than 1,000 law enforcement 
and justice system officials in the Caribbean and Central America on addressing 
human trafficking.72 A decade earlier, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) founded an internal panel to help explore ways the organization could aid 
governments in the fight against human trafficking.73 
 Still, though the region has made progress in recognizing the severity of 
human trafficking and related irregular migration flows, the Caribbean Basin 
continues to struggle considerably with these issues. Even in instances where 
governments have forged new legislation to address TIP and human smuggling, 
“some countries have modeled their national TIP laws so closely to TVPA [the 
American Trafficking Victims Protection Act] that they do not have the resources 
or the manpower to implement the complicated legislation.”74 The State 
Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report shows, country by country, the 
uniform lack of arrests and prosecutions across the Basin for TIP-related crimes. 
And of the entire Basin, only one country (Nicaragua) achieved a Tier One (most 
desirable) ranking in the 2014 report. The vast majority of Caribbean Basin states 
are ranked Tier Two or Tier Two Watch List, indicating efforts to comply with 
TIP protocols but continued shortfalls. Cuba and Venezuela have the distinction 
of being two among only twenty-three states listed in Tier Three, completely non-
compliant.75  Much of this reticence to action stems from an unwillingness or 
inability to dedicate scarce resources to a set of issues perceived to be less 
damaging than more pressing concerns. As we explored in the previous sections, 
both political will and limited resources are tied up in the issues of local crime 
and narcotics trafficking. Yet, as we have seen in Chapter Three, the 
multidimensional nature of security in the Caribbean cannot be so easily 
segmented. 
 There is valid criticism against the American response to TIP as well. The 
United States ‘names and shames’ countries in the Trafficking in Persons Report 
with poor records on human trafficking, and has the legislative authority to 
impose sanctions on those governments who fail to make adequate improvements. 
Some contend, however, that sanctions endanger countries undergoing political 
instability, or that critical allies may find themselves immune to sanction and 
criticism (no Latin American countries besides Cuba and Venezuela have been 
subject to sanctions for over a decade).76 In response, others suggest that the 
demotion of the Dominican Republic to Tier Three status in 2010 motivated that 
government to take more serious action.77 And while TIP cases lag in Latin 
America compared to global averages, the region at large reports an increase in 
trainings and workshops convened on the subject.78 Finally, there is also some 
criticism with regard to the bilateral exchanges in place to help repatriate 
trafficking victims to countries like Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
                                                
* Launched in 2009, CBSI is the “first major security aid program to the region since President Reagan’s 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in 1983.” See, United States Coast Guard, Western Hemisphere Strategy 
(Washington, DC: USCG, September 2014), 22. 
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and Nicaragua.79 In states with such a high gang presence, victims may be at 
continued risk of re-victimization.80 
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